1 2026:CGHC:21883 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 1821 of 2026 Someshwar Hospital Gariyaband Balak High School Road, Gariyaband Through Its Proprietor Shri Komal Chand Sinha Age 47 Years S/o- Shri Gosai Ram Sinha Address Balak High School Road Gariyaband District-Gariyaband (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Health And Family Welfare, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Nawa Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Director, Directorate Of Health Services, Indravati Bhawan, Nawa Raipur District-Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Collector-Cum Supervisory Authority, Gariyaband District- Gariyaband (C.G.) 4 - Chief Medical And Heath Officer, Gariyaband District-Gariyaband (C.G) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Jitendra Nath Nande, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate General YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.05.15 18:44:26 +0530 2 Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 11.05.2026 1. By filing the present writ petition, the petitioner calls in question the legality and validity of the License Suspension Order dated 06.03.2026 issued by the Collector-cum-Supervisory Authority, District Gariyaband under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh State Upcharyagriha Tatha Rogopchar Sambandhi Sthapanaye Anugyapan Adhiniyam, 2010 (for short, ‘Adhiniyam, 2010’), whereby the licence of the petitioner hospital has been suspended with immediate effect on the ground that the reply submitted by the petitioner to the notice dated 19.02.2026 was found unsatisfactory. The petitioner has also challenged the Show Cause Notice dated 06.03.2026 on the ground that the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010 has not been followed, inasmuch as neither a 30 days’ notice was granted nor any specific allegation, inquiry report or adequate opportunity of hearing was supplied before passing the impugned suspension order, rendering the action arbitrary, non-speaking and violative of principles of natural justice. The petitioner has prayed for following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ quashing the impugned License Cancellation order dated 06/03/2026 issued by the 3 Collector-cum supervisory authority, Gariyaband District Gariyaband and Show Cause Notice dated 06/03/2026 issued by the Respondent No. 03 for being non-est in the eyes of law. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ directing the respondent authorities to not to restrain the working of the Petitioner Hospital in any direct or indirect manner in the interest of Justice. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit and proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that one patient was admitted in the petitioner hospital with complaint of severe breathing problem, whereupon he was immediately examined and advised E.C.G., X-ray and other necessary pathological tests. The petitioner hospital promptly administered prophylactic treatment and, considering the critical condition of the patient, advised immediate admission and continuous medical observation. The treating doctor also apprised the family members about the seriousness of the patient’s condition and specifically advised them not to shift the patient from the hospital until he became medically stable. 4 3. However, despite such medical advice, the family members of the patient voluntarily submitted LAMA (Leave Against Medical Advice) on 08.02.2026 and decided to remove the patient from the hospital. Initially, the family members attempted to shift the patient on a two-wheeler, but upon intervention and advice of the hospital administration, they requested for an ambulance facility. Since the regular driver of the ambulance was unavailable at that time and considering the emergency condition of the patient, one of the family members, claiming himself to be a trained driver having experience in hospital transportation, requested permission to drive the ambulance. 4. Under compelling circumstances and in the interest of the patient, the petitioner hospital permitted the family members to use the ambulance only for shifting the patient to District Hospital, Gariyaband, situated nearby. However, instead of returning the ambulance after reaching the District Hospital, the family members allegedly proceeded towards Abhanpur-Raipur Road without informing the petitioner hospital, during which the oxygen supply in the ambulance got exhausted near Village Panduka and the patient unfortunately succumbed. Thereafter, the family members allegedly created disturbance and levelled false allegations against the petitioner hospital with an intention to exert pressure and malign its reputation. Subsequently, on the basis of a complaint made by the wife of the deceased, the respondent authorities issued notice dated 19.02.2026 seeking explanation 5 from the petitioner hospital, which was duly replied by the petitioner on 21.02.2026 along with all supporting documents. 5. However, without supplying any inquiry report, without specifying any precise negligence or violation, and without complying with the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010, the respondent authority issued the impugned License Suspension Order dated 06.03.2026 and simultaneous Show Cause Notice on the very same date, suspending the licence of the petitioner hospital in an arbitrary, mechanical and non-speaking manner. Hence, the present petition. 6. Mr. Jitendra Nath Nande, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned License Suspension Order dated 06.03.2026 as well as the consequential Show Cause Notice issued by the respondent authority are ex facie arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010. It is contended that the statute specifically mandates issuance of a clear 30 days’ notice before suspension or cancellation of licence, containing the precise reasons and grounds on which such action is proposed. However, in the present case, though an earlier notice dated 19.02.2026 was issued calling for explanation within three days, the petitioner duly submitted a detailed reply along with relevant documents on 21.02.2026 explaining the factual circumstances and medical treatment administered to the patient. Despite the same, without 6 waiting for the statutory period of 30 days and without conducting any fair adjudicatory exercise, the respondent authority proceeded to suspend the licence of the petitioner hospital with immediate effect. According to learned counsel, such action is in direct violation of the statutory safeguards engrafted under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010 and therefore the impugned action deserves to be quashed solely on the ground of procedural illegality. 7. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned show cause notice and suspension order are wholly vague, non-speaking and bereft of any specific allegation constituting negligence or breach of medical protocol on the part of the petitioner hospital. It is argued that neither the precise deviation from standard operating procedures nor any concrete deficiency in treatment has been disclosed by the respondent authority. The impugned order merely records that the reply submitted by the petitioner was “not satisfactory” without assigning any reasons as to why the explanation furnished by the petitioner was unacceptable. It is submitted that such a cryptic and mechanical order affecting the very functioning and livelihood of a licensed medical establishment cannot sustain in the eyes of law, particularly when civil consequences of serious magnitude ensue from the impugned action. Learned counsel would contend that the statutory requirement of passing a reasoned and speaking order has been completely ignored by the authority concerned, thereby 7 rendering the decision-making process arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the entire action initiated against the petitioner hospital is founded upon an undisclosed inquiry report and materials which were never supplied to the petitioner at any stage of the proceedings. It is argued that no opportunity of effective hearing was ever afforded to the petitioner to rebut the allegations or the findings allegedly recorded in such inquiry. The non-supply of the inquiry report and denial of adequate opportunity to controvert the adverse materials has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and vitiates the entire quasi-judicial proceedings. In support of such contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deepak Ananda Patil v. The State of Maharashtra and Others, (2023) 11 SCC 130, to contend that non-supply of inquiry report and denial of fair opportunity amounts to gross violation of principles of natural justice and renders the consequential action unsustainable in law. 9. Learned counsel also submits that the factual allegations levelled against the petitioner hospital are themselves misconceived and contrary to the record. It is contended that immediately upon admission, the patient was provided requisite prophylactic treatment and all necessary diagnostic procedures were advised considering the seriousness of his condition. The treating doctor 8 specifically advised the family members not to shift the patient and to continue hospitalization under close medical supervision. However, despite repeated medical advice, the family members voluntarily executed LAMA and insisted upon shifting the patient to another hospital. It is further submitted that owing to the pressure exerted by the family members and considering the emergency condition of the patient, the petitioner hospital permitted use of the ambulance only for transportation to District Hospital, Gariyaband situated nearby, as one of the family members claimed himself to be a trained driver. Thereafter, without the knowledge or consent of the petitioner hospital, the family members allegedly diverted the ambulance towards another route, during which the unfortunate incident occurred. Thus, according to learned counsel, the petitioner hospital cannot be held responsible for acts committed entirely beyond its control after the patient was taken away against medical advice by the attendants themselves. 10. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the impugned action has resulted in immediate closure and suspension of the petitioner hospital, thereby seriously affecting not only the rights of the petitioner institution but also causing grave prejudice to patients dependent upon the medical services provided by the establishment. It is contended that suspension of licence without adherence to due process and without recording cogent reasons amounts to colourable exercise of power and abuse of statutory 9 authority. Learned counsel therefore prays that the impugned License Suspension Order dated 06.03.2026 and Show Cause Notice dated 06.03.2026 be quashed and the respondents be directed to proceed strictly in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010 after affording full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, vehemently opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, premature and not maintainable in law in view of the efficacious statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioner under Section 10 of the Adhiniyam, 2010. He submits that the Adhiniyam, 2010 itself provides a complete mechanism of appeal against any order of suspension or cancellation of licence before the State Government and therefore, without exhausting the said statutory remedy, the petitioner has directly invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned State counsel submits that it is a settled principle of law that when a statutory remedy is available, the writ petition ought not to be entertained unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated, which are conspicuously absent in the present case. According to him, the petitioner has deliberately bypassed the statutory forum only to avoid adjudication on merits before the competent appellate authority 10 and therefore the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability alone. 12. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submits that the action taken by the respondent authorities is fully justified, bona fide and strictly in accordance with the provisions contained under the Adhiniyam, 2010. It is contended that the matter pertains to a serious incident involving death of a patient allegedly due to negligence of the petitioner hospital and exhaustion of oxygen supply during transportation in the ambulance vehicle. Immediately upon receiving information through electronic and print media regarding the unfortunate incident, the competent authority took cognizance considering the gravity of the allegations and constituted a four-member inquiry committee on 09.02.2026 under the directions of the Chief Medical and Health Officer, District Gariyaband. The inquiry committee recorded statements of the family members of the deceased, the Director of the petitioner hospital as well as the treating doctor and thereafter submitted a detailed inquiry report along with medical documents on 18.02.2026. Learned State counsel submits that the inquiry report disclosed several glaring discrepancies and serious lapses in treatment and record maintenance on the part of the petitioner hospital which prima facie established gross medical negligence warranting immediate preventive action in public interest. 11 13. Elaborating further, learned State counsel submits that the inquiry committee found contradictions in the diagnosis and treatment records maintained by the petitioner hospital. He submits that while the OPD slip dated 07.02.2026 mentioned the diagnosis as “Status Asthmaticus”, the internal hospital register dated 08.02.2026 reflected an altogether different diagnosis namely “MI Old/DM Type-II/RD/Hypotension”. It is submitted that despite the patient allegedly suffering from multiple critical ailments including cardiac complications, diabetes and asthma, no proper treatment protocol commensurate with such condition was administered. Further, no vital notes, admission notes or detailed clinical observations were maintained by the treating doctor, which according to learned counsel constitutes a serious breach of medical norms and statutory obligations. He would submit that even essential diagnostic procedures such as ECG, X-ray and blood investigations were delayed despite the critical condition of the patient. According to the State, the records themselves reveal that adequate oxygen support and timely referral to a higher medical institution were not ensured by the petitioner hospital, thereby endangering the life of the patient. 14. Learned State counsel also submits that the respondent authorities were justified in taking immediate interim action under Section 9(2) of the Adhiniyam, 2010 considering the seriousness of the allegations and the need to protect public health and safety. It is argued that the suspension order dated 06.03.2026 was 12 merely an interim preventive measure passed upon consideration of the petitioner’s reply dated 21.02.2026, which was found unsatisfactory. Thereafter, in compliance with Section 9(3) of the Adhiniyam, 2010, a detailed 30 days’ notice was also issued to the petitioner on 06.03.2026 proposing cancellation of licence and granting opportunity to submit explanation. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner indeed submitted its reply on 06.04.2026 after expiry of the prescribed period and therefore it cannot now contend that opportunity of hearing was not granted. According to him, the proceedings under Section 9(3) are still pending consideration and therefore the present writ petition challenging the show cause notice itself is premature and not liable to be entertained at this stage. 15. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submits that apart from the present incident, several other irregularities and deficiencies were also noticed against the petitioner hospital during inquiry. It is contended that despite suspension of Ayushman Bharat facility by the competent authority earlier, the petitioner hospital continued to represent on its OPD slips that treatment was available under Ayushman scheme, thereby misleading innocent patients. It is also submitted that the hospital falsely claimed availability of facilities such as ICU, X-ray and Sonography though such facilities were allegedly not available in reality. Learned counsel submits that Gariyaband being a tribal dominated district with limited healthcare infrastructure, the respondent authorities 13 were duty bound to take prompt and stringent action against any institution found indulging in negligent and misleading medical practices affecting public health and safety. He therefore submits that the impugned action has been taken strictly in discharge of statutory obligations and in larger public interest without any mala fide intention whatsoever. 16. Lastly, learned State counsel submits that a further district-level inquiry committee comprising five members under the chairmanship of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) was also constituted on 30.04.2026 for detailed investigation and the said committee has also reportedly found serious negligence on the part of the petitioner hospital management. It is therefore submitted that the petitioner has failed to make out any case warranting interference under the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. Learned counsel accordingly prays for dismissal of the writ petition being devoid of merits, premature and not maintainable in law. 17. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents available on record with utmost circumspection. 18. Before proceeding to examine the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce Sections 9 and 10 of the Chhattisgarh State Upacharyagriha 14 Tatha Rogopchar Sambandhi Sthapanaye Anugyapan Adhiniyam, 2010, which read as under :- “Section 9 – Cancellation or Suspension of licence. If at any time, it is found by the supervisory authority that :- (1) A licensed nursing home or clinical establishment has contravened or not complied with any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder or any condition specified at the time of licensing; or (2) A licensed nursing home or clinical establishment has been convicted of an offence punishable under this Act, he may after giving the nursing home or a clinical establishment, a reasonable opportunity of being heard, cancel or suspend the licence. (3) Notice to be given before cancellation of licence.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the supervisory authority shall give a 30 days’ notice to the nursing home or a clinical establishment whose licence is sought to be cancelled or suspended. The notice shall contain the reason and ground on the basis of which the licence is sought to be cancelled or suspended. If the noticee so requests, a personal hearing may also be granted to hear the defence of the noticee. If after following the above mentioned procedure and hearing the case of the noticee, the supervisory authority decides to cancel or 15 suspend the licence, he shall pass a speaking order to this effect which shall contain the reasons for such cancellation or suspension of licence.” “Section 10 – Appeal. Any person aggrieved by an order of the supervisory authority refusing, cancelling or suspending the licence may, within a period of 30 days after the date of such order, file an appeal to the State Government. (a) The State Government shall hear the appeal through an authority duly empowered by it in this regard. (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no appeal shall lie in any Court against the order of the State Government in this behalf.” 19. Bare perusal of the aforesaid statutory provisions would reveal that the legislature, while conferring power upon the supervisory authority to suspend or cancel the licence of a nursing home or clinical establishment, has simultaneously incorporated elaborate procedural safeguards to ensure fairness, transparency and adherence to principles of natural justice before any adverse action having civil consequences is taken against such establishment. The scheme of Section 9 unmistakably demonstrates that the power of suspension or cancellation is not intended to be exercised mechanically or arbitrarily, but only after strict compliance of the mandatory procedural requirements engrafted therein. 16 20. A conjoint reading of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 makes it abundantly clear that before suspending or cancelling the licence of a clinical establishment, the supervisory authority is obligated to: firstly, furnish to the establishment concerned the specific reasons and grounds forming basis of the proposed action; secondly, grant a reasonable opportunity of hearing; thirdly, issue a notice of 30 days before taking such action; and lastly, pass a speaking and reasoned order after due consideration of the reply and defence put forth by the noticee. The use of the expression “shall” in Section 9(3) leaves no manner of doubt that the requirement of granting a 30 days’ notice and passing a reasoned order is mandatory in nature and not merely directory. Such statutory safeguards have been consciously incorporated by the legislature considering the serious civil and financial consequences flowing from suspension or cancellation of licence of a medical establishment, which not only affects the institution itself but also impacts medical professionals, employees and patients dependent upon such healthcare services. 21. In Deepak Ananda Patil (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the similar issue, has held as under :- “17. It is a well-established principle of administrative law that an adjudicatory body cannot base its decision on any material unless the person against whom it is sought to be 17 utilized has been apprised of it and given an opportunity to respond to it. Surveying the precedents extensively, MP Jain & SN Jain's treatise on Principles of Administrative Law, MP Jain & SN Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (LexisNexis, 8 ed.) at 490-91, notes that: "If the adjudicatory body is going to rely on any material, evidence or document for its decision against a party, then the same must be brought to his notice and he be given an opportunity to rebut it or comment thereon. It is regarded as a fundamental principle of natural justice that no material ought to be relied on against a party without giving him an opportunity to respond to the same. The right of being heard may be of little value if the individual is kept in the dark as to the evidence against him and is not given an opportunity to deal with it. The right to know the material on which the authority is going to base its decision is an element of the right to defend oneself. If without disclosing any evidence to the party, the authority takes it into its consideration, and decides the matter against the party, then the decision is vitiated for it amounts to denial of a real and effective opportunity to the party to meet the case against him. The principle can be several judicial pronouncements where non-disclosure of materials to the affected party has been held fatal to the validity of the hearing proceedings. 18 (emphasis supplied) 18. In T. Takano v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2022) 8 SCC 162, a two judge bench of this court, of which one of us was part (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.), discussed the line of cases of this Court on the duty to disclose investigative material. The Court analyzed the ratio in Natwar Singh v. Director of Enforcement, (2010) 13 SCC 255, Krishna Chandra Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1589, Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 81, Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588, Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunaka, (1993) 4 SCC 727, State Bank of Patiala v. SK Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik, (2002) 3 SCC 443, Kothari Filaments v. Commr. Of Customs, (2009) 2 SCC 192, and noted that: "39. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) A quasi-judicial authority has a duty to disclose the material that has been relied upon at the stage of adjudication; and (ii) An ipse dixit of the authority that it has not relied on certain material would not exempt it of its liability to disclose such material if it is relevant to and has a nexus to the action that is taken by the authority. In all reasonable probability, such material 19 would have influenced the decision reached by the authority. Thus, the actual test is whether the material that is required to be disclosed is relevant for purpose of adjudication. If it is, then the principles of natural justice require its due disclosure." (emphasis supplied) In the present case, it is undisputed that the Committee's Report submitted to the Regional Joint Director (Sugar) contained findings with regard to the eligibility of individual members. It was both relied upon and relevant for the purpose of adjudication. It is also undisputed that the Report was not supplied to the individual members or to the cooperative society. 19. On the issue of the impact of such non- disclosure, in T. Takano, summarizing the ratio of the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar (supra), we noted that: "A Constitution Bench of this Court in Karunakar (supra) held that the non- disclosure of the relevant information is not in itself sufficient to warrant the setting aside of the order of punishment. It was held that in order to set aside the order of punishment, the aggrieved person must be able prove that prejudice has been caused to him due to non-disclosure. To prove prejudice, he must prove that had the 20 material been disclosed to him the outcome or the punishment would have been different. The test for the extent of disclosure and the corresponding remedy for non-disclosure is dependent on the objective that the disclosure seeks to achieve. Therefore, the impact of non- disclosure on the reliability of the verdict must also be determined vis-à-vis, the overall fairness of the proceeding. While determining the reliability of the verdict and punishment, the court must also look into the possible uses of the undisclosed information for purposes ancillary to the outcome, but that which might have impacted the verdict." The Committee's Report dealing directly with the findings on the eligibility of the individuals would have been relevant for any of the individuals to dispute the factual aspects on the basis of which their eligibility was called into question. Furthermore, in the absence of any other specific allegation or grounds of ineligibility being made available to the individuals, it is certain that the non-disclosure of the Report prejudiced them.” 22. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of aforementioned ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the record would demonstrate that initially a notice dated 19.02.2026 was issued to the petitioner calling upon it to furnish explanation within three days. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner admittedly submitted a 21 detailed reply dated 21.02.2026 along with supporting documents explaining the circumstances under which the patient was treated and subsequently shifted by his family members after execution of LAMA. However, immediately thereafter, the respondent authority proceeded to issue the impugned suspension order dated 06.03.2026 suspending the licence of the petitioner hospital with immediate effect on the ground that the reply submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory. Simultaneously, another notice purportedly under Section 9(3) of the Adhiniyam, 2010 also came to be issued on the very same date. 23. This Court finds substantial force in the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that the procedure adopted by the respondent authority appears to be inconsistent with the statutory mandate contained under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010. Once the statute itself contemplates issuance of a 30 days’ notice containing reasons and grounds before suspension or cancellation of licence, the authority could not have resorted to immediate suspension of licence first and thereafter initiate proceedings under Section 9(3) simultaneously on the same date. The statutory scheme envisages that the notice contemplated under Section 9(3) must precede the final decision of suspension or cancellation and not vice versa. The legislative intent behind incorporation of such provision is to ensure that the affected establishment receives adequate opportunity to effectively defend 22 itself before any drastic action is taken affecting its right to carry on lawful occupation and medical practice. 24. Equally significant is the requirement under Section 9 that the order passed by the supervisory authority must be a speaking and reasoned order. Recording of reasons is not an empty formality but constitutes an indispensable facet of fair decision-making. Reasons are the heartbeat of every quasi-judicial order as they demonstrate application of mind, exclude arbitrariness and enable judicial review. In the case at hand, prima facie the impugned suspension order merely records that the explanation furnished by the petitioner was “unsatisfactory” without disclosing as to what specific explanation was found deficient, what material was relied upon, what exact negligence was established against the petitioner hospital and how the authority arrived at its subjective satisfaction necessitating immediate suspension of licence. Such cryptic conclusion, bereft of analytical reasoning, does not appear to satisfy the statutory requirement of a speaking order contemplated under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010. 25. Further, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the impugned action admittedly stems from an inquiry conducted by the authorities pursuant to constitution of an inquiry committee. However, from the material placed before this Court, it does not appear that a copy of the inquiry report or the materials relied upon therein were supplied to the petitioner before passing the 23 impugned suspension order. The petitioner was therefore deprived of an effective opportunity to rebut the findings allegedly recorded against it. The principles of natural justice mandate that no material adverse to a party can be relied upon behind its back without affording reasonable opportunity to controvert the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deepak Ananda Patil (supra) has categorically held that reliance upon undisclosed inquiry material without furnishing the same to the affected party vitiates the entire adjudicatory process. 26. At the same time, this Court is also not oblivious of the seriousness of the allegations levelled against the petitioner hospital concerning alleged medical negligence resulting in unfortunate loss of human life. The inquiry reports placed on record indicate that the authorities have noticed certain discrepancies in treatment records, absence of vital notes, contradictions in diagnosis and alleged inadequacies in medical management. The State authorities, being custodians of public health, are undoubtedly empowered and duty bound to take appropriate action wherever public safety and healthcare standards are found compromised. The concern expressed by the State regarding protection of innocent patients, particularly in a tribal dominated district having limited healthcare infrastructure, cannot be brushed aside lightly. 24 27. Nevertheless, even where allegations are grave and public interest is involved, statutory authorities are required to act strictly within the four corners of law and in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the statute. Fairness in administrative action is the essence of rule of law. The requirement of complying with principles of natural justice becomes more stringent where the impugned action entails serious civil consequences such as closure or suspension of a functioning medical establishment. Expediency cannot override mandatory statutory safeguards expressly provided by the legislature. 28. This Court also finds merit in the preliminary objection raised by learned State counsel regarding availability of alternative statutory remedy under Section 10 of the Adhiniyam, 2010. Ordinarily, when a statute provides an efficacious appellate remedy, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not to be invoked directly. However, it is equally well settled that existence of alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar where the impugned action is alleged to be wholly without jurisdiction, violative of principles of natural justice or passed in patent breach of mandatory statutory procedure. Since the principal grievance raised in the present petition pertains to alleged non-compliance of mandatory procedural safeguards under Section 9 and denial of fair opportunity, this Court is inclined to examine the matter within the limited contours of judicial review. 25 29. Having considered the totality of circumstances, the statutory framework governing the field and the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that while the respondent authorities were justified in initiating inquiry proceedings in view of the serious allegations concerning functioning of the petitioner hospital, the consequential action impugned herein prima facie does not appear to satisfy the procedural requirements contemplated under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010. The impugned suspension order dated 06.03.2026 appears to have been passed without adherence to the mandatory statutory safeguards relating to prior 30 days’ notice, supply of relevant inquiry material and passing of a duly reasoned speaking order after affording effective opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 30. Consequently, while reserving liberty in favour of the respondent authorities to proceed afresh strictly in accordance with law and after complying with the mandate of Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010, the impugned License Suspension Order dated 06.03.2026 deserves to be set aside. 31. In the result, the instant writ petition is allowed in part. The impugned License Suspension Order dated 06.03.2026 issued by the Collector-cum-Supervisory Authority, District Gariyaband is hereby quashed and set aside. However, the respondent authorities shall be at liberty to proceed afresh against the 26 petitioner strictly in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 2010 after furnishing all relevant inquiry materials/documents to the petitioner and affording adequate opportunity of hearing. 32. It is further observed that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations levelled against the petitioner hospital and all issues are left open to be considered independently by the competent authority in accordance with law. 33. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh 27 Head-Note The power of suspension or cancellation of licence under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh State Upacharyagriha Tatha Rogopchar Sambandhi Sthapanaye Anugyapan Adhiniyam, 2010 is to be exercised strictly in compliance with the mandatory procedural safeguards of prior 30 days’ notice, supply of relevant inquiry material, adequate opportunity of hearing and passing of a reasoned speaking order. Non-compliance with principles of natural justice and reliance upon undisclosed inquiry material vitiates the impugned action notwithstanding availability of alternative statutory remedy.