ARB. A. (COMM.) 46/2026 p. 1 $~19 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010243032026 + ARB. A. (COMM.) 46/2026, I.A. 15042/2026 & I.A. 15043/2026 BIHAR STATE ROAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Ranjit Prakash, Mr. Shantanu Chaturvedi and Mr. Abhishek Bhushan Singh, Advocates. versus GR INFRAPROJECTS LIMITED .....Respondent Through: Mr. H.S Chandhoke, Mr. Shalin Arthwan and Mr. Anshuman Arha, Advocates. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA ORDER (ORAL) % 21.09.2026 I.A. 15041/2026 (Delay) 1. This application has been filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay of 17 days in filing the appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, challenging the order dated 02.02.2026. 2. The Appellant in its application stated that the delay of only 17 days. However, the Respondent contends that, since the appeal is governed by the 60 days limitation period under Section 13(1A) of the 1 “Act” hereinafter ARB. A. (COMM.) 46/2026 p. 2 Commercial Courts Act, 2015, limitation expired on 03.04.2026 and the appeal filed on 19.05.2026, which was actually delayed by 46 days. 3. The Appellant subsequently accepts in rejoinder that the reference to 17 days was an inadvertent computational error and seeks condonation of the actual delay of 46 days. 4. The reasons for the delay given by the appellant are that the delay was neither intentional nor attributable to negligence. 5. It is submitted that being a Government undertaking, the decision to challenge the Section 17 order allegedly required internal administrative examination, and approval of competent authorities. 6. It is further argued that the computational error concerning the number of days is merely procedural, and causes no prejudice to the Respondent, and should not prevent adjudication of the Section 37 appeal on merits. 7. The Respondent, on the other hand, seeks rejection of the condonation application principally on three grounds. 8. First, it submits that the Appellant proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the limitation period was three months, whereas the applicable period was 60 days, resulting in the actual delay being 46 days rather than 17 days. ARB. A. (COMM.) 46/2026 p. 3 9. Secondly, it contends that no “sufficient cause” has been established because the Appellant has merely relied upon vague assertions regarding administrative processing without disclosing specific dates concerning movement of the file and obtaining legal opinion. 10. Thirdly, the Respondent argues that governmental or bureaucratic procedure does not justify delay and relies upon Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd.2, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary3 and Postmaster General v. Living Media Ltd.4, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal5 and Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India6 to contend that delay in a Section 37 commercial appeal is to be condoned only exceptionally and that the cause preventing filing within the original limitation period itself must be specifically demonstrated. 11. The Respondent additionally asserts that, upon expiry of limitation, it legitimately proceeded on the basis that the Section 17 order had attained finality. 12. Having heard both the sides, the issue in the present application is confined to whether the Appellant has established “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the admitted delay of 46 days in preferring its appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the 2 (2021) 6 SCC 460 3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 4 (2012) 3 SCC 563 5 (2020) 10 SCC 654 6 (2023) 10 SCC 531 ARB. A. (COMM.) 46/2026 p. 4 Arbitration and Conciliation Act against the order dated 02.02.2026 passed under Section 17. 13. The law pertaining to this issue is settled, while such delay is not statutorily incapable of condonation, the governing standard under Borse Brothers (supra), requires the Appellant to demonstrate bona fide and diligent conduct throughout the entire period commencing from the impugned order until filing of the appeal. 14. The Appellant in the present matter relies upon governmental approval requirements, and an intervening administrative transition in the State of Bihar. 15. However, the Respondent’s argument is that no contemporaneous chronology or supporting material has been furnished to demonstrate how these circumstances actually prevented filing within the prescribed 60 days period. 16. This court agrees with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the mere fact that the Appellant is a Government undertaking, or that the proposed appeal is asserted to be meritorious, does not by itself constitute sufficient cause. 17. On the existing material, the application is vulnerable for want of a specific and substantiated explanation, though the relatively short delay of 46 days remains capable of being condoned. 18. In the absence of these particulars, this Court cannot determine ARB. A. (COMM.) 46/2026 p. 5 whether circumstance actually prevented filing within the original 60- day period, or whether the delay resulted merely from ordinary bureaucratic movement of the file. 19. Therefore, although a 46 days delay is otherwise capable of being condoned, the Appellant cannot rely on the alleged administrative difficulty in the air. The explanation must not turn into a general assertion rather the “sufficient cause” under Section 5 ought to be explained. 20. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, the application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed. ARB. A. (COMM.) 46/2026 21. As a consequence of the above, the petition is also dismissed as time barred. Pending application(s) also stand disposed of. OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J SEPTEMBER 21, 2026/pa