1 2026:CGHC:22914-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 360 of 2016 Judgment Reserved on 06.04.2026 Judgment Delivered on 14.05.2026 • Bhishma Vaishnav, S/o Gajanand Vaishnav, aged about 22 Years, R/o Indira Para, Bhilai 3, Police Station Bhilai 3, Civil and Revenue District Durg, Chhattisgarh. ---Appellant versus • State of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police Station Bhilai-3, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent ACQA No. 227 of 2017 • Kanhaidas Vaishnav, S/o Balak Das Vaishnav, aged about 72 Years, R/o Near Aghor Ashram, Dabhra, Police Station Dabhara District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh. ---Appellant Versus 1. Bhishma Vaishnava, S/o Gajanand Vaishnav, aged about 22 Years, 2. Srimati Kamini Vaishnav, W/o Gajanand Vaishnav, aged about 48 Years, 3. Ku. Nitu Vaishnav, D/o Gjanand Vaishnav, aged about 19 Years, VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 All are R/o Indira Para Bhilai - 3, Police Station Bhilai - 3, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. 4. The State of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police Station Bhilai - 3, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondents (Cause-title Taken From Caste Information System) For Accused Persons : Mr. Umakant Singh Chandel, Advocate For Complainant : None For State Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, P.L. Division Bench : Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, JJ. CAV Judgment Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. Since both the criminal appeals arise out of the same impugned judgment dated 17.02.2016 passed by the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, C.G. in Sessions Trial No. 138/2014, they are heard analogously and disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Criminal Appeal No. 360 of 2016 has been preferred by the accused, Bhishma Vaishnav, under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, calling in question the legality and correctness of his conviction under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with a fine of Rs. 500/-, in 3 default of payment of fine, he shall undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months. 3. Acquittal Appeal No. 227 of 2017 has been preferred by the complainant, Kanhai Das Vaishnav, calling in question the legality and correctness of the acquittal of accused persons, namely, Kamini Vaishnav and Nitu Vaishnav, of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A/34 and 304-B/34 of IPC, and further assailing the finding of the trial Court whereby the accused, Bhishma Vaishnav, has been acquitted of the offence under Section 498-A IPC. 4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that deceased, Nandini @ Neha Vaishnav, was the grand-daughter of the complainant (PW-1), Kanhai Das Vaishnav. Prior to the marriage, accused, Bhishma Vaishnav, had developed intimacy with the deceased and established physical relations with her on the promise of marriage. Subsequently, when he refused to marry her, the deceased lodged a report under Section 376 of IPC at Police Station Bhilai-3. Thereafter, in order to avoid the consequences of the said criminal case, accused Bhishma Vaishnav agreed to marry the deceased, and their marriage was solemnized on 19.01.2014 at Arya Samaj, Durg. After the marriage, the deceased started residing with the accused- Bhishma Vaishnav at Indira Para, Bhilai-3. 4 According to the prosecution, after the marriage, the accused- Bhishma Vaishnav (husband), Kamini Vaishnav (mother-in-law) and Nitu Vaishnav (sister-in-law) started subjecting the deceased to cruelty and harassment in connection with demand of dowry. It is alleged that they demanded an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- and a motorcycle, out of which, Rs.50,000/- was paid by the complainant’s side. On 30.05.2014, within about four months of the marriage, the deceased committed suicide by hanging in her matrimonial house. Merg intimation (Ex.P-6) was recorded on the information furnished by Suraj Kumar Soni (PW-11). Thereafter, on the report of PW-1, Kanhai Das Vaishnav, FIR (Ex.P-3) under Section 304-B IPC was registered against the accused persons. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-2 and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination. PW-2 Dr. N.C. Rai conducted the postmortem examination and submitted his report (Ex.P-4), opining that the cause of death of the deceased was asphyxia due to hanging. During the course of investigation, the spot map was prepared, statements of witnesses were recorded, and the accused persons were taken into custody vide Ex.P-10. 5. After completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed 5 and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, where charges under Sections 498-A/34 and 304-B/34 IPC were framed against the accused persons. The accused persons denied the charges and claimed trial. 6. To bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses and proved 11 documents. In their defence, the accused persons examined three witnesses (DW-1 to DW-3) and exhibited four documents (Exs. D-1 to D-4). 7. The learned trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and on due appreciation of the evidence available on record, by the impugned judgment, acquitted the accused persons, namely, Kamini Vaishnav and Nitu Vaishnav, of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A/34 and 304-B/34 of IPC, and further acquitted accused, Bhishma Vaishnav, of the offence under Section 498-A IPC, however, the said accused- Bhishma Vaishnav has been convicted and sentenced as indicated in paragraph 2 of this judgment. Being aggrieved, accused- Bhishma Vaishnav and complainant- Kanhai Das Vaishnav have preferred separate appeals. 8. Criminal Appeal No. 360 of 2016 : Learned counsel appearing for the accused/appellant submits that the 6 impugned judgment is contrary to law and the facts available on record. It is contended that the essential ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC have not been established, inasmuch as there is no reliable evidence to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death. It is further submitted that the prosecution witnesses have made material improvements and their statements suffer from contradictions, particularly on the aspect of alleged demand of Rs.1,50,000/- and a motorcycle. It is argued that the complainant (PW-1) himself has admitted in his cross- examination that no such demand was made in the meeting between the parties, which demolishes the prosecution case. It is further contended that the death was admittedly suicidal in nature and there is no direct or proximate evidence connecting the alleged acts of the accused/appellant with the death so as to attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC. Therefore, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of the charge levelled against him. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record. It is 7 contended that the deceased died within seven years of marriage and there is sufficient material to establish that she was subjected to cruelty by the accused/appellant. It is further submitted that the statutory presumption has been rightly invoked by the trial Court and the conviction recorded does not call for any interference by this Court. 10. Acquittal Appeal No. 227 of 2017: Learned counsel for the complainant submits that the learned trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused persons of the aforesaid charges. It is contended that the prosecution witnesses have clearly deposed that all the accused persons used to harass the deceased and demand dowry, however, their evidence has not been properly appreciated by the trial Court. It is further submitted that the findings of acquittal are contrary to the evidence available on record and, therefore, deserve to be set aside, and the accused persons be convicted accordingly. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/accused persons submits that the trial Court has rightly acquitted them upon due appreciation of the evidence on record. It is contended that only omnibus and general allegations have been made against the co-accused without any specific overt act, and no material has been brought on record to establish their involvement in any demand of dowry or cruelty soon 8 before the death of the deceased. It is further submitted that, in the absence of cogent and reliable evidence, the acquittal of accused persons is justified and does not warrant interference, particularly when no perversity or illegality is demonstrated. Accordingly, it is prayed that the acquittal appeal be dismissed. 12.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 13.The first question for consideration is whether the death of the deceased, Nandini @ Neha Vaishnav, was suicidal in nature. 14.The learned trial Court has recorded an affirmative finding in this regard and held that the death of the deceased, Nandini @ Neha Vaishnav, was suicidal in nature, relying upon the expert medical opinion of Dr. N.C. Rai (PW-2), who has proved the postmortem report (Ex. P-4), wherein the cause of death has been opined to be asphyxia due to hanging and the nature of death has been stated to be suicidal. Considering the testimony of Dr. N.C. Rai (PW-2) as well as the postmortem report (Ex. P-4), this Court is of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held the death of the deceased to be suicidal in nature, and the said finding recorded by the trial Court is hereby affirmed. 9 15.The next question that arises for consideration is whether the learned trial Court was justified in recording the conviction and imposing sentence upon the accused, Bhishma Vaishnav, for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC and acquitting him of the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC. 16.To attract the provisions of Section 304-B of IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is present with the idea of proximity test. 17.As regards the principles concerning the above-referred provisions, this Court wishes to refer to the decisions reported in V.K. Mishra and another (supra), K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao 1 & Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N. 2 . 18.In V.K. Mishra and another (supra), it has been held as under:- “7. In order to attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:- 1. The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. 1(2003) 1 SCC 217 2(2004) 9 SCC 157 10 2. Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. 3. She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. 4. Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. 5. Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. On proof of the essential ingredients mentioned above, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. ‘Soon before’ is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstance of each case and no strait- jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period ‘soon before the occurrence’. There must be in existence a proximate live link between the facts of cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry and the death. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned it would be of no consequence.” 11 19.In K. Prema S. Rao (supra) it has been held as under:- “16. … To attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that 'soon before her death' she was subjected to cruelty and harassment 'in connection with the demand for dowry'.” …… 20. To attract the provisions of Section 498-A of the IPC against the accused persons/appellants, the following ingredients, as contained therein, are required to be examined, which read as under:- “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "cruelty means"— (a) anywilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 12 21.In the light of the above enunciation of law, the facts of the present case are required to be examined minutely. 22.PW-1 Kanhai Das Vaishnav, grand-father of the deceased, stated that accused- Bhishma had physical relations with the deceased on promise of marriage and thereafter refused to marry, due to which, a report under Section 376 IPC was lodged. Thereafter, the marriage was solemnized in Arya Samaj. He further stated that after marriage, the accused persons started harassing the deceased and demanding money. According to him, they used to say that had accused- Bhishma married elsewhere, they would have received Rs.7-8 lakhs. He stated that Rs.50,000/- was paid and thereafter demand of Rs.1,50,000/- and a motorcycle was made. He also deposed that on the date of incident, the deceased informed about harassment through phone. However, in cross-examination, this witness admitted material omissions and contradictions. He admitted that the specific demand of Rs.1,50,000/- and motorcycle was not mentioned in his police statement. He further admitted that in the meeting between the parties, accused- Bhishma had not specifically demanded Rs.1,50,000/- and motorcycle. Thus, his testimony regarding dowry demand suffers from material improvements. 23. PW-9 Ankita Vaishnav, sister of the deceased, supported the 13 prosecution version regarding harassment and demand of money. However, she admitted that she was not present at the time when Rs.50,000/- was allegedly given and that no demand was made at the time of marriage. Her evidence regarding payment of money is hearsay in nature. 24.PW-10 Rajmani Vaishnav, brother of the deceased, also stated about demand of Rs.1,50,000/- and motorcycle, but he did not specify which accused made the demand or to whom the amount was paid. His testimony is omnibus in nature. 25.PW-14 Damyanti Vaishnav, grand-mother of the deceased, also made allegations of harassment and demand of money, but her statement also contains material contradictions and omissions. 26.Thus, the evidence of these related witnesses regarding dowry demand is inconsistent and unreliable. 27.PW-11 Suraj Kumar Soni, an independent witness and neighbour, stated that accused- Bhishma and the deceased were residing together separately and that there used to be frequent quarrels between them. He further stated that on the date of incident, he saw the deceased hanging and accused- Bhishma was trying to lift her body and he himself cut the piece of sari. 28.PW-3 Kavindra Singh Markam also stated that the deceased 14 and accused- Bhishma were living together separately and quarrels used to occur between them. 29.These independent witnesses do not support the prosecution case regarding involvement of accused- Kamini and Nitu. On the contrary, their evidence shows that accused- Bhishma and the deceased were residing separately. 30.The prosecution also relied upon alleged telephonic conversation made by the deceased shortly before her death. However, the call detail records do not support the prosecution case, as no outgoing call at the relevant time was found. 31.Upon a careful and comprehensive appreciation of the entire evidence available on record, it stands established that the death of the deceased was suicidal in nature and occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage. However, in order to bring home the charge under Section 304-B of IPC, the prosecution is under a legal obligation to prove that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives in connection with demand of dowry. In the present case, the evidence led by the prosecution on the aspect of demand of dowry is neither consistent nor reliable and suffers from material contradictions, omissions and improvements. The testimonies 15 of the prosecution witnesses do not inspire confidence to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand soon before her death. In absence of proof of this essential ingredient, the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 cannot be invoked. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge under Section 304-B IPC beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, the conviction of accused- Bhishma under the said Section cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 32.However, the evidence on record clearly establishes that the marriage between the deceased and accused- Bhishma was not a voluntary marriage but was solemnized under pressure arising out of the criminal case lodged under Section 376 IPC. The independent witnesses have stated that there were frequent quarrels between the deceased and accused- Bhishma. It has also come in evidence that accused- Bhishma was not maintaining cordial relations with the deceased and there was continuous discord between them. The evidence further establishes that due to the conduct of accused- Bhishma, the deceased was subjected to mental cruelty after marriage. The deceased committed suicide within a short 16 period of marriage. In such circumstances, presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 becomes applicable. The conduct of accused- Bhishma in entering into a compelled marriage and thereafter subjecting the deceased to continuous mental cruelty and discord clearly amounts to abetment of suicide. 33.Further, from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the relatives of the deceased, coupled with the surrounding circumstances proved on record, it is also established that accused- Bhishma subjected the deceased to cruelty after marriage. Although the allegations relating to demand of dowry have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt so as to attract the offence under Section 304-B IPC, but the evidence on record is sufficient to establish that the conduct of the accused falls within the ambit of “cruelty” as defined under Section 498-A IPC. The consistent version of the witnesses regarding quarrels, ill-treatment and strained matrimonial relations clearly indicates that the deceased was subjected to mental cruelty by accused- Bhishma. 34.Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid analysis, accused- Bhishma Vaishnav is acquitted of the charge under Section 304-B IPC. However, he is held guilty and convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC and is sentenced 17 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. He is also convicted for the offence under Section 498-A IPC and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. 35.Accused- Bhishma Vaishnav is reported to be on bail. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court forthwith to serve out the remaining part of his sentence, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law. 36.In the result, Criminal Appeal No. 360 of 2016 is partly allowed. 37.Insofar as Acquittal Appeal No. 227 of 2017, preferred by the complainant challenging the acquittal of the accused persons, is concerned, at the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in an appeal against an order of acquittal. In this regard, it would be profitable to refer to the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand (2025) 5 SCC 433 , wherein, in paragraphs 11 and 12, it has been held that the High Court may interfere with an order of acquittal if the same suffers from perversity, is based on misreading of material evidence, 18 or where material evidence has been ignored, and it has been observed as under:- “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our 19 considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, 20 there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acq15 ptuittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the 21 evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 22 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 38. Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffer from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 39.In the present case, upon a careful scrutiny of the entire evidence available on record, it is apparent that the prosecution has failed to establish the involvement of accused- Kamini Vaishnav and Nitu Vaishnav beyond reasonable doubt. The independent witnesses have categorically stated that the deceased and accused- Bhishma Vaishnav were residing separately from the other accused persons, and there is no cogent, reliable or convincing evidence on record to demonstrate that accused- Kamini 23 Vaishnav and Nitu Vaishnav subjected the deceased to any form of cruelty or harassment, much less in connection with any alleged demand of dowry or soon before her death. The allegations against them are general and omnibus in nature, lacking specific instances or particulars, and are not supported by consistent and trustworthy evidence. 40.The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011 in case of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka (2024) 3 SCC 544, has held in para 36 as under:- "36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- "(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; 24 (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court." 41. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Constable 907 Surendra Singh and Mallappa (supra), the view taken by the learned trial Court appears to be a plausible and possible view based on the evidence available on record. In the absence of any patent illegality, perversity, misreading, or misappreciation of evidence, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court in respect of accused- Kamini Vaishnav and Nitu Vaishnav. 42.In the result, both Criminal Appeal No. 360 of 2016 and Acquittal Appeal No. 227 of 2017 are partly allowed. 43.Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original 25 record be transmitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith for information and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha 26 HEAD-NOTE Conviction under Section 304-B IPC is unsustainable for want of proof of dowry demand or cruelty soon before death, and presumption under Section 113-B is not attracted. However, continuous mental cruelty is established, attracting presumption under Section 113-A Evidence Act. The conduct of the accused thus amounts to abetment of suicide.