THE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH ITS SECRETARY ROAD CONSTRUCTION DEPTT v. SADANAND PRASAD
LPA/681/2023 · 2026-07-13
Rajesh Shankar
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 20235 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 20235 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No.681 of 2023 With I.A. No.10020 of 2025 -----
1. The State of Jharkhand through its Secretary, Road Construction Department having office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
2. The Special Secretary, Road Construction Department having office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Town and District- Ranchi.
3. The Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department having office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Town and District- Ranchi.
4. The Chief Engineer-cum-Enquiry Officer, National Highway Wing, Jharkhand having office at Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Town & District-Ranchi.
.......... Appellants. -Versus- Sadanand Prasad, son of Late Gandhari Singh, resident at Thakur Toli, Prince Chowk, P.O. & P.S. Simdega, District-Simdega.
.......... Respondent. -----
CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Appellants : Mr. Rakesh Kr. Shahi, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-III For the Respondent:
-----
Order No.07
Date: 13.07.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the applicants/appellants.
2. I.A. No.10020 of 2025 seeks condonation of delay of 245 days in instituting the accompanying appeal.
3. The accompanying appeal challenges the learned single Judge’s
order dated 3rd March, 2023 in W.P.(S) No.2433 of 2012.
4. In paragraph no.5, it is vaguely stated that after the impugned
order was made, the same was forwarded to the legal cell to prepare grounds for L.P.A.
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5. Paragraph no.6 states that the file was then forwarded to the learned A.G. for seeking legal advice. 6. Paragraph no.7 states that the Advocate General gave legal advice on 18th August, 2023. 7. Paragraph no. 8 states that the Secretary approved the grounds for appeal, and paragraph no. 9 states that, after drafting the appeal, the L.P.A. was filed 245 days later. 8. There are the usual averments that the appellants have a good prima facie case, that there is every chance of success, and that the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate but due to various reasons beyond the appellants' control. 9. Based on the above vague and casual averments, no sufficient cause can be said to have been made out. 10. Despite several decisions of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by citing such casual reasons regarding movement of files from one table to the other or from one officer to another, as a matter of routine, condonation of delay is applied for. 11. Since the learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the appellants have a good case on merits, we did examine the grounds for the appeal. Even there, we are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. 12. Based upon the above pleadings, we are afraid that no case whatsoever has been made out for condoning the inordinate delay of 245 days. 13. The respondent (original petitioner) has already retired from service on 31st July, 2018. This is a case of utter lethargy,
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tardiness and indolence to borrow the phrases used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191. 14. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the distinction between ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ proffered as a ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier decisions, in which it is held that there is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant, even if the litigant is the Government, which is itself shackled by bureaucratic indifference.
Since the law of limitation binds everybody, beyond a particular point no indulgence can be shown, even to the Government, which functions through an impersonal machinery. 15. In Postmaster General and Others Vs. In Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court has held that in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, the delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and
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available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 16. In Union of India &Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D), through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost its right to have the matter considered on the merits because of its own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed that the delay was not deliberate, and in such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. The Court also held that, when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter.
The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if the cause assigned by the litigant is sufficient and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring the merits of the matter into aid for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. 2026:JHHC:20675-DB 5
17. The Hon’ble Court held that the ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 18. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said, but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, which also equally suffers the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 19.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State
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authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at a later stage. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never- exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 21. Applying the above principles to the gross facts of the present case, we dismiss this I.A. seeking condonation of the 245-day delay in instituting the accompanying appeal. 2026:JHHC:20675-DB 7
22. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and other I.As, if any, will not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.) 13th July, 2026 Sanjay/Rohit Uploaded on 15.07.2026