2026:HHC:34122 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 574 of 2007 Reserved on: 05.08.2026 Date of Decision: 13.08.2026 Kesar Singh & another ...Appellants Versus Surat Ram & Ors. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellants : Mr Tara Singh Chauhan, Senior Advocate with Mr Surya Chauhan, Advocate. For respondents No.1(a) to 1(b), 2 and 4(a) to 4(e) : Mr Sanjeev Kuthiala, Senior Advocate with Ms Tamana Sharma, Advocate. Respondent No.3 proceeded ex parte vide order dated 04.09.2019 Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 10.10.2007 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Kullu (learned Appellate 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:34122 Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 09.04.2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lahaul Spiti at Kullu (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court seeking a declaration that they are the owners in possession of the suit land mentioned in para 1 of the plaint based on the Will dated 10.08.2000 executed by Dharam Chand in their favour, and mutation No. 9196 dated 29.01.2003 was null and void. A consequential relief for permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering with the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs was also sought. It was asserted that Dharam Chand was the owner in possession of the suit land. He was the real uncle of the plaintiffs. He was unmarried and had love and affection for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs got him treated at various places. They also rendered services to the deceased. He executed a Will on 10.08.2000 in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had applied for the succession certificate regarding the debt and security of the 3 2026:HHC:34122 deceased, which was issued in their favour. The defendants claimed to be the legal heirs of the deceased and interfered with the plaintiffs’ ownership and possession. They were requested not to do so, but in vain. Hence, the suit was filed for seeking the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking preliminary objection regarding lack of locus standi, the plaintiffs being estopped from filing the suit by their act and conduct, the suit not being properly valued for court fees and jurisdiction and the plaintiffs being out of possession. It was admitted that Dharam Chand was the owner of the suit land. It was asserted that Dharam Chand was unmarried and he was serving as a pharmacist in a veterinary hospital, Kullu. He also remained posted at various places. It was specifically denied that the plaintiffs had ever served Dharam Chand or got him treated at various places. It was asserted that Dharam Chand used to reside with Surat Ram, father of defendant no. 1. The defendant no. 1 looked after the estate of the deceased during his lifetime. He had not executed any Will in the plaintiffs’ favour. The defendants filed an appeal against the grant of the 4 2026:HHC:34122 succession certificate. The suit was filed without any cause of action. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 5. The following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court on 13.04.2004: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration as prayed for? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession of the suit land as claimed? OP 4. Whether late Shri Dharam Chand alias Dine Ram executed a valid Will dated 10.08.2000 in favour of the plaintiffs as alleged. If so, its effect? OPP 5. Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action? OPP 6. Whether the plaintiffs have the locus standi to sue? OPP 7. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 8. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 9. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit by their act and conduct? OPD 10. Relief. 6. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence and plaintiffs examined plaintiff No. 1 Kesar Singh (PW1), Bhole Ram (PW2), Om Prakash (PW3), Ram Lal Bodh (PW4), Anju 5 2026:HHC:34122 (PW5), Baldev Krishan (PW6), Budh Ram (PW7), Malkiat Singh (PW8) and Prabha Devi (PW9). The defendants examined Jai Singh (DW1), Sandeep Chaddha (DW2), Amar Chand (DW3), defendant no. 1 Surat Ram (DW4) and Dr S. Ahamed (DW5). 7. The learned Trial Court held that the Will was shrouded in suspicious circumstances. The testimonies of the plaintiffs’ witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The handwriting expert compared the admitted signatures with the signatures appearing on the Will and found them to be different. The attesting witnesses belonged to a different village. The Will was not registered, and the reason for non-registration was not satisfactory. The document writer had not produced the register of the Will. All these circumstances made it difficult to place reliance on the execution of the Will. Hence, the learned Appellate Court answered all the issues in the negative and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Kullu (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate 6 2026:HHC:34122 Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the execution of the Will was shrouded in suspicion. The testimonies of the plaintiffs’ witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. No reason was assigned as to why no witness from the village was called. A marginal witness to the Will had actively participated in the execution of the Will, and no reason for the same was provided. The handwriting expert examined the disputed signatures and the admitted signatures and found them to be different. Learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the execution of the Will in these circumstances. There was no infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court; hence the appeal was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court, the plaintiff have filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 24.12.2007: 1. Whether the judgment is the result of misreading of the statement of PW1 Kesar Singh, PW6 Baldev Krishan, PW7 Budh Ram, PW9 Prabha Devi proved on record and compromise Ex. CA, Ex.PW6/A Will and Ext.DW5/A report of expert? 7 2026:HHC:34122 10. I have heard Mr Tara Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr Surya Chauhan, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms Tamana Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents No.1(a) and 1(b), 2 and 4 (a) to 4(e). 11. Mr Tara Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The plaintiffs had filed a petition for obtaining a succession certificate, which was allowed and a succession certificate was issued in the plaintiffs’ favour. Therefore, it was not permissible for the Civil Court to hold that the execution of the Will was not proved. The contradictions cannot be used to discard the execution of the Will. There is no requirement that the witnesses should have been joined from the village of the testator. The testimony of the handwriting expert is an opinion and cannot override the positive statements of the witnesses. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission: - 8 2026:HHC:34122 (i) Pentakota Satyanarayana and others versus Pentakota Seetharatnam and others (2005) 8 SCC 67; (ii) ShivaKumar and others vs. Sharanabasappa and others (2021) 11 SCC 277; (iii) Meena Pradhan and others vs. Kamla Pradhan and another (2023) 9 SCC 734; (iv) R. Saraswathy versus P. Bhavathy Ammal and another AIR 1989 Kerala 228; (v) Mahesh Kumar (Dead) by LRs vs. Vinod Kumar and others (2012) 4 SCC 387; (vi) Shashi Kumar Banerjee and others vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee (since deceased) through his LRs AIR 1964 SC 529 and; (vii) M.B. Ramesh (Dead) by LRs. Versus K.M. Veeraje Urs (dead) by LRs and others (2013) 7 SCC 490; 12. Mr Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Senior Advocate for respondents No.1(a) and 1(b), 2 and 4 (a) to 4(e) submitted that the conscience of the Court has to be satisfied regarding the due execution and attestation of the Will. The evidence brought on record showed that the execution of the Will was shrouded in suspicion. It was for the propounders to remove the suspicion, but they failed to do so. The statement of the handwriting expert made the execution of the Will highly doubtful. The execution and validity of the Will are pure questions of fact and do not require any interference from this Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submission: - 9 2026:HHC:34122 (i) Smt. Jaswant Kaur vs. Smt. Amrit Kaur and others (1997) 1 SCC 369; (ii) Gurdial Kaur and others vs. Kartar Kakur and others (1998) 4 SCC 384; (iii) Kavita Kanwar vs. Pamela Mehta and others (2021) 11 SCC 209; (iv) ShivaKumar and others vs. Sharanabasappa and others (2021) 11 SCC 277 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial Question of Law: 14. The law relating to the execution of the Will was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan, (2023) 9 SCC 734: (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 449 as under: “10.1. The court has to consider two aspects: firstly, that the will is executed by the testator, and secondly, that it was the last will executed by him. 10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind has to be applied. 10.3. A will is required to fulfil all the formalities required under Section 63 of the Succession Act, that is to say: (a) The testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction, and the said signature or affixation shall show that it was intended to give effect to the writing as a will; 10 2026:HHC:34122 (b) It is mandatory to get it attested by two or more witnesses, though no particular form of attestation is necessary; (c) Each of the attesting witnesses must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of such signatures; (d) Each of the attesting witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator; however, the presence of all witnesses at the same time is not required. 10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the will, at least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive, subject to the process of court, and capable of giving evidence, shall be examined; 10.5. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signatures but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator; 10.6. If one attesting witness can prove the execution of the will, the examination of other attesting witnesses can be dispensed with; 10.7. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will fails to prove its due execution, then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence; 10.8. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it can be accepted as the testator's last will. In such cases, the initial onus on the propounder becomes heavier; 10.9. The test of judicial conscience has evolved for dealing with those cases where the execution of the 11 2026:HHC:34122 will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It requires consideration of factors such as awareness of the testator as to the content as well as the consequences, nature and effect of the dispositions in the will; a sound, certain and disposing state of mind and memory of the testator at the time of execution; the testator executed the will while acting on his own free will; 10.10. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue influence, etc., has to prove the same. However, even in the absence of such allegations, if there are circumstances giving rise to doubt, then it becomes the duty of the propounder to dispel such suspicious circumstances by giving a cogent and convincing explanation. 10.11. Suspicious circumstances must be “real, germane and valid” and not merely “the fantasy of the doubting mind [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277] ]”. Whether a particular feature would qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Any circumstance raising suspicion, legitimate in nature, would qualify as a suspicious circumstance, for example, a shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit, etc.” 15. This position was reiterated in Gurdial Singh v. Jagir Kaur, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1466, wherein it was observed: “11. A Will has to be proved like any other document subject to the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that is, examination of at least one of the attesting witnesses. However, unlike other documents, when a Will is propounded, its maker is no 12 2026:HHC:34122 longer in the land of the living. This casts a solemn duty on the Court to ascertain whether the Will propounded had been duly proved. Onus lies on the propounder not only to prove due execution but to dispel from the mind of the court all suspicious circumstances which cast doubt on the free disposing mind of the testator. Only when the propounder dispels the suspicious circumstances and satisfies the conscience of the court that the testator had duly executed the Will out of his free volition without coercion or undue influence, would the Will be accepted as genuine. In Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur (1977) 1 SCC 369, this Court, referring to H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma 1959 Supp (1) SCR 426, enumerated the principles relating to proof of Will:— “10. ***** **** **** **** “1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator, and therefore, the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the 13 2026:HHC:34122 question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, 14 2026:HHC:34122 the court is called upon to decide a solemn question, and by reason of suspicious circumstances, the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc., in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter.” The Court further held:— “9. In cases where the execution of a will is shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. What, generally, is an adversary proceeding becomes in such cases a matter of the court's conscience, and then the true question which arises for consideration is whether the evidence led by the propounder of the will is such as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. It is impossible to reach such satisfaction unless the party which sets up the will offers a cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the will.” 12. Similarly, in Ram Piari v. Bhagwant (1993) 3 SCC 364, this Court held that when suspicious circumstances exist, Courts should not be swayed by the due execution of the Will alone: “3. ……………….Unfortunately, none of the courts paid any attention to these, probably because they were swayed by due execution even when this Court in Venkatachaliah case [AIR 1959 SC 443: 1959 Supp (1) SCR 15 2026:HHC:34122 426] had held that, proof of signature raises a presumption about knowledge, but the existence of suspicious circumstances rebuts it…………….” 13. There is no cavil when suspicious circumstances exist and have not been repelled to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court would not be justified in holding that the Will is genuine since the signatures have been duly proved and the Will is registered. (AIR 1962 SC 567). 16. A similar view was taken in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra), Jaswant Kaur (supra), Kavita Kanwar (supra), Shivakumar (supra), M.B. Ramesh (supra), Pentakota Satyanarayana (supra), Gurdial Kaur (supra) and Mahesh Kumar (supra). 17. Baldev Krishan (PW6) stated that he was called by Prabha Sharma with a direction to visit Pecha because a Will was to be written. He was asked by Prabha Devi to bring the witness, and he decided to join Budh Ram as a witness. He went in a taxi to the village and thereafter on foot. The plaintiffs were not present in the house. 18. The testimony of this witness is highly suspicious. He did not know the testator. He did not know the village. He decided to visit the village with a witness to the house of the plaintiffs and reached the house without guidance from any person. He did not find the plaintiffs in the house who would 16 2026:HHC:34122 have been present in the house because they were residing in the house. All these circumstances would make it difficult to rely upon his testimony. 19. Prabha Devi (PW9) stated that she was called by Dharam Chand in the morning, who told her that he would execute a Will in case he felt well. He disclosed that he was suffering from a stomachache. She called Baldev, and Budh Ram was called by Baldev. 20. She is a resident of Village Trambli. It is not explained why the deceased would have chosen to call Prabha Devi and asked her to visit the house to execute the Will. Learned Courts below had rightly pointed out that when the Will was being executed in the village, the villagers would have been the normal witnesses who could have been easily associated. However, the witnesses from different villages were associated, and the circumstances joining them are also not clear. Budh Ram was not even known to the testator, and the testator had not called Budh Ram to his house. He was taken by the scribe of the Will. All these circumstances were justifiably held to be suspicious by the learned Trial Court. 17 2026:HHC:34122 21. Learned Trial Court noticed the following contradictions in the statements of the witnesses to the Will. (i) Baldev Krishan (PW6) stated that he had prepared the rough draft of the Will and thereafter, he explained its contents to the testator and copied the original Will (Ext.PW6/A) from the rough draft. Budh Ram (PW7) stated that the Will (Ext.PW6/A) was directly written as per the testator’s dictation. Prabha Devi (PW9) stated that a rough draft was prepared. A copy was prepared, and the original Will was prepared finally. (ii) Baldev Krishan (PW6) stated that he had introduced Budh Ram (PW7) to the testator. Budh Ram (PW7) stated that he knew the testator for about 10 years. (iii) Baldev Krishan (PW6) stated that he was asked by Prabha Devi to bring an attesting witness. Prabha Devi (PW9), on the other hand, stated that Baldev Krishan had brought Budh Ram on his own. (iv) Baldev Krishan (PW6) stated that he had obtained the signatures of the testator in his register. However, Budh Ram (PW7) stated that Baldev Krishan (PW6) had obtained the signatures of the testator on the blank register by saying that its contents would be written subsequently. 22. Learned Trial Court held that these contradictions may not be material if viewed individually, but their cumulative effect may make the execution of a Will highly suspect. This conclusion was affirmed by the learned Appellate Court. The conclusions of the learned Courts below cannot be faulted. The manner of writing the Will: whether a rough draft was prepared, a copy was prepared, or the Will was directly written, would 18 2026:HHC:34122 make the testimonies of the witnesses regarding the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will suspect. The contradictions in the manner of writing of the Will would also make it suspicious that all the persons were present at the time of the execution of the Will and the Will was written in their presence as deposed by them. Similarly, the association of Budh Ram (PW7) and whether he knew the testator or not would also assume significance because Prabha Devi and Budh Ram did not belong to the village of the testator. If Budh Ram was not known to the testator, there was no reason with the testator to associate Budh Ram as a witness to the Will. Thus, the acquaintance with Budh Ram was also significant. The signatures on the register of the document writer were also significant because the Will was stated to have been executed at Village Pecha in the house of plaintiff Kesar Singh. It is undisputed that the deceased was serving as a pharmacist and he was not residing at Pecha. Therefore, it was essential to establish the presence of the testator and the witnesses in the village. 23. The signatures on the Will were compared with the admitted signatures of the testator by Dr S. Ahamed (DW5), 19 2026:HHC:34122 Government Examiner of question document. He found that the person who wrote the admitted signatures had not written the disputed signatures because there were variations in the letters which were fundamental in nature and beyond the range of natural variations. It was submitted that the testimony of the handwriting expert cannot be used to discard the testimonies of the witnesses. This submission will not help the plaintiffs. The testimony of the handwriting expert confirms the suspicion arising out of the testimonies of the witnesses, and the testimony of the expert is not in direct conflict with the testimonies of the witnesses. Hence, the judgment in R. Saraswathy (supra) and Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra) do not apply to the present case. 24. Learned Courts below have concurrently held that the execution of the Will is shrouded in suspicion. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the defendants that this is a pure finding of fact which cannot be interfered with while deciding a second appeal unless there is some perversity in the findings. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kashibai v. Parwatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 213, that it is not permissible for the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact related to the 20 2026:HHC:34122 execution of the Will while hearing the second appeal. It was observed: - “11..…. In the present case, the trial court, after a scrutiny and analysis of the evidence of Defendant 1, Smt. Parvati Bai, VirBhadra, Sheikh Nabi, Shivraj and Gyanoba Patil, who are witnesses to the Will, recorded the finding that none of them deposed that Lachiram had signed the said Will before them and they had attested it. None of them, except Sheikh Nabi, even deposed as to when the talk about the execution of the Will was held. The witness, Sheikh Nabi, however, deposed that the talk about the Will also took place at the time of the talk about the adoption. But this witness too did not depose that deceased Lachiram had signed the alleged Will in his presence. In the absence of such evidence, it is difficult to accept that the execution of the alleged Will was proved in accordance with law as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be true, as observed by the High Court, that the law does not emphasise that the witness must use the language of the section to prove the requisite merits thereof, but it is also not permissible to assume something which is required by law to be specifically proved. The High Court simply assumed that Lachiram must have put his signature on the Will Deed in the presence of the attesting witness, Sheikh Nabi, simply because the Deed of Adoption is admitted by the witness to have been executed on the same day. The High Court committed a serious error in making the observations that broad parameters of Nabi's evidence would show that Lachiram executed the Will in his presence, that he signed the Will being part of the execution of the testament, and this evidence in its correct background would go to show that what was required under Section 21 2026:HHC:34122 63 has been carried out in the execution of the Will. With respect to the High Court, we may say that these findings of the High Court are clearly based on assumptions and surmises and are totally against the weight of the evidence on record. The trial court, on a close and thorough analysis of the entire evidence came to a proper conclusion that the Will has not been proved in accordance with the law which finding has been further affirmed by the lower appellate court after an independent reappraisal of the entire evidence with which we find ourselves in agreement as there was hardly any scope or a valid reason for the High Court to interfere with. 12. Further, it may not be out of place to mention that sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (4) of Section 100 provides that when the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. But surprisingly enough, the High Court seems to have ignored these provisions and proposed to reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of fact without even formulating any question of law. It has been the consistent view of this Court that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. There is a catena of decisions in support of this view. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the present case discussed above, we are satisfied that there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the well-reasoned findings of the two courts below. Consequently, this appeal must succeed.” (Emphasis supplied). 22 2026:HHC:34122 25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rur Singh v. Bachan Kaur, (2009) 11 SCC 1 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 387: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 320 that it is not permissible for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution of the Will. It was observed: “13. The High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, exercises a limited jurisdiction. It may interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court and/or the first appellate court only in the event that a substantial question of law arises for its consideration. 14. The High Court framed only one substantial question of law, viz., whether the will had been duly proved and/or was otherwise genuine. It is essentially a question of fact. The learned trial Judge as also the first appellate court in opining that the will was genuine and free from suspicious circumstances inter alia took into consideration the existing materials on record viz. the parties ordinarily do not want their agricultural land to go out from the family and in that view of the matter if Kehar Singh had bequeathed his agricultural land only in favour of his sons and excluding the daughters from inheritance, no exception thereto could be taken. 18. The High Court essentially entered into the arena of the appreciation of evidence. It interfered with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below.” 26. It was held in Lisamma Antony v. Karthiyayani, (2015) 11 SCC 782, that it is impermissible to interfere with the findings of fact under section 100 of CPC. It was held: 23 2026:HHC:34122 “11. It is a settled principle of law that a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot be admitted unless there is a substantial question of law involved in it. As to what is a substantial question of law, in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722], this Court has explained the position of law as under : (SCC pp. 725-26, para 6) “6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in a second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in the second appeal.” 12. In view of the above position of law, the question formulated by the High Court in the present case, as quoted above, cannot be termed a question of law, much less a substantial question of law. The above question formulated is nothing but a question of fact. Merely for the reason that, on appreciation of evidence, another view could have been taken, it cannot be said that the 24 2026:HHC:34122 High Court can assume jurisdiction by terming such a question as a substantial question of law. 13. Having gone through the impugned order challenged before us and after considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the High Court has simply re-appreciated the evidence on record and allowed the second appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court.” 27. A similar view was taken in Narendra v. Ajabrao, (2018) 11 SCC 564, wherein it was observed: - “17. In the first place, we find that the High Court decided the second appeal like a first appeal under Section 96 of the Code inasmuch as the High Court went on appreciating the entire oral evidence and reversed the findings of fact of the first appellate court on the question of adverse possession. Such an approach of the High Court, in our opinion, was not permissible in law. 18. Second, the High Court failed to see that a plea of adverse possession is essentially a plea based on facts, and once the two courts, on appreciating the evidence, recorded that a finding may be of reversal, such a finding is binding on the second appellate court. It is more so as it did not involve any question of law, much less a substantial question of law. This aspect of law was also overlooked by the High Court. 19. Third, the High Court has the jurisdiction, in appropriate cases, to interfere in the finding of fact provided such finding is found to be wholly perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such a finding or when it is found to be against any settled principle of law, pleadings or evidence. Such errors constitute a question of law and empower the High Court to interfere. However, we do not find any such error here.” 25 2026:HHC:34122 28. It was held in Ramathal v. Maruthathal, (2018) 18 SCC 303, that it is not appropriate for the High Court to disturb the concurrent findings of fact by re-appreciating the evidence and its jurisdiction is confined to the substantial question of law. It was observed: - “13. It was not appropriate for the High Court to embark upon the task of reappreciation of evidence in the second appeal and disturb the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below, which are the fact-finding courts. At this juncture, for better appreciation, we deem it appropriate to extract Sections 100 and 103 CPC, which read as follows: “100. Second appeal. —(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated, and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such a question: 26 2026:HHC:34122 *** 103. Power of the High Court to determine issues of fact.— In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal— (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by the court of first instance, and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100.” 14. A clear reading of Sections 100 and 103 CPC envisages that a burden is placed upon the appellant to state in the memorandum of grounds of appeal the substantial question of law that is involved in the appeal; then the High Court, being satisfied that such a substantial question of law arises for its consideration, has to formulate the questions of law and decide the appeal. Hence, a prerequisite for entertaining a second appeal is a substantial question of law involved in the case, which has to be adjudicated by the High Court. It is the intention of the legislature to limit the scope of a second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved, and the amendment made to Section 100 makes the legislative intent clearer that it never wanted the High Court to be a fact-finding court. However, it is not an absolute rule that the High Court cannot interfere in a second appeal on a question of fact. Section 103 CPC enables the High Court to consider the evidence when the same has been wrongly determined by the courts below, on which a substantial question of law arises, as referred to in Section 100. When the appreciation of evidence suffers from material irregularities, and when there is perversity in the findings of the court which are not based on any material, the court is empowered to interfere on a question of fact as well. Unless and until there is absolute 27 2026:HHC:34122 perversity, it would not be appropriate for the High Courts to interfere in a question of fact just because two views are possible; in such circumstances, the High Courts should refrain from exercising the jurisdiction on a question of fact. 15. When the intention of the legislature is so clear, the courts have no power to enlarge the scope of Section 100 for whatsoever reasons. Justice has to be administered in accordance with the law. In the case at hand, the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing the well- considered judgment of the courts below, which is based on cogent reasoning. The learned Judge ought not to have entered the arena of reappreciation of the evidence; hence the whole exercise done by the High Court is beyond the scope and jurisdiction conferred under Section 100 CPC.” 29. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurnam Singh v. Lehna Singh, (2019) 7 SCC 641 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 709: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 374, that where the First Appellate Court had appreciated the facts regarding the execution of the Will, it is not permissible for the High Court to interfere with this finding of facts in second appeal under Section 100 of CPC. It was observed: “15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in reappreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under Section 100 CPC. The High Court has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the first appellate court, which were on reappreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the first appellate court in the exercise of powers under Section 96 CPC. 28 2026:HHC:34122 Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the first appellate court. The first appellate court dealt with, in detail, the so-called suspicious circumstances which weighed with the learned trial court, and thereafter it came to the conclusion that the will, which as such was a registered will, was genuine and did not suffer from any suspicious circumstances. The findings recorded by the first appellate court are reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order [Lehna Singh v. Gurnam Singh, Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 2191 of 1985, order dated 27-11-2007 (P&H)], the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC.” 30. Similarly, it was held in C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy, (2020) 4 SCC 659, that the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact unless there is perversity or the same is de hors the evidence led before the Courts: “25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343], it was held that findings of fact could not have been interfered with in the second appeal. This Court held as under : (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 12-15) “12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to deciding a substantial question of law if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure 29 2026:HHC:34122 findings of fact reached by the courts below, without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu [Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu, (1996) 3 SCC 392], this Court held : (SCC p. 393) ‘It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of the trial court and the first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did.’ 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty [Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty, (1996) 6 SCC 166], this Court held : (SCC p. 166) ‘Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. … Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material.’ 15. And again in Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. [Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N., (1997) 4 SCC 484], this Court held : (SCC p. 486, para 5) 5. … The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording a reverse finding of fact, which is impermissible.” 30 2026:HHC:34122 31. A similar view was taken in Chandrabhan (deceased) through LRs & ors. Vs. Sarswati & ors. (2022) 20 SCC 199 wherein it was observed at page 210: “32.3. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well- recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 32. It was submitted that the succession certificate was issued in favour of the plaintiffs and the findings in the succession certificate would constitute res judicata in the present proceedings. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joginder Pal vs. Indian Red Cross Society (2000) 8 SCC 143 that the proceedings for grant of succession certificate are summary in nature. No rights are finally decided and the proceedings in the Civil Court. It was observed: 15….These sections make it clear that the proceedings for grant of succession certificate are summary in nature and that no rights are finally decided in such proceedings. 31 2026:HHC:34122 Section 387 puts the matter beyond any doubt. It categorically provides that no decision under Part X upon any question of right between the parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or any other proceeding between the same parties. Thus, Section 387 permits the filing of a suit or other proceeding even though a succession certificate might have been granted. 16. This question was also considered by this Court in the case of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma v. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi Pillai [(2000) 6 SCC 301: JT (2000) 5 SC 336]. In this case, after having considered the provisions of Sections 370 to 390 of the Indian Succession Act as well as Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been held that any adjudication under Part X does not bar the same question being raised between the same parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding. It has been held that Section 387 of the Indian Succession Act takes a decision given under Part X of the Indian Succession Act outside the purview of Explanation VIII to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has been held that Section 387 gives a protective umbrella to ward off the rays of res judicata to the same issue being raised in a subsequent suit or proceeding. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in this case. 17. In view of the specific provisions of law, it is not possible to accept Mr Sohal's submissions. Section 387 specifically permits the 2nd (sic 1st) respondent to file a subsequent suit. Merely because issues were raised and/or evidence was led does not mean that the findings given thereunder are final and operate as res judicata. Even in summary proceedings, issues can be raised and/or evidence can be led. The proceedings remain summary even though the court may, in its discretion, permit leading of evidence and raising of issues. So in a subsequent suit the crucial issues must be decided afresh 32 2026:HHC:34122 untrammelled or uninfluenced by any finding made in the proceedings for grant of succession certificate. 33. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the findings recorded by the Court granting the succession certificate. 34. Therefore, there is no misreading of the statements of the witnesses and the documents. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Final Order: 35. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. 36. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any. 37. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 13th August, 2026 (Nikita)