TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 Page 1 of 8 $~100 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010457392026 + TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 & CRL.M.As. 29835-29836/2026 UMESH SHARMA .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Pushkar Khtana and Mr. Aman Verma, Advocates. versus AISHWARYA .....Respondent Through: None. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA O R D E R % 24.09.2026 1. The present petition under Section 447 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 20231 seeks transfer of Maintenance Case No. 181/2025, titled Aishwarya v. Umesh Sharma, from Family Court-02, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, to another competent Family Court. An earlier application seeking the same transfer was rejected by the Principal Judge, Family Court, on 23rd July, 2026. The order dated 16th January, 2026, which forms a substantial part of the factual backdrop of the present petition, is separately under challenge before this Court in CRL.M.C. 1339/2026. 2. The Petitioner’s grievance centres on the proceedings of 16th January, 2026. He submits that, at his first effective hearing, the Family Court awarded ad interim maintenance of ₹25,000 per month each to the 1 “BNSS” This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 28/09/2026 at 11:48:33 TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 Page 2 of 8 Respondent wife and the minor child without adequately considering his objections or permitting him to place his financial material on record. He further contends that the order discloses no assessment supporting the quantum or the need for immediate relief. 3. He also relies on the Respondent wife’s incomplete financial disclosure under Rajnesh v. Neha2, noting that the Courts in the parallel proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 had called for financial affidavits and supporting documents. He further points to an inaccurate recital of the period of pendency, the direction making maintenance payable from the date of filing, and the execution order dated 3rd July, 2026, which, according to him, incorrectly attributed this Court’s reduction of the child’s maintenance to his payment of school fees. Read with his objections to the recording of submissions and the pace of the proceedings, he says these circumstances cumulatively give rise to a reasonable apprehension that he may not receive fair and impartial consideration. 4. Few background facts be noted first. By order dated 16th January, 2026, the Family Court directed the Petitioner to pay ad interim maintenance of ₹25,000 per month each to the Respondent wife and the minor child, pending completion of the parties’ financial disclosures. In the proceedings challenging that order, this Court, by an interim order dated 20th February, 2026, maintained the wife’s maintenance at ₹25,000 per month and reduced the child’s maintenance to ₹15,000 per month, expressly without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. 5. The governing principles are settled. While a fair hearing is This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 28/09/2026 at 11:48:33 TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 Page 3 of 8 fundamental to the administration of justice, proceedings cannot be transferred from a competent court merely because a party is dissatisfied with an interlocutory order or the manner in which the case has progressed. As held in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Rani Jethmalani3, transfer requires more than hypersensitivity or mini grievances. The apprehension asserted must, as explained in R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala4, be reasonable, genuine and justifiable. 6. Actual bias need not be proved. The test, as stated in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh Bhullar5, is whether the apprehension is reasonable, viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable person acquainted with the relevant facts. Applying that principle, this Court held in Kinri Dhir v. Veer Singh6 that “bias is not an issue which is required to be proved as existing in fact” and that what is relevant is whether the facts give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The apprehension “can neither be founded on imagination nor can it rest merely on the fact that an adverse decision was rendered” and must be tested from the viewpoint of an ordinary person to determine whether the material would “legitimately give rise to a doubt” as to whether the Judge or adjudicator would be able to decide the matter impartially and fairly. 7. The expressions “substantial material to establish” bias and “hostile discrimination” in the order dated 23rd July, 2026 cannot be read as requiring proof of actual bias. The question is whether the circumstances, viewed objectively and cumulatively, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of 2 (2021) 2 SCC 324 3 (1979) 4 SCC 167 4 (2000) 7 SCC 129 5 (2011) 14 SCC 770 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 28/09/2026 at 11:48:33 TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 Page 4 of 8 partiality. It is on this test that the Petitioner’s case must be examined. 8. Tested on this standard, the Petitioner’s principal grievance does not justify transfer. The order dated 16th January, 2026 did not finally determine even the interim-maintenance application; it granted ad interim maintenance pending completion of pleadings and financial disclosure. The order records the income figure placed before the Court by counsel for the Petitioner and proceeds on that basis, while directing the parties to file their complete financial record. Whether that material justified the quantum fixed, and whether the order otherwise conforms to Rajnesh v. Neha, are questions concerning its legality and correctness. Those questions are already pending before this Court in CRL.M.C. 1339/2026 and cannot, without objective material indicating partiality, be converted into grounds for transfer. 9. There is another reason why this circumstance cannot sustain the transfer plea. The decision in Naveen Kumar v. Kavita7, on which the Petitioner himself places considerable reliance, recognises the distinction between interim and ad interim maintenance and accepts that ad interim relief may, in an appropriate case, be granted on the basis of admitted income or other prima facie material even before the entire material for grant of interim maintenance is not on record. Whether the Family Court exercised that discretion correctly in this case is one question; whether its order reveals predisposition in favour of the Respondent wife is another. 10. The objection to making the ad interim maintenance payable from the date of the petition stands on the same footing. Relying on Naveen Kumar 6 TR.P.(C.) 5/2022 7 2025:DHC:5114 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 28/09/2026 at 11:48:33 TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 Page 5 of 8 and Manoj Kumar v. Sangeeta8, the Petitioner contends that such relief ought ordinarily to operate from the date of the order. Whether the direction in the present case accords with those decisions is a question concerning the legality of the order dated 16th January, 2026. Even if the direction is open to correction, an error of law does not, without more, furnish an objective basis for apprehending bias merely because it carries substantial financial consequences. That issue must therefore be left to be decided in the proceedings where the order itself is under challenge; it would be inappropriate to prejudge it while exercising transfer jurisdiction. 11. Nor does the fact that other Courts dealing with maintenance claims between the same parties adopted a different procedural course, by itself, furnish an objective basis to apprehend partiality. Those proceedings arose under different statutory provisions, were before different Courts, and were at different stages. The requirements governing financial disclosure must, of course, be observed in accordance with law. A difference in the sequence or timing in which another Court chose to secure such disclosure cannot, without something more, be read as preferential treatment in the present proceedings. 12. The remaining objections concerning the order dated 16th January, 2026 stand on a different footing. The Petitioner rightly points to two inaccuracies: the case had not been pending for “about one year”; nor was it at the “stage of completion of proceedings”, since the same order directed filing of financial record. These inaccuracies may bear upon the correctness of the order, but, without more, do not support a reasonable apprehension of bias. 8 2025:DHC:5113 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 28/09/2026 at 11:48:33 TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 Page 6 of 8 13. The same conclusion applies to the omission to record every submission; a judicial order need not reproduce all that transpires at the Bar. Likewise, the brief recital that the matter could not be settled does not establish non-compliance with Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, much less predisposition against the Petitioner. 14. The Petitioner also invites comparison with orders passed by the same Presiding Officer in other maintenance matters. Such a comparison is inappropriate as the financial circumstances, admitted income, asserted needs, the material on record and the stage of proceedings may differ from case to case. The treatment of unrelated matters involving strangers to the present dispute therefore affords no reliable basis to infer differential treatment. 15. The execution order dated 3rd July, 2026 requires separate consideration. It proceeds on the premise that this Court reduced the child’s maintenance because the Petitioner was paying school fees. The order dated 20th February, 2026 records the Petitioner’s payment of approximately ₹9,000 per month towards school fees and ₹20,000 towards the wife’s maintenance, but assigns no such reason for reducing the child’s maintenance from ₹25,000 to ₹15,000 per month. That reduction was an interim arrangement, expressly without prejudice to the parties’ rights and contentions. The reason attributed in execution therefore travels beyond the terms of this Court’s order. 16. That discrepancy, however, does not justify transfer. It arose from the Family Court’s construction of an interim order during execution; it neither altered this Court’s operative directions nor affected execution at ₹25,000 per month for the wife and ₹15,000 per month for the child. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 28/09/2026 at 11:48:33 TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 Page 7 of 8 17. The execution order contains no personal remark, extraneous consideration, or indication that any pending issue stood foreclosed. An erroneous construction of an order, if established, is ordinarily correctable in accordance with law. Without objective material indicating predisposition or partiality, it cannot sustain a transfer plea. 18. Kinri Dhir illustrates the distinction. Transfer was warranted there because repeated references to “blackmail” and “extortion” went beyond the merits and cast serious aspersions on the litigant’s character, creating a reasonable apprehension that her future claims might not receive dispassionate consideration. By contrast, factual inaccuracies, an isolated intemperate expression, or complaints about procedure were not considered sufficient. The feature that crossed the threshold in Kinri Dhir is absent here. 19. The circumstances must, as the Petitioner submits, be assessed cumulatively. Viewed together, they concern the procedure adopted, the adequacy of reasons, certain factual recitals, and the construction of an interim order. Some may warrant examination or correction in the appropriate proceedings. They do not, however, disclose prejudgment, personal animus, extraneous consideration, or preferential treatment from which a reasonable apprehension of bias may objectively arise. 20. This conclusion accords with R. Balakrishna Pillai, where the Supreme Court rejected the transfer plea even upon considering the circumstances conjointly, and Afjal Ali Sha @ Abjal Shaukat Sha v. State of West Bengal9, which holds that an apprehension must be well founded and cannot rest on imagination or allegation. The material relied upon here, whether viewed individually or cumulatively, does not meet that threshold. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 28/09/2026 at 11:48:33 TR.P.(CRL.) 85/2026 Page 8 of 8 21. No ground is made out to transfer Maintenance Case No. 181/2025 or any consequential proceedings. The petition is accordingly dismissed. 22. Nothing in this order expresses any view on the legality or correctness of the ad interim maintenance order dated 16th January, 2026, including the quantum, the date from which it was made payable, or compliance with the requirements of financial disclosure. CRL.M.C. 1339/2026 shall be decided independently and remain unaffected by this order. The Family Court shall likewise decide the maintenance proceedings on their merits and the material before it, uninfluenced by any observation herein. SANJEEV NARULA, J SEPTEMBER 24, 2026 as 9 2023 INSC 257 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 28/09/2026 at 11:48:33