2026:JHHC:20892-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Acquittal Appeal (DB) No.13 of 2013 ------ (Against the Judgment and order of Acquittal dated 19.06.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Commissioner-IV, Ranchi in Sessions Trial No.292 of 2003/Sessions Trial No.299 of 2003) ------ The State of Jharkhand through the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, P.O.+P.S.+District-Ranchi .…. Appellant Versus 1. Md. Idrish, S/o Shafik, R/o Paras Toli, P.O.+P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi 2. Md. Tabrej Alam, S/o Gulam Rabani, R/o Bari Masjid, P.O. + P.S.-Hindpiri, District-Ranchi 3. Md. Junaid Quadri s/o of Farukh R/o-Gawala Toli, P.O.+P.S.- Doranda, District-Ranchi. 4. Md. Sadeek Alam S/o Noor Mohammad, R/o-Kumhar Toli, P.O.+P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi. 5. Md. Naushad S/o Md. Uttarullah, R/o- Nai Mohalla, P.O.+P.S.- Doranda, District-Ranchi. 6. Md. Shoaib Ahmad ‘Zia’ S/o Mumtaz, R/o Rasaldar Nagar, P.O.+P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi. 7. Md. Maqsud Alam S/o Md. Washir, R/o Dhobi Mohalla, P.O.+P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi. 8. Md. Baban @ Sami Ahmad S/o Habibulla, R/o Rasaldar Nagar, P.O.+P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi. …… …….. Respondents PRESENT HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ….. For the Appellant : Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Public Prosecutor For the Respondents : Mr. B.M. Tripathy, Sr. Advocate Mr. Nutan Kumari Sharma, Advocate ….. C.A.V. on 25.06.2026 Pronounced on 14/07/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The instant appeal is preferred under Section 378(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein, the Judgment of acquittal dated 19.06.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Commissioner- 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 2 IV, Ranchi in Sessions Trial No.292 of 2003/Sessions Trial No.299 of 2003, has been assailed. Prosecution case 2. This Court before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment of acquittal, deems it fit and proper to refer the prosecution story in brief. 3. The case was registered on the basis of the written report signed by Sita Ram Mehta, Assistant Sub Inspector (PW-2) which forms the basis of the FIR. The said written report is dated 28.12.2000, wherein the informant has stated that on 28.12.2000 he was on duty at Doranda Eidgah along with a Magistrate. At about 11.30. A.M, after peaceful performance of Namaaz at Idgah Maidan Doranda people came back to their house. The informant along with concerned Magistrate also returned back. While, he was returning back to the police station, he stopped at a Tea Stall near B.M.P-1 Camp and at about 12 p.m., in the noon, one person came and informed him that there was a gathering at Rajendra Chowk and traffic was being stopped by certain persons resulting into road jam. After getting this news and in order to disperse the crowd he went to Rajendra Chowk and upon reaching the place, i.e., Rajendra Chowk, he came to know that since morning i.e. at about 9.30 a.m. to 10.00 a.m., certain persons were obstructing the traffic carrying the dead body of a small girl who had died in a road accident which was occasioned by a truck of JAP (Jharkhand Armed Police). For this reason, people from the vicinity, i.e., Resaldar, Gwala Toli, Arvind Nagar, Doranda were carrying the dead body of the child and were making demand of various things 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 3 and were also obstructing traffic. It has also been stated that some of the protestors were also having rod, Hockey stick etc. The crowd was led by Farooque Gaddi, Md. Akbar, Md. Musa, Md. Samir, Md. Azam, Junna alias Munna, Md. Sabir, who were carrying dead body of the child and were making protest. 4. It has been alleged that the crowd was also shouting slogans. The informant tried to talk to the crowd and he informed the Inspector who came along with other police officials at the place of occurrence. They also tried to talk to the crowd but to that, no effect. The crowd was making demand to call the Chief Minister. In the meantime, S.D.O. Sadar, Ranchi and Dy.S.P. Hatia Sri U.C. Jha(deceased) came to the place of occurrence. 5. They also tried to talk to the crowd but the mob made demand for arrest of the driver who had committed the accident resulting into the death of the girl child. On this, Dy.S.P. and S.D.O. Sadar directed the inspector to immediately arrest the driver whereupon the Police Inspector as well as Dasrath Prasad Singh went to JAP-1 in order to arrest the said driver and seize the said vehicle. In the meantime, S.D.O and Dy.S.P tried to console the crowd but the crowd became unruly and started setting fire on vehicles and started pelting stones, out of whom, informant identified Farooque, Chotu, Firoz, Md. Ali, Rouf Gaddi, Pappu, Sams Tabrez, Rahman alias Pintu, Sajjad Ali, Md. Romi alias Farhan, Md. Soheb, Ziauddin, Noushad, Maqsud. Seeing the unruly crowd, S.D.O declared the crowd to be illegal and directed the crowd to disperse whereupon the crowd again became unruly and started pelting stones. 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 4 6. It has been alleged that in the meantime, some persons rushed to the Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha and asked him to come near JPSC office where pelting stones, firing, bombing etc. was being done. Getting this information, Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha rushed towards JPSC office and his bodyguard, Rakesh Kumar (PW-5) accompanied him. They saw that C.R.P.F personnel came on trekker. 7. It has also been stated that when the C.R.P.F people came near the JPSC office and were coming down then the unruly mob started snatching their arms and started pelting stones on them. Some of them rushed towards the trekker shouting to kill the police personnel and even set on fire the said vehicle. 8. It has been stated that one person in the crowd was also carrying AK-47 rifle. The unruly mob was ruthlessly pelting stones and some of them assaulted the Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha, whereupon U.C. Jha sustained injury and fell down and became unconscious. In the meantime, C.R.P.F personnel also opened fire. The informant further stated that seeing unruly mob, the S.D.O had declared this mob to be illegal and directed to disperse but the crowd paid no heed to this order. On account of firing made by the CRPF personnel, the crowd started rushing here and there and dispersing. Police personnel also started dispersing and the injured Dy.S.P was carried away by his bodyguard and other police personnel towards the JAP Campus. 9. The injured C.R.P.F personnel were also carried away for treatment. Three people were also injured by police firing. The crowd which was near Rajendra Chowk when they received 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 5 information about police firing, they also became unruly and started pelting stones as a result Yuvraj Hotel was damaged and set on fire the various vehicles which were stalled on account of road blockage at Rajendra Chowk. 10. Informant has named Farooque Gaddi, Musa, Md. Sabir, Md. Azam, Farooque, Chotu, Firoz, Md. Akhbar, Md. Islam, Rouf Gaddi, Pappu, Soheb, Ziauddin, Noushad, Maqsud, Shams Tabrez, Sajjad Ali, Romi @ Farhan and Junaid as a member of unlawful assembly. Informant stated that he had identified these accused persons and can again identify them on seeing them. Dy. S.P., Sri U.C. Jha was injured along with Lans Nayak Ranjit Singh, Indradeo Prasad and others. It has been alleged that the accused persons with the intention of committing murder had committed the brutal assault. 11. On the basis of the said written report the case was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 342, 435, 188, 353, 437/120B of IPC r/w section 3/5 of the Explosive Substance Act and Section 27 of the Arms Act. Subsequent to death of Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha, in course of treatment, Section 302 was also added. 12. Police subsequent to investigation submitted the charge sheet under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353, 307, 302, 337, 435, 341, 323, 342, 427, 435/120B of IPC r/w section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 3/5 of the Explosive Substance Act on 03.04.2001 against nine accused persons out of which the eight accused persons/appellants faced trial and one Musa @ Md. Muslim, who died during the pendency of the case. 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 6 13. Charges were framed against accused persons/appellants under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 341, 342, 427, 435, 302, 307, 353/120B of IPC r/w section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 3/5 of the Explosive Substance Act. 14. In this case, 13 prosecution witnesses were examined by the prosecution namely, PW.1 Dr. Ajit Kumar Choudhary, PW.2 Sita Ram Mehta (informant), PW.3 Basisth Pandit, PW.4 Sri Niwas Kumar, PW.5 Rakesh Kumar, PW.6 Surendra Kumar Singh, PW.7 Suresh Rajak, PW.8 Ajit Oraon, PW.9 Nagendra Nath Dhar Dubey, PW.10 Prasant Mitra, PW.11 Suresh Oraon, PW.12 Yatindra Prasad and PW.13 Manga Oraon. 15. Documentary evidence has also come on record. Ext. 1, 1/1, 1/2 and 1/3 is the post-mortem report of the various deceased; Ext.2 is the signature on the written report of Sita Ram Mehta, Ext.3 is the signature of witness on the seizure list; Ext.4 is the written report; Ext.5 is the endorsement on the FIR; Ext.6 is the statement of Md. Sadeek recorded by Executive Magistrate Yatindra Prasad(PW-12) and Ext.7 and 7/1 is the seizure list. 16. The learned trial Court, taking into consideration, the testimonies of the witnesses and the documentary evidence vis- à-vis the material available on record, has arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellants and accordingly, the appellants were acquitted of the charges by giving them benefit of doubt. 17. The said impugned judgment is the subject matter of the instant appeal. Submission of the learned counsel for the State-appellant 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 7 18. Mr. Pankaj Kumar, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-appellant has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned judgment of acquittal: - i The learned Trial Court while acquitting the appellants has discarded the testimony of the witnesses. ii The learned Trial Court failed to take into consideration that the deceased Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha, died on account of injuries sustained by him, but, the learned trial court doubted the manner of injury. iii The learned Trial Court had placed undue reliance on the non-identification of the named persons in the dock by the prosecution witnesses which is contrary to the observation made by the learned trial Court that after 12 years of the incident memory is likely to fall. iv It is not in dispute that the occurrence has taken place and there was an unruly mob, stone pelting was done and the crowd went hay-way and as a result of such acts, Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha was injured who succumbed to injuries resulting into his death. v The learned Trial Court should have more circumspect in considering the dying declaration recorded by the Investigation Officer under Section 161 of CrPC and should have not merely brushed it aside. 19. Learned counsel for the State-appellant therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment of acquittal is perverse and, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law, hence, fit to be set aside. 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 8 Submission of the learned senior counsel for the respondents: 20. Mr. B.M. Tripathy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, has urged the following ground in support of the case: i He has submitted that in the instant case, there is compete failure on behalf of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the respondents more so to establish it beyond reasonable doubts. ii None of the respondents has been identified by all the witnesses in the court and hence, their presence at the time and place of occurrence, is doubtful. iii Learned Senior counsel has submitted that the statement recorded by the Investigation Officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C in respect of the statement of the deceased, U.C. Jha, will not come within the purview of dying declaration. iv Learned counsel has submitted that in present case, it is admitted fact that there was crowd making protest and demand and there were stones pelting. It may also not be disputed that some unruly incidents took place culminating into death of Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha and opening fire by the C.R.P.F personnel is also admitted fact and within these admitted factual parameters, the respondents cannot be convicted, unless, it is established that the respondents had any participation in the said unlawful assembly or that they were members of the unlawful assembly. 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 9 v There is no evidence on record to show the complicity of the present respondents in the instant case. vi Learned Senior counsel has further submitted that it is very sorry state of affairs that an officer in the rank of Dy. S.P. has been done to death but the death was not a result of any injury, rather, it was a result of improper treatment by the doctors. Hence, the Police and the prosecution have cooked up a false and completely concocted story in the present matter. vii Learned senior counsel points out that in the FIR, there are names of about 19 accused persons/respondents with their parentage and even the mother's name of one accused has been mentioned but while the prosecution witnesses were examined, none of the respondents by their names were identified by any of the witnesses. viii Learned Senior counsel points out that even the person who had signed the written report forming the basis of FIR is unable to identify any of the respondents by their names. ix There was no explanation as to how the name along with parentage figured in the case and more significantly, there is no explanation as to what happened to the other accused persons whose names figured in the FIR. x Charge sheet has been submitted by the Police only against the present respondents and against rest of the accused persons, the investigation is still going. 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 10 xi It has also been pointed out that the enthusiasm of the prosecution can be seen by submitting charge sheet under Section 3/5 of the Explosive Substance Act read with Section 27 of the Arms Act. 21. Learned Senior counsel for the respondents, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment requires no interference, as the respondents were acquitted of the charges levelled against them as the prosecution has failed to bring forth any material on record to establish the guilt of the respondents. Analysis 22. We in order to scrutinize the submission made on behalf of the State-appellant in assailing the impugned judgment needs to go through the deposition of the witnesses, which have been considered by the learned trial court. 23. PW.1, namely, Dr. Ajit Kumar Choudhary is the Professor, Department of Forensic Medicines, RIMS, Ranchi and had conducted the post-mortem examination and prepared the post- mortem report. He has proved the post-mortem report of U.C. Jha which has been exhibited as Ext.1. Ext.1/1 is the post-mortem report of Sajjad Anwar, Ext.1/2 is the post-mortem report of Shams Tabrez Rahman @ Pintu and post-mortem report of Md. Ali Khan is exhibited as Ext.1/3. The post-mortem reports were prepared by the team of doctors. 24. Doctor had stated that the post-mortem of Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha was conducted on 31st December, 2000 at 23.30 hours. The doctor had found stitched wound over 11cm long x 2cm x scalp deep on right parito temporal region of the head situated over the 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 11 right ear and another stitched wound 2cm x 1¾ cm x scalp deep on posterior part of right parietal region of head through which a drainage tube is applied. 25. The internal injury was diffused contusion over the front parito temporal scalp with right temporal muscles and a bony gap of 5½ x 5 cm in the right parietal bone underneath dura matter was incised. The other internal injury also speaks about diffused contusion of right hemisphere. 26. The reason for death has been stated to be head injury, though, the opinion regarding stitched injury was not given and has been mentioned that it can be obtained by the concerned surgeon. 27. The Doctor in his cross-examination had stated that U.C Jha was treated by some other surgeon and for this reason, opinion with regard to the stitched wound could not be given. 28. PW. 2, namely, Sita Ram Mehta, who is the informant of the case has stated that the occurrence is dated 28.12.2000 and he received information at about 12 in the noon when he was at Yunus Chowk at Tea Stall, where he was informed that some persons were sitting on dharna. He came to Rajendra Chowk and saw about 8 to 10 persons were sitting on dharna along with a dead body of a deceased girl child and they were making demand to call the S.P., D.C. and Chief Minister. Thereafter, he called on Doranda P.S. and informed the Officer-in-charge and thereafter, Officer-in-charge, Surendra Prasad Singh along with other police personnel came there and started talking to the said people and in the meantime, the entire road was blocked. 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 12 29. It has further been testified that thereafter, Dy. S.P. Hatia, Sri U.C. Jha came there and tried to talk to the people but the protestors did not agree and protest continued along with the dead body of the girl child. Thereafter, Dy. S.P. U.C. Jha ordered for arrest of the truck driver of JAP-1, from whom, the death of the girl was caused due to accident. 30. Informant has further stated that within sometime, all the miscreants surrounded the Dy.S.P and assaulted him with weapons where after Dy.S.P. fell down and he has taken away for treatment. Thereafter, C.R.P.F personnel came on a trekker. The crowd also raised slogans against them and tried to snatch away the rifle and dress of the C.R.P.F personnel. C.R.P.F personnel opened fire leading to death of three people. 31. It has further been stated that Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha died in course of treatment. Informant has proved his signature on the written report, which is Ext.2. He has further stated that the matter is very old so he can’t remember the name of the accused persons but he remembers the name of Junaid, Md. Musa and Rajan. He has stated that he does not know the names of persons present the court. 32. In his cross-examination, informant stated that he does not remember the name of the Magistrate who was deputed along with him. The occurrence took place in front of Yuvraj Hotel, presently there is a petrol pump over there. At para-25 he has deposed that who is the accused he cannot say. He was alone, so it was not possible for him to see the entire occurrence alone. He neither identify any of the accused by name nor he can 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 13 identified the accused person in the court or their father and mother’s name. He says that about one thousand persons were present in the crowd. He further deposed that three persons who has been named in course of deposition are not present in the Court. 33. PW.3, Basistha Pandit, who is paper vendor. He has proved the signature on the seizure list, which is Ext.3. He says nothing about the occurrence. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he does not know as to on what paper his signature was taken. 34. PW.4, Sri Niwas Kumar, is a police officer. He has stated in his evidence that getting information about the protest at Rajendra Chowk, Doranda, he along with Surendra Prasad Singh and other police officers came to the place of occurrence where he found that all the vehicles were stopped in the jam. The protestors were making demand to call S.P. and D.C and making demand for compensation of Rs.5 lacs besides job in the family of the deceased. 35. It has further been stated by this witness that the crowd became unruly and started damaging the property by using lathi, danda and a truck was also set on fire besides the vehicle of the fire brigade department. Dy. S.P. U.C. Jha was also injured on account of stones pelting. One of the miscreants was shot by a bullet in front of Tiwary Bechar petrol pump. U.C. Jha was taken to hospital where he died in course of treatment. He deposed that he was at Tiwary Bechar petrol pump at the time of occurrence when U.C. Jha was injured. General identification has been made where he identified all the accused persons present in the court. 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 14 In his cross-examination, PW-4 stated that he cannot identify any of the accused persons by their names. 36. PW.5, Rakesh Kumar, is the bodyguard of the deceased Dy. S.P, Sri U.C. Jha. He has stated that Dy.S.P., Sri U.C. Jha got information about the unruly crowd and they came to Rajendra Chowk. They had come to the place of occurrence on the information given by S.P. Ranchi. He saw that the whole Rajendra Chowk was fully jam. About 5 to 7 hundred people were there and Dy. S.P. U.C. Jha tried to talk to the mob but to that no effect. 37. It has been stated by this witness that from the side of Yuvraj Hotel, C.R.P.F personnel were coming and crowd started pelting stones on the C.R.P.F personnel. He has further stated that near the residence of Judge Saheb at Rajendra Chowk, near the temple, they were present there. In the meantime, somebody informed that there was stone pelting and getting this information they rushed towards the place where stone was being pelted and, in the meantime, one of the stone hits on the back side of head of Sri U.C. Jha. There was unrestricted stone pelting and they rushed towards the campus of JAP-1. 38. Thereafter, Sri U.C. Jha was taken for treatment and after getting his treatment he came back to the residence of Commandant JAP-1 and after half an hour, Sri U.C. Jha got nauseating feeling and he was again rushed to hospital where CT- scan was done and blood clotting was found and in course of treatment he died. He cannot name any of the persons who were throwing stones but seeing the accused persons in the court room, he identified them to be present on the date of occurrence. 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 15 39. In his cross-examination he has stated that he cannot identify any of the person when 5 hundre to 7 hundred persons were there and the accused persons present in the court could not be identified by him. 40. PW.6, Surendra Kumar Singh, who is the investigating officer of the case. He has deposed in his evidence that the case was registered on the basis of the written application made by Sita Ram Mehta. The written report is in the writing of Sita Ram Mehta and it bears his endorsement which has been exhibited as Ext.-4. Formal FIR is exhibited as Ext.-5, statement of Md. Sadeek recorded by Dr. Yatindra Prasad is exhibited as Ext.-6, Ext.-7 and 7/1 are the seizure list. He stated that all the accused persons are present in the court are known to him and he can identify them. Nousad was not present on that date. 41. In his cross-examination, the investigating officer stated that supplementary investigation against 12 accused continued as he had submitted charge sheet against nine but he does not know what is the fate of such supplementary investigation. None of the accused was subject to any test identification parade because all the accused persons were named in the FIR. He cannot say as to where the Executive Magistrate recorded the statement of Sadeek Mian. 42. PW.7, Suresh Rajak, who is also police personnel. He has stated in examination-in-chief that getting information about the unruly crowd and the occurrence, he rushed to the place of occurrence where Dy.S.P., Sri U.C. Jha was trying to talk to the unruly crowd. The crowd was armed with lathi, rod, stone etc. In 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 16 the meantime, C.R.P.F personnel came and assault began. Dy.S.P was assaulted by rod on his head and also by stone on his head. The occurrence took place in front of the office of fire- brigade and firing by the CRPF also took place at the same place. The Dy.S.P Saheb was also injured at the same place. He cannot identify any of the accused persons by their names nor had participated any test identification parade. 43. PW.8, Ajit Oraon, was declared hostile by the prosecution as he completely declined to support the prosecution case. 44. PW.9, Nagendra Nath Dhar Dubey, who was posted at Doranda Police Station on 28.12.2000 as a literate munsi. He has stated that the crowd became uncontrolled then Surendra Singh asked him to go to the police station and take assistance from C.R.P.F personnel and he rushed to the P.S. and he cannot say what happened thereafter. PW-9 declined to identify any of the accused persons. He further stated that Dy.S.P. U.C. Jha was injured at Rajendra Chowk towards the over bridge. 45. PW.10, Prasant Mitra, is a press photographer and he has stated that on the date of occurrence, his Camera was thrown into the fire. He cannot identify any of the accused persons either in the court or on the date of occurrence. In cross-examination he stated that he cannot say as to where U.C. Jha was assaulted and by whom. 46. PW.11, Suresh Oraon, is also police personnel. He stated that on account of the jam, he could not come to the place of occurrence and so by another route, he came to the State Bank near Kadru Chowk. C.R.P.F personnel opened fire whereupon 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 17 mob started dispersing and Dy.S.P Sri U.C. Jha also tried to flee away, but he was chased by the crowd and assaulted by rod and stone as a result Dy.S.P was injured and fell down and he died in course of treatment. PW-11 has stated that all the accused persons present in the court were present on that date but he cannot say the name of any of them. In his cross-examination, PW-11 stated that the occurrence took place between Rajendra Chowk and Yuvraj Hotel. 47. PW.12, Yatindra Prasad, who is the Executive Magistrate. He has stated in his evidence on the order of Sub-Divisional Officer, he had recorded the statement of Md. Sadeek, which has already been exhibited as Ext.-6. He further stated that as the matter is old, he cannot identify Md. Sadeek. 48. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he was authorized by S.D.O, Ranchi to record the statement of the accused but there is no mention of such authorization. He further stated that the statement of Md. Sadeek was recorded at the police station in a chamber. Md. Sadeek was identified by co- villagers, whom he had brought by his staff on his official vehicle. 49. PW.13 is the formal witness. He has proved his signature on the Ext.-3 but in cross-examination he stated that what was the contents of the said paper he cannot say. 50. Thereafter, statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C was recorded. The accused persons have denied the complicity in the occurrence and have stated that they were not present on the date and time of occurrence and at the place of occurrence. They have 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 18 also denied with regard to the complicity in any manner in the alleged occurrence. 51. In the instant appeal, learned counsel for the State has inter alia assailed the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court mainly on the ground that learned Trial Court placed undue reliance on the non-identification of the named persons in the dock by the prosecution witnesses and acquitted the respondents. 52. Learned Counsel for the State has also assailed the impugned judgment on the ground that learned Trial Court failed to take into consideration that the deceased Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha, died on account of injuries sustained to him, but, the learned trial Court doubted the manner of injury. 53. Before entering into the merit of the case, it needs to refer herein that an Appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no imitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. 54. However, before the Appellate Court decides to interfere with a judgment of acquittal, it is required in law to record a finding that there are compelling reasons arising out of overlooking some vital evidence on the record that warrants interference with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 wherein it has been held that even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 19 the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is being quoted as under: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.” (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 20 55. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 484 has observed that the principle to be followed by the appellate courts considering an appeal against an order of acquittal is to interfere only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable" it is a compelling reason for interference. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under: "21. The principle to be followed by appellate courts considering an appeal against an order of acquittal is to interfere only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable" it is a compelling reason for interference (Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra). The principle was elucidated in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat : (SCC p. 229, para 7) "While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then -- and then only-- reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions." 56. Now coming to the facts of the instant case in the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position and material available on the record, from the evidence, this Court finds that on the day of occurrence i.e. on 28.12.2000, a girl child had died in a road accident by a truck of JAP (Jharkhand Armed Police) and regarding death of girl child, people from the vicinity were carrying the dead body of the child and were making demand of various things and were also obstructing traffic since about 9.30 to 10.A.M, at Rajendra Chowk, which resulted in traffic Jam. To pacify the matter police force, S.D.O., Ranchi, Dy.S.P., Hatia, Sri 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 21 U.C. Jha (deceased) and administration had reached at the place of occurrence and they were trying to console the crowd. But the crowd became unruly and started setting on fire on vehicles and started pelting stones. 57. To control the situation, CPPF personals were called, who opened fire and on account of firing made by the CRPF personnel the crowd started rushing here and there and dispersing, but, three persons from the mob died. The unruly mob was ruthlessly pelting stones and Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha, was injured by stone. Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha, was treated for the injury, but later on he died in course of treatment. 58. Learned counsel for the State has assailed the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court on the ground that learned Trial Court placed undue reliance on the non-identification of the named persons in the dock by the prosecution witnesses. 59. So far as participation of the appellants in the offence and their identification is concerned, this Court finds that PW-2 is the informant of the case and he in his cross-examination at paragraph-25 had specifically deposed that he does not know who are the accused and at pagraph-43 informant stated that he neither identify any of the accused by name nor he can name the accused person in the court or their father and mother’s name. 60. Further, ongoing through the evidence of the PW-5, who was bodyguard of the deceased Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha, and he was all along with the Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha, during the occurrence, this Court finds that PW-5 had stated in his examination-in-chief that that he cannot name any of the persons who were throwing stones 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 22 from the crowd. In his cross-examination PW-5 at para-18 had stated that he cannot identify any of the person by name when 5 hundred to 7 hundred persons were there and at para-19 he repeated that accused persons present in the court could not be identified by him. 61. Again, ongoing through the evidence of PW-6, who is the Investigating Officer of the case, this court finds that Investigating Officer in his evidence had simply stated that he can identify the accused persons but, in his cross-examination, Investigating Officer had categorically stated that he did not conduct the test identification parade of any of the accused persons before the witnesses. 62. At this juncture, it needs to refer herein the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Suraj Pal v. State of Haryana, (1995) 2 SCC 64, wherein, Hon’ble Apex Court had pointed out the object, purpose and importance of test identification parade. In this case Hon’ble Apex Court pointed out that the holding of identification parades has been in vogue since long in the past with a view to determine whether an unknown person accused of an offence is really the culprit or not, to be identified as such by those who claimed to be the eyewitnesses of the occurrence so that they would be able to identify the culprit if produced before them by recalling the impressions of his features left on their mind. Paragraph-14 of this judgment is quoted herein below- “14. Before dealing with the various contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants as referred to above, we shall first state the object, purpose and importance of the test identification parade. It may be pointed out that the holding of identification parades has been in vogue since long in the 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 23 past with a view to determine whether an unknown person accused of an offence is really the culprit or not, to be identified as such by those who claimed to be the eyewitnesses of the occurrence so that they would be able to identify the culprit if produced before them by recalling the impressions of his features left on their mind. That being so, in the very nature of things, the identification parade in such cases serves a dual purpose. It enables the investigating agency to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the claim of those witnesses who claimed to have seen the offender of the crime as well as their capacity to identify him and on the other hand it saves the suspect from the sudden risk of being identified in the dock by such witnesses during the course of the trial. This practice of test identification as a mode of identifying an unknown person charged of an offence is an age-old method and it has worked well for the past several decades as a satisfactory mode and a well-founded method of criminal jurisprudence. It may also be noted that the substantive evidence of identifying witness is his evidence made in the court but in cases where the accused person is not known to the witnesses from before who claimed to have seen the incident, in that event identification of the accused at the earliest possible opportunity after the occurrence by such witnesses is of vital importance with a view to avoid the chance of his memory fading away by the time he is examined in the court after some lapse of time.” (emphasis supplied) 63. Further, in the case of Dara Singh v. Republic of India, (2011) 2 SCC 490, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down that in the absence of any independent corroboration like TIP held by the Judicial Magistrate, the evidence of eyewitnesses as to the identification of the appellant-accused for the first time before the trial court generally cannot be accepted. Paragraph-41 of this judgment id quoted herein below- “41. It is a well-settled principle that in the absence of any independent corroboration like TIP held by the Judicial Magistrate, the evidence of eyewitnesses as to the identification of the appellant-accused for the first time before the trial court generally cannot be accepted. As explained in Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2010) 6 SCC 1 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1385] , that if the case is supported by other materials, identification of the accused in the dock for the first time would be permissible subject to confirmation by other corroborative evidence, which are lacking in the case on hand except for A-1 and A-3.” (emphasis supplied) 64. Hence, in the present case, when the P.W.2 informant, P.W.5 the bodyguard of the deceased Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha and P.W.6 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 24 the Investigating Officer, did not identify the accused persons during the course of trial, a serious question arises as to whether, in the absence of such identification, it would be legally proper to convict the respondents/accused. 65. The failure of these material witnesses to identify the respondent/accused casts a grave doubt upon the prosecution case, particularly when the identity of the assailants is the core issue. 66. In criminal jurisprudence, identification of the accused by credible witnesses is a sine qua non for fastening criminal liability, unless corroborated by unimpeachable circumstantial evidence. Therefore, without such identification, the conviction of the respondents would rest on shaky foundations. 67. Further, on the basis of the legal principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred to and quoted hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs, this Court comes to the considered conclusion that, in the present case, since the accused/respondent has not been identified by the aforesaid prosecution witnesses who themselves claim to be eyewitnesses to the alleged occurrence, the substratum of the prosecution case stands seriously eroded. 68. The absence of identification by material witnesses strikes at the very root of the prosecution version, rendering the evidence incapable of sustaining a conviction. The failure to hold TIP, coupled with the non-identification during trial, creates a fatal 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 25 lacuna in the prosecution case, which cannot be bridged by mere reference to the FIR particulars. 69. Thus, applying the settled legal position, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and consequently, the conviction of the respondents cannot be sustained on such infirm evidence. 70. It is evident from the impugned judgment that the learned trial Court had also dealt the issue of identification of the accused persons and had noted that despite the fact that the witnesses have claimed to have identified the accused, but no TIP was conducted by the prosecution. When the accused persons were named along with their parentage by the witnesses there was no question of getting any TIP conducted. In that view of the matter the prosecution argues that there was no requirement of T.I.P but when such identification was made by the prosecution witnesses while making statements before the Investigating office, they ought to have identified the accused persons in the court by their names. Thus, in the court failure to identify the accused by their names demolishes the prosecution case against the accused persons. 71. Thus, taking into aforesaid fact the learned Trial Court had categorically observed that complicity of the accused persons/respondents were not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 72. Further, learned Counsel for the State has raised the ground that learned Trial Court failed to take into consideration that the 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 26 deceased Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha, died on account of injuries sustained by him, but, the learned trial court doubted the manner of injury. 73. In this regard, this Court has gone through the evidence of the Doctor PW-1, who had conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha. 74. Doctor had found two stitched wounds on the body of the deceased Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha – (i) 11cm long x 2cm x scalp deep on right parito temporal region of the head situated over the right ear and (ii) 2cm x 1¾cm x scalp deep on posterior part of right parietal region of head through which a drainage tube is applied. 75. Doctor opined that death of Dy.S.P. Sri U.C. Jha, was caused due to head injury. 76. But, in his cross-examination, Doctor PW-1 stated that U.C Jha, was treated by some other surgeon, in his absence, before the body was handed over to him for the postmortem and for this reason, he had opined that opinion can be had from the surgeon concerned. 77. Hence, as per the testimony of the Doctor PW-1, deceased U.C Jha, died due to head injury and before his death, he was treated by some other Doctor. But the first Doctor, who had treated the deceased U.C Jha, was not examined by the prosecution. 78. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the case, learned Trial Court has rightly came to the conclusion that there was complete absence of medical evidence with regard to the stitched wound as unfortunately the doctor who treated him first had not been examined nor there was any material on record, i.e., any 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 27 injury report or medical treatment report on record with regard to the treatment made by the first doctor. 79. Learned Counsel for the State has further assailed impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on the ground that statement of the deceased U.C. Jha, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C shall be considered as dying declaration within the meaning of section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, but it has been brushed aside by the learned Trial Court. 80. In this regard, this Court finds that Doctor PW-1, who had conducted post mortem had opined that deceased U.C. Jha, had died due to head injuries. 81. Further, PW-5 was the body guard of the deceased Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha, and on the day of occurrence he was all along with the Dy. S.P. U.C. Jha. Body guard PW-5 had stated in his evidence that Dy. S.P., U.C. Jha, had sustained injury by stone on the back side of his head. Thereafter, Sri U.C. Jha was taken for treatment to the Doctor, where wound was bandaged and they came back to the residence of Commandant JAP-1, but, after half an hour Sri U.C. Jha got nausea feeling and he was vomiting, so, again they rushed to hospital where CT-scan was done and blood clotting was found and in course of treatment he died. 82. Hence, as per the testimony of the bodyguard (P.W.5), the deceased Dy. S.P. U.C. Jha experienced nausea, vomiting, and upon CT-Scan examination, blood clotting was detected. In such circumstances, a pertinent question arises as to how and at what stage the statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 28 Procedure was recorded by the Investigating Officer. The medical condition of the deceased, as narrated by P.W.5, casts serious doubt on the feasibility and reliability of recording any statement during that period. 83. Furthermore, the prosecution has failed to examine the first Doctor who treated the injured Dy.S.P. U.C. Jha, thereby depriving the court of crucial medical evidence which could have clarified the physical and mental fitness of the deceased at the relevant time. The non-examination of the treating Doctor constitutes a material lapse, as it directly affects the evidentiary value of the alleged statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and undermines the credibility of the prosecution case. 84. Hence, ground raised by the learned counsel for the State that statement of the deceased U.C. Jha, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C shall be considered as dying declaration within the meaning of section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, is not tenable. 85. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention here that there is no straight jacket formula on the basis of which the guilt of the accused is said to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 86. Moreover, there is no way to determine objectively, the reasonability of the doubt that the court might have. So, it depends solely on the court to say court is convinced by the arguments of the prosecution or that there still remains a degree of reasonable doubt so as to impart the judgment in favour of the defense. 87. This follows from the cardinal principle that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved to be guilty by the 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 29 prosecution and the accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, the guilt should be proved beyond any reasonable doubt that a reasonable man with ordinary prudence can have. There should be no doubt whether the accused is guilty or not. If there is slightest doubt, no matter how small it is, the benefit will go to the accused. 88. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decision has propounded the proposition that in the criminal trial, there cannot be any conviction if the charge is not being proved beyond all reasonable doubts, as has been held in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors. Vrs. State of U.P., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 454, wherein, at paragraph-22, it has been held as under: - "22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime." 89. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka, 2017 (13) SCC 98, has held at paragraph-26 as under: "26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the findings recorded by the High Court we feel that the High Court has failed to understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of the trial, 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 30 there were lapses on the part of the investigating agency and the evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt." 90. Further, it needs to refer herein the principle of 'benefit of doubt' belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of 'benefit of doubt' can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath & Ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 96, wherein, it has been held at paragraph-7, as under: - "7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence of the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when the High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to Bhagirath "as a matter of abundant caution". Unfortunately, the High Court did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. Any restraint by way of abundant caution need not be entangled with the concept of the benefit of doubt. Abundant caution is always desirable in all spheres of human activity. But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused." 91. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 3 SCC 57 has laid down the principle that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 31 criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted, for ready reference, paragraph 6 thereof requires to be referred herein which reads hereunder as:- “6. ------The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. —" 92. It needs to refer herein before laying down the aforesaid view, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 has already laid down the same view at paragraph-163 which is required to be referred which reads hereunder as- “163. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. ---" 93. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid discussions and upon close scrutiny of the evidence, as well as after examining the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, finds that the learned Trial Court has given thoughtful consideration to the material on record and rightly arrived at the conclusion that none of the prosecution witnesses had identified the respondents/accused. 94. The learned Trial Court has further not erred in declining to accept the statement of the deceased Dy. S.P. U.C. Jha, 2026:JHHC:20892-DB 32 recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a dying declaration within the meaning of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 95. It is evident from the aforesaid discussion that the learned Trial Court has appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective, and the conclusions arrived at are supported by cogent reasoning and material on record. 96. On the basis of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the grounds agitated for interference with the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court are not worthy for consideration. 97. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant fail to disclose any perversity, or illegality in the impugned judgment which would warrant to exercise the power of appellate jurisdiction. 98. Accordingly, the instant appeal is dismissed. 99. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of. 100. Let the Lower Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith, along with a copy of this Judgment. I Agree. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) 14/07/2026 Rohit /-A.F.R. Uploaded on 15.07.2026