2026:HHC:34848 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 330 of 2014 Reserved on: 13.08.2026 Date of Decision: 19.08.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Gopal Dutt Nainwal ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the respondents : Mr. Ramesh Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 05.05.2014 passed by Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kandaghat, (Camp at Solan), District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 304A of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 187 of Motor Vehicles Act (M.V. Act). (The 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:34848 parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 304A of IPC and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicle Act. It was asserted that the informant Balbir Singh (PW2), Baldev, Rama Devi, Ram Kali (PW1) and Raj Kumar (PW3) were filling the potholes on National Highway-22 on 30.09.2008. Informant Balbir Singh, Rama Devi and Ram Kali were picking up the stones, and Raj Kumar was setting the stones in the middle of the road. Baldev was standing with a red flag. A truck bearing registration No. HR-55-7838 came from Solan at high speed and hit Raj Kumar and Baldev. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the truck. The injured were taken to the hospital, and intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ex.PW13/A) was recorded at the Police Station. ASI Ashok Kumar (PW13) went to the hospital for verification. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ex.PW2/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW13/B) was registered. SI Ashok Kumar (PW13) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan 2026:HHC:34848 (Ex.PW13/C). He seized the truck vide memo (Ex.PW4/A) and the articles loaded in it vide memo (Ex.PW13/B). Dr Mamta Mahajan (PW5) examined Raj Kumar and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. She issued the MLC (Ex.PW5/B). She also examined Baldev and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. She issued the MLC (Ex.PW5/C) and referred Baldev to IGMC, Shimla for further treatment. He succumbed to his injuries. Dr Sangeet K. Dhillon (PW9) conducted the postmortem examination of Baldev and found that the cause of death was fracture of the temporal bone leading to hemorrhagic and neurogenic shock. She issued the report (Ex.PW9/A). Yoginder Kumar (PW7) mechanically examined the vehicle, but did not find any defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ex.PW7/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the IPC and Section 187 of the 4 2026:HHC:34848 Motor Vehicle Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Ramkali (PW1), Balbir Singh (PW2) and Raj Kumar (PW3) are the eyewitnesses. Sohan Lal (PW4) had stopped the truck and witnessed its seizure. Dr Mamta Mahajan (PW5) examined the injured. Pratap Singh (PW6), Jagdish Chand (PW10) and Bhupinder Singh (PW12) witnessed the recovery. Yoginder (PW7) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. SI Yadav Singh (PW8) and Ashok Kumar (PW13) investigated the matter. Dr Sangeeta K. Dillon (PW9) conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased. HC Sohan Lal (PW11) proved the certificate. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. He claimed that he was at Nainital on 30.09.2008. He admitted that the truck and the documents of the truck were seized by the police. He stated that he was falsely implicated. He was informed by the police official that his truck was impounded. He went to the Police Station on 2026:HHC:34848 the third day. Suresh Kumar was driving the truck on the date of the incident. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that Balbir Singh (PW2), Raj Kumar (PW3) and Ram Kali (PW1) had not identified the driver of the vehicle, and the prosecution’s case that the accused was driving the truck and his rashness led to the accident was not proved. Therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The prosecution witnesses stated that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The registration certificate mentioned that the accused was the owner of the vehicle. Therefore, the burden was upon the accused to show who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He did not produce any evidence, and there was nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses to show that the accused was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6 2026:HHC:34848 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Ramesh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution witnesses specifically stated that the accused present in the Court was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The registration certificate also showed the accused to be the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the burden was upon the accused to prove who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. However, he failed to produce any evidence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Ramesh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution witnesses had not seen the truck driver at the time of the incident. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct a Test Identification Parade. However, no Test Identification Parade was conducted. The accused has a right to silence, and no adverse inference can 2026:HHC:34848 be drawn against him for failure to appear in the witness box. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: 8 2026:HHC:34848 “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 2026:HHC:34848 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 10 2026:HHC:34848 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Balbir Singh (PW2) has stated in the statement (Ex.PW2/A) that he did not know the name of the driver and could identify him if the driver was brought to him. Therefore, the initial version of the prosecution is that the driver of the truck was not seen by the informant. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 1 SCC 702: 2002 SCC (Cri) 256: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1243 that the Investigating Officer should explain the steps leading to the detection of the offender to exclude the likelihood of his innocence having been branded as a culprit, when the identity of the offender is not known. It was observed at 713: 2026:HHC:34848 “26. Before parting with the case, we would like to place on record an observation of ours, touching on an aspect of the case. There are clueless crimes committed. The factum of a cognizable crime having been committed is known, but neither the identity of the accused is disclosed nor is there any indication available of the witnesses who would be able to furnish useful and relevant evidence. Such offences put to the test the wits of an investigating officer. A vigilant investigating officer, well-versed with the techniques of the job, is in a position to collect the threads of evidence, finding out the path that leads to the culprit. The ends, which the administration of criminal justice serves, are not achieved merely by catching hold of the culprit. The accusation has to be proved to the hilt in a court of law. The evidence of the investigating officer given in the court should have a rhythm explaining step by step how the investigation proceeded, leading to the detection of the offender and the collection of evidence against him. This is necessary to exclude the likelihood of any innocent person having been picked up and branded as a culprit, and then the gravity of the offence arousing human sympathy, persuading the mind to be carried away by doubtful or dubious circumstances, treating them as of “beyond doubt” evidentiary value. 15. SI Ashok Kumar has not stated as to how he concluded that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He merely stated that he had arrested the accused. He stated in his cross-examination that the accused is the owner of the vehicle who had appeared in the Police Station after 3-4 days of the incident. Thus, as per the Investigating Officer, the accused was implicated because he happened to be the owner of the vehicle. 12 2026:HHC:34848 16. Ram Kali (PW1) stated in her examination-in-chief that she was unable to identify the driver of the truck. Balbir Singh (PW2) stated that he had not seen the accused and he could not identify him. Raj Kumar (PW3) stated in his examination-in- chief that he could not identify the accused because he had not seen the driver on the spot. Therefore, the statements of eyewitnesses do not establish that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. 17. Sohan Lal (PW4) stated that he found Baldev lying in blood. He stopped the truck, and the driver went away from the spot. He had not seen the driver at the spot. Therefore, his testimony also does not establish that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. 18. It was submitted that the accused is the owner of the truck and the burden was upon him to establish who was driving the truck at the time of the accident. This submission will not help the prosecution. It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Abdul Rafeeque v. Mohanakrishnan, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 1181, that the accused has a right to silence, and no adverse inference can 2026:HHC:34848 be drawn against him for not appearing in the witness box. It was observed: 23. It is basic criminal jurisprudence that an accused cannot be compelled to be examined as a witness. No adverse inference can be drawn against the accused merely because he has chosen to abstain from the witness box (See Kashiram v. State of M.P: (2002) 1 SCC 71: AIR 2001 SC 2902). The right of the accused to keep silence finds its expression in the provision contained in Section 315(1) of the Code. It is the mandate of the proviso to Section 315(1) of the Code that the failure of the accused to give evidence shall not be subject to any comment by any of the parties or the court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him at the same trial. It is immaterial that, in a case, the burden is on the accused to prove a fact. No court can comment on the choice made by the accused to abstain from the witness box. Failure or omission of the accused to examine himself as a witness shall not attract any comment from the court. No adverse inference can be made against the accused on his failure to enter the witness box (See Abdul Nazar v. Dileep Kumar: 2004 (3) KLT 264). 24. In Abdul Nazar (supra), this Court has observed as follows: “In these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge was obviously in error in making the comment extracted above, relating to the failure of the accused to take the witness stand. Even in a prosecution for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Section 315 Cr.P.C operates with vigour. Of course, the burden is on the accused under Section 139 of the N.I. Act to rebut the presumption against him. But no court would be justified in commenting on the failure/refusal of the accused to take the witness stand in support of the defence set up by him. It appears to be necessary to caution the Courts on this aspect as it is often found that comments do creep into judgments against the 14 2026:HHC:34848 inability/failure of the accused to examine himself as witness. There can be no doubt on the question. The accused need not examine himself as a witness. …. His omission or failure or refusal to examine himself cannot be the subject matter of any comment or justify any presumption or finding against him. The incorrect impression deserves to be dispelled at the earliest”. 19. It was for the prosecution to establish, by conducting a Test Identification Parade to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle, and when the witnesses stated that they were unable to identify the accused, he cannot be convicted simply because he happened to be an owner of the vehicle. 20. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 21. No other point was urged. 22. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 23. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail 2026:HHC:34848 bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 24. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19th August, 2026 (Chander)