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2026 DAILYLAW 20074 (BOM)

SHITAL SANDESH VIRKAR AND ANR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

WP/2210/2026 · 2026-10-14

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Judgment text

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27-WP-2210-2026.DOC IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.2210 OF 2026 Shital Sandesh Virkar & Anr. …Petitioners Versus The State of Maharashtra & Ors. …Respondents Mr. Vipul Dushing a/w Tanmay Kate, for the Petitioners. Mr. Shahaji Shinde, APP, “B” Panel Counsel, for the Respondent- State. CORAM: MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J. DATED: 14 OCTOBER 2026 PC:- 1. Heard Mr. Dushing, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners and Mr. Shinde, learned APP, for the Respondent-State of Maharashtra. 2. In this Writ Petition, the relief sought is the quashing of the DV proceedings filed against the Petitioners i.e. Original Opponent Nos.2 and 3. The Petitioner No.1 (Opponent No.2) is the wife of brother of Petitioner No.1’s husband i.e. Original Opponent No.1 and the Petitioner No.2 (Opponent No.3) is the sister of Original Opponent No.1. 3. It is the contention of Mr. Dushing, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, that there are no allegations whatsoever against the Page 1 Arjun 27-WP-2210-2026.DOC present Petitioners and that there are no allegations concerning any demand or assault at least against Petitioners. He further submits that Petitioner No.2 (Opponent No.3) is the married sister of Opponent No.1 and resides in Mumbai. 4. Mr. Dushing, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shobhit Kumar Mittal v. State of U.P. 1 and more particularly on Paragraph Nos.18, 21 and 23 thereof. He also relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana 2 and more particularly on Paragraph Nos.20, 26 and 27 thereof. He further relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal 3 and more particularly on Paragraph Nos.32, 39, 34 and 40 thereof. 5. Perusal of the Complaint shows that the DV Complaint was filed by Respondent No.2 (Applicant No.1), who is the wife of Original Opponent No.1-Sagar Yallappa Virkar. Applicant No.2 in the said DV Case is the daughter of Applicant No.1 and Opponent No.1. At the time of filing the DV Complaint i.e. in August 2023, 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2059 2 (2025) 3 SCC 735 3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158 Page 2 Arjun 27-WP-2210-2026.DOC the daughter’s age was only 1 year and 6 months. 6. The present Petitioners are Opponent Nos.2 and 3 in the said DV proceedings. Petitioner No.1 is the wife of brother-in-law of Respondent No.2 and Petitioner No.2 is the sister-in-law of Respondent No.2. 7. Although it is the contention raised by Mr. 6. The present Petitioners are Opponent Nos.2 and 3 in the said DV proceedings. Petitioner No.1 is the wife of brother-in-law of Respondent No.2 and Petitioner No.2 is the sister-in-law of Respondent No.2. 7. Although it is the contention raised by Mr. Dushing, learned Counsel for the Petitioners that there are no allegations against the Petitioners and, in any case, no allegations of assault or demand against them, the allegations against the present Petitioners as set out in DV Complaint are as follows: ß2- vtZnkj fgps nkfxus o tkcns.kkj dz- 1 ;kauk ?kkrysyh lksU;kph pSu o vaxBh gs tkcns.kkj dz- 1 rs 3 ;kaP;k rkC;kr vkgsr- 3- vtZnkj fgpk fookg >kysuarj vtZnkj gh ukan.;klkBh tkcns.kkj dz- 1 ;kaP;k ?kjh vkyh- R;kosGh rsFks tkcns.kkj dz- 1] 2 o tkcns.kkj dz- 2 ;kapk eqyxk ukes ;’kjkt ,df+=r jkgr gksrs- tkusokjh 2021 e/;s vtZnkj fgl tkcns.kkj ua-2 fgus lkafxrys dh] tkcns.kkj dz- 1 ;kaps ifgys yXu >kys gksrs] ijarq tkcns.kkj dz- 1 ;kaP;k v’kk fofp= okx.;keqGs R;kapk ?kVLQksV >kyk- 4- ekgs Qsczqokjh 2021 e/;s tkcns.kkj dz-2 o 3 ;kauh vtZnkj dz-1 fgl lkafxrys dh] ßrqyk tj ;sFks jgk;ps vlys rj vkeP;k ethZizek.ks jgkos ykxsy-Þ lnjosGh tkcns.kkj dz-2 o 3 ;kauh tkcns.kkj dz-1 ;kyk vtZnkj dz- 1 fgP;kfo:/n HkMdkowu fnys dh] ßvtZnkj Eg.krs dh] rqeP;k’kh yXu d:u eh [kwi eksBh pqd dsyh vkgs-Þ lnj osGh tkcns.kkj dz-1 Page 3 Arjun 27-WP-2210-2026.DOC ;kus vtZnkj dz-1 fgl vokZP; Hkk”ksr f’kohxkG d:u csne ekjgk.k dsyh- 6- tkcns.kkj dz-2 ;kauh tkcns.kkj dz-1 ;kauk vtZnkj dz-1 fgP;k fo:/n dkghgh [kksVsukVs lkaxwu HkMdko.;kps dke dsys- 7- tkcns.kkj dz-3 ;k toGp jkgr vlY;keqGs lrr ;kaP;kp ?kjke/;s vlk;P;k vkf.k fnolHkj vtZnkj dz-1 fgpk tkcns.kkj dz-2 o 3 feGwu NG djk;P;k f’kok; jk=h tkcns.kkj dz-1 vkY;koj R;kaps dku Hkjk;P;k R;keqGs vtZnkj dz-1 gh jkstp ej.k ;kruk lgu djr vls- 8- tkcns.kkj dz-1 rs 3 gs vtZnkj dz-1 fgl Eg.kr dh] ßrq xjksnj vkgsl gs dkgh txkP;k osxGs >kysys ukgh] R;keqGs rqyk ?kjkrhy loZp dkes djkoh ykxrhy vkf.k rs lq/nk osGsP;k vkre/;s-Þ tkcns.kkj dz-1 rs 3 usgeh vtZnkj dz-1 fgl Eg.kr vlr dh] ßrq>h tkÅ ekgsjgwu [kwi dkgh ?ksowu ;srs ijarq rqyk ek= ekgsjgwu lk/kh QqVdh doMh nsr ukghr-Þ tkcns.kkj dz-1 rs 3 ;kauh vtZnkj dz-1 o frps ukrsokbZdkauk dks.krhp nkn fnyh ukgh- tkcns.kkj dz-1 rs 3 gs vtZnkj dz-1 fgl Bsowu ?ks.;kl r;kj ukghr] gs loZ Ck?kwu vtZnkj dz-1 fgyk R;kp fno’kh ijr ekgsjh vk.kys-Þ 8. The definition of domestic violence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) is very broad. The contentions raised in the DV Complaint clearly shows that the allegations fall within the definition of domestic violence under the DV Act. 9. The Supreme Court in the decision of State of Haryana v. Page 4 Arjun 27-WP-2210-2026.DOC Bhajan Lal 4, in Paragraph No.102, laid down the guidelines governing the exercise of powers under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as follows: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 Page 5 Arjun 27-WP-2210-2026.DOC (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis added) 10. If the allegations against the present Petitioners (Opponent Nos.2 and 3) made in the D.V. Complaint are examined on the Page 6 Arjun 27-WP-2210-2026.DOC touchstone of above parameters in Bhajan Lal (supra), then it is clear that no case is made out to exercise power of this Court to quash the Complaint. 11. The Supreme Court in Shobhit Kumar Mittal (supra) and Dara Lakshmi Narayana (supra), has held that if allegations are vague and omnibus then the power to quash be utilised. However, as noted hereinabove, very specific allegations are made against the Petitioners (Original Opponent Nos.2 and 3). The decision of the Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi (supra) is inter alia concerning the circumstances in which imprisonment be imposed under the DV Act. Thus, the same has no application at this stage. 12. The Supreme Court has held that where upon a reading of the Complaint as it is, if no offence is made, then in that case, the Complaint can be quashed. In the present case, specific allegations of domestic violence, as contemplated under the provisions of the DV Act, have been made against the Petitioners. 13. Accordingly, no interference with the impugned proceedings is warranted. The Writ Petition is dismissed. [MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.] Page 7 Arjun