1 2026:CGHC:21996-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1343 of 2025 Vicky @ Sukhiram @ Idaki S/o Girdhari Yadav Aged About 20 Years R/o Village - Jora, Odiya Basti, Police Station - Telibandha, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station - Telibandha, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Kishore Narayan, Advocate For Respondent/State : Ms. Vaishali Mahilong, Deputy Government Advocate Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 11.05 .2026 1. Heard Mr. Kishore Narayan, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Ms. Vaishali Mahilong, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.05.13 10:19:32 +0530 2 2. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) questioning the impugned judgment dated dated 12.12.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, First Fast Track Special Court ‘POCSO’, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case ‘POCSO’ No.78/2019, by which, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under :- Conviction Sentence Under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Life imprisonment which means imprisonment till the end of natural life of the appellant with fine of Rs.1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for two months. Under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 : Convicted but no separate sentence imposed. 3. It is not in dispute that during pendency of the trial, the prosecutrix and her minor daughter were murdered, for which the present appellant was separately tried in Sessions Trial No.118/2021. By judgment dated 19.07.2022 passed by the learned Special Judge (Atrocities) and Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, the appellant/accused has been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302 (two counts) and 201 of the IPC in relation to 3 the homicidal death of the prosecutrix and her daughter. Against the said judgment of conviction, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.631/2023, which was also listed today and has been dismissed today by this Court vide a separate judgment passed therein. 4. The appellant/accused Vicky @ Sukhiram @ Idaki was tried for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “POCSO Act”) on the allegation that about one to one and a half years prior to lodging of the FIR dated 04.04.2019, he repeatedly established physical relations with the victim, who was below 18 years of age, on the false promise of marriage, due to which she became pregnant and later gave birth to a female child. 5. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 04.04.2019, father of the victim (PW-01) lodged a written complaint (Ex.P/01) at Police Station Telibandha, Raipur alleging that his daughter/victim was aged about 17 years. About one to one and a half years prior thereto, the victim had gone to the house of her maternal grandmother at Raipur during Ganesh immersion festivities, where she came in contact with the appellant/accused. It was alleged that the accused trapped the victim in a love affair and on the false promise of marriage committed forcible sexual intercourse with her repeatedly, as a result of which she became 4 pregnant. On the basis of written complaint (Ex.P/01), FIR (Ex.P/02) was registered against the accused for offences punishable under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act and investigation was set in motion. 6. During investigation, consent of the victim and her father was obtained vide consent letter (Ex.P/09), pursuant to which the victim was medically examined at District Hospital, Raipur on 05.04.2019. Dr. Smt. Pratibha Sharma (PW-04), who medically examined the victim, proved medical examination report Ex.P/20 and deposed that the victim was found habituated to sexual intercourse and was suspected to be pregnant, whereafter urine pregnancy test and ultrasonography were advised. Pregnancy examination report (Ex.P/22), proved by Dr. Y.C. Mishra (PW-05), confirmed that the victim was pregnant. 7. During investigation, statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded vide Ex.P/12 pursuant to order-sheet dated 08.04.2019 (Ex.P/13). Counseling report of Child Welfare Committee was brought on record as Ex.P/14. Statements of the victim and her father under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were also recorded during investigation. 8. For establishing the age of the victim, the prosecution obtained admission-discharge register of Class-III and school records from the concerned school through retired Headmaster (PW-03). Certified copy of admission-discharge register was exhibited as 5 Ex.P/18C and mark-sheet of Class-VIII was exhibited as Article A- 1. As per these documents, date of birth of the victim was recorded as 03.03.2002 and therefore on the date of FIR i.e. 04.04.2019 and at the time of occurrence, she was below 18 years of age. The prosecution further alleged that after obtaining the mobile number of the victim, the accused used to contact her over phone and thereafter called her to Raipur on the pretext of introducing her to his family members. When the victim went with the accused to his house, nobody was present there and the accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. It was alleged that the accused thereafter repeatedly called the victim to Raipur every second or third day on the assurance that he would marry her and established physical relations with her repeatedly. Due to such physical relations, the victim became pregnant. When the victim insisted upon marriage, the accused refused, whereafter on 03.04.2019 she narrated the incident to her father and thereafter report was lodged. 9. During investigation, Patwari Devendra Kumar Verma (PW-02) prepared spot map (Ex.P/11). Property seizure memos relating to clothes and other articles of the victim and accused were prepared vide Ex.P/04, Ex.P/05, Ex.P/06, Ex.P/17, Ex.P/23 and Ex.P/26. Memorandum statement of the accused was recorded vide Ex.P/07. Medical examination of the accused was conducted pursuant to memo Ex.P/24 and medical report thereof was obtained. Notices and correspondence for DNA examination were 6 also brought on record vide Ex.P/08, Ex.P/35 and Ex.P/36. However, the accused expressed unwillingness for DNA test vide Ex.P/37. 10. During pendency of the present case, certified copy of judgment dated 19.07.2022 passed in Sessions Trial No.118/2021 was brought on record as Ex.P/38, whereby the accused stood convicted for murder of the victim and her daughter. DNA report was exhibited as Ex.P/39 and affidavit of the victim was brought on record as Ex.P/40. 11. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined father of the victim as PW-01, Patwari Devendra Kumar Verma as PW-02, retired Headmaster of the school concerned as PW-03, Dr. Smt. Pratibha Sharma as PW-04, Dr. Y.C. Mishra as PW-05 and Investigating Officer Divya Sharma as PW-06. The prosecution also proved documentary evidence including written complaint (Ex.P/01), FIR (Ex.P/02), statement of victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P/12), counseling report of CWC (Ex.P/14), medical examination reports (Ex.P/20 and Ex.P/22), school admission- discharge register (Ex.P/18C), certified copy of judgment dated 19.07.2022 (Ex.P/38), DNA report (Ex.P/39) and affidavit of the victim (Ex.P/40). 12. Statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded wherein he denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him and pleaded false implication. The defence 7 of the accused was that the victim was a consenting party and was in love with him, and that the prosecution had failed to establish that she was below 18 years of age. 13. The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and documentary evidences available on record, by the impugned judgment dated 12.12.2024 convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 415(2) of the BNSS has been preferred by him calling in question the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 14. Mr. Kishore Narayan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has assailed the impugned judgment dated 12.12.2024 as being perverse, erroneous and contrary to the facts, evidence and settled principles of law governing criminal trials. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has committed a manifest error in appreciating the evidence on record and has recorded findings of guilt without there being any legally admissible and reliable proof. 15. It is contended by Mr. Narayan that the most crucial ingredient of the prosecution case, namely the age of the victim, has not been proved in accordance with law. Learned counsel submits that the prosecution sought to establish the age of the victim through school records, particularly the admission–discharge register and mark-sheet of Class VIII, proved respectively as Ex.P/18C and Article A-1 through PW-03, the retired Headmaster of the 8 concerned school. However, it is argued that these documents, in absence of strict proof of foundational facts and proper certification in accordance with law, could not have been treated as conclusive proof of age. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court has erroneously discarded the requirement of strict proof and instead placed reliance upon the oral testimony of PW- 01, the father of the victim, regarding her age. 16. Mr. Narayan submits that PW-01, being the father of the victim, is an interested witness and his statement, being purely oral and not supported by primary documentary proof in admissible form, cannot be treated as conclusive evidence for determining age. It is urged that PW-01 had no personal knowledge in the nature of documentary verification and his version is merely hearsay insofar as the exact date of birth is concerned. In absence of reliable and admissible evidence, the finding that the victim was a minor suffers from serious illegality and vitiates the entire conviction under the POCSO Act. 17. It is further submitted by Mr. Narayan that the victim unfortunately died during the pendency of trial and, therefore, she could not be subjected to examination or cross-examination. The entire prosecution case, therefore, rests heavily upon the testimony of PW-01 as well as other formal witnesses. Learned counsel submits that PW-01 has not witnessed the alleged incident and his evidence is purely in the nature of hearsay, based upon what 9 was allegedly narrated to him by the deceased victim. It is contended that conviction cannot be sustained on such untested and uncorroborated testimony, particularly when the best evidence, i.e. that of the victim herself, was not available for scrutiny by way of cross-examination. 18. It is further argued by Mr. Narayan that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that PW-01 is not an eye witness to any of the alleged incidents and his deposition (PW-01) is only in respect of lodging of FIR Ex.P/01 and initial information given by the victim. Similarly, the statement of Investigating Officer PW-06 Divya Sharma and other formal witnesses cannot be treated as substantive evidence to establish the core allegations. 19. Mr. Narayan further submits that the documentary evidence such as FIR Ex.P/01, statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Ex.P/12, and school records Ex.P/18C, even if taken at their face value, do not conclusively establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in the absence of primary testimony of the victim. It is submitted that the entire prosecution case suffers from serious evidentiary gaps and the learned trial Court has drawn adverse inferences without legal justification. It is, therefore, urged that the impugned judgment is based on conjectures and surmises, suffers from non-application of mind, and is liable to be set aside. 20. Per contra, Ms. Vaishali Mahilong, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State, has vehemently opposed the 10 submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and has fully supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. It is submitted that the learned trial Court, upon a meticulous appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, has recorded clear, cogent and well-reasoned findings which are fully borne out from the evidence and do not suffer from any illegality, perversity or material irregularity. The impugned judgment dated 12.12.2024 therefore deserves to be affirmed in its entirety and the appeal filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed. 21. It is further submitted by Ms. Mahilong that the prosecution has successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a minor aged about 17 years at the relevant time. The age of the victim stands conclusively proved from duly exhibited school records and admission-discharge register, proved through PW-03 (Head Master), and marked as Ex.P/16, Ex.P/17, Ex.P/18C and Article A-1. The said witness has categorically proved the date of birth of the victim as 03.03.2002, and his testimony has remained consistent and unshaken in cross-examination. The learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly accepted the said documentary evidence as reliable proof of age. 22. It is further submitted by Ms. Mahilong that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant regarding inadmissibility of age-related documents is wholly untenable. The school records, duly proved 11 through competent witness, are admissible in evidence and constitute reliable proof of age. The learned trial Court has correctly appreciated the said evidence and rightly returned a finding that the victim was a minor at the time of occurrence. 23. It is contended by Ms. Mahilong that the testimony of PW-01, father of the victim, cannot be brushed aside as mere hearsay evidence, as the same is duly corroborated by contemporaneous documentary and scientific evidence including written complaint Ex.P/01, FIR Ex.P/02 and medical evidence Ex.P/20 and Ex.P/22. It is further submitted that the medical evidence adduced by PW- 04 Dr. Pratibha Sharma and PW-05 Dr. Y.C. Mishra clearly establishes that the victim was pregnant and had been subjected to sexual intercourse. The said medical evidence fully corroborates the prosecution case and strengthens the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 24. It is further submitted by Ms. Mahilong that DNA report Ex.P/39, duly proved by PW-06 Divya Sharma, constitutes a strong and clinching scientific circumstance which conclusively connects the accused with the offence. The said scientific evidence remains unrebutted and the appellant has failed to offer any plausible explanation in respect thereof. It is further submitted that the offences under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act stand fully established in view of the proved minority of the victim and the repeated sexual assault committed upon her. 12 In law, consent of a minor is wholly immaterial, and therefore the defence plea of consensual relationship has been rightly rejected by the learned trial Court. 25. It is lastly submitted by Ms. Mahilong that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the entire evidence on record and has recorded a well-founded conviction. There is no perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed and the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant be affirmed. 26. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, considered their rival submissions made herein-above, and carefully perused the entire record of the case with utmost circumspection. 27. In view of the facts of the prosecution case and the rival submissions advanced by the parties, the following points arise for consideration before this Court in the present appeal:- (i) Whether the victim was a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 at the time of the incident, i.e., whether she was below 18 years of age? (ii) Whether the accused, during a period commencing about one to one and a half years prior to 04.04.2019, committed 13 rape upon the victim on more than one occasion by committing forcible sexual intercourse with her? (iii) Whether the accused, during the aforesaid period, committed repeated penetrative sexual assault upon the victim, who was below 18 years of age, thereby attracting the provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012? (iv) Whether the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Trial Court are sustainable in law and on facts, or whether the accused is entitled to acquittal? 28. We shall first deal with Point No. (i), which pertains to the determination of the age of the victim at the relevant time, i.e., on 04.04.2019 and during the period of about one to one and a half years prior thereto, and whether she was below 18 years of age so as to fall within the definition of a “child” under Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 29. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 14 30. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows: “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. 15 (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the 16 medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the 17 provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the victim VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said 18 certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 31. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act unequivocally defines a “child” as any person who has not completed eighteen years of age. The legislative intent underlying the said provision is to afford the widest possible protection to persons below the age of majority from sexual exploitation and abuse. Thus, for invocation of the provisions of the POCSO Act, the foundational requirement is that the prosecution must satisfactorily establish that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of occurrence. Likewise, 19 in the present case, the prosecution has also projected the age of the victim as below sixteen years for the purposes of attracting aggravated penal consequences under the Indian Penal Code, as it then stood, thereby making the determination of age a crucial and determinative issue. 32. At the outset, it is to be noted that the consistent defence taken by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is that the victim was a major at the time of the alleged incident and that she was of marriageable age. However, such a bald assertion, in the absence of any cogent documentary evidence or reliable oral testimony, cannot be accepted when weighed against the cumulative and consistent prosecution evidence on record. 33. The victim, though unfortunately not examined during trial owing to her demise, her age has been consistently reflected in her prior material evidence and surrounding circumstances. The prosecution has relied upon the documentary records including the Dakhil-Kharij Register (Ex. P/18C) and the Class VIII mark- sheet (Article A-1), both of which record her date of birth as 03.03.2002. Though these documents have been sought to be questioned by the defence on the ground of mode of proof, they cannot be brushed aside in toto, particularly when they are duly supported by oral evidence of persons acquainted with her age. 34. The father of the victim (PW-01), who is a competent witness having special knowledge of her birth and age, has categorically 20 deposed that the victim was born in the year 2002. Though he has not stated the exact date of birth in mathematical precision, his statement regarding the year of birth stands in clear consonance with the entries made in school records (Ex. P/18C and Article A- 1). Importantly, in the FIR lodged on 04.04.2019 itself, the informant has disclosed the age of the victim as 17 years, which remains unshaken in cross-examination. 35. Further corroboration is available from the medical evidence. Dr. Smt. Pratibha Sharma (PW-04), who had examined the victim on 05.04.2019, has clearly stated that the age of the victim was recorded as 17 years at the time of medical examination. This contemporaneous medical assessment lends strong corroborative value to the prosecution case regarding her minority at the relevant time. The defence suggestion that the age was recorded merely on the basis of her statement does not dilute the evidentiary value of such medical record, particularly when it is consistent with other material on record. 36. It is also relevant that the FIR dated 04.04.2019 itself reflects the age of the victim as 17 years. The said disclosure made at the earliest point of time assumes significant evidentiary value, as it was made prior to any possibility of tutoring or deliberation. The said version has not been discredited in cross-examination. 37. The documentary evidence in the form of Dakhil-Kharij Register (Ex. P/18C), duly proved by the Head Master (PW-03), shows the 21 date of birth of the victim as 03.03.2002. Though it has been argued that the entry was not proved by its scribe, it is well settled that school records maintained in the ordinary course of official duty carry evidentiary value under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872, particularly when supported by official testimony. The defence has not been able to demonstrate any manipulation, fabrication, or motive for false entry. 38. The Class VIII mark-sheet (Article A-1) further records the same date of birth i.e., 03.03.2002. Though it is not a matriculation certificate issued by a Board, it nonetheless constitutes a relevant piece of documentary evidence which, when read with other materials on record, supports the prosecution version regarding age. The consistency between both documents reinforces their reliability. 39. The statement of the father of the victim (PW-01), the FIR version dated 04.04.2019, the medical examination report dated 05.04.2019, and the school records (Ex. P/18C and Article A-1) collectively form a complete chain of evidence establishing that the victim was born in the year 2002. These materials mutually corroborate each other and leave no room for doubt regarding her age. 40. It is also significant that the defence has not produced any contrary documentary evidence such as any birth certificate, Aadhaar record, or any other public document to establish that the 22 victim was a major at the relevant time. The mere suggestion in cross-examination or in Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement cannot dislodge the consistent prosecution evidence. 41. In the present case, it is further borne out that during the course of trial the victim had expired, and therefore her deposition could not be recorded. However, her age, as reflected in contemporaneous records and supported by medical and oral evidence, remains reliable and admissible for determination of this issue. 42. On a cumulative appreciation of the entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established that the victim was born in the year 2002, and was thus below 18 years of age on 04.04.2019 as well as during the relevant preceding period of about one to one and a half years when the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred. 43. Accordingly, it stands conclusively established that on the date of the incident i.e., 04.04.2019, the victim was a minor and therefore fell within the definition of a “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. 44. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds no infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned trial Court on the issue of age of the victim. The said finding is based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and settled principles of law, and the same is hereby affirmed. 23 45. Accordingly, Point No. (i) is answered in the affirmative, holding that the victim was below 18 years of age during the relevant period and thus falls within the definition of a “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. 46. This Court shall now deal with Points No. (ii) and (iii) together, as both the issues arise out of a common factual matrix and are intrinsically interwoven, resting upon the consistent oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the unimpeached medical evidence, documentary records including school and official records, and the statutory presumptions engrafted under the POCSO Act,. A piecemeal examination of these issues would neither be appropriate nor conducive to a proper appreciation of evidence; hence, they are being considered conjointly. 47. The appellant stands convicted by the learned Trial Court for offences punishable under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The gravamen of the prosecution case, as accepted by the Trial Court, is that the appellant developed a close relationship with the victim, a minor girl, under the false promise of marriage, and thereafter established repeated sexual relations with her over a prolonged period. As a consequence of such repeated sexual exploitation, the victim became pregnant. It is further the case of the prosecution that during the pendency of earlier proceedings, the victim and her minor child were 24 subsequently found dead under suspicious circumstances, thereby rendering her unavailable for examination during trial. 48. In view of the unfortunate demise of the victim, the prosecution case rests primarily upon the testimony of PW-01 (father of the victim), corroborated by medical evidence, documentary records, and circumstantial material forming a complete chain of events. It is well settled that absence of testimony of the victim is not fatal if the remaining evidence is cogent, credible, and inspires confidence so as to complete the chain of circumstances pointing towards the guilt of the accused. 49. PW-01, the father of the victim, has given a vivid and consistent account of the entire incident. He has categorically deposed that the appellant was in a relationship with his daughter and had allured her on the false promise of marriage. He has further stated that the appellant used to frequently call the victim and establish physical relations with her. According to PW-01, when the family came to know about the said relationship, a complaint was lodged, pursuant to which the appellant was arrested and remained in custody for approximately six months. 50. PW-01 has further deposed that after release on bail, on the assurance of marriage, the appellant again took the victim along with him and continued to maintain sexual relations with her. It is during this period that the victim became pregnant. PW-01 has specifically stated that the victim informed him about her 25 pregnancy caused by the appellant, which compelled the family to take legal recourse. 51. Significantly, in cross-examination, though attempts were made to discredit him, PW-01 withstood the test of cross-examination and reiterated material facts. Even the defence suggestions elicited during cross-examination have strengthened the prosecution case, particularly regarding the continued association of the appellant with the victim, the promise of marriage, and the resultant pregnancy. It is settled law that admissions elicited in cross-examination, even if unintended, can be relied upon when they support the prosecution case. 52. PW-02, the mother of the victim, has also supported the prosecution case in material particulars. She has corroborated that the victim was residing intermittently with the appellant and that she had conceived during the said period. PW-02 has further stated that the victim had disclosed to the family about the sexual relations and pregnancy. Her testimony is natural, consistent, and free from embellishment. 53. PW-03, the Investigating Officer, has deposed regarding investigation, seizure of documents, recording of statements, and collection of medical and school records. His testimony establishes the procedural correctness of the investigation and corroborates the documentary chain. 26 54. The medical evidence assumes paramount importance in the present case. PW-04, Dr. Pratibha Sharma, who examined the victim on 05.04.2019, has proved Ex.P-20 and categorically stated that the uterus of the victim was enlarged consistent with approximately six weeks of pregnancy. She has also opined that the findings were consistent with recent sexual intercourse. 55. The physical examination further revealed clinical signs consistent with sexual activity, including: evidence of recent uterine enlargement corresponding to early pregnancy, tenderness and physiological changes consistent with sexual intercourse, absence of any congenital abnormality negating pregnancy, and other gynecological findings recorded in the MLC. 56. PW-05, Dr. Y.C. Mishra, who conducted the urine pregnancy test, has proved Ex.P-22 and confirmed that the victim was found pregnant. The medical findings thus conclusively establish not only the factum of pregnancy but also corroborate the allegation of repeated sexual intercourse. 57. It is a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that medical evidence, though primarily corroborative in nature, attains significant evidentiary value when it lends assurance to the consistency and credibility of ocular or testimonial evidence. 27 Where the medical findings are in harmony with the version of the prosecution witnesses and do not materially contradict the ocular account, the same reinforces the prosecution case rather than weakening it. 58. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shree Kant Shekari, (2004) 8 SCC 153, has categorically held that medical evidence cannot be viewed in isolation and must be appreciated in conjunction with the testimony of witnesses, and where both are consistent, the evidentiary value of the prosecution case stands strengthened. In the present case, the medical evidence, particularly relating to pregnancy and physiological findings, clearly supports the prosecution version and corroborates the testimony of PW-01 and PW-02, thereby fortifying the chain of circumstances. 59. The documentary evidence on record, particularly the school admission register and other official records duly proved through competent witnesses, clearly establishes that the victim was a minor at the relevant point of time. The entries in the admission register, which reflect the date of birth of the victim, have been proved in accordance with law by the concerned official witnesses, and there is nothing on record to suggest that such entries were fabricated, manipulated, or recorded with any ulterior motive. It is trite law that school records maintained in the regular course of institutional functioning carry a strong presumption of 28 correctness, especially when they are contemporaneous and not shown to be unreliable. 60. In the absence of any cogent rebuttal evidence from the defence, such as contrary birth certificate, authentic municipal records, or any expert evidence disputing the recorded age, the documentary evidence stands unshaken and reliable. The learned Trial Court has, therefore, rightly placed reliance upon such records to conclude that the victim was below 18 years of age at the relevant time. 61. Once the prosecution successfully establishes foundational facts, namely that the victim was a minor and that sexual intercourse had taken place, the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, is automatically attracted. The said provision shifts the evidentiary burden upon the accused, requiring him to disprove the presumption of guilt beyond a mere denial or suggestion in cross-examination. 62. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Asharam Bapu, (2023) 8 SCC 1, has reiterated in unequivocal terms that Section 29 of the POCSO Act creates a reverse burden clause, and once the prosecution establishes foundational facts, the Court shall presume the accused to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. It has further been held that mere denial or bald assertion of innocence does not discharge the statutory burden cast upon the accused. 29 63. Similarly, in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217, the Supreme Court has observed that in cases involving sexual offences, especially against minors, the testimony of the victim or prosecution witnesses cannot be discarded on minor inconsistencies, omissions, or absence of independent corroboration, if the core of the prosecution case inspires confidence and remains intact. The Court further emphasized that undue importance should not be attached to trivial discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter. 64. Further, in Jarnail Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has authoritatively laid down that school records maintained in the regular course of institutional duty constitute the most reliable and primary evidence for determination of age in cases under the POCSO Act. It has been held that such records, if duly proved and not shown to be unreliable, should ordinarily be accepted as conclusive proof of age. 65. Further, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, the Apex Court has clearly held that consent of a minor is immaterial in the eyes of law and cannot constitute a valid defence either under Section 376 IPC or under the provisions of the POCSO Act. It has been categorically observed that the legislative intent behind the POCSO Act is to provide absolute protection to children below 18 years from sexual exploitation, and 30 therefore, any alleged consent given by a minor has no legal sanctity. 66. The defence plea that the victim voluntarily accompanied the appellant or that the relationship was consensual is wholly untenable in law. Once minority is established, consent becomes legally irrelevant. The defence has also failed to produce any documentary evidence such as Aadhaar card, birth certificate, or any other reliable material to dislodge the prosecution case. Mere suggestions in cross-examination, without substantive proof, cannot rebut statutory presumptions or credible oral and medical evidence. 67. Upon cumulative appreciation, the following circumstances stand firmly established: • continuous relationship between appellant and victim, • repeated sexual intercourse under promise of marriage, • resultant pregnancy confirmed medically, • consistent testimony of PW-01 and PW-02, • documentary proof of minority, • absence of any plausible defence evidence. These circumstances form a complete and unbroken chain leading only to one inference, namely the guilt of the appellant. 31 68. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence in its correct perspective. The findings recorded are based on sound reasoning, proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, and are in consonance with settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. 69. This Court finds no perversity, illegality, or miscarriage of justice in the impugned judgment. The prosecution has successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant subjected the minor victim to repeated sexual intercourse, thereby attracting Section 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 70. Accordingly, Points No. (ii) and (iii) are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the prosecution and against the appellant. The findings of the learned trial Court are hereby affirmed. 71. Insofar as Point No. (iv) is concerned, this Court has carefully re- appreciated the entire evidence on record, both oral as well as documentary, including the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the exhibits proved during trial, and finds no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court warranting any interference in appellate jurisdiction. 72. The prosecution case, as discussed hereinabove, is primarily founded upon the consistent and cogent testimony of PW-01 (father of the victim), who has withstood the test of cross- examination. PW-01 has categorically deposed that the appellant 32 was in a relationship with the victim and had developed intimacy with her on the false assurance of marriage. He has further stated that the appellant repeatedly called the victim to Raipur and subjected her to sexual intercourse on various occasions, resulting in her pregnancy. PW-01 has also clearly stated that after lodging of the initial complaint, the appellant remained in custody for a period of about six months, and thereafter, upon assurance of marriage, the victim was again sent with him. His testimony further reveals that during the period of cohabitation with the appellant, the victim conceived a child. 73. The deposition of PW-01 is not a solitary or uncorroborated version; rather, it finds substantial corroboration from PW-02, who has also supported the prosecution case regarding the victim residing with the appellant and giving birth to a child during such period. PW-02 has further corroborated the fact that the victim was under the influence and control of the appellant and that the relationship was not an isolated incident but a continuing course of conduct. 74. The medical evidence on record further strengthens the prosecution case in an unambiguous manner. PW-04, Dr. Pratibha Sharma, who conducted the medical examination of the victim, has proved Ex.P/20 and has clearly opined that the uterus size of the victim was consistent with approximately six weeks of pregnancy. She has also opined that sexual intercourse had taken 33 place. The said medical evidence corroborates the oral testimony of PW-01 and PW-02 and establishes the factum of sexual activity. 75. PW-05, Dr. Y.C. Mishra, who conducted the urine pregnancy test, has proved Ex.P/22 and has categorically deposed that the victim was found to be pregnant. His evidence is consistent with PW-04 and leaves no manner of doubt regarding the pregnancy of the victim, which stands as a crucial circumstance connecting the appellant with the offence. 76. It is also pertinent to note that PW-06, the Investigating Officer, has proved the entire chain of investigation and has specifically stated that during the course of investigation, it was found that the victim was in continuous association with the appellant and had conceived a child during such association. The Investigating Officer has also proved the relevant seizure memos and other documentary exhibits, which form part of series, thereby lending procedural authenticity to the prosecution case. 77. The documentary evidence, including Ex.P/20 (medical examination report), Ex.P/22 (pregnancy test report), and other contemporaneous records collected during investigation, clearly support the prosecution version and remain uncontroverted in material particulars. The defence has not been able to dislodge the credibility of these exhibits through any substantive rebuttal evidence. 34 78. This Court also finds that the testimony of PW-01 and PW-02 is natural, spontaneous, and inspires confidence. There are no material contradictions or omissions which go to the root of the prosecution case. On the contrary, the cross-examination conducted on behalf of the appellant has rather reinforced the prosecution story, particularly with regard to the victim being in contact with the appellant and the subsequent pregnancy arising out of such relationship. 79. The defence theory of consensual relationship or voluntary association does not hold any legal water in view of the statutory scheme governing the present case. Once the age of the victim is established as below 18 years, the question of consent becomes wholly irrelevant in law. The learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated this legal position while recording conviction. 80. At this stage, it is also relevant to observe that the entire chain of circumstances formed by oral testimonies of PW-01 and PW-02, corroborated by medical evidence in Ex.P/20 and Ex.P/22, as well as the investigative findings proved by PW-06, is complete, consistent, and unbroken, pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellant and ruling out any hypothesis of innocence. 81. This Court also finds support from the settled legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asharam Bapu (supra), wherein it has been held that where statutory presumption under the POCSO Act is attracted, and foundational facts are 35 established by the prosecution, the burden shifts upon the accused to rebut the same by leading cogent evidence, and mere denial is not sufficient. Similarly, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, it has been reiterated that consent of a minor is immaterial and cannot be a defence under the POCSO Act or Section 376 IPC. 82. In view of the aforesaid appreciation of evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has meticulously examined the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, and has recorded well-reasoned findings based on proper appreciation of law and facts. No perversity, illegality, or material irregularity is found in the impugned judgment warranting interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 83. Accordingly, Point No. (iv) is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the prosecution and against the appellant, and the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are hereby affirmed. 84. Having considered the entire evidence on record in its cumulative perspective and having carefully examined the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment dated 12.12.2024 does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. The appreciation of evidence by the learned Trial Court is neither arbitrary nor based on conjectures or surmises, but is founded upon a meticulous scrutiny of oral 36 testimonies, documentary exhibits, medical evidence, seizure memos, and surrounding circumstances which form a complete and unbroken chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellant. 85. It is a settled principle that an appellate Court, while exercising jurisdiction in a criminal appeal against conviction, does not lightly interfere with findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court unless such findings are shown to be manifestly erroneous, perverse, or wholly unsustainable on the basis of evidence on record. In the present case, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based upon consistent and credible testimony of PW-01 and PW- 02, duly corroborated by medical evidence (Ex.P/20 and Ex.P/22), documentary records (Ex.P/01, Ex.P/02, Ex.P/12, Ex.P/18C, Article A-1), seizure memos relating to recovery of incriminating materials prepared during investigation, and statements of investigating witnesses PW-03, PW-04, PW-05 and PW-06. The prosecution evidence, when read as a whole, inspires full confidence and leaves no reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the appellant. 86. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2012) 8 SCC 21, held as under: “22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version 37 of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the 38 above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 87. In the matter of Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India and others, (2018) 17 SCC 291, in paras 14 and 20, it is observed as under: “14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with authority that the Pocso Act is a gender legislation. This Act has been divided into various chapters and parts therein. Chapter II of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of the said Chapter contains two sections, namely, Section 3 and Section 4. Section 3 defines the offence of “Penetrative Sexual Assault” whereas Section 4 lays down the punishment for the said offence. Likewise, Part B of the said Chapter titled “Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor” 39 contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and Section 6. The various subsections of Section 5 copiously deal with various situations, circumstances and categories of persons where the offence of penetrative sexual assault would take the character of the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section 5(k), in particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability of a child stipulates that where an offender commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking advantage of the child's mental or physical disability, it shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.” *** “20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge Bench in M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 “1. … “child is the father of man”. To enable fathering of a valiant and vibrant man, the child must be groomed well in the formative years of his life. He must receive education, acquire knowledge of man and materials and blossom in such an atmosphere that on reaching age, he is found to be a man with a mission, a man who matters so far as the society is concerned.” 88. The Supreme Court in the matter of Nawabuddin v. State of Uttarakhand (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.144 OF 2022), decided on 08.02.2022 has held as under:- 40 “10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid objects and to achieve what has been provided under Article 15 and 39 of the Constitution to protect children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, the POCSO Act, 2012 has been enacted. Any act of sexual assault or sexual harassment to the children should be viewed very seriously and all such offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment on the children have to be dealt with in a stringent manner and no leniency should be shown to a person who has committed the offence under the POCSO Act. By awarding a suitable punishment commensurate with the act of sexual assault, sexual harassment, a message must be conveyed to the society at large that, if anybody commits any offence under the POCSO Act of sexual assault, sexual harassment or use of children for pornographic purposes they shall be punished suitably and no leniency shall be shown to them. Cases of sexual assault or sexual harassment on the children are instances of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of such debased sexual pleasure. Children are precious human resources of our country; they are the country’s future. The hope of tomorrow rests on them. But unfortunately, in our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position. There are different modes of her exploitation, including sexual assault and/or sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation of children in such a manner is a crime against 41 humanity and the society. Therefore, the children and more particularly the girl child deserve full protection and need greater care and protection whether in the urban or rural areas. As observed and held by this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745, children need special care and protection and, in such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. In the case of Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703, it is observed by this Court that a minor who is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected even more than a major victim because a major victim being an adult may still be able to withstand the social ostracization and mental harassment meted out by society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so. Most crimes against minor victims are not even reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a close friend. Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Therefore, no leniency can be shown to an accused who has committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 and particularly when the same is proved by adequate evidence before a court of law.” 89. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on allowing the victim to provide her version based on her 42 recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. In State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekar, (2004) 8 SCC 153, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows: “21. It is well settled that a victim complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the victim on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration, as understood in the context of an accomplice, would suffice.” 90. On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705, observed as follows: “17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to 43 say as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.” 91. The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP v. Sonu Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under : “12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as 44 modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.” 92. Applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the facts of the present case and as observed hereinabove, this Court finds no reason whatsoever to doubt the credibility, consistency and trustworthiness of the victim. The testimony of the victim, as unfolded during trial, is found to be natural, cogent and wholly reliable, inspiring complete confidence of this Court. She has withstood the rigours of cross-examination and nothing material could be elicited to discredit her version or to create any reasonable doubt in her account of the incident. Her deposition stands fully corroborated by the medical evidence, the injuries noted in the medico-legal examination, the FSL report Ex.P/58 and the DNA report Ex.P/59, which scientifically reinforce the prosecution version. In such circumstances, the conviction of the 45 accused can safely be sustained even on the sole testimony of the victim, which is of sterling quality. 93. The law is well settled that in cases of sexual offences under the POCSO Act, the testimony of the victim/victim assumes paramount importance and can be made the sole basis of conviction if it is found to be trustworthy and of sterling quality. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rai Sandeep @ Deenu (supra) has laid down the test of a “sterling witness”, whose testimony must be of such quality that it inspires implicit confidence and does not suffer from any material infirmity. The victim in the present case clearly satisfies this standard, her version being consistent, natural and duly corroborated by medical and scientific evidence. Further, in Alakh Alok Srivastava (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized that courts must deal with child sexual abuse cases with utmost sensitivity and seriousness, ensuring that the protective object of the POCSO Act is not diluted by hyper-technical approaches. Similarly, in Nawabuddin (supra), it has been reiterated that undue insistence on corroboration in cases involving sexual offences against minors would defeat the very object of the statute. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the testimony of the victim in the present case stands fully established and deserves acceptance in its entirety. 94. The defence taken by the appellant that the victim was a consenting party and that she was a major at the relevant time 46 has been rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court. Once the minority of the victim stands conclusively established, as already discussed, any question of consent becomes wholly irrelevant in view of the statutory mandate under the POCSO Act. The Trial Court has correctly applied the law in this regard and has rightly held that the appellant cannot derive any benefit from such a plea. 95. The consistent version of PW-01, duly corroborated by PW-02, coupled with the contemporaneous FIR (Ex.P/01), medical reports (Ex.P/20 and Ex.P/22), school records (Ex.P/18C and Article A-1), and seizure of material exhibits during investigation, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant developed a close relationship with the minor victim, exploited her under the false promise of marriage, and subjected her to repeated sexual intercourse. The medical evidence further fortifies the prosecution case by proving pregnancy and signs of sexual activity, thereby lending scientific corroboration to the oral account. 96. The absence of examination of the victim, though unfortunate on account of her demise, does not in any manner weaken the prosecution case, as the law is well settled that conviction can be based on reliable and cogent evidence even in the absence of the victim’s testimony, provided the remaining evidence forms a complete chain. In the present case, the prosecution evidence is not only consistent but also mutually corroborative, leaving no missing link in the chain of circumstances. The seizure of 47 incriminating articles and contemporaneous investigative steps further strengthen the prosecution version. 97. This Court is also mindful of the fact that the appellant has already been convicted in another connected matter arising out of Sessions Trial No.118/2021 by judgment dated 19.07.2022 (Ex.P/38) for the murder of the victim and her minor child. The said conviction has also been assailed by the appellant in CRA No.631/2023, which has since been dismissed by this Court, thereby affirming the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court therein. While the said circumstance has not been treated as substantive evidence for the purpose of adjudication of the present appeal, it nevertheless forms an integral part of the overall factual backdrop of the case. The said admitted position, in fact, lends further assurance to the prosecution version and also sufficiently explains the non-availability of the victim for examination during the trial. 98. The prosecution case also stands strongly fortified by the extra- judicial confession made by the appellant before PW-05, wherein he voluntarily disclosed his involvement in the commission of the offence in the presence of respectable witnesses of the locality. Though extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence by itself, in the present case it finds due corroboration from the chain of other incriminating circumstances including medical evidence, documentary records, and seizure memos. The said confession 48 appears to be voluntary, truthful and inspires confidence as it has been made to a person in whom the appellant reposed faith and has remained unshaken during cross-examination. 99. Further, the motive behind the commission of offence is clearly established on record. The evidence of PW-01 and PW-02 demonstrates that the appellant had developed intimate relations with the victim and had been exploiting her under the false promise of marriage, and when the victim insisted upon marriage and the relationship became strained, the appellant harboured resentment and ill-will, which culminated in the commission of the offence. Motive, though not always essential, assumes significance in the present case as it provides a compelling background to the chain of circumstances proved by the prosecution. 100. The seizure evidence also plays a crucial corroborative role. The Investigating Officer PW-06 has duly proved the seizure memos (Ex.P/12 and other related documents), by which material exhibits including clothing articles and other incriminating objects were recovered at the instance of the appellant. The said recoveries were made in accordance with law and have not been successfully challenged by the defence. The FSL report further corroborates the prosecution case by connecting the seized articles with the incident in question. 49 101. Upon an independent reappreciation of the entire material on record, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective, has applied the settled principles of law governing offences under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and has recorded findings which are fully supported by evidence. No material contradiction, illegality, or perversity has been demonstrated by the appellant to persuade this Court to take a different view. 102. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds itself in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by the learned Trial Court. The prosecution has successfully established its case beyond all reasonable doubt, and the appellant has failed to rebut the statutory presumption or probabilise his defence in any manner whatsoever. 103. Accordingly, this Court affirms the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.12.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Raipur in Special Sessions Case No.78/2019. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. 104. It is further stated at the Bar that the appellant is in custody. He shall serve out the sentence as awarded by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law. 105. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are 50 undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 106. Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and action, if any. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu