IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA LPA No.472 of 2026 Decided on : _18.08.2026 Yash Pal ... Appellant Versus State of H.P. and others …Respondents. Coram Hon’ble Mr. Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Mr. Suneel Awasthi, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Arsh Rattan, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No. 1 & 2. : Mr. Vikrant Thakur, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Shubham Singh Guleria, Advocate, for respondent No.3. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral) Consideration has been sought of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 12333 of 2026, titled Yash Pal Singh vs. State of H.P. and others, decided on 23.07.2026 filed by the present appellant, which was dismissed on the ground that the litigation qua the appellant had attained finality, as the benefit granted to the similarly situated persons in LPA No. 506 of 2024, titled Mohit Gupta vs. State of H.P. and others, and LPA No. 34 of 2025, titled Pratibha Chauhan vs. State of H.P. and others, decided on 29.05.2026, could not be extended, as this Court had been pleased to confine the benefit to the parties before it. It was held by the learned Single Judge that the present appellant had acquiesced to the earlier judgment dated 20.11.2024 and, 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes -2- therefore, the fresh writ petition, as such, was not maintainable and any further adjudication would open a Pandora's box. Accordingly, no relief could be granted and the petition was dismissed. 2. Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others, (2015) 1 SCC 347, in support of his argument that the question, as such, in issue was whether the judgment was of general applicability and the Apex Court held that once the Court was deciding on a policy matter, the benefit should flow to all similarly situated persons entitled to the same. It is submitted that the petitioner was a party to the earlier round of litigation before the learned Single Judge and, though unsuccessful, since similarly situated persons approached this Court and got relief in the LPA filed by Mohit Gupta and Pratibha Chauhan's cases (supra), it is submitted that he should also be extended the same relief. It is submitted that after the decision dated 29.05.2026 rendered by us, he had filed a representation for consideration of the same relief on 05.07.2026 (Annexure P-3), and the same having not been processed, he had approached the Writ Court for a decision on the said representation and met with the fate of dismissal, and the right, as such, has been closed out at the initial stage. 3. Counsel for the respondents has rightly argued that, having not preferred to file the Letters Patent Appeal along with the others and having earlier filed CWPOA No. 5229 of 2019, which had been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 20.11.2024 (Annexure P-1), merely because the co-appellants, namely, Pratibha Chauhan and Yash -3- Pal, succeeded in the LPA’s filed by them, the appellant, as such, on filing of the representation, could not be allowed to agitate the grievance, which is on account of the fact that he had accepted the judgment and the principle of estoppel, as such, operates against him. It is submitted that the issue is regarding a selection to be made on 01.01.2013 and, as per the advertisement in question, and qua the appellant, the matter, as such, has become final, as he had not filed the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. Filing of a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action would also not arise merely on account of the filing of the representation, as the cause of action, as such, had ceased to exist the moment he preferred not to file the Letters Patent Appeal. 4. We are in agreement with the arguments raised by the counsel for the respondents that the judgment relied upon in Arvind Kumar Srivastava's case lays down the principle that similarly situated persons cannot be treated differently, as the same would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, the aspect of being a fence- sitter has also been highlighted, and it has been held that laches, delay and acquiescence constitute valid grounds for declining relief where the wrongful action had not been challenged. The observations made by the learned Apex Court read as under:— “22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly, situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the dnormal rule would be -4- that merely because other sunilarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well- recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their e counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma. Union of India³). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. 5. In the present case, the present appellant was a party to the earlier round of litigation before the learned Single Judge and had not succeeded therein. Having not filed the Letters Patent Appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, the right, as such, could not be revived merely on account of the co-appellants having succeeded. Such -5- success for them would not grant a fresh cause of action to the appellant to file a subsequent writ petition. 6. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment passed by us, on an earlier occasion, was a judgment in personam, whereby we had considered the rights, as such, of the two appellants, who had approached this Court and we had granted them specific relief and had not allowed the appeals to the extent that all the persons could be adjusted. The said persons had been left out on account of the action of the State, whereby the reserved candidates had been given appointment against the unreserved seats despite the fact that they had qualified the preliminary examination and got the benefit, as such, being reserved candidates on account of the minimum qualifying marks to be obtained, which were of lower standards. It was on that account that we were of the considered opinion that the two appellants in question could not have been prejudiced on account of the action of the State, whereby the said reserved candidates had been given appointment against the unreserved seats and, thus, accordingly, the appellants had been pushed out of the zone of selection. 7. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the judgment, as such, was a judgment in rem, as we were dealing with a cause which involved specific appellants and we had neither set aside the merit list nor directed the Commission to redraw it and give benefit to others who had also been left out. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge was very justified in reading down the effect of the Letters Patent Appeal judgment passed by us on an individual basis. -6- 8. In view of the above and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, the impugned judgment does not call for any interference. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, along with the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 18th August, 2026 Tarun Singh