1 2026:CGHC:21528-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 397 of 2026 1 - The Commissisoner Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Estate Officer Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, Vikas Bhawan, Near Nehru Chowk, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1 - Sushil Samnani S/o Bhagwan Das Aged About 53 Years R/o Behind Guru Ghasidas School, Kasturba Nagar, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Rani Samnani W/o Sushil Sanmani Aged About 50 Years R/o Behind Guru Ghasidas School Kasturba Nagar, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Urban Administration And Development Department, Mahanadi Bhavan, Mantralaya, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - The Collector Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Mayor - In - Council Through Its Chairperson, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Bilaspur Smart City Limited Registered Office 3rd Floor, Integrated Command And Control Center, Tarbahar Chowk, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Through Its Chairman. ... Respondents BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.05.08 16:59:24 +0530 2 For Appellants : Mr.R.S.Marhas, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.Samrath Singh Marhas, Advocate For Respondents No.1 and 2 For Respondents No.3 and 4/State : : Mr.Gautam Khetrapal, Advocate Mr.Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 8.5.2026 1. Heard Mr.R.S.Marhas, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.Samrath Singh Marhas, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr.Gautam Khetrapal, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 & 2 and Mr.Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for respondents No.3 & 4/State on I.A.No.01/2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 95 days in filing the present appeal. 2. On due consideration, I.A.No.01/2026 is allowed. Delay is condoned. 3. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is heard finally. 4. The appellants have filed this writ appeal against the order dated 28.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 4503 of 2025 by which the learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petition filed by respondents No.1 and 2 herein/writ petitioners 3 therein. 5. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the case are that the subject land bearing Khasra No. 488, Juna Bilaspur, is Nazul land owned by the State Government. The Municipal Corporation has merely been placed in possession of the land for “Vyavasthadin” (management) purposes and the land has neither been formally allotted nor conveyed to the Corporation. The Appellants conducted verification of 88 shopkeepers of the old bus stand and categorised them into Category “A” (holders of live and valid leases), Category “B” (holders of expired leases), and Category “C” (persons having no documents). The original petitioners were placed in Category “A”. 6. A conscious policy decision was taken by the Mayor-in-Council that all allotments in New Imlipara Commercial Complex shall be made only for a maximum period of three years through a transparent lottery/allotment process. The said policy is in consonance with the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1994, and also with the legal position that the Corporation has no authority to grant long-term leases in respect of Nazul land. Vide letter dated 31.07.2025, the original petitioners were invited to participate in the lottery/allotment process. However, instead of participating, their son-in-law refused to do so on the ground that they were seeking a “permanent lease” up to the year 2037–38. 4 7. Learned Single Judge, while observing in paragraph 25 of the impugned order that “the Corporation cannot execute leases beyond the permissible period of three years” since the land in question is Nazul property, has paradoxically directed in paragraphs 26 and 27 that the shop be allotted to the respondents for the entire period up to 2037–38 and that the conditions be altered accordingly. The said direction is wholly unsustainable in law. The directions contained in paragraphs 25, 26, and 27 of the impugned order create an anomalous and legally untenable situation by conferring rights upon the respondents beyond the permissible period prescribed under the statutory provisions, thereby rendering the impugned directions contrary to law. Hence, this writ appeal. 8. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants submits that the impugned order is self-contradictory on the face of the record. The learned Single Judge, in paragraph 25 of the impugned order, has categorically observed that the Municipal Corporation “cannot execute leases beyond the permissible period of three years” in respect of Nazul land; however, in paragraphs 26 and 27, the learned Single Judge has nevertheless directed the Appellants to allot the shop to the respondents up to the year 2037–38 and to alter the applicable conditions accordingly. Such mutually inconsistent directions are legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside. He further submits that the Municipal Corporation has no statutory authority whatsoever to grant a lease 5 exceeding three years in respect of Nazul land, ownership whereof vests exclusively in the State Government. The Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1994 prescribe that disposal of such property can be undertaken only through public auction or with prior approval of the State Government. Admittedly, no approval for grant of any long-term lease has been obtained from the State Government. Therefore, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to “alter the conditions” and execute a long-term lease is wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the statutory framework. He also submits that the policy decision taken by the Mayor-in-Council, which has been extracted even in the writ petition, was a conscious and reasoned decision arrived at after due deliberation. The said policy uniformly provided that allotments in New Imlipara Commercial Complex would be made only for a maximum period of three years through a transparent lottery process applicable to all 88 eligible shopkeepers. The learned Single Judge has erred in overriding the said policy decision and granting a special and preferential treatment to the writ petitioners alone, thereby violating the principles of equality and uniformity embodied under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. Learned Senior Advcoate contended that the original petitioners voluntarily declined to participate in the transparent lottery/allotment process despite being specifically invited vide communication dated 31.07.2025. Having consciously refused the 6 opportunity extended to them, they cannot subsequently invoke writ jurisdiction to claim a preferential long-term lease. The doctrine of approbate and reprobate squarely applies, and the respondents cannot be permitted to accept and reject the same process simultaneously. He further contended that no fundamental or vested legal right exists in favour of the respondents to compel the Municipal Corporation to execute a lease beyond the permissible period of three years. The earlier lease pertained to the old shop situated at the demolished old bus stand, whereas the proposed allotment in the newly constructed Imlipara Commercial Complex constitutes an entirely fresh allotment governed by a new policy framework. Mere existence of an earlier lease up to 2037–38 does not create any enforceable right to claim a similar long-term lease in the new commercial complex. He also cotended that the impugned order seriously prejudices public interest. Imlipara Commercial Complex forms part of the Bilaspur Smart City Project, and the decision to restrict allotments to a period of three years was taken consciously to maintain administrative flexibility, ensure transparency, and maximize public revenue. The direction to grant long-term leases in favour of the respondents would unjustifiably bind the Corporation for decades without any statutory authority and contrary to public interest. 10. He lastly submits that the findings and directions contained in paragraphs 25 to 27 of the impugned order are perverse, contrary to the pleadings and unsupported by the material available on 7 record, including the resolution of the Mayor-in-Council and the communication dated 31.07.2025 addressed to the respondents. The impugned findings therefore deserve to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 opposes the submissions made by learned Senior Advocate for the appellants and submits that the learned Single Judge considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly disposed of the writ petition filed by respndents No.1 and 2, which warrants no interference by this Court. 12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumpsection. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon perusal of the record, this Court is of the considered opinion that no interference is warranted with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. The learned Single Judge has rightly taken into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the admitted position that the respondents/writ petitioners were holders of a valid subsisting lease in respect of the original premises up to the year 2037–38 and were duly included in Schedule “A” by the Municipal Corporation itself. The categorisation made by the Corporation clearly acknowledges the continuing legal status and 8 entitlement of the writ petitioners. 15. This Court further finds that the learned Single Judge has not granted any blanket or unconditional direction contrary to the statutory provisions governing Nazul land. In paragraph 25 of the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has specifically observed that the land in question is Nazul property and that the Municipal Corporation cannot execute leases beyond the permissible period of three years without adherence to the applicable statutory framework. The subsequent directions contained in paragraphs 26 and 27 are therefore required to be read harmoniously with the aforesaid observation. 16. The directions issued by the learned Single Judge merely protect the legitimate expectation and preferential entitlement of the writ petitioners arising out of the subsisting lease and earlier assurances extended by the Corporation during previous proceedings. The learned Single Judge has consciously directed that the allotment process be undertaken in accordance with statutory provisions and subject to any approval, clarification, or permission required from the State Government. Thus, the impugned order cannot be construed as compelling the Municipal Corporation to act dehors the statute or in excess of its jurisdiction. 17. This Court is also not persuaded by the contention of the Appellants that the respondents forfeited their rights by not participating in the lottery process. The material on record 9 demonstrates that the respondents sought protection of their existing contractual and legal rights flowing from the earlier lease agreement, and their refusal to participate in a general lottery process cannot be treated as abandonment of such rights. 18. The learned Single Judge has rightly balanced the equities by directing preferential allotment in favour of the respondents while simultaneously ensuring adherence to statutory requirements and transparency in the allotment process. The apprehension expressed by the Appellants regarding violation of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1994 is therefore misconceived, as the order itself mandates compliance with statutory provisions and any requisite governmental approval. 19. No perversity, jurisdictional error, or patent illegality is found in the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in intra-court appellate jurisdiction. The impugned order is reasoned, equitable, and based upon the material available on record. 20. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu