RAHUL PATHANIA AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS
CRMMO/805/2026 · 2026-08-19
Rakesh Kainthla
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 19905 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 19905 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2026:HHC:35078 ______________ Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CrMMO No. 805 of 2026
Reserved on: 12.08.2026
Date of Decision: 19.08.202
Rahul Pathania & Anr.
....Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. & others
....Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No.
For the petitioners : Mr Vijender Katoch, Advocate.
For respondents
:
Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No.150 of 2024, dated 18.06.2024, registered at Police Station Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354D, and 506 read with
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2026:HHC:35078 Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 12, 14 and 15 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 based on compromise between the parties. It has been asserted that the matter has been reconciled between the parties and the informant has decided to pardon the accused, considering their young age. The accused had apologised many times to the victim’s family and felt remorse for the incident. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties.
2.
I have heard Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State.
3.
Mr Vijender Katoch,
learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the matter has been reconciled between the parties. The parties do not want to proceed further with the matter after the compromise. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties. He relied upon the
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judgment of this Court in Ranjeet Kumar vs. State of H.P. & others, Cr.MMO No. 648 of 2024, dated 08.12.2023 in support of his submission. 4. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State submitted that the offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous and involves the uploading of the victim’s indecent photographs; the offence cannot be compromised, and the F.I.R. cannot be quashed based on a compromise effected between the parties. 5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6. A perusal of the FIR shows that the accused had uploaded the victim’s indecent photographs on Instagram and Facebook. This was confirmed by the seizure of the mobile phones showing the uploaded photographs. Hence, the nature of the offence is heinous. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193, that an offence punishable under POCSO cannot be quashed on the compromise effected between the parties. It was observed: -
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“25. Thus, in unambiguous terms, this Court held that before exercising the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime, besides observing and holding that heinous and serious offences could not be quashed even though a victim or the victim's family and the offender had settled the dispute. This Court held that such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society….. Xxxx
30. ….In that context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sunil Raikwar v. State, 2021 SCC Online Del 258. Paragraph 12 therein, to the extent it is relevant, reads thus: —
“12. The father of the victim cannot be permitted to settle the dispute with the accused. He is not the victim, and the courts have to safeguard and protect the interests of children against the onslaught of bad forces. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused is being prosecuted for an offence that shocks the value system of a society, and this is not a matter that can be permitted to be settled as a compoundable minor offence.
Deterrence to others committing similar offences is a must, and they cannot get a signal that anything and everything can be compromised…”
31. In view of the very object and purpose of enacting the POCSO Act, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusions in paragraph 12 extracted above in the given case……. 32. In the decision relied on by the High Court to quash the proceedings viz., Gian Singh's case (supra) and the decision in Laxmi Narayan's case (supra) in unambiguous terms this Court held that the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could not be used to quash proceedings based on a compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which is not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society. When an incident of the aforesaid nature and
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2026:HHC:35078 gravity allegedly occurred in a higher secondary school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be simply described as an offence which is purely private in nature and has no serious impact on society.”
7. The Punjab and Haryana High Court followed this
judgment in Dipanshu Verma v. State of Haryana, CRM-M No.26476 of 2025, decided on 27.03.2026 and refused to quash the FIR, based on a compromise between the parties.
8.
In Ranjeet Kumar (supra), this Court was concerned with the quashing of F.I.R. after the marriage between the parties. The Court held that when the victim was living a happy and peaceful married life, the continuation of the proceedings would result in disturbance in her family life. However, a caveat was added in para 40 that sexual offences which are grave, heinous and gruesome in nature can never be a subject matter of the compromise. In the present case, admittedly the parties have not entered into a matrimonial relationship, and the cited
judgment does not apply to the present case. Further, in view of the caveat, the matter is heinous and cannot be quashed based on a compromise.
9.
In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed.
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10.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
( Rakesh Kainthla )
Judge
19th August, 2026 (Ravinder)