1 2026:CGHC:22687 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 676 of 2018 Smt. Davlen Tirki W/o Jivan Masih Tirki @ Bahadu, Aged About 57 Years R/o Kunkuri, Tehsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur Chhattisgarh. (Plaintiff), District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Sabiail Josef S/o Gabarel Aged About 45 Years, R/o Kunkuri (Postalpara), Tehsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur Chhattisgarh., District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Sunil S/o Gabarel Aged About 35 Years, R/o Kunkuri (Postalpara), Tehsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur Chhattisgarh., District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Khistofar S/o Gabarel Aged About 30 Years, R/o Kunkuri (Postalpara), Tehsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur Chhattisgarh., District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh 4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Jashpur Chhattisgarh. (Defendants), District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Kishan Lal Sahu, Advocate For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Jai Prakash Tiwari, PL (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) Judgment on Board 13.05.2026 1. Heard on admission. 2. The parties are referred to their original status before the learned trial Court. 3. This is an appeal preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “CPC”) assailing the legality, correctness and validity of the HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2026.05.18 15:48:22 +0530 2 judgment and decree dated 25.09.2018 passed in Civil Appeal No. 12A/2015 passed by the learned Additional Judge to the Court of Additional District Judge, Kunkuri , District Jashpur (C.G.). 4. By the impugned judgment and decree, the appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 96 of the CPC was dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 30.03.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class-I, Kunkuri, District Jashpur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 3A/2011 was affirmed. 5. Brief facts of the case are that the suit property involved in the present appeal comprises in piece of Khasra No. 489/4, admeasuring 0.28 acre situated at Village Kunkuri. The suit was instituted against defendant No. 1- Gabarel Kerketta who expired during the pendency of the suit and whose legal representatives were subsequently substituted on record. 6. As per the pleadings of the plaintiff, she purchased the suit property from deceased defendant No. 1- Gabarel Kerketta in the year 1970 for a consideration of Rs. 280/- whereafter she constructed a mud house over the suit property and has been residing therein. It has been pleaded that after delivering possession of the suit property, deceased defendant No. 1 assured the plaintiff that he would execute and register the sale deed in her favour. It has further been pleaded that deceased defendant No. 1 from time to time received certain amounts from the plaintiff which were allegedly recorded in a diary and till the year 1993 an amount of Rs. 16,970/- had been received by him from the plaintiff. Relying upon the assurances extended by deceased defendant No. 1, the plaintiff never insisted upon execution and registration of the sale deed. It is further pleaded that on 16.03.1993 deceased defendant No. 1 expressed his inability to refund the amount received from the plaintiff and stated that the same may be treated as the consideration amount towards the 3 suit property. Thereafter, upon the plaintiff requesting execution and registration of the sale deed, deceased defendant No. 1 allegedly supplied certain documents pertaining to the suit property including Patwari maps and other related documents. Even thereafter, he continued to avoid execution of the sale deed on one pretext or another. It has also been pleaded that in the year 1994, deceased defendant No. 1 executed a writing on a stamp paper in the presence of five witnesses undertaking to get the sale deed registered. According to the plaintiff, she has remained in possession of the suit property since the year 1970 and, therefore, has perfected her title by way of adverse possession. It has further been pleaded that on 26.08.1997 deceased defendant No. 1 issued a threatening letter directing the plaintiff to vacate the suit property, whereafter the present suit came to be instituted. 7. The written statement was filed by deceased defendant No. 1 wherein the averments made in the plaint were specifically denied. It was pleaded that the suit property was never sold to the plaintiff and in fact had merely been let out to her on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/-. It was further pleaded that besides the plaintiff, four other tenants were also residing on the suit property. Deceased defendant No. 1 denied having either demanded or received any amount from the plaintiff. According to him, when the plaintiff started raising unauthorized construction over the suit property, the impugned notice was issued restraining her from doing so. It was thus contended that the suit property exclusively belonged to deceased defendant No. 1 and that the plaintiff was merely a tenant therein. Accordingly, dismissal of the suit was prayed for. 8. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination. “1- Whether the plaintiff had acquired possession over the land bearing “Not Proved.” 4 Khasra No. 489/4, area 0.113 hectare/0.28 acre, situated at Village Kunkuri, P.H. No. 7, Revenue Inspector Circle and Tahsil Kunkuri, District Jashpur, by way of purchase from Defendant No. 1 in the year 1970 for a consideration of 280? ₹ 2. Whether, upon payment of the entire sale consideration in respect of the said land, the plaintiff is entitled to get a registered sale deed executed by Defendant No. 1? “No” 3. Whether, after purchasing the suit land bearing Khasra No. 489/4, area 0.28 acre, for Rs. 280, the plaintiff had further paid a total amount of Rs.16,970 to Defendant No. 1 as and when required by him? “Not Proved.” 4. Relief and costs. “The plaintiff has failed to prove his claim.” 9. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court decided Issue Nos. 1 to 3 against the plaintiff and ultimately dismissed the suit. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC before the First Appellate Court, which too came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the plaintiff had entered into an agreement to sell in respect of the suit property in the year 1970 and had paid a sum of Rs. 280/- towards the entire sale consideration. Pursuant thereto, possession of the suit property was also delivered to the plaintiff. He submits that deceased defendant No. 1 used to receive money from the plaintiff from time to time and had acknowledged the same by executing a writing on stamp 5 paper undertaking to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. He further submits that since no interference was caused in the possession of the plaintiff for a considerable period and in view of the repeated assurances extended by deceased defendant No. 1, the plaintiff did not institute a suit for specific performance earlier. According to him, the cause of action first arose in the year 1997 when the threatening notice was issued by deceased defendant No. 1 compelling the plaintiff to institute the present suit. It is further contended that since the plaintiff remained in possession of the suit property throughout, the suit for specific performance cannot be said to be barred by delay or laches. Alternatively, he further submits that the plaintiff has remained in uninterrupted possession of the suit property since the year 1970 and, therefore, having remained in possession for more than 27 years, she has perfected her title by adverse possession. He submits that both the Courts below committed an error in deciding Issue Nos. 1 and 2 against the plaintiff and, therefore, the substantial questions of law proposed in the memo of appeal deserve to be formulated and the appeal deserves admission. 11. Mr. Jai Prakash Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 submits that the dispute is essentially between the plaintiff and the private respondents and that the State is merely a formal party to the proceedings. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record with utmost circumspection. 13. The plaintiff has founded her case on two grounds. Firstly, it is her case that an agreement to sell in respect of the suit property was entered into in the year 1970, pursuant whereto possession of the suit property was also delivered to her and deceased defendant No. 1 continued to receive money from her from time to time. It has further been pleaded that deceased defendant No. 1 6 acknowledged the transaction in writing on a stamp paper executed in the presence of five witnesses. Secondly, it is the case of the plaintiff that when the threatening notice was issued by deceased defendant No. 1 in the year 1997, the cause of action arose for institution of the suit seeking specific performance of contract. In the alternative, the plaintiff has pleaded that she has perfected her title by adverse possession by remaining in possession of the suit property for nearly 27 years. 14. Issue Nos. 1 and 2 are germane for adjudication of the present appeal. While deciding the said issues, the learned trial Court meticulously examined Ex. P/1 and P/2 and also appreciated the oral testimony of the plaintiff and her witnesses, PW-2 Baleshwar Singh and PW-3 Allauddin. Upon due appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court recorded a categorical finding that the execution of the alleged documents and the presence of the witnesses at the time of such execution were not satisfactorily proved by the plaintiff. 15. While assessing Ex.P/1, the learned trial Court found that neither the Khasra number nor the description and location of the suit property had been mentioned therein. The learned trial Court further observed that the alleged document did not specify the exact amount paid towards consideration and did not even appear to constitute a valid agreement to sell. It was further observed that merely because a document was executed after 20 years recording that the suit property had been sold earlier, the same could not be treated as a valid document of sale. Accordingly, the learned trial Court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the suit property had been sold by deceased defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff in the year 1970 and consequently, Issue No. 1 was decided against the plaintiff. 7 16. While deciding Issue No. 2, the learned trial Court observed that although the plaintiff alleged that the suit property had been sold in the year 1970, no written agreement to sell had been produced before the Court. The learned trial Court further held that there existed no legally enforceable written agreement to sell on record. So far as possession of the plaintiff over the suit property is concerned, the learned trial Court found on the basis of pleadings and evidence that the plaintiff was indeed residing over the suit property. However, it was also observed that while the plaintiff claimed to have constructed the house herself, deceased defendant No. 1 consistently treated her as a tenant. 17. The learned Trial Court further observed that a suit for specific performance of a contract is governed by the period of limitation of three years as prescribed under the Limitation Act. Such limitation commences either from the date fixed for performance under the agreement to sell or where no such date is fixed from the date on which refusal to perform the contract is communicated. The learned trial Court observed that in the present case no written agreement to sell had been produced. Even assuming arguendo that an agreement to sell had been entered into in the year 1970, the limitation for filing the suit would have expired in the year 1973. It was further observed that even if the subsequent transaction of the year 1993 wherein certain documents were allegedly furnished by deceased defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff is taken into consideration, the limitation for filing the suit would have expired in the year 1996, whereas the suit admittedly came to be filed only in the year 1997. 18. The findings so recorded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court are based upon proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record. The case of the plaintiff suffers 8 from several inherent infirmities. Firstly, according to the plaintiff herself, the suit property was allegedly sold in the year 1970 for a consideration of Rs. 280/-. Under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 any sale transaction involving immovable property valued above Rs. 100/- was mandatorily required to be effected through a registered instrument. Even assuming arguendo that there existed an agreement to sell, the same was allegedly executed in the year 1970 and no suit for specific performance was instituted for nearly 27 years thereafter. Furthermore, even considering the subsequent alleged cause of action arising in the year 1993, when deceased defendant No. 1 allegedly agreed to execute the sale deed by supplying certain documents, the suit was still not instituted within the prescribed period of limitation of three years and ought to have been filed by the year 1996. The suit having been instituted only in the year 1997, the learned trial Court rightly decided Issue Nos. 1 and 2 against the plaintiff and the same has rightly been affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court. 19. The next submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiff has perfected her title over the suit property by way of adverse possession. The said plea is liable to be rejected outright. Mere long possession over the property does not ipso facto lead to the irresistible conclusion that title has been perfected by adverse possession. 20. The law with regard to perfection of title on the basis of adverse possession is no longer res integra. A Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Siddiq (dead) through LRs. (Ram Jan- mabhumi Temple case) v. Mahant Suresh Das and ors. reported in (2020) 1 SCC 1 in paragraph 1142-1143 held as under:- “1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the ac- ceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the 9 claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed. Evidently, there- fore, the plaintiffs in Suit No. 4 ought to be cognizant of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the Hin-dus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a ti- tle in the latter. Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not neces- sary for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be established on evidence. It be- comes then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been established. 1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case. Reading paragraph 11(a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and co- gent basis has been made out in the pleadings and estab-lished in the evidence.” 21. This judgment was relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Chand (Dead) through LRs Versus Nathu Ram (dead) through LRs reported in (2020) 11 SCC 263 in para 15. In case of M. Karim Vs. Mst Bibi Sakina reported in AIR 1964 SC 1254, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. here is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired 10 "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea.” 22. In case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal and ors. Vs. Manjit Kaur and ors. reported in (2019) 8 SCC 729 Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e., adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespasser’s long possession is not synonym with adverse possession. Trespasser’s possession is construed to be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute adverse possession. The owner can take possession from a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and the large concept is that actual tiller should own the land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The legislature in various States confers rights based on possession.” 23. In order to establish a plea of adverse possession, the possession of the claimant must be open, continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, and to the knowledge of the true owner for the statutory period. Mere possession, however long without the necessary animus possidendi, is insufficient to constitute adverse possession. 24. In the case at hand, this Court is unable to find any material demonstrating hostile possession on the part of the plaintiff against deceased defendant No. 1. Consequently, the plea of adverse possession is devoid of merit and deserves rejection. 25. It is well settled that for admission of a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, formulation of a substantial question of law is sine qua non, as held 11 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1962 SC 1314 and in the matter of Chandrabhan (Deceased) Through Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Saraswati & Ors. reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273. In the present case, no substantial question of law arises for consideration. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 26. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. Decree be drawn accordingly. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) JUDGE H. Ansari