1 2026:HHC:33304 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. : 272 of 2025 Decided on : 07.08.2026 State of H.P. and others …Appellants Versus Hem Singh and others …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellants : Mr. Rohit Sharma and Ms. Ranjana Patial, Deputy Advocates General. For the respondents : Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge. (Oral) By way of the instant Regular Second Appeal, the appellants have called in question the judgment and decree, dated 4th August, 2025, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the First Appellate 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:33304 Court’) in Civil Appeal No. 38 of 2023, titled as The State of H.P. and others versus Hem Singh and others. 2. By virtue of judgment and decree, dated 4th August, 2025, the learned First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal, preferred by the appellants herein against the judgment and decree, dated 26th September, 2023, passed by the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P., in Civil Suit No. 293 of 2016, titled as Chuhar Singh (since dead) through his LRs and others versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others. 3. The learned trial Court, vide aforesaid judgment and decree, dated 26th September, 2023, has decreed the suit of the respondents herein, filed for declaration with consequential relief for mandatory injunction, under Sections 38 and 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 4. For the sake of convenience, parties to the present appeal are, hereinafter, referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court. 5. Brief facts, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under: 3 2026:HHC:33304 5.1. Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief for mandatory injunction, on the ground, that plaintiff No. 1-Chuhar Singh, alongwith one Mohan alias Mohan Singh, son of Mangtoo; and Dalip Singh, son of Mohan Singh alias Mohan, son of Mangtoo, was owner in possession of the land, comprised in Khewat Khatauni No. 7 min/22, Khasra Nos. 128 min, 129 min, 126 min and 132 min, prior to settlement. 5.2. According to the plaintiffs, the settlement, in the area, took place in the year 1967-68 and subsequently, new khata khatauni and khasra numbers were framed and in the settlement, the khasra numbers of the aforesaid land were changed to Khasra Nos. 463 and 490, land measuring 00-17-08 hectares, of khata khatauni No. 7 min/22, situated in Village Ratoli, Ill. Bera, Tehsil Sarkaghat. 5.3. It has been averred in the plaint that during the settlement and even before that, the entry of Gair Mumkin sadak was made in the revenue record. According to the plaintiffs, although, the State of Himachal Pradesh, through Public Works Department (B&R) had encroached 4 2026:HHC:33304 upon the aforesaid land, for the purpose of the construction of the road, which, though was constructed, however, no compensation was paid to the plaintiffs. 5.4. It has been averred in the plaint that again, the consolidation took place in the area and the khata khatauni and khasra numbers were again changed, as per Mishal Hakiyat Bhuatrikaran 1991-92 and new khata khatauni of the land are 17 min/19 min, khasra No. 273, land measuring 00-09-74 hectares and 292, land measuring 0-17-08 hectares, in Village Ratoli (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’). 5.5. As per the case set up by the plaintiffs, defendant No. 3-Land Acquisition Officer/Collector, Mandi, issued notice, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, on 16th September, 2008, for acquiring the suit land of the plaintiffs, alongwith other co-sharers and other estate right holders, for the construction/accreditation/improvement of Data road Project Una–Aghar–Barsar-Jahoo–Bhambla- Kalkhar and Ner Chowk. The suit land is stated to have been measured by the revenue staff, in the presence of the State Government employees and the employees of 5 2026:HHC:33304 Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department (B&R) and the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector. The notification, under Sections 6 and 7 of the Land Acquisition Act, was issued, as per the negotiations, on 11th April, 2008. The negotiated rates were proved by the defendants No. 1 and 2 and 45,000/- per biswa, in lump-sum, in pursuance of ₹ the negotiated/settlement ward No. 30, dated 26th March, 2009. 5.6. It the further case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No. 1 is entitled to half of the compensation, which was assessed on 26th March, 2009, vide award No. 30, i.e., out of total compensation of 19,00,124/- and the remaining ₹ half is of plaintiffs No. 2 to 4. 5.7. It has also been averred by the plaintiffs that there is no dispute with regard to the acquisition of land, but, the compensation was withheld by the defendants, under the pretext, that the land was earlier acquired and the compensation was paid, but, in fact, no compensation has been paid to the plaintiffs. 5.8. It has further been averred that the plaintiffs and co-sharers have approached this Court, by filing Civil 6 2026:HHC:33304 Writ Petition No. 5064 of 2010 and this Court, while holding that highly disputed questions of facts are involved in the matter, which are required to be decided by the Civil Court, the petitioners were allowed to withdraw the petition, with liberty to file the Civil Suit, before the appropriate Court. 5.9. As such, the plaintiffs filed the present suit, before the learned trial Court, seeking the following relief: “It is, therefore, prayed that keeping in view the submissions made above a decree for declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are entitled for the compensation of suit land i.e. khasra Nos. 273, 292 alongwith interest @ 15% per annum from the date of award with consequential relief for mandatory injunction directing the Defendants to make the payment of Rs. 19,00,124/- with interest @ 15% with effect from the date of award i.e. 26-3-2009 till the payment and/or any other relief which the Learned Court deems fit under the circumstances of the case may kindly be awarded in favour of the plaintiffs and against the Defendants and justice be done.” 6. The suit was contested by the defendants, by filing the written statement and the preliminary objections, that the suit of the plaintiffs is legally and factually not maintainable in its present form and context; that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendants; 7 2026:HHC:33304 that the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by limitation for delay; that the plaintiffs have suppressed the material facts from the perusal of the Hon’ble Court; that the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties; and that the suit is liable to be dismissed with special costs under Section 35(A) of the CPC; have been taken. 6.1. On merits, it has been averred by the defendants that compensation to the tune of 3,02,596/- ₹ for khasra No. 273 was paid to plaintiff-Chuhar Singh on 26th March, 2009, for the widening purpose of road, namely, super highway Jahu to Kalkhar. 6.2. It has further been submitted that the suit land initially was acquired in the year 1958-60 and compensation of 547.49 was paid to the predecessor of ₹ the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, even, 109.74 ₹ are lying deposited in Treasury, in the name of Ganga and others (forefathers), which are yet not withdrawn. The revenue entries and registration of mutation have not been denied by the defendants. 8 2026:HHC:33304 6.3. It has also been averred by the defendants that a wrong and false suit has been filed on the basis of mis- calculation. 6.4. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made by the defendants, before the learned trial Court, to dismiss the suit, filed by the plaintiffs. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues came to be framed, by the learned trial Court, on 11th January, 2019: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for compensation qua the suit land to the extent of ₹ 19,00,124/- along with interest @ 15 per cent with effect from 26.03.2009, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether suit is not within limitation, as alleged? OPD 3. Whether plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiffs have suppressed the material facts from this Court, is so, its effect? OPD 5. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD 6. Relief. 8. Thereafter, the parties were directed to adduce the evidence. After closure of the evidence, upon hearing 9 2026:HHC:33304 learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs, as aforesaid. 9. The said judgment and decree, passed by the learned trial Court, has unsuccessfully been challenged by the defendants, by filing the appeal before the learned First Appellate Court. 10. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree, passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the present Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the defendants, before this Court. The appeal has been sought to be admitted on the following proposed substantial questions of law: “1.Whether the suit is decreed for compensation when plaintiff in his evidence admits that land was acquired before his birth and persons to whom payments were made were the forefathers of plaintiffs? 2. Whether copies of register of payment of compensation qua acquisition of 50 year old acquisition proves that land was acquired and compensation was paid to the then owners? 3. Whether silence and inaction of the then owners and thereafter their legal heirs for 50 years by not claiming compensation proved that compensation was paid and land was acquired?” 10 2026:HHC:33304 11. It has been contended by Mr. Rohit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, that the judgments and decrees, passed by both the Courts below, are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. In support of his contention, the learned Deputy Advocate General has argued that both the Courts below have not appreciated the real point in controversy and have wrongly decreed the suit, filed by the plaintiffs. 12. As per his further submissions, both the Courts below have not taken into consideration the fact that the amount of compensation stands already paid to the claimants-plaintiffs. 13. Per contra, Mr. Tek Chand, learned counsel appearing for the defendants-respondents, has supported the judgments and decrees, passed by the Courts below and has submitted that in view of the mandate, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no person can be deprived of his property, without following the due process of law. 14. He has also argued that the State has dragged the plaintiffs into uncalled for litigation, for more than 30 11 2026:HHC:33304 years and that, although, the land of the plaintiffs was utilized way back, however, the amount of compensation has not been paid to them so far. 15. Heard. 16. With the consent of the parties, the appeal is being taken up for hearing, at admission stage. 17. Admittedly, the suit land, owned by the plaintiffs, has been utilized by the State, for the construction of road, Una-Aghar-Barsar-Jahoo-Bhambla- Kalkhar-Nerchowk. It has also been admitted that the suit land has been utilized and the acquisition process was started by the competent authority. It has been submitted that though, the acquisition proceedings were started, but, the amount of compensation was not paid by the authorities. As such, the plaintiffs were constrained to approach this Court for payment of amount of compensation, however, this Court, while observing that since, highly disputed questions of facts are involved in the case, disposed of the said petition, as having been withdrawn, by the plaintiffs, with liberty to file civil suit before the competent court of law. 12 2026:HHC:33304 18. The learned trial Court has taken into consideration the oral, as well as, documentary evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled for a sum of 12,94,932/-, alongwith simple ₹ interest @ 6% per annum from 22nd July, 2008, till the realization of whole amount, from the defendants. The judgment and decree, passed by the learned trial Court, has been upheld by the learned First Appellate Court. 19. The bone of contention of the learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the appellants-defendants, is that the claim, filed by the plaintiffs was stale and highly belated. The said contention does not hold water, as, the defendants are the constituents of the welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, a suit, on the basis of title, cannot be said to be time barred, which right could only be defeated by proof of perfection by way of adverse possession by the other. 20. Admittedly, the plaintiffs are the title holders of the suit property. Being owners of the suit land, they can file a suit, at any stage, until and unless, their right is 13 2026:HHC:33304 defeated by the defendants through the perfection of title, by way of adverse possession. Hence, the plaintiffs were well within their right to file a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction, since, the suit land was utilized by the State, for construction of the road in issue, without adopting due process of law, including payment of compensation. 21. Moreover, the defendants were not in possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had consented for the construction of the road through the suit land. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to substantiate the claim of the defendants that the plaintiffs had provided either express or implied consent, for construction of the road. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, reported in (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 569, has held that no person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without any legal sanction; without following the due process of law and depriving him the payment of just and fair 14 2026:HHC:33304 compensation. Relevant paras 12.1 and 12.2 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. 12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article.” 23. Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of H.P. and others, reported in (2022) 7 Supreme Court Cases 508. 24. Even otherwise, the defendants-appellants are before this Court, in Regular Second Appeal, against the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below and the concurrent findings can only be interfered with, if the 15 2026:HHC:33304 findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, are suffering from ‘perversity’. 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Govindaraju versus Mariamman, reported in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 500, has elaborately discussed the term ‘perverse’. Relevant paragraphs 16 to 19 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:- “16. As per settled law, the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in Second Appeal under Section 100 is limited to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal or additional substantial questions of law framed at a later date after recording reasons for the same. It was observed in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be a 'substantial' question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of the parties before the Court. As to what would be the question of law "involving in the case", it was observed that to be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by the court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision between the parties. 17. After perusal of the findings recorded by the courts below and the High Court, we are of the opinion that the questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal were not questions of substance arising from the findings 16 2026:HHC:33304 record\ed by the courts of fact. The court of fact recorded the finding that the title in the suit property did not pass to Veeramuthu Moopanar and the sale deed dated 1.7.1940 executed by him in favour of his two daughters was a nominal and a sham transaction. The court of fact had also come to the conclusion that there was a divorce between Thayarammal and Sengamalai Moopanar under custom and the respondent herein had failed to prove that Ganapathy Moopanar was the son of Sengamalai Moopanar from his first wife. After recording this finding of fact, the court of fact held that since Ganapathy Moopanar was not proved to be the son of Sengamalai Moopanar and that a divorce had taken place between Thayarammal and Sengamalai Moopanar, Ganapathy Moopanar could not succeed to the estate of Thayarammal being the heir of her husband under Section 15(1) (b) of the Act. That in the absence of any direct heir, the property of Thayarammal reverted back to the heirs of her father i.e. the family members of the brother of her father. The sale effected by Ganapathy Moopanar in favour of the respondent did not convey any title as Ganapathy Moopanar was not proved to be the owner of the property. 18. The High Court on re-appreciation of evidence recorded a finding to the contrary and held that the marriage between Thayarammal and Sengamalai Moopanar had not been dissolved. It further held that Ganapathy Moopanar was the son of Sengamalai Moopanar from his previous wife. That the sale executed by Veeramuthu Moopanar dated 1.7.1940 in favour of his two daughters was not a nominal and sham transaction. That it conveyed a valid title of the suit property to his two daughters. As the daughters had not inherited the property but purchased the same from their father, they became the absolute owners of the same. Thayarammal had inherited the share of her sister after her death. As Thayarammal had died issueless and had a step-son Ganapathy Moopanar from her husband, Ganapathy Moopanar inherited the suit property being the heir of her husband under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act and succeeded to the estate of Thayarammal. 17 2026:HHC:33304 That Ganapathy Moopanar had a conveyable title in the suit property and the sale made by him in favour of the respondent was valid and decreed the suit. This was done on re-appreciation of evidence present on record. Questions of law which had been framed at the time of admission and were referred and reproduced in the judgment were not adverted to while deciding the appeal. No finding was recorded on those questions. After reproducing the questions of law, the learned Single Judge did not advert to either of them or record findings on them. The learned Single Judge proceeded to decide the appeal thereafter as if after framing the questions of law the High Court gets the jurisdiction to re- appreciate the evidence and come to a conclusion other than the one recorded by the courts of fact. As observed by this Court in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) for the question of law to be involved in the case, first a foundation for it has to be laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of facts arrived at by the court of fact and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. In the present case, the learned Single Judge proceeded to re-appreciate the evidence and on re-appreciating the same, set aside the findings referred to above on facts. On reversal of the findings referred to above on facts, the High Court came to the conclusion that Ganapathy Moopanar would inherit the property under Section 15(1)(b) being the heir of the husband of Thayarammal and not under Section 15(2)(a) under which property was to revert back to the heirs of her father. The questions of law which were framed at the time of admission of the appeal were not decided by the High Court. 19. Even if the High Court was of the view that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below were wrong, in our opinion, these findings of fact could not be disturbed without coming to the conclusion that the findings recorded were perverse i.e. based on misreading of evidence or based on no evidence. The High Court did not come to such a conclusion. The learned Singh Judge also did not come to the conclusion that the 18 2026:HHC:33304 appeal involved other substantial questions of law or formulate the same. 26. In Arulvelu and another versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor & another, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has again elaborately discussed the term ‘perverse findings’. Relevant paragraphs 24 to 30 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:- “24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others (2001) 1 SCC 501 this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others AIR 1966 Cal. 31, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned 19 2026:HHC:33304 the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition “Perverse – Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition “Perverse – Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.” 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition “Perverse – Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.” 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) “Perverse – Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.” 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition “Perverse – A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus: "We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering 20 2026:HHC:33304 with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High 21 2026:HHC:33304 Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness – as distinguished from the legal permissibility – of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Transport Corporation & Another versus Bajrang Lal, reported in 2014(3) Shim.LC 1472, has held that the High Court may entertain second appeal even, on the question of facts, where, the factual findings are found to be perverse. Meaning thereby, if this Court comes to the conclusion that the findings are perverse, then only, the 22 2026:HHC:33304 concurrent findings, recorded by both the Courts below, can be interfered with. 28. No other point has been urged or argued. 29. From the stand as taken by the parties, as considered by the learned trial Court, as well as, affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, and in view of the discussion made above, this Court is of the opinion that the Courts below have rightly appreciated the point in controversy after considering the oral, as well as, documentary evidence, placed on record. 30. Viewed thus, no question of law, much less, substantial question of law arises, in the present case. Hence, the present appeal, being devoid of any merit, is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly. 31. Pending miscellaneous applications are also disposed of accordingly. 32. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. 33. Send down the record. ( Virender Singh ) Judge August 07, 2026 ( rajni )