2026:HHC:32812 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1121 of 2026 Reserved on: 05.08.2026 Decided on: 06.08.2026 Ram Chand …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr.N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate with Mr. Harish Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Victim/Complainant : Mr Shekhar Badola, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 71 of 2026 dated 11.05.2026 registered at Police Station, Amb, District Una, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:32812 2. It has been asserted that as per the prosecution, the victim (name being withheld to protect her identity) got acquainted with the petitioner through social media platforms. The petitioner promised to marry the victim and developed a physical relationship with her. The petitioner subsequently refused to marry the victim. These allegations are false. The petitioner was serious in getting the marriage solemnised. However, he found that the victim was involved with some other person, and when he confronted the victim about this fact, she denied her relationship and threatened to implicate the petitioner in a false case. As per the victim, she had also met the petitioner's mother and sister, which shows the petitioner’s genuine intention to solemnise marriage with the victim. The petitioner had joined the investigation pursuant to the order passed by the learned Special Judge, Shimla. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on pre-arrest bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim came in contact with the petitioner through social media. The petitioner met the victim at Daulatpur Bazaar and promised to marry her. He would take her to various 3 2026:HHC:32812 hotels and would have a physical relationship with her on the promise of marriage. The victim agreed to develop a physical relationship with the petitioner because of the promise of marriage made by him. The petitioner had also introduced the victim to his mother and sister, who also promised that the petitioner and victim would be married. The petitioner refused to marry the victim on 02.05.2026 by saying that his family members were getting him married to some other girl. The victim made a complaint to the police, and the police registered the FIR. The police investigated the matter and seized various articles. The police obtained the call detail record and found that the petitioner and the victim had talked to each other frequently. The petitioner had not produced his iPhone and claimed that he had sold the iPhone to someone in Delhi. Subsequently, the police put the SIM under surveillance and found that the SIM was in operation and was being used on the iPhone. Subsequently, the petitioner produced his iPhone, which was seized by the police. The offence committed by the petitioner is heinous. The petitioner would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Hence, the status report. 4. The notice of the bail petition was issued to the victim, who filed the objections reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was 4 2026:HHC:32812 asserted that the petitioner had induced the victim into establishing a physical relationship with him for a prolonged period of time on the false promise of marriage. Subsequently, he refused to marry her. The consent of the victim was obtained by a false promise which the petitioner never intended to fulfill. The petitioner had introduced the victim to his family members to assure the victim about the sincerity of his promise. However, subsequently he refused to marry the victim. The petitioner and his family members threatened the victim to withdraw the complaint filed by her. The petitioner stopped the informant/victim and her sister on 07.07.2026 near Amroh bus station and threatened to put her photographs on social media if she failed to withdraw the complaint made by her. A complaint was also made to the police regarding this fact. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Harish Thakur, Advocate for the petitioner, Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State and Mr Shekhar Badola, learned counsel for the victim/informant. 5 2026:HHC:32812 6. Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The relationship between the parties continued for more than 2 years as per the averments made in the complaint, which shows that the relationship was consensual. The victim cheated on the petitioner, and when the petitioner confronted her, she threatened to falsely implicate the petitioner. She filed a false complaint because of the confrontation made to her. The petitioner had joined the investigation. He had produced his mobile phone before the police, and no recovery is to be effected from him. The investigation is almost complete and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The allegations made by the victim regarding the threat given to her are false and have been made with an intent to prejudice the mind of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 7. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that the offence committed by the petitioner is heinous. He had made a false promise to marry the victim without any intent to fulfill it. The petitioner had threatened the victim, which shows that the 6 2026:HHC:32812 petitioner would intimidate the witnesses if released on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. Mr Shekhar Badola, learned counsel for the victim/informant, submitted that the petitioner had made a false promise to marry the victim and entered into a physical relationship with her. He subsequently refused to marry the victim. He had threatened the victim and her sister, which shows that the petitioner would intimidate the witnesses if released on bail. A complaint was made regarding this fact to the police as well. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the power of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was observed: “69. Ordinarily, an arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre-arrest bail should 7 2026:HHC:32812 be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors are considered to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes with the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.” 11. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held: “25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.” 12. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should 8 2026:HHC:32812 balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed: “21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 13. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The status report specifically mentions that the petitioner had promised to marry the victim and entered into a physical relationship with her. The victim specifically stated in the complaint made to the police that she would not have entered into the physical relationship with the petitioner, but for the promise of marriage made to her. The petitioner took the victim to a restaurant on 02.05.2026 and told her that he could not marry her, and he had promised to marry her simply to enter into a physical relationship 9 2026:HHC:32812 with her. He was going to marry some other girl, who was selected by his family members. These allegations show that the petitioner never intended to marry the victim and he had made a false promise to induce her to enter into a physical relationship with him. Therefore, prima facie the ingredients of commission of an offence punishable under Section 69 of BNS are satisfied. 15. It was submitted that the victim had cheated the petitioner and she made a false complaint after the petitioner had confronted her. This submission is not supported by any material on record. The status report does not mention any such fact. The petitioner had also not placed any material to corroborate this version. Therefore, the submission that a false complaint was made by the victim because the petitioner had confronted her regarding her cheating cannot be accepted. 16. The victim specifically stated that she and her sister were going to Talwada on 07.07.2026, when the petitioner followed her and asked her to withdraw the complaint filed by her. He threatened to put her photographs on social media. He also showed such photographs to the victim. She had filed a complaint to the SHO, Amb, District Una, regarding this incident. This complaint 10 2026:HHC:32812 supports the submission made on behalf of the State and the victim that the petitioner would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail, which would compromise the fair trial in the present case. 17. It was submitted that these allegations are false and were made to prejudice the mind of the Court against the petitioner. This submission cannot be accepted. The complaint was made to the SHO Amb, which means that the victim can be exposed to penal consequences for making a false complaint. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that the victim would have made a false complaint simply to get the bail petition dismissed. 18. It was submitted that the investigation is complete and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. N. Sanjay, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1747, that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted because the charge sheet has been filed or the custodial interrogation is not required. It was observed at page 397: “26. In a litany of pronouncements, from Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, (1980) 2 SCC 559 and Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 SCC 795 to Atulbhai Vithalbhai Bhanderi v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 17 SCC 11 2026:HHC:32812 521, the Court cautioned against elaborately discussing/detailing the evidence or rendering findings basis the same when seized with the question of considering whether or not to grant bail. Indeed, as held by us in State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, (2023) 17 SCC 510: ‘11. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits.…’ (emphasis supplied) 27. In Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar C K, (2022) 17 SCC 391, it was held: ‘12. We are dealing with a matter wherein the original complainant (appellant herein) has come before this Court praying that the anticipatory bail granted by the High Court to the accused should be cancelled. To put it in other words, the complainant says that the High Court wrongly exercised its discretion while granting anticipatory bail to the accused in a very serious crime like POCSO, and, therefore, the order passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail to the accused should be quashed and set aside. In many anticipatory bail matters, we have noticed one common argument being canvassed that no custodial interrogation is required and, therefore, anticipatory bail may be granted. There appears to be a serious misconception of law that if no case for custodial interrogation is made out by the prosecution, then that alone would be a good ground to grant anticipatory bail. Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be considered along with other grounds while deciding an application seeking anticipatory bail. There may be many cases in which the custodial interrogation of the accused may not be required, but that does not mean that the prima facie case against the accused should be ignored or overlooked, and he should be granted anticipatory bail. The first and foremost thing that the court hearing an anticipatory bail application should consider is the prima facie case put up against the accused. Thereafter, the nature of the offence should be looked into along with the 12 2026:HHC:32812 severity of the punishment. Custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline anticipatory bail. However, even if custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated, it by itself cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail.’ (emphasis supplied) 28. In P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1157, it was stated: ‘23. As held by this Court in Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar C.K., (2022) 17 SCC 391, it would be preposterous as a proposition of law to say that if custodial interrogation is not required, that by itself is sufficient to grant anticipatory bail. Even in cases where custodial interrogation may not be required, the court is obliged to consider the entire case put up by the State, more particularly, the nature of the offence, the punishment provided in law for such offence, etc. 24. It is needless to say that for the purpose of custodial interrogation, the investigating agency has to make out a prima facie case at the time when remand is prayed for. Whether any case for police remand is made out or not, it is for the Court concerned to look into it. 25. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are of the view that we should not come in the way of the investigating agency at this point and the investigation should be permitted to proceed further.’ (emphasis supplied) 19. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be released on bail because the police have completed the investigation and the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required. 20. The allegations made against the petitioner are heinous, and the offence is punishable with imprisonment of 10 years. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ms X versus State of Maharashtra and another, 2023 STPL 3386 SC, [2023(2) Crimes 66 13 2026:HHC:32812 (SC)] that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted in an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. It was observed: “22. Surprisingly, none of the aforesaid aspects has been touched upon in both the impugned orders. The nature and gravity of the alleged offence has been disregarded. So has the financial stature, position and standing of the accused vis-a-vis the appellant/prosecutrix been ignored. The High Court has granted anticipatory bail in favour of the respondent No. 2/accused in a brief order of three paragraphs, having been swayed by the 'star variations in the narration of the prosecutrix' implying thereby that what was originally recorded in the FIR did not make out an offence of rape, as defined in Section 375 IPC, which is an erroneous assumption. Even if the first Supplementary statement of the appellant/prosecutrix recorded in the evening hours of 6th August 2022, the date on which the FIR had been registered against the respondent No.2/accused in the first half of the same day, her second Supplementary statement recorded on 6th September 2022 and the Medico-Legal Report of the doctor who had examined the appellant/prosecutrix on 8th August 2022, are kept aside for a moment, we find that there was still sufficient material in the FIR that would prima facie attract the provision of Section 376, IPC. In our opinion, these factors ought to have dissuaded the High Court from exercising its discretion in favour of respondent No.2/accused for granting him anticipatory bail. 22. Keeping in view the nature of the offence and the punishment provided for it, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail. 23. No other point was urged. 14 2026:HHC:32812 24. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 25. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 6th August, 2026 (Nikita)