- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 13058 OF 2025 BETWEEN: 1. MR. CHANDRU, SON OF BOREGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS, OCC: DRIVER, R/O. AGHALAYA VILLAGE, K.R. PETE TALUKA, MANDYA DISTRICT-591 426. 2. MRS. ALIA BARASARA, W/O. RAJESH BARASARA, AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, OCC: PRINCIPAL, SHRI PADMAVATHI ENGLISH MEDIUM HIGH SCHOOL, R/O. LAXMI DEVI COMPLEX, NAGAMANGALA ROAD, SRIKANTHA NAGAR, SHRAVANABELAGOLA TALUK, HASSAN DISTRICT-573 135. 3. MR. JEEVAN A. R, S/O. RAMAKRISHNA, AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS, OCC: SECRETARY, SHRI PADMAVATHI VIDYA SAMSTHE, R/AT ARUVANAHALLI VILLAGE, SHRAVANABELAGOLA TALUK, HASSAN DISTRICT-573 135. Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. GAUTAM S BHARADWAJ, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. PRASHANT F GOUDAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE, BY SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, SHRAVANABELAGOLA POLICE STATION, THROUGH THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU-560 001. 2. MR. MADHUKUMAR, S/O. ANDANAYYA, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/O. SANENAHALLI VILLAGE, SHRAVANABELAGOLA, SHRAVANABELAGOLA TALUK, HASSAN DISTRICT-573 135. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R-1; SMT. MOHANA KUMARI B.V, ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT AND FIR REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 BEFORE THE SHRAVANABELAGOLA P.S. BEARING CR.NO.129/2025 BY ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS COURT, HASSAN DISTRICT, HASSAN, VIDE ANNEXURE-“A” AND ANNEXURE-“B” FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 352, 351(3), 115(2) OF THE BNS, 2023 AND UNDER SECTION 3(1)(r)(s) AND SECTION 3(2)(va) OF THE SCHEDULED CASTES AND THE SCHEDULED TRIBES (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES AMENDMENT ACT, 2015) AS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 stand at the doors of this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.129/2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 352, 351(3), 115(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (the 'Atrocities Act' for short). 2. Heard Sri.Prashant F Goudar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri.B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Addl. SPP appearing for respondent No.1, Smt.Mohana Kumari B.V., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and have perused the material on record. 3. Facts adumbrated are as follows: 3.1. The second respondent registers a complaint before the Block Education Officer regarding the inaction of the Principal and school administration which has allegedly enraged - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 the Principal. The second respondent then seeks to register a complaint against these petitioners on the score that the driver of the bus and the Principal and the office bearer of the school have all indulged in hurling of abuses against the complainant and also did assault him. This becomes a crime in Crime No.129/2025. A counter case is also registered by the Principal of the school against the complainant which becomes a crime in Crime No.130/2025, albeit for different offences. Therefore, it becomes a case and a counter case. The registration of the crime has driven the driver and the Principal and the Secretary to this Court in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel Sri.Gautam S Bharadwaj appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the provisions of the Atrocities Act are misused and abused in the case at hand for no reason whatsoever, as the children of the complainant were arriving late to come into the bus for pick up to the school, which had derailed the entire time line of the bus arriving at the school. When this was sought to be complained at, the driver is in fact hurled abuses at and not the other way round and notwithstanding the said fact, a crime - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 comes to be registered against the driver, the Principal and the Secretary of the Institution, alleging offences under the Atrocities Act. Learned counsel seeks quashment of the proceedings. 5. Per contra, learned counsel representing the complainant would submit that the matter involves hurling of abuses against the member of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, as the case would be, which would become the ingredients of the Atrocities Act and therefore, the counsel would submit that the matter must be permitted to be investigated into, in the least. 6. The learned Addl. SPP would toe the lines of the learned counsel appearing for the complainant, but however would place the material on record with regard to the statements recorded of the hurling of abuses, if any, against the complainant. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material on record. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 8. The afore-narrated facts link in the chain of events and the dates, are all a matter of record. They would not require any iteration. The entire issue has now sprung from the registration of the complaint. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. 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The complaint narrates that the driver of the bus has hurled certain abuses and the Principal was looking at the hurling of abuses and stood silent and did nothing. The Secretary, who was nowhere, is also dragged into the web of proceedings, just because he is the Secretary of the school. This becomes a crime in Crime No.129/2025 for the aforesaid - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 offences. The primary offences are of the Atrocities Act. The offences are the ones punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act. Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) would require hurling of abuses in a public place or a place of public view. Neither of it is even averred in the complaint for investigation to be permitted to be continued against these petitioners in the case at hand. Jurisprudence is replete as to how the ingredients of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) must be present in a given case. 10. The Apex Court in the case of HITESH VERMA vs. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710, has held as follows: "10. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well. The object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the offence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is thus intended to punish the acts of the upper caste against the vulnerable section of the society for the reason that they belong to a particular community. 11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26-1- - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under: “3. (1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;” 12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “(1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in any place within public view”. 13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste. 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original) - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet. 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of M.P. [Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104] , this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” The said judgment is subsequently reiterated even in GUNJAN @ GIRIJA KUMARI vs. STATE (NCT OF DELHI), reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 834, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. 5.1 Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act read as under, “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— 3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (a) to (q) ……….. (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” 5.1.1 The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act can be said to have been committed when a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe intentionally insults or intimidates with an intent to humiliate a person belonging to - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is made out when any member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name in any place within public view. 5.2 The ingredients of the offences are that there has to be an intentional insult or intimidation which has to be with an intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or that such member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name by a person who does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The common essential for constituting the offence under both the Sections is that the insult or intimidation under sub-clause (r) or hurling of abuses under sub- clause (s) have taken place “in any place within public view”. 5.3 All the appellants are framed for the offence under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC. Section 506, IPC is about punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation whereas the offence of criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503, IPC. It says that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, and when the same is done with an intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation. Section 34, IPC speaks about the acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. 5.4 Before examining the sustainability of the charge framed and the charge-sheet for its details and contents in respect of the aforesaid offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, it would be useful to survey few decisions of this Court which have explained the scope and purport of the phrase “in any place within public view” pinpointing that the said requirement is indispensable to be fulfilled in order that the offence under the SC/ST Act is constituted. 5.5 In Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel7, the place where the informant was insulted by the appellant by calling him ‘chamar’ was one where he had been standing near the car which was - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 parked at the gate of the premises of his employer. This Court held that such place was “a place within public view”. The argument that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence did not come within the purview of the offence under the SC/ST Act was negatived by explaining a fine distinction between the expression ‘in any place within public view’ as used in the provision and the expression ‘public place’. 5.5.1 It was stated that the expression ‘a place within public view’ could not be confused with the expression ‘public place’. It was highlighted that a place can be a private place yet can be within public view, “….It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view….” (Para 28) 5.6 Swaran Singh (supra) came to be relied on by this Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand8 in respect of the concept of ‘place within public view’ as an ingredient of the offence. The very observations in Swaran Singh (supra) were reiterated in paragraph 14 in Hitesh Verma (supra) when the Court noticed the allegations in the FIR about abusing the informant. It was stated in the FIR that the incident of abuse happened within the four walls of the building of the informant, and it was not the case of the informant that any member of the public was present at the time of the incident in the house. The Court, therefore, ruled that the basic requirement that the abusive words were uttered in ‘a place - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 within public view’ was not made out. It was further noticed that witnesses whose names were appended to the chargesheet were not the persons present within the four walls of the building. 5.7 In a more recent decision in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy9, this Court considered its own decisions in Swaran Singh (supra) as well as Hitesh Verma (supra), and elucidated an ironed-out proposition of law as under, “It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.” (Para 11) 5.7.1 The Court observed that even by taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, what was alleged was that when the complainant was in the office, the accused came there, made inquiries from the complainant and upon not being satisfied, started abusing the complainant in the name of his caste and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came later to pacify the accused and took him away. The Court thus noticed that the incident had taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the complainant, which was not “a place within public view”. 5.8 A decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sri Rithesh Pais v. State of Karnataka, by Puttur Town P.S.10 may also be noticed to be relevant, in which the offence was held to be not made out as the chargesheet material showed that the hurling of the abuses had happened in the basement and within the walls of the basement, holding that the basement of the building was not “a place within public view”. - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 5.9 A conclusive statement of law that emanates from the ratio of the decisions of this Court discussed above is that in order to make out the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and the act and conduct of hurling of caste-based abuses must take place at “a place within public view”. It must be a place within the public gaze. Even happens to be a private place, then in such eventuality a public-eye must have an access to be able to notice what happens there or what is taking place that will only make the “place within public view”. 6. Having appreciated the aspect that the requirement that the occurrence of the incident of insult or abuse, towards the member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe has to be in “a place within public view”, making the same a necessary condition for constituting the offence under the SC/ST Act, the facts in the present case may be attentively noticed. 6.1 In the FIR, while referring to the incident of abuse, on 28.01.2021, the statements were made by respondent No. 2-complainant that the appellants were in the habit of harassing and hurling caste- based slurs at him for over a year and that they used to do it when some other persons or friends come to meet him, by using the abusive words from their balcony or at the ground floor of the house. 6.2 These allegations about the alleged continuous conduct did not speak of any specific instance or happening on a particular day and they are too irrelevant to contribute to make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. It was next stated that because of such behaviour of the appellants, respondent No. 1- complainant had to send his son in a separate house. Such general accusations lead nowhere when it comes to allegation about the commission of offence. 6.3 As per the averments in the FIR, on the relevant date that is on 28.01.2021, the altercation occurred at the time when the appellants were trying to break open the house of respondent No. 2- - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 complainant. According to respondent No. 2- complainant, appellant No. 1 hurled casteist slur in an abusive way to insult him and his wife. All the appellants-accused, it was further alleged, intimidated respondent No. 2-complainant and also threatened to implicate him in molestation charge. 6.4 It was noticeable that in the complaint/FIR, nowhere it was stated that the said incident wherein appellant No. 1 and other appellants are stated to have abused and threatened respondent No. 1- complainant, took place where there was a public gaze. The necessary ingredient of occurrence of the incident “in a place within public view” was conspicuously absent. 6.5 Not only that it was not stated that it was “a place within public view” or that the outsiders or the members of the family were present at the time, the details mentioned in the FIR clearly indicated that the place of occurrence of the incident was inside the residential house. Referring to the facts stated and the contents of FIR in this regard, firstly the FIR is silent about the place of occurrence of the alleged incident. Secondly, point No. 5(b) in the FIR mentioned the place of occurrence at the address stated as “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi”, which was admittedly a residential home. Similarly was recorded the address of respondent No. 2- complainant in point No. 6(e) in the FIR to reinforce that it was the place of residential house where the occurrence took place. Thirdly, in the charge-sheet filed before the court, the very residential address “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, Kirti Nagar, Delhi” was mentioned to suggest the place of occurrence. 6.6 Respondent No. 2-complainant named two witnesses, one Love Manchanda and another named Chandra Prakash. Not only that both were the friends of respondent No. 2-complainant, from their statements, nothing could be elicited to show that they witnessed the incident. Love Manchanda stated that “on 28.12.2020, Bhim Sain (complainant) asked me to accompany him to his house where he wanted to take a picture of the locked lock of his house”. In his statement, Chandra Prakash - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 stated that “he went to the house at Ramesh Nagar with the complainant Bhim Sain and when he wanted to open the lock of his house, the accused interjected”. 6.7 All material facts go to suggest that the alleged incident took place in a private place and within four walls of the house of respondent No. 2- complainant and the appellants, who all are family members. While the allegation in the FIR was, as stated, that respondent No. 2-complainant had been suffering similar kind of incidents since long and for last one year, it was not stated anything specific in respect of those earlier incidents with regard to the incident for which the complaint was filed, it was not indicated that any independent member of public was present to witness the occurrence. Once that is so, to suggest that the house place was not exposed to public eye or public gaze, a residential house in no way becomes “a place within public view”. 7. For any criminal proceedings to initiate, the starting point is filing of a complaint and registration of FIR. The complaint/FIR provides the first account of the happening of events and incidents alleged as commission of offence. A reaction and revelation at the first blush is always natural and therefore becomes creditworthy. The contents of the complaint giving the initial and primary description could be treated as more reliable, for, at the subsequent stage, there would be a scope and room for improvisation. 8. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal11, this Court laid down the acid test that if the contents of the FIR, taken at their face value, do not make out any case against the accused, such an FIR registered with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed. In Hitesh Verma (supra), in addition to the ingredient of “a place within public view”, the details in the FIR or the charge-sheet failed to disclose the precise contents of abusive language employed by the applicant to attract the offence under the SC/ST Act. In other words, when the essentials to constitute the offence did not come out from and were not satisfied in the contents of the FIR, the offence was held to - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 have not been made out, rendering the FIR liable to be quashed. 8.1 In Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh12, this Court noted that the defect in the FIR was in the nature of non-mentioning of the name of material witness PW-1 which was treated as a basic defect in the hypothesis portrayed by the prosecution. The Court, in that context, observed, “although we accept that the FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of the crime, but absence of certain essential facts which are conspicuously missing in the present FIR, point towards suspicion that the crime itself may have been staged”. 8.2 Also in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh13, this Court found absence of requisite ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act holding that the offence was not committed at “a place within public view”. It was observed that even though the appellant in that case might have abused the complainant, but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in view of the clear absence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. 9. Thus, it is trite principle that the FIR becomes liable in law to be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence alleged therein. The basic constituents of the offence alleged in the FIR must stem and stand disclosed from the contents of the FIR. In order that the FIR alleging any action is sustainable in law to be a good and acceptable document to proceed criminally against any accused named therein or any person to be made accused on its basis, it must manifest and reveal basic ingredient of the offence(s) alleged therein. For an offence to be made out under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, as is the question in the instant case, the requirement that the occurrence has to be “in a place within public view” is not satisfied, is missing and absent. - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 9.1 It could be said that the occurrence of the incident to become an offence under the SC/ST Act must have happened “in a place within public view”, is in a way, a principal requirement amongst the other ingredients. The other aspects namely “intentional insult or intimidation” and “an intent to humiliate”, gathers a kind of intensity when the insult, intimidation, humiliation or abusive utterances, as the case may be, takes place in “a place within public view”, in the presence of members of the public. The requirement that the place must be one “within public view” can be said to be substantiating the other elements of the offence under the SC/ST Act. It is therefore a sine qua non for making out the offence under the SC/ST Act.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court in GUNJAN supra considers the entire spectrum of the law that is laid down hitherto and holds that hurling of abuses in a secluded place, hurling of abuses in a basement or within the four walls of a particular property, would not become a public place or a place of public view. The same goes in the case at hand. Therefore, permitting further investigation even in the case at hand would become an abuse of the process of the law. What remains is the offences under Sections 352, 351 and 115 of the BNS. They are Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC. Interpretation of those provisions as well need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in the case of MOHAMMAD WAJID - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:26584 CRL.P No. 13058 of 2025 vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 has specifically interpreted these provisions. If the elucidation of law by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment is pitted against the facts obtaining in the case at hand, what would unmistakably emerge is, permitting investigation even would become an abuse of the process of the law. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: O R D E R [I] Criminal Petition is allowed. [II] Proceedings in Crime No.129/2025 pending before the Addl. District and Sessions Court, Hassan District, Hassan, stands quashed qua the petitioners. I.A.No.2/2025 is disposed as a consequence. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE CBC List No.: 2 Sl No.: 37