2026:JHHC:19809-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 355 of 2026 Barun Prasad Singh, S/o Late Muneshwar Prasad Singh, R/o Mohalla-Gangajal, Ward No. 16, PO & PS-Saharsa, District- Saharsa, Bihar ... ... Appellant Versus 1. Central Bank of India through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director, having its registered office at Chandramukhi, Nariman Point, PO-Nariman Point, PS-Colaba, Mumbai, Maharashtra 2. General Manager, H.R.D, Central Bank of India, office at 17th Floor Chandramukhi, Nariman Point, PO-Nariman Point, PS- Colaba, Mumbai, Maharashtra 3. Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India, having office at 2nd Floor, Block-B, Maurya Complex, Dakbunglow Road, Patna, Bihar 4. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India, having office at 2nd Floor, Krishna Arcade, H.B. Road, Dipatoli, Booty More, PO & PS-Bariatu, Ranchi 5. Assistant General Manager, Central Bank of India, Regional Office, Jatinchand Road, Lalpur Chowk, Ranchi 6. Branch Manager, Central Bank of India, TELCO Town Branch, having its office at Red Carpet Service Station, Jamshedpur, PO & PS-Telco, District-East Singhbhum ... … Respondents ----- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Appellant : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. P.A.S. Pati, Advocate ----- Order No. 02 Dated: 06.07.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge’s order dated 27.11.2025 dismissing the appellant’s/writ petitioner’s W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019. 3. In this case, the appellant/writ petitioner, who was an officer with the Central Bank of India, applied for premature retirement under Voluntary Retirement Scheme (V.R.S) by 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 2 his application dated 27.06.2007. This was rejected by the Bank vide letter dated 08.09.2007 on the ground that there was no V.R.S scheme in vogue at that time. 4. Further, this communication also said that the appellant’s application dated 27.06.2007 was treated as one for “premature retirement” in terms of Clause 19.7 of the Officer Service Regulation (OSR). However, the petitioner was ineligible for “premature retirement” as per Clause 19.7 of the OSR because he had neither attained the age of 55 years nor had completed 30 years of service as an officer. 5. The appellant, without challenging the communication dated 08.09.2007 rejecting his application for voluntary or premature retirement, proceeded to tender his resignation vide letter dated 24.11.2007, though the resignation was made effective from 21.07.2008. 6. The Bank, by its communication dated 12.07.2008, accepted the petitioner’s resignation from the date he indicated and relieved him from service on 21.07.2008. The petitioner was informed that this was in accordance with Regulation 20.2 of the OSR. 7. For almost 8 years, the petitioner did not bother to challenge either the letter dated 08.09.2007 rejecting his application for voluntary or premature retirement or the communication dated 12.07.2008 by which his resignation was accepted, effective from the date indicated by him, i.e., 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 3 21.07.2008. 8. After eight long years, the petitioner instituted C.W.J.C. No. 1700/2016 in the Patna High Court; however, the same was dismissed vide order dated 22.09.2016 for want of territorial jurisdiction. 9. The petitioner then instituted W.P.(S) No. 7299/2016 before this Court seeking the following relief: “That by the instant application the petitioner above named prays for the issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/ direction(s) commanding upon the respondents to forthwith fix the retirement benefits of the petitioner who worked as the Manager MMG-2 (Middle Management Grade-2). Having joined the service on 30.12.1978, with a further direction on the respondents to pay to him his arrears of pension and other retiral dues with interest.” 10. Significantly, even in W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016, the petitioner neither challenged the communication dated 08.09.2007 by which his application for voluntary/premature retirement was rejected, nor the communication dated 12.07.2008 by which his resignation was accepted and he was relieved with effect from 21.07.2008. The only relief was to forthwith fix the retirement benefits of the appellant and to pay him the arrears of pension and other retiral dues with interest. 11. W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon’ble Mr Justice Shree 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 4 Chandrashekhar, as His Lordship then was) by observing thus, “1. The petitioner’s resignation was accepted on 21.07.2008. It is admitted at Bar that scheme for pension was brought into existence in the year, 2010 and the employees should have opted for pension under the scheme provided they were in service as on the date of application. Not only that, to a pointed query of the Court the learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to indicate whether an application opting pension under 2010 scheme was made. 2. The respondents have pleaded that all admissible post-retiral benefits including gratuity have been paid to the petitioner. 3. In the aforesaid facts, finding no merit in the writ petition, it is dismissed.” 12. The appellant instituted L.P.A No. 444 of 2017 against the learned Single Judge’s order dated 14.07.2017. This time, in appeal, however, the appellant tried to make out a completely different case by referring to the pension scheme brought into existence in 2010 and relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shashikala Devi Vs. Central Bank of India & Ors., (2014) 16 SCC 260. The appellant also urged that under Rules 14 and 29 of the Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Regulations, 1995”), he was entitled to pensionary benefits. 13. The Division Bench held that it did not consider it necessary to interfere with the learned Single Judge's reasoning in 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 5 dismissing the appellant’s writ petition. However, the Division Bench, considering the new materials brought by the appellant at the appellate stage, disposed of the appeal giving liberty to the appellant to apply afresh before the appropriate forum. The appellant, in pursuance of such liberty, filed a representation with the Bank on 21.01.2019, and because the same was not disposed of, instituted W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 in which the impugned order dated 27.11.2025 came to be passed. 14. In W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019, the appellant/writ petitioner, for the first time, sought for the following reliefs: “(A) For quashing of letter dated 08.09.2007 as contained in ref. no. RO/HRD/07-08/843 (Annexure-3), issued under the signature of the Assistant General Manager to the Branch Office, Telco Town, Central Bank of India, whereby and whereunder application of the petitioner for Voluntary Retirement Application dated 27.06.2007 has not been considered under the Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 and treated it as application for premature retirement;” (B) For quashing of letter dated 20.09.2007 (Annexure-4), issued under the signature of Senior Manager, Central Bank of India, Telco Branch, whereby the petitioner has been informed that his application for voluntary retirement has been returned by the Regional Office as he has not completed 55 years of age or has not completed 30 years of service; (C) For a direction upon the respondents to forthwith fix the pension of the petitioner since 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 6 21.07.2008 when the petitioner’s resignation has been accepted, release arrears of pension with all consequential benefits with statutory interest pursuant to Regulations 14 and 29 of the Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995. 15. The learned Single Judge, by a detailed order dated 27.11.2025, dismissed W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 against which the appellant has instituted the present Letters Patent Appeal. 16. Mr Rajesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the learned Division Bench, vide order dated 02.01.2019, while disposing of L.P.A. No. 444 of 2017 had given the appellant liberty to apply afresh before the appropriate forum. He, however, submitted that under this liberty, it was open to the appellant to rely on fresh material in the form of the 2010 Scheme/Settlement and the law laid down in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra). 17. Mr Rajesh Kumar submitted that in terms of this fresh material, the appellant was neither entitled to seek quashing of letter dated 08.09.2007 by which the appellant’s application for voluntary/premature retirement was rejected and also, the letter dated 20.09.2007 by which the appellant was informed that his application for voluntary retirement has been returned by the regional office since he had not attained the age of 55 years or completed 30 years of service. 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 7 18. Mr. Rajesh Kumar submitted that under the very same liberty referred to above, the appellant was also entitled to urge that consequent upon the acceptance of his resignation w.e.f. 21.07.2008, he was entitled to pension under regulations 14 and 29 of the Regulations, 1995 and for a direction for release and payment of such arrears of pension with statutory interest. 19. Mr. Rajesh Kumar submitted that the decision in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra) entirely supports the case of the appellant. Further, given the liberty granted to the appellant, learned Single Judge could not have dismissed the appellant’s writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 on the ground of delay and laches. 20. Mr. Rajesh Kumar submitted that for the above reasons, the impugned order dated 27.11.2025 dismissing W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 warrants interference. 21. Mr. P.A.S. Pati, the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, defended the impugned order based on the reasons set out therein. He pointed out that W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 was barred by inordinate delay and laches, as well as by the principles of res judicata and/or constructive res judicata. 22. Mr Pati submitted that reliance on the case of Shashikala Devi (supra) was misplaced as in that matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had not dealt with the regulations applicable to officers like the appellant. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 8 Court was concerned with the case of a peon who had completed 34 years of service and who, instead of applying for voluntary retirement, mistakenly applied to resign from service. 23. Mr Pati submitted that, in the present case, the appellant was an officer governed by the OSR, 1979, and that he had initially applied for voluntary/premature retirement and, upon its rejection, made a single application to resign with prospective effect. Mr Pati further pointed out that, in the case of LIC Vs. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the context of the decision in Shashikala Devi (supra), held that the pension scheme, though it should be construed as beneficial legislation, cannot be dealt with on a charitable principle. 24. Accordingly, Mr. Pati submitted that this appeal may be dismissed. 25. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 26. At the very outset, we have discussed the facts and list of dates as applicable in this appeal. 27. In W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019, in which the impugned order dated 27.11.2025 has been made, the appellant/writ petitioner has sought to challenge, practically after 12 years of the communications of 2007 and 2008, by which his applications for voluntary/premature retirement or for acceptance of his resignation request w.e.f. 21.07.2008 were 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 9 rejected. There is no explanation, or in any event no sufficient explanation, for this inordinate delay of over 12 years in raising such challenges. Rather, the material on record shows that the appellant accepted the position arising out of the 2007-2008 communications and, belatedly, still tried to make out the case that, notwithstanding such communications, he was entitled to certain pensionary benefits under the Regulations, 1995. 28. The record shows that the appellant, for the first time, instituted petitions in 2016, first before the Patna High Court and then this High Court regarding his predicament. Even in those petitions, there were no challenges to the 2007-2008 communications which are now sought to be challenged after almost 12 years. All that the appellant sought for was some pensionary benefits based upon his interpretation of the Regulations, 1995. 29. The learned Single Judge, by order dated 14.07.2017 in W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016 as quoted above, held that the appellant/writ petitioner was not entitled to any pensionary benefits based upon the Regulations or Scheme which entered force in 2010, long after the appellant was no longer in service with the Bank. 30. This decision of the learned Single Judge was specifically approved by the Division Bench in its order dated 02.01.2019 in L.P.A. No. 444 of 2017. By this order, however, 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 10 liberty was given to the appellant to apply afresh before the appropriate forum because he claimed to have come up with “new materials” and had tried to make out a case which was completely different from the one pleaded by the appellant in W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016. 31. Now, liberty cannot be construed as carte blanche to raise the same old issues by trying to pass them off as new material. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the new material comprised Regulations 14 and 29 of the Regulations, 1995 and 2010 Settlement, by which the pension scheme was introduced, and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra). We note that the Regulations, 1995, were already in force when the appellant instituted his belated W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016. Similarly, even the decision in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra), assuming it could be called “new material”, was delivered in 2014. Therefore, the only so-called “new material” was the 2010 Settlement Scheme. 32. The argument regarding the 2010 Settlement Scheme was specifically raised by the appellant before the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016, and the same was expressly rejected. The learned Single Judge, in fact, noted that the learned counsel for the appellant was unable to indicate whether the appellant had ever made an application opting for a pension under the 2010 Scheme. The learned 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 11 Single Judge also noted that it was admitted at Bar that the pension scheme was introduced only in the year 2010, and that employees should have opted for pension under the scheme, provided they were in service as on the date of application. 33. Admittedly, the appellant was not even in the service of the Bank in the year 2010, when the pension scheme came into force. Therefore, by misconstruing the liberty granted by the Division Bench in its order dated 02.01.2019 and ignoring the rules of res judicata or in any event constructive res judicata, the appellant could not have filed W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 to belatedly challenge the communications of 2007 and 2008 by which his application for voluntary/premature retirement came to be rejected, or communications by which he was denied any pension despite the acceptance of his resignation w.e.f. 21.07.2008. 34. Even if inordinate delay and laches, or the principle of constructive res judicata, which is applicable to the present case, are to be ignored on demurrer, the appellant is still unable to specify to us the errors, if any, in the communications dated 08.09.2007 or 20.09.2007. The communication dated 08.09.2007 informed the appellant that there was no scheme for voluntary retirement and even in terms of the rules for premature retirement, the appellant was ineligible as he had not completed 55 years of age or 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 12 30 years of service. This decision was entirely consistent with OSR, 1979. 35. Incidentally, in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not concerned with OSR, 1979, but was dealing with the rules applicable to Class-IV employees, which were governed by different regulations and schemes. On facts as well, the peon, who was involved in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra), had put in 34 years of service at the time when he applied for resignation by confusing it with voluntary retirement. 36. The case of Shashikala Devi (supra) runs on its own facts which are not comparable with the facts of the appellant’s case. As noted earlier, the appellant was an officer governed by OSR, 1979, in contrast with the peon in Shashikala Devi’s case who was governed by different regulations. Further, the peon had put in 34 years of service and was otherwise eligible for the benefits of voluntary retirement, which was not the case with the appellant herein. 37. Further, we also note that in the case of LIC Vs. Shree Lal Meena (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the specific context of Shashikala Devi’s case, has observed that such issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 13 particular date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by implication. The provisions will have to be read as they read unless there is some confusion or they are capable of another interpretation. 38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that when framing such schemes, an important aspect is their financial implications. These implications affect both the employees (contributors) and the State. Thus, it would be inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes beyond their contours and to extend them to employees for whom they were not intended by the legislature. 39. The learned Single Judge has also drawn out the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement by relying upon several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this case, the appellant was aware of the distinction because first, he made an application for voluntary retirement and upon its rejection, without challenging such rejection, specifically applied for relief to resign services with a prospective date. Even after the resignation was accepted, the appellant’s only contention was that he was entitled to pensionary benefits. Even this contention was never made good in the petitions filed by the appellant. The learned Single Judge has considered the matter in substantial detail, and we detect no error in the reasoning or in the findings of 2026:JHHC:19809-DB 14 fact which are mostly indisputable. 40. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal, though, without any order for costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) July 06, 2026 Manish/Ritesh A.F.R. Uploaded on 10.07.2026