2026:HHC:35435 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 901 of 2026 Reserved on: 18.8.2026 Date of Decision: 21.8.2026. Sumit …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : M/s Vijender Katoch and Shivanshu Attri, Advocates. For the Respondent-State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 117 of 2025, dated 20.07.2025, registered at Police Station, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Section 65(1), and 137(2) read with Section 3(5) of Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita 2023 (BNS) and Sections 6 and 17 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, (POCSO Act) and the consequential proceedings arising out of it. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:35435 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner and the victim’s mother have entered into a compromise voluntarily without any influence from any person. The victim believes that nothing wrong has been done by the petitioner to her and she has decided to pardon her. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records carefully. 4. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that the power to quash the proceedings under section 482 based on the compromise is different from the power of compounding under section 320 of CrPC. It was observed: “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320. The court is guided solely and squarely thereby. On the other hand, the formation of 3 2026:HHC:35435 opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence, criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power. However, the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of the indictment. 58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of society, and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of a civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal 4 2026:HHC:35435 proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts, and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed. 59. B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist a distinction between compounding an offence under Section 320 and quashing a criminal case by the High Court in the exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different, although the ultimate consequence may be the same, viz., acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment. 60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554], Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153], Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321]. The principle propounded in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] that the 5 2026:HHC:35435 inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override an express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], the Court observed the same thing: that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. A similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554]. In Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the commission of the offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471 IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference 6 2026:HHC:35435 made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] supports the view that criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing. 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding, FIR or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accordance with the guideline engrafted in such power, viz., (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases the power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before the exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in 7 2026:HHC:35435 that capacity, etc., cannot provide a basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding. 5. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193, that an offence punishable under POCSO cannot be quashed on the compromise reached between the parties. It was observed: - “25. Thus, in unambiguous terms, this Court held that before exercising the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity 8 2026:HHC:35435 of the crime, besides observing and holding that heinous and serious offences could not be quashed even though a victim or the victim's family and the offender had settled the dispute. This Court held that such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society….. Xxxx 30. ….In that context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sunil Raikwar v. State, 2021 SCC Online Del 258. Paragraph 12 therein, to the extent it is relevant, reads thus: — “12. The father of the victim cannot be permitted to settle the dispute with the accused. He is not the victim, and the courts have to safeguard and protect the interests of children against the onslaught of bad forces. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused is being prosecuted for an offence that shocks the value system of a society, and this is not a matter that can be permitted to be settled as a compoundable minor offence. Deterrence to others committing similar offences is a must, and they cannot get a signal that anything and everything can be compromised…” 31. In view of the very object and purpose of enacting the POCSO Act, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusions in paragraph 12 extracted above in the given case……. 32. In the decision relied on by the High Court to quash the proceedings viz., Gian Singh's case (supra) and the decision in Laxmi Narayan's case (supra) in unambiguous terms this Court held that the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could not be used to quash proceedings based on a compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which is not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society. When an incident of the aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred in a higher secondary school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be simply described as an offence which is purely private in nature and has no serious impact on society.” 9 2026:HHC:35435 6. The Punjab and Haryana High Court followed this judgment in Dipanshu Verma v. State of Haryana, CRM-M No.26476 of 2025, decided on 27.03.2026 and refused to quash the FIR, based on a compromise between the parties. 7. Further, the petitioner has filed a copy of the compromise and not the original compromise before the Court and therefore the petitioner’s plea that he has compromised the matter with the victim’s mother is also not supported by the original compromise on record. 8. In view of the above, the present petition cannot be allowed, and the same is dismissed. 9. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st August, 2026 (Chander)