2026:JHHC:19945-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No.366 of 2024 With I.A. No.9719 of 2024 ----- 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Secretary, Department of Human Resources Development, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, Distt.-Ranchi. 3. The Director, Primary Education, Human Resources Development, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, Distt. Ranchi. 4. The Deputy Commissioner-cum-President, District Education Establishment Committee, Hazaribagh, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District - Hazaribagh. 5. The Regional Deputy Director of Education (RDDE), North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District - Hazaribagh. 6. The District Superintendent of Education, Hazaribagh, P.O. & P.S. Hazaribagh, District - Hazaribagh. .......... Appellants. -Versus- Uttam Kumar Chatterjee, Son of Late Sujoy Chandra Chatterjee, Resident of Milan Kutir, Ashram Road, Jhumri Telaiya P.O. & P.S. Jhumri Telaiya, District- Koderma, Jharkhand. .......... Respondent. ----- CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Appellants : Mr. Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, AC to SC-IV For the Respondent: Mr. Sabi Uddin, Advocate ----- Order No.06 Date: 07.07.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. I.A. No.9719 of 2024 seeks condonation of delay of 287 days in filing this appeal against the learned Single Judge’s order dated 18th September, 2023 disposing of W.P.(S) No.5098 of 2021. 3. The so-called reasons for the delay have been set out in paragraphs-4, 5 & 6 of the said I.A. 4. In paragraph- 4, all that is referred to is the movement of files from one table to the other and from one officer to the other. 2026:JHHC:19945-DB 2 Even this is stated most casually. The deponent of the affidavit accompanying this I.A. seems to be under the firm impression that a different period of limitation has been prescribed for the State Government and the movement of files or obtaining of opinions is some statutory prerequisite to filing an appeal. 5. Further, the officials seem to be under the impression that a period of 8 to 10 months to move the files from table to table and from one official to another is reasonable and liable to be condoned as a matter of routine. They are also under the firm impression that the directions in the impugned order need not be complied with until they take their own time to file an appeal, and such appeal or application for interim relief therein is decided by the Appellate Court. 6. In paragraph 5, it is stated that the delay “was due to procedural technicalities and was not deliberate”. In paragraph-6, it is stated that “appellants are Government functionaries having several layers of decision-making process which consumed much time.” 7. Based upon the above averments, no sufficient cause could be said to have been made out to condone this delay of 287 days. In fact, such a casual attitude has been deprecated time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court when pleaded as a sufficient cause for seeking condonation of delay. 8. In Postmaster General and Others Vs. In Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons 2026:JHHC:19945-DB 3 concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court has held that in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, the delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 9. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D), through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost its right to have the matter considered on the merits because of its own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed that the delay was not deliberate, and in such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations. 10. The Court also held that, when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main 2026:JHHC:19945-DB 4 matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if the cause assigned by the litigant is sufficient and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring the merits of the matter into aid for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. 11. The Hon’ble Court held that the ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice. 12. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds unless a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, in which the State machinery is able to establish that 2026:JHHC:19945-DB 5 it acted in good faith and remained vigilant throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said, but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate procedure for a litigating State agency, which also equally suffers the bars of limitation from pursuing litigation due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at a later stage. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are 2026:JHHC:19945-DB 6 obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law. 15. Apart from the fact that no sufficient cause has been shown in this matter, the contentions now raised on behalf of the appellants cannot be accepted on applying the above-referred principles. 16. This I.A. is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the I.As. therein, if any, will not survive and are disposed of. However, there shall be no order for costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) 7th July, 2026 Sanjay/AKT Uploaded on 10.07.2026