APHC010161682021 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] MONDAY, THE SECOND DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 2617/2021 Between: Venkata Rao Sannapaneni ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND The State Of Andhra Pradesh ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. KAMBHAMPATI RAMESH BABU Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following: ORDER: Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity „the Cr.P.C.,‟) by the Petitioner/Accused, seeking to quash the proceedings against Petitioner/Accused in Crime.No.138 of 2021 on the file of Vinukonda Town Police Station, Guntur District. 2. The allegations against the petitioner, as borne out from the police record, are that on 31.03.2020 at about 16:00 hours, while the respondent police were on routine patrolling duty in Vinukonda Town and, upon reaching the area near Sai Durga Transport situated on Marapuram Road, they noticed 2 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 a person standing on the roadside in possession of certain boxes. On suspicion, when the police attempted to approach him, the said individual allegedly fled from the spot, abandoning the boxes. It is further alleged that, upon inspection, the said boxes were found to be 10 in number, each containing liquor bottles branded as “Old Admiral Special”, totaling 480 bottles of 180 ml each. It is further the case of the prosecution that, upon enquiry with the nearby persons, the identity of the said individual was revealed to be the present petitioner, namely Venkateswarlu Sannapaneni. 3. Sri Kambhampati Ramesh Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent, being an officer in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police, is wholly bereft of statutory competence to effect seizure and detention of any excisable article under Section 53 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (for brevity „the Act‟), the said provision not vesting such authority in an officer of the said rank; it is further submitted that a conjoint and harmonious construction of Section 53 of „the Act.,‟ with Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Powers and Duties) Rules, 1972, framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 72 read with Sections 52 and 53 of „the Act.,‟ unequivocally delineates that, insofar as police officials are concerned, only an officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is empowered to effect arrest without warrant, conduct searches, and seize articles liable for confiscation, while the said power is conferred upon Excise Officers not below the rank of Sub-Inspector and Revenue Officers not below the rank of Deputy 3 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 Tahsildar having jurisdiction; it is thus urged that the impugned seizure having been effected by an officer lacking inherent jurisdiction is ex facie ultra vires the statutory mandate and consequently vitiates the entire proceedings. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the impugned search is vitiated by manifest non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of „the Act.,‟ inasmuch as the respondent has neither obtained a search warrant as contemplated under Section 54 of „the Act.,‟ nor adhered to the indispensable procedure prescribed under Section 55 of „the Act.,‟ which mandates the prior recording of grounds constituting “reason to believe” that an offence under Sections 34, 35, 36, 37 or 37-A of „the Act.,‟ has been, is being, or is likely to be committed, along with a further satisfaction that obtaining a warrant would afford an opportunity for the offender to escape or to conceal evidence; it is submitted that the absence of such recorded reasons and jurisdictional satisfaction renders the search ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and in contravention of the statutory mandate, thereby vitiating the entire proceedings, and it is further contended that the invocation of Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ is wholly untenable in the absence of any foundational allegations attracting the essential ingredients of the said offence. 5. 5. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the procedural safeguards enshrined under Section 55 of „the Act.,‟ are not mere formalities but constitute substantive protections designed to insulate citizens from capricious, ill-founded, and vexatious prosecutions, and any 4 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 infraction thereof strikes at the very substratum of the prosecution case; however, in the case on hand, the respondent, who is ex facie bereft of jurisdiction under Section 53 of „the Act.,‟ has, in a wholly arbitrary and colourable exercise of power, purportedly fabricated a mediators‟ report laden with false and concocted allegations and proceeded to foist a case against the petitioner in complete derogation of the mandatory statutory regimen, without adhering to the indispensable procedural preconditions; it is further urged that it is a well-settled proposition of law that where search and seizure are effected in patent violation of mandatory provisions, the entire proceedings stand vitiated ab initio and are rendered non est in the eye of law, and in the absence of legally admissible and procedurally sanctified material, no culpability can be fastened upon the petitioner, and therefore, the continuation of the impugned proceedings would amount to a manifest abuse of the process of law, warranting the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the same in order to secure the ends of justice. 6. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, insofar as the alleged offence under Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ the very initiation of proceedings is vitiated by a patent infraction of the mandatory bar engrafted under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ which unequivocally mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except upon a complaint in writing by the Court concerned or by an officer duly authorized by it, or by a Court to which it is subordinate; it is submitted that, in the case on 5 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 hand, the F.I.R. has been registered suo motu on the basis of a report submitted by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Vinukonda Town Police Station, which is ex facie impermissible in law and dehors the statutory mandate; it is therefore urged that the continuation of proceedings insofar as the offence under Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ is concerned is wholly without jurisdiction, legally unsustainable, and liable to be quashed. 7. 7. Sri A.Sai Rohith, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contends that the allegations disclosed in the FIR prima facie constitute cognizable offences under „the Act.,‟ and „the I.P.C.,‟ warranting a full-fledged investigation and trial, it was submitted that at the stage of exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ this Court should not embark upon a meticulous examination of disputed questions of fact or the evidentiary value of the material collected by the investigating agency. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor argued that the seizure of contraband liquor bottles during routine patrol duty was made in furtherance of maintaining public order and enforcing prohibition laws, and that mere irregularities, if any, in the manner of search or seizure do not ipso facto vitiate the prosecution, particularly when recovery of illicit liquor is admitted and forms the substratum of the case. 8. It was further submitted that the non-compliance with Sections 54 and 55 of „the Act.,‟ even if assumed, is not fatal at the threshold and can be adequately explained during trial, and that such procedural aspects cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings at the inception. With regard to the offence 6 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 under Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that the police were well within their powers to register the FIR on receipt of information disclosing disobedience of lawful orders promulgated by public authorities, and that the bar under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ operates only at the stage of cognizance by the learned Magistrate and not at the stage of registration or investigation by the police. It was therefore urged that the petition is premature, that the allegations require adjudication on evidence, and that interference at this stage would amount to stifling a legitimate prosecution and defeating the object of the statutory provisions, and hence the Criminal Petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 10. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 11. In this regard it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.,1 wherein at paragraph Nos.28 & 29, it is held as under: “28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to 1 (2010) 9 SCC 567 7 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in those sections. (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar [(1971) 3 SCC 329, Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1971) 2 SCC 376, Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [(1996) 3 SCC 533 : State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391 : K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy [(2005) 7 SCC 352 : and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370) 29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. [(1953) 1 SCC 637 and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1775 : this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.” 12. Thus, in C. Muniappan supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ bars courts from taking cognizance of offences like Section 188 of „the IPC‟ unless there is a written complaint by the concerned public servant, in order to prevent frivolous or malicious prosecutions and to ensure adherence to the prescribed procedure. This bar cannot be circumvented by misdescribing the offence under other provisions, as the true nature of the offence determines the applicability of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C‟. 13. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar 2, at paragraph No.12 it is held as under: “12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time 2 (1971) 3 SCC 329 8 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528 :. The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non- compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein.” 14. Therefore, in Govind Mehta supra, it is held that the legality of cognizance must be assessed at the time the Magistrate takes cognizance under Section 190 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and Section 195 operates as a limitation on such power. If there is non-compliance with Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the specified offences. 15. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh3, at paragraph No.6 it is held as under: “6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to the court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein. In Patel Laljibhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376 the main controversy was as to when the accused had become a party to the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in 1974 replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of any relevance. It is seen that the appellants therein had filed a civil suit 3 (1996) 3 SCC 533 9 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-1963 and the civil suit had come to be dismissed on 30-1-1965. Thereafter, the private complaint was filed on 16-11-1965. In the light of those facts it was held that the respondent was a party to the proceedings in the suit and that, therefore, the private complaint was not maintainable.” 16. Ergo, in Surjit Singh supra, it is held that the provision aims to prevent private vendetta, protect the integrity of judicial proceedings, and avoid harassment or misuse of criminal process, especially in matters affecting public justice. Accordingly, in such cases, private prosecution is barred and only the court is empowered to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ as illustrated in Patel Laljibhai case. 17. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh4, at paragraph No.2 held as under: “2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC. The judgment of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy [(1983) 4 SCC 240 on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the 4 (1998) 2 SCC 391 10 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 civil court and hence it was held that the court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 CrPC.” 18. So, in Raj Singh supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ applies only at the stage of taking cognizance by the court and does not restrict the statutory power of the police to investigate an FIR disclosing a cognizable offence. However, after investigation, the court cannot take cognizance in view of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ unless a complaint is filed by the competent authority under Section 340 of „the Cr.P.C‟. 19. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy5, at paragraph Nos.3 & 4 held as under: “3. By the impugned order, the High Court of Madras quashed the prosecution of the respondents, which was launched under Sections 467, 468, 471, 472 and 477-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code (for short “IPC”) on the ground that the complaint was barred under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). Undisputedly, the forgery is said to have been committed before the document was filed. Earlier, there was diverse opinion of this Court as to whether protection of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC was available in relation to forgery committed prior to the filing of document or after its filing. A Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. MeenakshiMarwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 has categorically laid down in para 33 of the judgment that protection engrafted under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it had been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. This being the position, in our view, the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents on the ground that provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC were applicable. 4. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to claim protection under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, which enumerates the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC. It has been pointed out that according to the petition of complainant, the accused persons had falsely filed a complaint before the Deputy Registrar, Chits, who dismissed the matter finally. The said complaint was not dismissed by the Deputy Registrar on merits, but without any adjudication, inasmuch as there was no finding that the complainant had lodged a false complaint before the Deputy Registrar. The present complaint does not 5 (2005) 7 SCC 352 11 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 relate to falsity or otherwise of the complaint before the Deputy Registrar; rather according to the prosecution case, the accused persons are said to have forged the document. This being the position, in our view, the provisions of Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, shall have no application to the case in hand. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents.” 20. Accordingly, in K. Vengadachalam supra, it is held that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ applies only when forgery is committed after a document is produced in court; hence, it does not bar prosecution for forgery committed prior to its filing. Similarly, Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ is inapplicable where the allegation is of forgery and not of filing a false complaint, and therefore, the High Court erred in quashing the prosecution. 21. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B., 6 at paragraph No.12 held as under: “12. Section 195 CrPC, on which the question raised is grounded, provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned no prosecution for an offence under Section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are committed, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on the other hand, they may also constitute the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence. The section does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been made. It was however argued that if on the same facts an offence of which no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of Section 195 is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as well which is outside the purview of the section and prosecution for that other offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of Section 195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that section would become nugatory and if such a course was permitted those provisions will stand defeated. It was further said that it is not permissible for the 6 (1953) 1 SCC 637 12 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 prosecution to ignore the provisions of this section by describing the offence as being punishable under some other section of the Penal Code.” 22. Thus, in Basir-Ul-Huq supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ mandates a written complaint by the concerned public servant for offences under Sections 172–188 of „the IPC‟, but it does not bar cognizance of other distinct offences arising from the same facts. However, its provisions cannot be circumvented by disguising an offence covered under Section 195 as a different offence to avoid the statutory bar. 23. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh7, wherein at paragraph Nos.15 & 16 it is held as under: “15. On a scrutiny of Section 195(1)(a), we are of the view that a successor in office of a public servant concerned will also fall within the ambit of the expression „public servant concerned‟. Any other view contrary to it will only create difficulties in certain situations. For example, in a case where a public servant concerned promulgates a preliminary order under Section 133, 145 or 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is transferred or retires or ceases to be in office on any account before a final order is passed, would it mean that the successor who is under the law to continue the same proceeding has no right to file a complaint if the preliminary order is disobeyed. The answer would be that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation, one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by the public servant concerned. 16. Therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1422 we are of the view that the successor in office of the public servant gets into the same position of the public servant concerned and he is in law eligible to file a complaint against wrongdoers. To say in other words, the successor in office falls within the ambit of the expression „public servant concerned‟. The view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed.” 7 (1994) 4 SCC 95 13 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 24. Consequently, in Mata Bhikh supra, it is held that a successor in office of a public servant is also covered within the expression “public servant concerned” under Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and is competent to file a complaint. Therefore, the successor has the same legal authority as the original officer, and the contrary view of the High Court is unsustainable. 25. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy8, at paragraph No.8 it is held as under: “8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.” 26. Thus, in Hemareddy supra, it is held that where in the same transaction, offences both covered and not covered under Section 195(1)(b) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ are committed, they cannot be split up for separate prosecution. Accordingly, prosecution for offences outside Section 195(1)(b) cannot be sustained independently when they are inseparably connected with offences requiring a court complaint. 27. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh 9 , at paragraph No.5 it is held as under: “5. The learned counsel next contends that the complaint could only be filed by the Magistrate before whom the original proceedings were taken. He says that according to Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint in respect of Sections 193, 195 and 211 IPC, can only be made by the Court in which the proceedings out of which the offences arose took place. We 8 (1981) 2 SCC 185 91968 SCC OnLine SC 253 14 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 see no force in this contention. Section 559 enables a successor-in- office of a Magistrate to file a complaint. The relevant portion of Section 559 reads as follows: “559. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor in office. (2) When there is any doubt as to who is the successor in office of any Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency town, and the District Magistrate outside such towns, shall determine by order in writing the Magistrate who shall, for the purposes of this Code or of any proceedings or order thereunder, be deemed to be the successor in office of such Magistrate.” This section was substituted for the original Section 559 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (18 of 1923). Since the amendment it has been held, and we think rightly, that a successor in office of a Magistrate can file a complaint under Section 476, CrPC, in respect of an offence under Section 195 IPC, committed before his predecessor. (See Behram v. Beparor [27 Cr LJ 776] Bara KanonManjhi v. GopiManjhi [AIR 1927 Pat 327] ; and In re SubramaniamChettiar [AIR 1957 Mad 442] . This section applies to all Magistrates and there is no reason why the plain terms of the section should be cut down to limit it, as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant, to Magistrates whose courts are permanent. It seems to us further clear that sub-section (2) has not the effect of limiting Section 559(1) Section 559(2) applies when there is a doubt as to who the successor is, and that doubt can be resolved in the manner laid down in sub-section (2). The sub-section does not mean, as contended by the learned counsel, that until a successor is determined under sub-section (2) there is no successor for the purposes of sub-section (1). If there is no doubt about who the successor is, then that person can exercise the powers under sub-section (1). We accordingly hold that the complaint was properly filed by Shri Joginder Singh “Karangarhia”, Magistrate.” 28. In light of the above, in Ajaib Singh supra, it is held that a successor Magistrate is competent to file a complaint under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ as Section 559 empowers a successor-in-office to exercise the powers and duties of the predecessor. Therefore, a complaint filed by a successor Magistrate is valid, and the contention that only the original Magistrate can file it has no merit. 15 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 29. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni10, wherein at para No.48, it is held as under: “48. Equally important to remember is that if in the course of the same transaction two separate offences are made out, for one of which Section 195 CrPC is not attracted, and it is not possible to split them up, the drill of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC must be followed. Thus, in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , this Court referred to a judgment of the Madras High Court (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy, In re [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] ) and approved its ratio as follows : (Hemareddy case [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , SCC pp. 190-91, paras 7-8) “7. … In the third case, Somasundaram, J., has observed : (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy case [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] , SCC OnLine Mad) „The main point on which Mr JayaramaAyyar appearing for the petitioner seeks to quash this committal is that on the facts an offence under Section 193 IPC is disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under Section 193 IPC is revealed. Section 193 reads as follows: “193. Punishment for false evidence.—Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” “Fabrication of false evidence” is defined in Section 192. The relevant portion of it is: “Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending that such circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and that such circumstance may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding is said “to fabricate false evidence”.” The effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred by the complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will to come into existence intending that such will may cause the Judge before whom the suit is filed to form an opinion that the will is a genuine one and, therefore, his minor daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation, therefore, in the complaint will undoubtedly fall under Section 192 IPC. It will, therefore, amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC i.e. 10(2020) 20 SCC 1 16 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that the facts disclosed will also amount to an offence under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. For prosecuting this petitioner for an offence under Sections 467 and 471, a complaint by the court may not be necessary as under Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to any proceeding in any court. Mr JayaramaAyyar does not give up his contention that the petitioner, though he appears only a guardian of the minor girl, is still a party to the proceeding. But it is unnecessary to go into the question at the present moment and I reserve my opinion on the question whether the guardian can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be disposed of on the other point viz. that when the allegations amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC, a complaint of court is necessary under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and this cannot be evaded by prosecuting the accused for an offence for which a complaint of court is not necessary.‟ 8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.”” 30. Therefore, in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd., supra, it is held that where, in the same transaction, offences both attracting and not attracting Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ arise and are inseparable, the mandate of Section 195(1)(b) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ must be followed. Such requirement cannot be avoided by prosecuting the accused for other offences for which a court complaint is not required. 31. This Court in Kantamaneni Ravishankar v. State of A.P.,11 at para No.86 held as under: “86. Therefore, to register a crime against a person, who disobeyed the ordinance, there must be a complaint from public servant about the disobedience of ordinance. Hence, the very registration of crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. is contrary to the settled law laid down by the Apex Court and other High Courts 112020 SCC OnLine AP 726 17 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 (referred supra) and the police officer is incompetent to register a crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. on the complaint of any other person other than a public servant and any other person, who is authorized by pubic servant. Consequently, registration of crime against the petitioner is vitiated by irregularity.” 32. Thus, in Kantamaneni Ravishankar supra, it is held that registration of an offence under Section 188 of „the IPC‟ requires a complaint by the concerned public servant, and any FIR registered by police on a complaint from others is legally unsustainable and vitiated. 33. This Court, in Kollu Ravindra v. State of A.P12 has categorically held that a complaint invoking offences under Sections 172 to 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ must emanate from a “public servant” as envisaged under Sections 190 and 200 of „the Cr.P.C.‟ In the absence of such a statutory complaint, the learned Magistrate is divested of the competence to take cognizance of the alleged offence. The bar contained in Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ therefore, operates as a clear embargo on the assumption of cognizance based merely on a police report. 34. This Court, further also held in Kanakamedala Ravindra Kumar v. State of A.P 13that when the allegations arise out of a single, indivisible transaction giving rise to multiple offences, one falling squarely within the ambit of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and another ostensibly outside its sweep, such offences, being inextricably interwoven, cannot be artificially segregated to bypass the statutory embargo. The Court has categorically held that mere deletion of Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ from the charge sheet does 12 2025 SCC OnLine AP 3870 13 Criminal Petition No: 987/2020 18 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 not efface the bar, for the factual substratum of the alleged act continues to be integrally connected with the disobedience of a promulgated order, thereby mandating a complaint by the competent public servant as required under Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.‟ 35. Further, as per Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ there is a bar for taking cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both inclusive of, „the I.P.C.,‟ unless there is a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned. 36. In the instant case, there is no complaint by a public servant, though the FIR was registered for an alleged offence under Section 188 of „the I.P.C‟. The mandatory complaint, as contemplated under Section 195 read with Sections 190 and 200 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ has not been filed before the competent Magistrate. In the absence of such a complaint, the police are not empowered to register an FIR suo motu based on the report of the Sub-Inspector; hence, the very registration of the FIR is contrary to law and unsustainable. 37. Upon a careful perusal of the record, it is evident that the foundation of the prosecution is legally unsustainable. Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. creates a bar on the Court from taking cognizance of offences under Sections 172 to 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ except upon a written complaint by the concerned public servant or by an officer duly authorized in that behalf. In the present case, no such complaint has been filed; instead, cognizance has been sought on the basis of a police report submitted by the Sub-Inspector, which is not 19 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 permissible under law. This procedural defect goes to the root of the matter and renders the initiation of criminal proceedings invalid. The bar under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. is not a mere technical requirement but a substantive safeguard intended to prevent the misuse of the legal process. 38. The Court, in its considered reasoning, first addressed the foundational infirmity in the prosecution case, namely the lack of jurisdiction of the Sub-Inspector of Police to effect seizure under Section 53 of „the Act‟. It observed that the statutory scheme vests such powers only in police officers not below the rank of Inspector, while Sub-Inspectors are excluded from the ambit of authority. Consequently, the seizure of liquor bottles by an officer bereft of competence was held to be ultra vires, thereby striking at the root of the prosecution and rendering the proceedings void ab initio. 39. Secondly, it is underscored the manifest non-compliance with Sections 54 and 55 of „the Act‟. These provisions, being mandatory in nature, require either a search warrant or the prior recording of “reason to believe” before a search can be conducted. It is noted that no warrant was obtained, nor were reasons recorded, thus violating substantive procedural safeguards designed to protect citizens from arbitrary intrusion. The absence of such compliance, it is held, vitiated the search and deprived the prosecution of any legally admissible material to sustain the charge. 40. Thirdly, it is turned to the invocation of Section 188 of „the I.P.C.‟ The authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court in C. Muniappan supra 20 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 and Govind Mehta supra, reiterating that Section 195(1)(a)(i) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ imposes a jurisdictional bar on cognizance of offences under Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ unless a written complaint is filed by the concerned public servant. In the present case, the FIR was registered suo motu by the Sub-Inspector, which was impermissible in law. It is held that such initiation of proceedings was wholly without jurisdiction and legally unsustainable, thereby necessitating quashment. 41. Upon a meticulous construction of Rule 3 of the Excise Rules, this Court is of the considered view that the said provision unequivocally engrafts plenary powers upon specified categories of enforcement officers, viz., Excise Officers not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, Police Officers of and above the rank of Inspector, and Revenue Officers not below the rank of Deputy Tahsildar, to act suo motu and without the interposition of a warrant in matters pertaining to offences contemplated under the Act. The said authorities are, inter alia, empowered to effectuate arrest of any person found in flagrante delicto in the commission of offences punishable under the relevant provisions, to seize and detain any excisable or other article upon formation of a bona fide and reasonable belief as to its liability for confiscation, and to subject to search and detention any person, conveyance, vessel, receptacle, or covering in respect of which there exists reasonable cause for suspicion of concealment of such offending articles. 21 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 42. It is further noted that the respondent, being the Sub-Inspector of Police, is not authorized, under section 53 of „the Act.,‟ to seize and detain any excisable or other article, which he has reason to believe to be liable for confiscation under the said Act, or any other law for the time being inforce, relating to excise revenue. As per Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Powers and Duties) Rules, 1972 made in excise of powers conferred under Section 72 read with Sections 52 and 53 of „the Act.,‟ any excise officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, any police officer not below the rank of an Inspector and any officer of the Revenue Department of and above rank of a Deputy Tahsildar having jurisdiction over the place, are having power to arrest without warrant, to seize articles liable for confiscation and to make searches. 43. In light of these cumulative infirmities, the seizure by an incompetent officer, the illegal search in violation of statutory safeguards, and the impermissible initiation of proceedings under Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ and the continuation of prosecution would amount to a manifest abuse of process. 44. In culmination, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution was unsustainable both on jurisdictional and substantive grounds. The absence of a statutory complaint under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the lack of foundational ingredients for the alleged offences, and the taint of mala fides collectively render the proceedings in FIR No.138 of 2021 an abuse of the process of law. 22 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 45. Therefore, the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused in Crime.No.138 of 2021 on the file of Vinukonda Police Station, Guntur District, are liable to be interfered and quashed. 46. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed. Accordingly, the proceedings in Petitioner/Accused in Crime.No.138 of 2021 on the file of Vinukonda Police Station, Guntur District, are hereby quashed. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 02.02.2026 KMS 23 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.2617 of 2021 Dated 02.02.2026 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO:2617 of 2021 Date: 02.02.2026 KMS