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2026 DAILYLAW 19645 (ORI)

RABI NARAYAN MISHRA v. STATE OF ODISHA

WP(C)/10343/2026 · 2026-05-12

Aditya Kumar Mohapatra

Writ Petition (Civil)body2026

Judgment text

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Page 1 of 6. IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK WP(C) No.10343 of 2026 Rabi Narayan Mishra ..... Petitioner Represented by Adv. – Sukanta Kumar Mishra -versus- State of Odisha and others ..... Opposite Parties Represented by Adv. – Mr. U.C. Jena, ASC CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR MOHAPATRA ORDER 12.05.2026 Order No. 04. 1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Arrangement (Virtual /Physical Mode). 2. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioner as well as learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State-Opposite Parties. Perused the writ petition as well as documents annexed thereto. 3. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers: “Under the above circumstances, it is therefore humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be graciously pleased to quash the order of suspension of the petitioner dated 31.03.2026 passed by the Opposite party No.4 under Annexure-7 and direct the Opposite Parties to reinstate the petitioner in his post and allow him to discharge his duties with all consequential service and financial benefits as the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the ratio in the case of Sri Sathya Sahi Seva Organisation and another Vrs State of Orissa and Page 2 of 6. others, reported in 2008 (II) OLR-432 and in the case of Baijayanti Nayak versus State of Odisha and others reported in 2024 (I) ILR-CUT-987. And/or pass any other appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions in the fitness of the case. And for this act of this kindness as in duty bound the Petitioner shall ever pray.” 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner at the outset contended that the Petitioner being aggrieved by order of suspension dated 31.03.2026 at Anenxure-7 passed by the Opposite Party No.4 has approached this Court by filing the present writ application. Learned counsel for the Petitioner at the outset contended that the Petitioner was initially appointed as a Demonstrator in Chemistry on 08.08.1994 and joined his service. Thereafter, the service of the Petitioner was confirmed by the governing body. Finally, while working as such, the Petitioner became eligible to get grant-in-aid block grant with effect from 05.10.2010 under the GIA Order 2009. Accordingly, he was extended with the benefit as is due and admissible to him under the GIA Order, 2017 with effect from 04.04.2022. The grievance of the Petitioner in the present writ application is that although the Petitioner was working as Demonstrator in Chemistry, he was placed under suspension by the ADM, who is the President of the Governing Body, with effect from 31.03.2026. While assailing such suspension order on the ground of its validity and legality, learned counsel for the Petitioner referred to Rule 21 of the 1974 Rules and stated before this Court that the impugned order of suspension should have been approved by the Director within 30 days from the date of passing of such order. He further submitted that unless the order is approved by the Director, it will be presumed that the same has Page 3 of 6. come to an end after expiry of 30 days from the date of passing of such order. In the present case, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the order of suspension dated 31.03.2026 at Annexure-7 has not been approved by the Director although the said order, as is evident from the order at Anenxure-7, was passed under Rule 21 of the 1974 Rules. With the aforesaid factual backdrop, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Petitioner is now continuing on suspension in after expiry of 30 days in violation of Rule 21 of the 1974 Rules. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned order of suspension is unsustainable in law and, accordingly, the same should be quashed. 5. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand contended that he has received instruction vide letter dated 06.05.2026 from the Office of the Director, Higher Education. A copy of such instruction was placed on record. On perusal of the instruction it appears that the Director, Higher Education has categorically admitted that the suspension order of the Petitioner has not been approved by the Director, Higher Education, Odisha nor has any proposal been received in the department. It has also been indicated in the instruction that the Governing Body is the disciplinary authority for taking disciplinary action against any Block Grant Employees other than the Principal/Principal (In Charge) and Higher Education Department has no role in approval of any disciplinary action against Block Grant Employees. In the said context, reference has also been made to the order dated 16.03.2024. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, learned counsel for the State contended that the Opposite Parties have not committed any illegality and that the impugned suspension order dated Page 4 of 6. 31.03.2026 at Annexure-7 does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 6. Having heard learned counsels appearing for both sides, on a careful examination of the background facts as well as the materials annexed to the writ application, this Court observes that the Petitioner who was working as a Demonstrator in Chemistry and was getting block grant has approached this Court by challenging the impugned suspension order dated 31.03.2026 at Annexure-7. The question, therefore, which is required to be adjudicated is as to whether the Petitioner is covered under the 1974 Rules and as to whether the order of suspension is required to be approved by the Director as has been provided under Rule 21 of the Rules 1974. 7. On a close scrutiny of the Rules 1974 it appears that the same is applicable to the teachers and members of the staff of the aided educational institutions, with the exclusion of primary schools and schools established and maintained by the Municipality and NAC. Rule 21 of the 1974 Rules provides for the disciplinary authorities and Rule 21 Sub-Rule (2) Clause (b) provides that in respect of any other employee, the disciplinary proceeding shall be initiated by the Managing Committee of the Governing Body as the case may be. In so far the present Petitioner is concerned, admittedly the disciplinary proceeding was initiated by the Governing Body as the ADM, while working as the President thereof, has exercised such power to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the present Petitioner. However, such exercise of power under Rule 21(2)(b) is subject to the second proviso contained therein. As per the second proviso, the Page 5 of 6. Managing Committee of the Governing Body, as the case may be, may place any employee under suspension at the initiation of disciplinary proceeding for a period of 30 days pending approval of the Inspector or the Director as the case may be. 8. In view of the aforesaid specific provision, it is not disputed that the Opposite Party No.4 has the power to initiate the disciplinary proceeding. However, the order of suspension is required to be placed before the Inspector or the Director, as the case may be, within thirty days from the date of passing of such suspension order. As per instruction received, learned counsel for the State submitted that the order of suspension was never placed before the Director for approval as per the second proviso to Rule 21(2)(d). Learned counsel for the Petitioner further clarified that so far as the present Petitioner is concerned, his suspension is to be approved by the Director and that the provision for approval by the Inspector would not be applicable to the case of the present Petitioner. He further submitted that taking into consideration the specific instruction and submission made by the learned counsel for the State that the matter of suspension was never placed before the Director for approval within the aforesaid statutory period, the impugned suspension order is unsustainable in law and, accordingly, the same should be quashed. 9. On a careful analysis of the provision contained in Rule 21, this Court is of the view that the governing body of the institution is the disciplinary authority of the present petitioner. Although a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against the present Petitioner and he has been placed under suspension by virtue of the impugned order dated 31.03.2026 at Anenxure-7 however, Page 6 of 6. such order has not been placed before the Director for approval. On a close scrutiny of the second proviso to Rule 21(2)(b) it appears that the same is required to be mandatorily placed before the Director of such Managing Committee. On a reading of the second proviso, this Court found that it is a very clear that the Managing Committee of the Governing Body, as the case may be, may place an employee under suspension at the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding for a period of 30 days, pending approval of the Director. Therefore, the interpretation of the second proviso to clause (b) of Rule 21(2) reveals that the further continuance of the suspension order is subject to the approval of the Director. It is not disputed that the Governing Body has power to place the employee under suspension for an initial period of thirty days. 10. In the instant case, the order dated 31.03.2026 at Annexure- 7 having not been approved by the Director, as has been provided in 21(2)(b) second proviso, this Court is of the view that the same is invalid and a nullity in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the suspension order dated 31.03.2026 at Annexure-7 is hereby quashed. It is further made clear that it is open to the Managing Committee to proceed against the Petitioner, if they are so advised, following the provisions of the applicable rules. 11. With the aforesaid observations/ directions, the writ application is allowed. Urgent certified copy of this order be granted on proper application. ( A.K. Mohapatra) Judge Sisir Designation: PERSONAL ASSISTANT