904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 904 WRIT PETITION NO. 3138 OF 2026 Rahul Omprakash Singh ...Petitioner Versus State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary, Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents 905 WRIT PETITION NO. 3139 OF 2026 Omprakash Suryabaux Singh ...Petitioner Versus State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary, Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents 906 WRIT PETITION NO. 3140 OF 2026 Divyanshu Rajendra Singh ...Petitioner Versus The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary, Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents 907 WRIT PETITION NO. 3141 OF 2026 Swarup Dilip Choudhury ...Petitioner Versus The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Principal Secretary Co. Op. Dept. And Ors. ...Respondents 908 WRIT PETITION NO. 3142 OF 2026 Manjulata Rajendra Singh ...Petitioner Versus State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary, Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents ZIP 1 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc 909 WRIT PETITION NO. 3143 OF 2026 Kirti Rajendra Singh ...Petitioner Versus The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Principal Secretary Co. Operative Dept. And Ors. ...Respondents 910 WRIT PETITION NO. 3144 OF 2026 Rajendra Bhardwaj Singh ...Petitioner Versus State Of Maharashtra Thr. Pr. Secretary, Cooperation Department And Ors ...Respondents 911 WRIT PETITION NO. 3145 OF 2026 Jui Lalmohan Sadhuka ...Petitioner Versus The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Its Secretary, Cooperation Department And Ors. ...Respondents 912 WRIT PETITION NO. 3146 OF 2026 Malati Amarbahadur Singh ...Petitioner Versus The State Of Maharashtra Thr. Principal Secretary Co. Operation Dept. And Ors. ...Respondents ….. Adv. Surel S. Shah, Senior Advocate a/w Adv. Vikrrant Shinde, Adv. Ranjit Shinde and Adv. Bhavika Shinde, for Petitioners. Adv. Ruturaj P. Pawar, for Respondent No.3. Adv. Vedantika Naik, for Respondent No.4. Mr. Sanjay D. Rayrikar, learned AGP in WP/3138/2026, WP/3146/2026, Mr. Y. D. Patil in WP/3139/2026, WP/3144/2026, Mr. A. P. Vanarase in WP/3140/2026, Mr. J. P. Patil in WP/3141/2026, WP/3143/2026, Mr. R. P. Kadam in WP/3142/2026 and Mr. S. P. Kamble in WP/3145/2026, for the Respondents-State. ….. ZIP 2 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc CORAM : SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. DATE : 17th JULY, 2026. P.C. : The matter is taken for final disposal with the consent of the parties. 2. The petitioners have suffered orders of rejection of nomination passed by respondent No.3 – Election Decision Officer/Scrutiny Officer, which is a cause to approach before this Court. 3. By elaborate order, the preliminary objection raised by the respondents for having alternate remedy of appeal under Section 152A(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, was overruled on 14.07.2026. I indicated to examine the matters on merits. 4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Surel Shah, submitted that out of 45 nominations 44 are rejected by Returning Officer on identical ground of non-compliance of bye-law No.40(a). The circumstances are beyond control of the petitioners and others and the compliance is impossibility. My attention is adverted to ban imposed by Reserve Bank of India vide communication dated 06.10.2025. Various correspondence inter se amongst respondent No.4 – Bank and the respondent authorities is brought to my notice to show that no fault can be attributed to the petitioners and others. It is submitted that even representation was also made to the respondents ZIP 3 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc either to dispense with the bye-law to relax the condition. It is further submitted that no election is possible to be held if the respondents insist for implementation of the bye-law in question, and the administrator will be continued, which will be against democratic principles. It is further submitted that even the respondent No.4 – Bank is also aware of the difficulty and passed a resolution on 15.06.2026. It is submitted that in a given situation bye-law No.40(a) be read down as directory or it be dispensed with. The word ‘and’ occurring in sub-clause ‘a’ shall be read as ‘or’. It is submitted that petitioners have huge share holdings and there is no reason for them to not to deposit Rs.50,000/- or maintain the said balance. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent No.3, Mr. Pawar, learned counsel for the respondent No.4, Mr. Naik, and learned AGPs repeal the above submissions. The learned counsel, Mr. Pawar, submitted that the bye-law or any qualifying condition cannot be waived or ignored by the Returning Officer. It does not fall within purview of his power. It is vehemently submitted that compliance of bye-law 40(a) was not impossibility before imposition of ban. It was possible for the petitioners to maintain the deposits. It is submitted that the petitioners could have approached the competent authorities or competent forum for relaxing or dispensing with the condition in question to qualify for nomination. It is submitted that any interpretation, relaxation, modification or ZIP 4 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc reading down of the relevant bye-law would amount to changing the rules after game has commenced. It is submitted that the petitioners were negligent and the compliance was possible for them. 6. The relevant provision 40(a)of bye-law is as follows : “(40) ****** a) For bank category (Deposits in Cr) 100 to 500 Cr. . He must hold shares of the Bank of aggregate value of minimum RS.10,000/- (Rs. Ten thousand) and, . In addition to above, he must be holding aggregate deposits (in all types of accounts) of not less than Rs.50,000/- (Fifty Thousand) for continuous period of minimum one year during the immediately preceding financial year in which the elections of the banks are to be held and he should also hold such minimum prescribed deposit as on the date of publishing the list of voters, in the Bank in his name or in the name of the firm / company / society / trust, to whom he is representing as a proprietor / Director / Office bearer / Trustee. . The members contesting from the Reserve Seats under section 73 B and 73 C shall comply with 50% of the criteria required for the general category.” 7. The petitioners nominations are rejected for non-compliance of sub-clause (a) for not having maintained balance of Rs.50,000/- as stipulated therein. The grievance of the petitioners is that due to ban imposed by Reserve Bank of India, the banking transactions are halted and it was not possible for the share holders, depositors or customers to transact with the respondent No.4 Bank. 8. The ban was imposed by Reserve Bank of India vide letter dated 06.10.2025 with effect from 07.10.2025. The elections are scheduled in financial year 2026-2027. The last financial year was 01.04.2025 to ZIP 5 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc 31.03.2026. The banking transaction was unaffected and open up to 06.10.2025. There was span of about 6 months for petitioners to maintain the deposits to the tune of Rs.50,000/- in the last financial year. It was not a case that the ban imposed by Reserve Bank of India was covering the period of last financial year. I do not approve the submission of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners that it was impossible for the petitioners to comply with the condition of maintaining deposits of minimum Rs.50,000/-. 9. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Surel Shah, has placed reliance on common judgment passed by this Court on 25.06.2026 in Writ petition No.2438 of 2025 in the case of Smt. Anita Vijaykumar sagre & Ors. Versus The Returning Officer, and District Collector Shri Mahakali Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd.. In that case, there was enmass rejection of nomination in the election of Multi-state Co-operative Society, a Sugar Factory for not supplying the sugarcane for preceding three years to the Society, which was the condition laid down vide bye-law No.39B(1). The distinguishing feature of facts is that the Sugar Factory was inoperative for more than five years being defaulter of Sangli District Co-operative Bank. The defunct condition preceded for five years and in that context this Court held that it was impossibility for those petitioners to comply the condition. The facts of the present case are different. Here period of 01.04.2025 to 06.10.2025 was available to ZIP 6 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc satisfy the condition. Not only that but the petitioners could have maintained the requisite balance by depositing the amounts prior to 01.04.2025. There was no prohibition in doing so. The reliance on the above judgment would not enure to the benefits of the petitioners. 10. The learned counsel, Mr. Pawar, has relied upon the judgment of Co-ordinate Bench passed on 19.04.2011 in Writ Petition No.2683 of 2011. The issue germane before the High Court was as to whether the compliance to the bye-law was impossibility or not. It was held that it was possible for the members to supply sugarcane to that Sugar Factory. The relevant paragraph No.10 of the said judgment reads as under : “10. As Karkhana itself could not function, no member could supply the sugarcane to Karkhana in later two years. However, it is not in dispute that Karkhana functioned in the year 2007- 2008 and hence, as per the provisions of bye-law 17A(2) r/w Byelaw No.29GH(1), the respondent no.1 ought to have supplied his sugarcane at least in first year i.e. 2007-2008 to Karkhana. Respective respondent no.1 could not supply the sugarcane accordingly and certificate issued by Karkhana in this respect is not in dispute. The record shows that in the year 2007-2008, the crushing operation started on 06.01.2008 and continued till June, 2008. Moreover, the respondent no.1 has not given any explanation in this respect and has not pointed out any unavoidable circumstance or then just and sufficient reason expressing inability to supply sugar cane to factory.” I also propose to adopt the same view for recording that it was not impossibility for the petitioners to comply the conditions. 11. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Surel Shah, has placed reliance on the judgment of Division Bench in the case of Yeshawant Khashaba ZIP 7 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc Dubal & Ors. Versus Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Maryadit & Ors.1 to buttress that, if the compliance of any bye-law is impossibility, the relevant provisions be read down appropriately. The Division Bench was considering the validity of bye-law, the compliance of which alleged to have been impossibility. In that context, the view was taken to read down the provision. In the present matter, the orders passed by Returning Officer are under consideration. Neither the Returning Officer nor this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, can have power to read down any provision of bye-law. Rather, it was open to the petitioners to approach competent authority or the Division Bench to bring it to the notice that concerned bye-law was impossibility and it was required to be relaxed or dispensed with. This judgment will also not help the petitioners. 12. The petitioners have relied on a correspondence dated 30.06.2026 issued by Reserve Bank of India extending the ban upto 07.10.2026. When the election program was declared, the ban was operational. The letter dated 15.06.2026 issued by respondent No.4 – Bank to the Commissioner would indicate the request made to grant exemption from concerned bye-law. Thereafter, the Deputy Registrar also addressed a letter dated 03.07.2026 to the respondent No.4 – Bank opining to go for amendment to the concerned bye-law. On 06.07.2026, the representation was made by the petitioners to the respondents for 1 1991 C.T.J. 230 ZIP 8 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc relaxing the conditions. Neither the bye-law was declared to be dispensed with or relaxed. The petitioners could have approached competent forum or the Court ventilating grievance of onerous bye-law. In the absence of such endeavour, the respondent No.3 – Returning Officer had no alternative than to adhere to the bye-laws. 13. The learned counsel, Mr. Pawar has adverted my attention to judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in Writ Petition No.5228 of 2023 passed on 12.04.2023 to show that scope of the Returning Officer is very restricted. The relevant extract of the said judgment is as follows : “13. Therefore, it is necessary to see whether the Respondent No.1, in the first place, had no jurisdiction whatsoever to pass the impugned order observing that the Petitioner was not qualified to contest the election. In this context, in my opinion, Rule 25 of the said Election Rules is extremely important which is already reproduced hereinabove. Sub-rule (2) of the said Rule 25 clearly Abtauthorizes the Returning Officer to examine the nomination for papers, and more importantly, to decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and after summary inquiry, if any, he can reject the nomination on any of the following grounds that the candidate was disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat by or under the Act, the Rules and the bye-laws. Thus, whether the candidate has violated any bye-law and, therefore, has incurred disqualification can be decided by the Returning Officer. Whether he commits any error in arriving at his conclusion is a totally separate issue which can be gone into in the election petition but the very fact that he has the power to consider this particular ground of violation of any bye-law and to give a decision on that issue is clearly provided for under this Rule 25 of the said Election Rules.” I find that respondent No.3 is justified in rejecting the nomination. 14. The election program was published on 16.06.2026. The ZIP 9 of 10 904 to 912-WP-3138-2026 (C).doc petitioners or the stakeholders could have approached the competent forum against the bye-law 40(a). Any reading down of the mandatory provision or dispensation of the qualifying condition would be changing of the rules after the game has begun. Any endeavour on the part of this Court to declare that rule in question is directory would offend the above principles. Useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Manjusree Versus State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr2, more specifically to paragraph No.32. The learned counsel, Mr. Pawar, is right in contending that, if this Court grants any relaxation or reads down the concerned provision then that may deprive the aspiring persons who going by bye-law 40(a) did not file nomination, as they found themselves to be disqualified. 15. For the reasons stated above, I find that no case is made to grant any relief to the petitioners. Writ petitions are dismissed. Rule is discharged. [ SHAILESH P. BRAHME] 2 (2008) 3 SCC 512 ZIP 10 of 10