2026:JHHC:19520 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P (S) No. 2481 of 2017 Sourav Kumar son of Divakar Yadav, Resident of Village & PO Pasari, P.S Poraiyahat, District-Godda …………………….. Petitioner Versus 1. State of Jharkhand 2. Deputy Commissioner, Godda, PO & P.S_Godda, District-Godda. Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chairman District Selection Committee, Godda, PO & PS-Godda, District-Godda. 3.District Panchayati Raj Officer, Godda, PO & P.S_Godda, District-Godda. ...... Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD For the Petitioner : Mr. Anuj Sarwesh, Advocate Mr. Prabhakaran Munda, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, GA-I ------------ Order No.07/ Dated:3rd July 2026 Per, Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred for the following reliefs: “(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned letter as contained in Memo No. 50 dated 19.1.2017 (Annexure-5) issued by District Panchyati Raj Officer, Godda so far as it relates to cancellation of contractual appointment of the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer under the Department of Rural Development Department (Panchyati Raj), Jharkhand, because the same is wholly without jurisdiction and illegal, and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and therefore fit to be quashed.. AND (ii) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondents for reinstating the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer under the Rural Development Department (Panchyati Raj), Jharkhand, in the District of Godda against which the petitioner was duly appointed after fulfilling all the eligibility criteria and after being declared successful 2026:JHHC:19520 2 upon the basis of merit list, because once the petitioner was appointed on the post of Junior Engineer after following due process, the petitioner cannot be arbitrarily and unreasonably removed from contractual services without providing him any reasonable opportunity. AND (iii) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondents for granting continuity of contractual services from the date of cancellation of his contractual appointment by the impugned order dated 19.1.2017 till the date of reinstatement and further for payment of all the arrears of honorarium to which the petitioner is legally entitled for. AND/OR (iv) For any other consequential relief or relief (s) to which the petitioner is duly entitled in the eyes of law considering the facts and circumstances of the case.” Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition reads as under: (i) An Advertisement was issued vide Advertisement No. 01/2016 for contractual appointment to the post of Junior Engineer and Accounts Clerk-Cum-Computer Operator under the District Panchayati Raj Office in the District of Godda under the signature of Deputy Commissioner-Cum-Chairman District Selection Committee, Godda. (ii) From perusal of the Advertisement, it reveals that the total number of 18 posts in all categories were sanctioned and vacant and an honorarium of Rs.17,000/- per month was fixed for Junior Engineers. (iii) In paragraph-1 of the Advertisement, the educational qualification for the post of Junior Engineer is given and it stipulates that 60% marks in Diploma in the discipline of Civil Engineering or 2026:JHHC:19520 3 equivalent educational qualification from recognized University/Institute is mandatory. (iv) That under Para-1 (Ga) the maximum age limit is provided as 40 years on the cut-off date which has been fixed as 1.1.2016. It is also provided that upon recommendation of District Selection Committee appointment shall be made on contract by the Deputy Commissioner. It has also been provided that appointment shall be made on the basis of total marks obtained after taking into account the educational qualification, experience and interview. (v) It is further stated that the petitioner fulfilled all the eligibility criteria and applied for the post of Junior Engineer in view of Advertisement No. 01/2016 issued by the Deputy Commissioner- Cum-Chairman, District Selection Committee, Godda. (vi) Further, after undergoing the selection process conducted by the District Selection Committee, Godda under Chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner, Godda, the petitioner was appointed on contract against the post of Junior Engineer under the Panchayti Raj, Branch, Godda in general category and name of the petitioner has been reflected at serial no.8 of the appointment letter which is contained in Order No. 18/2016 and issued vide Memo No. 783 dated 16.12.2016. (vii) In pursuance of the appointment letter dated 16.12.2016, the petitioner submitted his joining on 23.12.2016 under Panchayati Raj Office in the District of Godda and he duly marked his attendance from 23.12.2016 to 23.1.2017. 2026:JHHC:19520 4 (viii) It is the case of the petitioner that vide order dated 17.1.2017 as contained in Memo No. 47 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Godda, sixteen newly appointed Junior Engineers were posted in different blocks within the district of Godda but surprisingly the name of the petitioner did not find place in the aforesaid order and the petitioner was not given any posting in any block like other similarly situated candidates. (ix) It is further case of the petitioner that just after two days of posting of other new appointees vide letter as contained in Memo No. 50 dated 19.1.2017 issued by the District Panchyati Raj Officer, Godda, the appointment of the petitioner was cancelled on the basis of recommendation of constituted committee. (x) It has been pleaded that the impugned letter of cancellation dated 19.1.2017 is wholly without jurisdiction and arbitrary because final contractual appointment was made by the District Selection Committee under the Chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner, Godda and there was no occasion for the so-called constituted committee to re-visit the eligibility and qualification of the petitioner and issue a cancellation letter. (xi) It is further stated that it would be evident from the eligibility stipulated in the Advertisement No. 01/2016 that no specific eligibility with regard to experience was given therein and the petitioner fulfilled all the educational qualification and other qualifications including experience given in the Advertisement and after thorough scrutiny, the merit list of successful candidates was prepared and the petitioner was declared successful and, therefore, it 2026:JHHC:19520 5 was not open to the respondent authorities to again revisit the merit list and revise the same and therefore it is wholly illegal and against the fundamental principles of service jurisprudence. (xii) The petitioner has also submitted a representation dated 16.2.2017 before the Deputy Commissioner, Godda but till date no action has been taken upon the representation of the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner has been compelled to move this Hon'ble court by way of filing the instant writ petition. 3. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 18/19.01.2017 passed by the respondent no.4-the District Panchayati Raj Officer, Godda the present writ petition has been preferred by the writ petitioner. 4. It would be evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner in pursuance to the advertisement No.01/2016 issued by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chairman, District Selection Committee, Godda dated 14.07.l2016 has made application for consideration of his candidature to be appointed as Junior Engineer on contract basis. 5. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that he has been selected based upon the eligibility and the certificate including the experience certificate. The appointment letter has also been issued on 16.12.2016 under the authority of the Deputy Commissioner, Godda but at the time of scrutiny of the certificate it reveals that his experience certificate is having error and, as such, his appointment has been cancelled vide Memo No.50 dated 19.01.2017 issued by the respondent no.4, i.e., District Panchayati Raj Officer, Godda. Thereafter, the petitioner gave his representation on 16.02.2017 but till date no action has been taken upon the said representation. 2026:JHHC:19520 6 6. The petitioner being aggrieved with the order dated 19.01.2017 signed on 18.01.2017 is before this Court by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner: 7. Mr. Anuj Sarwesh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of his contention has taken the following grounds: (i) It has been submitted that the order impugned suffers from an error and flagrant violation of elementary principles of service jurisprudence because it has been issued by the inferior officer in the rank, i.e., by the District Panchayati Raj Officer, Godda who is lower in the rank to the Deputy Commissioner, Godda who issued appointment letter. (ii) It has been submitted that before issuing the cancellation letter no opportunity was provided to the petitioner to defend himself because neither any explanation has been called for nor any show cause has been issued by the authority concerned before passing the order impugned which is gross violation of principle of natural justice and, as such, the order impugned is fit to be quashed and set aside. (iii) It has been contended that it is basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee and the case of the writ petitioner the said principle has not been followed. Therefore, the order impugned needs interference. 2026:JHHC:19520 7 (iv) It has been submitted that the copy of decision of the Committee, on which recommendation the order impugned has been passed, has not been provided to the petitioner which is wholly in contravention of the terms and conditions stipulated in the Advertisement and, as such, it is wholly without jurisdiction and fit to be quashed. (v) It has been contended that the petitioner has also submitted a representation dated 16.2.2017 before the Deputy Commissioner, Godda but till date no action has been taken upon the representation of the petitioner which clearly shows the malafide and colourable exercise of power and therefore the impugned letter is fit to be quashed. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law and, as such, the same are liable to be quashed and set aside. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-State: 9. On the other hand, Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State has tried to justify the correctness of the impugned order dated 18/19.01.2017 on the flowing grounds: (i) That experience certificate has been found to suffer from an error and, as such, immediately after scrutiny of the certificate, based upon the inquiry conducted as contained in inquiry report dated 13.01.2017 the impugned order has been passed and, as such, it needs no interference by this Hon’ble Court. 2026:JHHC:19520 8 (ii) It is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to take a ground that the mechanical order has been passed on 18/19.01.2017 rather an inquiry was conducted by the Committee to scrutinize the certificates of the candidates and after having found error in the experience certificate of the petitioner, the recommendation for cancellation of the petitioner’s appointment was made by the said Committee and thereafter the order impugned was passed and, as such, there is no error in the order impugned. (iii) It has been contended that the appointment of the petitioner was not as per the norms of the advertisement as his experience certificate was found having error and, as such, the cancellation of the appointment has been passed which needs no interference. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent-authority, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is not a fit case where interference is required. Analysis: 11. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents and the materials available on record. 12. On the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect and contention of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has to decide the following issues: (i) Whether the order of appointment is in violation of the principle of natural justice, since, before issuance of the order of cancellation of appointment vide order dated 18/19.01.2017 no show cause has been issued? 2026:JHHC:19520 9 (ii) Whether the copy of the inquiry report dated 13.01.2017 has not been supplied to the petitioner before passing the order impugned vitiated the proceeding? (iii) Whether the order impugned suffers from jurisdictional error as the order of appointment has been issued by the respondent no.3, i.e., Deputy Commissioner, Godda while impugned order has been passed by the respondent no.4, i.e., the District Panchayati Raj Officer, Godda who is the inferior in rank to the Deputy Commissioner, Godda? (iv) Whether the order impugned dated 18/19.01.2017 is perverse as because no reason has been assigned while issuing the order impugned? 13. Since all the issues are inextricably linked, as such, these issues are being taken together. 14. In regard to Issue Nos.(i) and (ii) which concerns the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice, this Court records that although the appointment in question is of contractual character, the determinative point for consideration is whether, notwithstanding the contractual nature of such appointment, the principles of natural justice are required to be observed. The Court, therefore, is called upon to adjudicate Issue No.(i) by examining the applicability of natural justice even in cases of contractual engagement. 15. It stands firmly established in law that the principles of natural justice are inherent in every decision-making process undertaken by a competent authority; and this is particularly so where such decision results in civil 2026:JHHC:19520 10 consequences or entails adverse implications upon the rights of the affected party. 16. Further, it is settled position of law that whether it has been provided in the bylaws or not is immaterial, rather, the observance of principle of natural justice since has been held to be inbuilt and, hence, it is mandatorily to be followed. 17. At this juncture, reference of the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., (1978) 1 SCC 248 is required to be made. The relevant paragraph-221 is being referred hereinbelow: - "221. It is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the rights of that individual, the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. This principle was laid down by this Court in the State of Orissa v. Dr (Miss) Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269, 1271] in the following words: "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed: it need not be shown to be superadded. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case." 18. In the Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr. (Supra) the 2026:JHHC:19520 11 validity of Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967 was under challenge which pertains to impounding of the passport having not provided with a provision to provide for an opportunity before impounding the passport and on that ground the validity of Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967 was challenged. 19. The Hon'ble Apex Court has refused to hold that provision to be invalid, however, has laid down that even though there is no reference to provide an opportunity to the party concerned who is going to be adversely affected leading to civil consequence even then the cardinal principle of natural justice will be said to be inbuilt in that provision. 20. Further, in the case of “State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha”, (2010) 2 SCC 772, it has been laid down that it is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under: "28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since 2026:JHHC:19520 12 no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental enquiry had to be conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee. 30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service. 31. In Shaughnessy v. United States [97 L Ed 956 : 345 US 206 (1952)] (Jackson, J.), a Judge of the United States Supreme Court has said: (L Ed p. 969) "... Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied." 21. In the case of “State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal”, (1998) 6 SCC 651 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that one of the principles of natural justice is that a person against whom an action is proposed to be taken has to be given an opportunity of hearing. This opportunity has to be an effective opportunity and not a mere pretence. 22. Another thing is that what is the meaning of natural justice as to whether only the issuance of show cause notice will be said to be the observance of principle of natural justice or the basis upon which the decision has been taken by the concerned authority to take adverse decision which is detrimental to the interest of the litigant concerned. 2026:JHHC:19520 13 23. Herein, the basis of coming to the conclusion of the error found to be there in the experience certificate is the inquiry report dated 13.01.2017. Therefore, the said inquiry report is the basis for cancellation of the appointment of the writ petitioner but even though the copy of the inquiry report has not been supplied to the writ petitioner. 24. If the copy of the inquiry report dated 13.01.2017 could have been supplied to the writ petitioner but no-show cause has been issued, then it would also be said to be non-observance of the principle of natural justice. 25. In the instant case, even the copy of the inquiry report has not been supplied to the writ petitioner which also strengthen the fact that before taking the decision to cancel the appointment of the writ petitioner the inquiry report which was mandatorily to be supplied along with the show cause so as to the litigant concern may be in a position to know that what exactly come against him and thereafter an opportunity of hearing ought to have been provided to have a chance to rebut the same. 26. In the present case, the counter affidavit has been filed but no specific averment has been given as to whether any show cause has been issued as also the inquiry report has been served to the writ petitioner. Even if it could have been referred in the counter affidavit but if it has not been referred in the impugned order, then also by making a reference in the counter affidavit will not suffice, rather the show cause has been issued or copy of the inquiry report would have been served to the writ petitioner then it would be reflected from the face of the order on the basis of consideration made by the competent authority. 27. “Consideration” means the active application of mind which can go either way in favour of the petitioner or against him. Further, the 2026:JHHC:19520 14 consideration means active application of mind which can only be said to be there if the document/defence will be well considered by the authority concerned, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein at paragraph-19 it has been held that the term "consider" postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under: "19. The word “consider‟ is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over‟, “to regard as‟, or “deem to be‟. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider‟ postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order." 28. From the interpretation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to meaning of "consideration", it would be evident that consideration can only be said to be proper consideration if there is active application of mind. 29. In the instant case, it is evident that no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to present his defence; rather, the authority, subordinate in rank to the appointing authority, straightaway proceeded to pass the impugned order of cancellation of appointment of the petitioner. 2026:JHHC:19520 15 30. The issue no.(iii) pertains to the jurisdiction of the authority which issued the order by which the appointment of the writ petitioner has been cancelled. 31. It is no longer res integra that services of an employee cannot be terminated by an authority below the Appointing Authority albeit the termination order can be passed by an authority superior to the Appointing Authority. There is no dispute that the departmental proceeding can be initiated by a person lower in rank than appointing authority. But the final order can be passed only by the appointing authority or an authority higher to him, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Union of India & Ors. vs Hasmukhbhai Hirabhai Rana” reported in AIRONLINE 2006 SC 359. 32. In “Sampuran Singh Vs. State of Punjab” [(1982) 3 SCC 200], the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that in view of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution the removing authority cannot be subordinate in rank to the appointing authority. By necessary implication the removing authority may be higher in rank to the appointing authority 33. This Court is conscious of the fact that, in the instant case, the writ petitioner has been appointed on a contractual basis; nevertheless, the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions are squarely applicable herein. 34. In the present case, the advertisement inviting applications was issued under the authority of the Deputy Commissioner, acting as the Head of the District Appointment Committee. The appointment of the petitioner was made under the seal and signature of the Deputy Commissioner, Godda, in his capacity as Chairman, as is evident from the appointment 2026:JHHC:19520 16 letter dated 16.12.2016 appended as Annexure-3. Consequently, any decision adverse to the interest of the writ petitioner ought to have emanated from the Deputy Commissioner, Godda. However, the impugned order has been issued by the respondent no.4, namely, the District Panchayati Raj Officer, Godda, who is hierarchically subordinate to the appointing authority, as is evident from Annexure-5. The said order, therefore, suffers from jurisdictional error. 35. Upon consideration of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the impugned order passed by respondent no.4 has emanated from an authority subordinate in hierarchy to the appointing authority; and consequently, the said order suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity and stands vitiated by error. 36. This Court has formulated issue no. (iv) to know that the order impugned dated 18/19.01.2017 is said to be perverse because no reason has been assigned while issuing the order impugned rather it has been mentioned in the impugned order dated 18/19.01.2017 that after scrutiny of the educational certificates as well as experience certificates and other documents, the previously issued appointment orders for both the aforementioned applicants are cancelled due to their experience certificates being found defective. For ready reference, the order impugned dated 18/19.01.2017 is being reproduced hereunder as: समाहरणालय, गोड्डा (जिला पंचायत शाखा) ज्ञापांक 50 जि०चं० जिनांक- 19.01.17 प्रेजित, 1. सौरभ कु मार, रौल नं0-20166 जपता-श्री जिवाकर यािव, ग्राम-पसई, थाना-पोडैयाहाट, जिला-गोड डा। 2. सुशांत कु मार जमश्रा, रौल नं0-20116 2026:JHHC:19520 17 जपता-श्री नरेन्द्र कु मार जमश्रा, ग्राम-लतौना, थाना-पथरगामा जिला- गोड डा। जविय: संजविा आधाररत कनीय अजभयन्ता के पि पर जनयुक्ति के संबंध में। उपयुि जविय के संबंध में कहना है जक कायाुलय आिेश संख्या-18/2016 सहपजित ज्ञापांक-783/जि०प० जिनांक-16.12.2016 के आलोक में आपकी जनयुक्ति की कारुवाई की गई थी एवं जिनांक-02.01.2017 तक आपजि िाक्तखल करने की जतजथ जनधाुररत की गई थी। जिसमें कु ल-10 आपजि प्राप्त हुए। जनयुक्ति आिेश संख्या-18/2016 सहपजित ज्ञापांक-783/जि०प० जिनांक-16.12.2016 के कक्तिका-14 में जनजहत शतु के आलोक में प्राप्त आपजियों के जनराकरण हेतु गजित सजमजत के द्वारा अच्छाजित जनयुि संजविा आधाररत कनीय अजभयन्ता के आवेिन पत्र के साथ संलग्न शैक्षजणक योग्याता, अनुभव प्रमाण पत्र एवं अन्य कागिात के साथ-साथ अभ्यजथुयों द्वारा जिये गये जविय ज्ञान कम्प्युटर ििाता ज्ञान परीक्षाफल को पुनः िााँच की गई। िााँचोपरान्त जिनांक- 13.01.2017 को सम्पन्न चयन सजमजत द्वारा रौल नं0-20166 सौरभ कु मार तथा रौल नं0- 20116 सुशांत कु मार जमश्रा का अनुभव प्रमाण पत्र त्रुजटपूणु पाये िाने के कारण उि िोनों अभ्यजथुयों का पूवु में जनगुत जनयुक्ति आिेश सं0-18/2016 सहपजित ज्ञापांक- 783/जि0पं0 जिनांक-16.12.2016 को रद्द जकया िाता है तथा प्राप्त अंक के आधार पर प्रतीक्षा मेधा सूची में रखा िाता है ताजक भजवष्य में ररक्ति होने के िशा में उनके जनयुक्ति पर जनयुमानुसार जनणुय जलया िा सके । अतः इसकी सूचना सभी संबंजधत को िी िाती है। ह0/- 18/1/17 जिला पंचायत राि पिाजधकारी, गोड डा। 37. On perusal of the impugned order, it reveals that in the said letter it has only been stated that in the light of the condition stipulated in Clause 14 of Appointment Order No. 18/2016 read with Memo No. 783/ZP dated 16.12.2016, the committee constituted to resolve objections re-examined the applications along with the attached educational qualification certificates, experience certificates, and other documents-of the contract- based Junior Engineers, as well as the results of the subject knowledge and computer proficiency tests they had undertaken. Following a review by the Selection Committee on 13.01.2017, the experience certificates of Roll No. 20166 (Saurabh Kumar) and Roll No. 20116 (Sushant Kumar Mishra) were found to be defective; consequently, the previously issued appointment orders (Order No. 18/2016 read with Memo No. 783/ZP 2026:JHHC:19520 18 dated 16.12.2016) regarding these two candidates are hereby cancelled, and they are placed on the waiting merit list based on the marks obtained so that in the event of a vacancy arising in the future, a decision regarding their appointment can be taken in accordance with the rules but it has no where stated that what was the defect in the experience certificate submitted by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner gave a representation on 16.02.2017 to the Deputy Commissioner, Godda for redressal of his grievance but no response has been given as yet. 38. The law is well-settled that an inquiry officer, being a quasi-judicial functionary, is under a bounden duty to afford the delinquent a fair opportunity to present his case, and to consider the evidence adduced by him in its proper perspective. In the present case, however, no such opportunity was extended to the petitioner to lead evidence in his defence; and the inquiry officer, without permitting such participation, straightaway recorded a finding that the petitioner’s experience certificate was defective. Such a course of action, in the considered view of this Court, is perverse in nature. 39. It needs to refer herein that the interpretation of the word "perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. 40. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality 2026:JHHC:19520 19 incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under: "24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression "perverse" means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse finding" means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. "Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable." 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.--Purposely deviating from 2026:JHHC:19520 20 accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. "Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence." 41. In the instant case, the Inquiry Officer, while discharging a quasi-judicial function, was required to act with complete impartiality and to apply an independent mind to the material placed before him, upon proper appreciation of the evidence. It is manifest, however, that before arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner’s experience certificate was defective, the Inquiry Officer failed to disclose what error or defect was found therein. This omission constitutes a patent error, conspicuous on the face of the record, and accordingly, the impugned order stands vitiated as being perverse and tainted by procedural lapse. 42. After having answered all the four issues which have been answered in favour of the writ petitioner, in consequence thereof, this Court is of the view that the impugned order passed by the respondent no.4-the District Panchayati Raj Officer, Godda dated 18/19.01.2017 needs to be interfered with and, accordingly it is being interfered with. 43. Accordingly, the order dated 18/19.01.2017 is hereby quashed and set aside. 44. At this stage, this Court posed a query to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to the subsistence of the scheme under which appointments were made pursuant to the advertisement issued in the year 2016. In response, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that he is having no instruction on that issue. 2026:JHHC:19520 21 45. This Court, therefore, finds no alternative but to remit the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Godda, with a direction to take a fresh decision in the light of the findings recorded hereinabove. In the event that the scheme pursuant to Advertisement No.01/2016 is still operative, the Deputy Commissioner shall pass a consequential order of appointment after duly verifying the experience certificate of the writ petitioner; and if such certificate is found to conform to the requirements stipulated under Advertisement No.01/2016, the appointment shall be made in favour of the writ petitioner. 46. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt or production of a copy of this order. 47. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the instant writ petition stands disposed of. 48. Pending I. As, if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Sudhir Dated: 03/07/2026 AFR