JUDGMENT : WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, J. 01. The petitioner through the medium of the instant petition has sought the following relief(s): “A) By issuance of writ, order or direction one in the nature of Mandamus, respondents be directed to extend the life of building permission granted in favour of petitioner vide Order No. 2175 of 2016 dated 24-10-2016 further for a period of three years commencing from the date Hon’ble Court passes the order. B) By issuance of writ, order or direction one in the nature of Mandamus, respondents be directed to allow the petitioner to raise the building strictly as per the building permission granted in favour of the petitioner. C) By issuance of writ, order or direction respondents be directed not to interfere in the commencement of work undertaken by the petitioner as per the permission granted by the competent authority. D) Any other order or direction which the Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the given facts and circumstances of the case.” ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 02. The only grievance which has been projected in the instant petition is that the respondents have failed to grant extension of the building permission in favour of the petitioner. Accordingly, a prayer has been made seeking a direction to the respondents to extend the validity of the building permission already granted in favour of the petitioner vide order No. 2175/2016 dated 24.10. 2016 which was valid for a period of three years. 03. In addition, the petitioner has also prayed that he be granted permission to allow the petitioner to raise the building strictly as per the building permission already granted in favour of the petitioner. 04. The instant petition has been preferred by the attorney holder namely Muzaffar Jan Pattoo on behalf of Mr. Mohammad Subhan Yatoo for redressal of grievances and enforcement of fundamental and other legal rights. 05. It has been urged by the petitioner in the instant petition that by virtue of General Power of Attorney executed in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner took possession of the property in the shape of land measuring 3 kanals falling under Survey No. 727 Min, Khewat No. 105 and khata No. 742 situated at Mousa Baghat Barzullah Tehsil Chanapora Natipora, District Srinagar Kashmir. 06. 06. The further case of the petitioner is that he being the lawful attorney, thereafter applied before the competent authority for building permission which was subsequently granted vide Order No. 2175 of 2016 dated 24.10.2016. 07. It has been further submitted that the petitioner could not act upon the said building permission and undertake construction of the said building owing to the fact that the Valley was in a state of turmoil in the year 2016. Subsequently, due to the prevailing conditions in the Valley, the petitioner faced financial constraints in raising the said structure. The said situation was further aggravated by the abrogation of Article 370 followed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the overall circumstances prevented the petitioner from undertaking construction at the site. 08. The petitioner further prayed that, for obtaining the aforesaid permission in 2016, the petitioner had already deposited the construction fee amounting to Rs. 8,26,285/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs Twenty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Eight Five Only)vide G.R. No. 19080 dated 22.10.2016 before the respondents. The petitioner submits that, despite having obtained the building permission after completing all requisite formalities, construction could not be undertaken due to the economic setbacks faced by the petitioner. The further case of the petitioner is that he has now overcome the financial crisis and intends to construct the structure in accordance with the permission already granted by the competent authority and the petitioner, therefore, seeks indulgence of this Hon’ble Court to direct the respondents to extend the validity of the building permission granted in the petitioner’s favour. 09. The petitioner further submits that there is no impediment in extending the validity period of the building permission, as the proposed structure is within the permissible height under the Master Plan and does not violate land use, building laws, regulations, or the provisions of the Srinagar Master Plan. The petitioner also submits that the requisite construction fee was already deposited way back in 2016. However, the petitioner further submits that he has no alternate and efficacious remedy available except to approach this Hon’ble Court for redressal of his grievances. 10. To the contrary, the record reveals that the respondents were granted last and final opportunity vide order dated 15th December, 2025 for filing the reply, which till date has not been filed. Accordingly, the right to file the reply shall stand closed. 11. Today, when the instant petition was taken up, Mr. 10. To the contrary, the record reveals that the respondents were granted last and final opportunity vide order dated 15th December, 2025 for filing the reply, which till date has not been filed. Accordingly, the right to file the reply shall stand closed. 11. Today, when the instant petition was taken up, Mr. Bikram Deep Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, fairly submitted that since an innocuous prayer has been made in the instant petition, the writ petition can be disposed of at this stage even in the absence of a reply. 12. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the petitioner could not act on the building permission and construct the said building owing to the fact that the valley was in state of turmoil in the year 2016 and subsequently due to the prevailing conditions, the petitioner faced financial constraint in raising the said structure. It has been urged by the petitioner that the said scenario was overtaken by abrogation of Article 370 followed by COVID-19 Pandemic and the overall contour of the situation restrained the petitioner from raising the construction on spot. Another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of is that the petitioner for obtaining the permission in the year 2016 has already deposited the construction fee assessed to the tune of Rs. 8,26,285/- paid vide G. R. 19080 dated 22nd October, 2016 before the respondents. 13. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the petitioner after having obtained the building permission and after completing all the requisite formalities including the payment of fee could not raise the construction of the structure because of the economic setbacks faced by the petitioner and since the petitioner has now overcome the financial crises wants to construct the said structure as per the building permission which has already been granted. In addition, it has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there should be no impediment in extending the time period of the building permission inasmuch as the overall height of the structure is within the permissible height as per the master plan and having regard to the fact that the permission was already granted in favour of the petitioner and the said construction on site does not violate the land use building laws and regulations or the provisions of the Srinagar Master Plan in vogue. 14. 14. The averments of the petitioner have gone uncontroverted as the respondents have failed to file reply in the instant matter in spite of availing various opportunities and also the last opportunity on 15th December, 2025. LEGAL ANALYSIS; 15. Heard. Admit. 16. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the instant petition is taken up for disposal at this stage in light of the submissions made by the rival counsel. 17. Mr. Bikram Deep Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, further submits that the petitioner, instead of approaching the appropriate authority, i.e., the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation (SMC), in terms of Section 251 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 2000, has approached this Court by bypassing the said authority. 18. According to Mr. Bikram Deep Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to have approached the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation, for seeking extension of the building permission in accordance with law after fulfilling all requisite formalities. However, the petitioner, without approaching the appropriate authority in terms of Section 251 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 2000, has filed the instant petition, which is not maintainable. 19. The Court is in agreement with the arguments advanced by Mr. Bikram Deep Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General that the petitioner ought to have approached the appropriate authority before filing the instant petition in accordance with law after fulfilling all requisite formalities. However, the petitioner, instead of approaching the appropriate authority, has filed the instant petition without availing the alternate and efficacious remedy available under the statute. For the facility of reference Section 251 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 2000 is reproduced as under”: “The Commissioner when sanctioning the erection of a building or execution of a work, shall specify a reasonable period after the commencement of the building or work within which the building or work is to be completed and if the building or work is not completed within the period so specified it shall not be continued thereafter without extension/fresh sanction obtained in the manner hereinbefore provided, unless the Commissioner on application made, therefore, has allowed an extension of that period.” 20. This Court after examining the record and the legal position is of the considered view that the building permission which was granted initially in favour of the petitioner vide Order No. 2175/2016 dated 24.10.2016 has since expired as the same was valid for a period of three weeks from the date of issuance of the same. However, the expiry of the building permission does not come in the way of the petitioner to approach the competent authority again for seeking extension/fresh building permission in accordance with the rules in vogue and subject to fulfillment of all requisite formalities as envisaged under law. 21. In the aforesaid backdrop, the petitioner seeks liberty of this Court to approach the competent authority for seeking extension/fresh building permission to which Mr. Bikram Deep Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General is not averse. 22. It is worthwhile to mention that section 251 of the Jammu and Kashmir Municipal Corporation Act, 2000, though couched in regulatory terms, is both restrictive and enabling in nature. While it prohibits continuation of construction after expiry of the stipulated period without fresh sanction, it simultaneously preserves the right of an applicant to seek extension of time or to obtain fresh permission upon making an appropriate application before the Commissioner. Thus, the provision does not extinguish the right of a person upon expiry of permission but provides a statutory mechanism for its revival in accordance with law. 23. In the present case, the petitioner was granted building permission in the year 2016 after fulfilling all requisite formalities, including deposit of “construction fee” amounting to Rs. 8,26,285/-. However, owing to circumstances beyond his control, such as disturbed conditions in the Valley and due to outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic, financial constraints, and subsequent supervening events, the petitioner could not undertake construction within the stipulated period. The expiry of the permission, therefore, cannot be viewed in isolation so as to defeat the substantive rights of the petitioner, particularly when the statute itself enables him to seek extension or fresh sanction. 24. A harmonious construction of Section 251 would require that while the petitioner cannot proceed with construction on the basis of an expired permission, he cannot be deprived of the benefit of the amount already deposited by him, especially when no construction activity was undertaken and no violation of building norms has occurred. 24. A harmonious construction of Section 251 would require that while the petitioner cannot proceed with construction on the basis of an expired permission, he cannot be deprived of the benefit of the amount already deposited by him, especially when no construction activity was undertaken and no violation of building norms has occurred. The provision does not contemplate forfeiture of the construction fee in such circumstances, and any such action would be arbitrary and contrary to the principles of fairness. 25. Accordingly, while according extension/fresh building permission, the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation shall accord due consideration to the fact that the petitioner has already deposited an amount of Rs. 8,26,285/- as construction fee vide G.R. No. 19080 dated 22.10.2016. Since the petitioner could not raise the construction in 2016 due to financial constraints and is now willing to undertake the construction after improvement of his financial condition, the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation while computing the fresh fee for building permission shall adjust the said amount as construction fee. In case the “construction fee” has increased, the differential amount shall be payable by the petitioner while seeking extension/fresh permission in accordance with law. Since the petitioner could not raise construction, the “construction fee” already assessed and paid by the petitioner cannot be forfeited, as the construction was never raised, and the said fee can be adjusted at the time of granting extension/fresh permission. 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa , (1954) 1 SCC 455 : 1954 SCC OnLine SC 71 held as under: “Our Constitution, however, has made a distinction between a tax and a fee for legislative purposes and while there are various entries in the three lists with regard to various forms of taxation, there is an entry at the end of each one of these lists as regards fees which could be levied in respect of every one of the matters that are included therein. A tax is undoubtedly in the nature of a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes, the payment of which is enforced by law. But the essential thing in a tax is that the imposition is made for public purposes to meet the general expenses of the State without reference to any special benefit to be conferred upon the payers of the tax. But the essential thing in a tax is that the imposition is made for public purposes to meet the general expenses of the State without reference to any special benefit to be conferred upon the payers of the tax. The taxes collected are all merged in the general revenue of the State to be applied for general public purposes. Thus, tax is a common burden and the only return which the taxpayer gets is the participation in the common benefits of the State. Fees, on the other hand, are payments primarily in the public interest but for some special service rendered or some special work done for the benefit of those from whom payments are demanded. Thus in fees there is always an element of quid pro quo which is absent in a tax.” 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has drawn a clear distinction between a “tax” and a “fee”, holding that a fee is levied for a specific service rendered and necessarily involves an element of quid pro quo. 28. Applying the said principle to the facts of the present case, the amount of Rs. 8,26,285/- deposited by the petitioner is in the nature of a “construction fee” and not a tax, as the same was paid for a specific purpose, i.e., grant of building permission and facilitation of construction. 29. It is an admitted position that the petitioner could not undertake construction pursuant to the permission granted in 2016 due to circumstances beyond his control, and consequently, no actual benefit or service was availed by him. 30. In the absence of any corresponding service rendered, the essential element of “quid pro quo” is not satisfied; therefore, retention or forfeiture of the said amount by the respondents would be contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 31. Accordingly, the only legally permissible course would be to adjust the said amount while considering the petitioner’s application for extension/fresh building permission. 32. Similarly Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shree Digvijay Cement Co. Ltd. V. Union of India , (2003) 2 SCC 614 : (2003) 259 ITR 705 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 122 held as under: “It is no doubt true that in taxing legislation, the legislature deserves greater latitude and greater play in joints. 32. Similarly Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shree Digvijay Cement Co. Ltd. V. Union of India , (2003) 2 SCC 614 : (2003) 259 ITR 705 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 122 held as under: “It is no doubt true that in taxing legislation, the legislature deserves greater latitude and greater play in joints. This principle, however, cannot be extended so as to validate a levy which has no sanction of law, however laudable may have been the object to introduce it and howsoever laudable may have been the purpose for which the amount so collected may have been spent.” 33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has categorically held that even in fiscal matters, no levy or retention of money by the State is permissible without authority of law. 34. It has further been held that a levy lacking statutory sanction cannot be justified on equitable considerations, irrespective of the object sought to be achieved. 35. In the present case, once the petitioner has deposited the construction fee and has not utilised the permission granted, the respondents cannot retain the said amount in absence of any statutory provision authorising its forfeiture. 36. Retention of the amount without extending the benefit of construction or adjusting the same towards extension/fresh permission would amount to an unauthorised exaction, which is impermissible in law. 37. Therefore, in light of the aforesaid principle, it would be apt to adjust the amount already deposited by the petitioner while granting extension/fresh building permission. CONCLUSION; 38. In the aforesaid backdrop, this Court directs the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation to deduct/adjust the aforesaid amount of the construction fee already paid by the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 8,26,285/- while according extension/fresh permission to the petitioner. In case, there is any cost escalation, the petitioner shall pay the differential amount and conversely, if the same amount is payable as on date, the amount of Rs. 8,26,285/- already paid by the petitioner shall be adjusted as “construction fee” for the extension/fresh permission to the petitioner. 39. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of by directing the petitioner to approach the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation, within a period of two weeks from today by filing a proper application seeking extension of the building permission, in terms of Section 251 off the Municipal Corporation Act, 2000 subject to fulfillment of all requisite formalities as envisaged under law. 39. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of by directing the petitioner to approach the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation, within a period of two weeks from today by filing a proper application seeking extension of the building permission, in terms of Section 251 off the Municipal Corporation Act, 2000 subject to fulfillment of all requisite formalities as envisaged under law. The Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation, is directed to accord due consideration to the said application strictly in accordance with law and rules within a period of four weeks thereafter, of course, subject to giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as well. 40. While according consideration to the case of the petitioner for extension/fresh permission, the Commissioner, Srinagar Municipal Corporation, shall accord due consideration to the observations of this Court made in the preceding paragraphs. 41. The order of consideration which is likely to be passed be forwarded to the petitioner through registered post. 42. The writ petition is disposed of in the manner indicated above.