2026:JHHC:20016-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI First Appeal No.171 of 2025 Mukesh Kr. Ray, aged about 38 years (now 39 years), S/o Sri Parmanand Ray, present address: Villa No.195, Grandla Casa, R.K. Farm Gate, Byagadadenahallz, P.O. Byagadadhenahalli, P.S. Anekal, Bengaluru, Karnataka, Permanent Address: Katiyani-14 east, Road No.1, Block-A, Near Bharat Petrol Pump, Vastu Vihar, Phase-2, Amaghata, Gobindpur, P.O. Jailgara, P.S. Govindpur, Dist. Dhanbad, Jharkhand. … … Plaintiff/Appellant Versus Bindu Kumari @ Bindu Devi, aged about 30 years, W/o- Mukesh Kr. Ray, D/o Surendra Singh, Village- Bahuriadih, P.S. Jamua (Nawadiha O.P), P.O. Gadi Nawdiha, ,District Giridih, Jharkhand …Defendant/Respondent ------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ------- For the Appellant : Mr. Niladri S. Mukherjee, Advocate Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Yogesh Modi, Advocate ------------------- C.A.V. on 22nd June, 2026 Pronounced on 07/07/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 20th June, 2025 and decree signed on 30th June, 2025, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad in Original Suit No. 28 of 2024, whereby and whereunder, the suit filed by the appellant - husband for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce u/s 13(1)(ia) and (i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against respondent-wife, has been dismissed. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 2 2. Briefly stated, the facts as stated by the plaintiff-appellant, in nut-shell, is that prior to marriage there was discussions between both the parties and photo of both the parties were exchanged and the plaintiff's-appellant‟s parents requested to the defendant family to show the defendant before marriage and when the plaintiff and his relatives saw the defendant, they surprised that the girl was someone else compared to the actual photo shared by the defendant family. Thereafter, the plaintiff's family decided not to solemnize the marriage, as this was a case of cheating. Then the defendant's/respondent‟s family lodged false complaint before Giridih Police Station. 3. It has been stated that the defendant's/respondent‟s family misbehaved with him and his family members and threatened to send them to jail and assaulted badly. On 7th May 2012, police arrived at his home and threatened them with dire consequence if they didn't agree to marry. 4. Being highly aggrieved by the police and having credible threat of losing life and livelihood, and under huge pressure, he performed his marriage on 29.06.2012 without his will and consent. He has further stated that during ceremony of marriage no other function has been done as it was forceful marriage. No dowry and gift were exchanged between them. After marriage, the defendant-respondent came to his house at Dhanbad and he tried to continue his matrimonial life 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 3 and to maintain peace in the family. Surprisingly, he knows from the first day that the defendant-respondent was highly quarrelsome and abnormal and she quarrel with him and his family members. 5. He has further stated that apart from marriage there was no physical relation established between them. On 29.09.2012, the parents of the defendant brought her in Maika and thereafter she never returns to her matrimonial house on several request made by him. It is further stated that he is working in a Private Sector at Bengaluru for his livelihood. He has further stated that since 30.09.2012 they were living separately and since then she has been deserted him. From the above facts, it is stated that it is impossible to continue matrimonial life with the defendant-respondent, so, by filing the suit prayer has been made that to dissolve the marriage by granting a decree of divorce in his favour. 6. On being noticed, the respondent appeared and filed written statement, in which, it has been stated that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable either in law or in fact and the same has been filed on false and fabricated grounds without any cogent reason. There is no cause of action. The plaintiff-appellant has committed cruelty and domestic violence upon her for want of dowry for which she filed a criminal case U/s-323/379/498(A)/34 of I.P.C. and Section- 4 of D.P. Act against the plaintiff and his family members at 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 4 Giridih Court. However, it is admitted that she got married on 29.06.2012 at Baba Baidhyanath Mandir, Deoghar as per Hindu Customs and Rites. At the time of marriage, the plaintiff and his family members put pressure upon her parents for want of dowry and her parents gave various gold and silver jewelleries worth Rs.-6,50,000/- and Rs.- 6,00,000/- cash for goods and articles. Her parents spent Rs.-20 lakh at the time of marriage. Her father gave Rs.- 1,51,000/- cash at the time of tilak and after engagement the plaintiff-appellant and his family members started demanding Rs.-50 lakh and threatened that if the said amount shall not be given then they will not perform marriage and after her father complained to local police then with the intervention of police the plaintiff-appellant agreed to marry. After marriage, she went to her matrimonial house and after staying 2 days at her matrimonial house, she went to Bangalore with the plaintiff-husband, the appellant herein. 7. The plaintiff-appellant and his family members continued their demand and upon pressure her father gave Rs.- 8,50,000/- to the plaintiff's/appellant‟s father. However, the plaintiff-appellant and his family members continued to torture her. On 05.11.2023, the plaintiff-appellant and his family members beaten respondent very badly and they took away all her stridhan and ousted her from her matrimonial 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 5 house. Thereafter, she has filed a maintenance case before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Giridih in which plaintiff- appellant had not appeared. 8. It has been stated that she lived with the plaintiff continuously for 11 years at various places. She was ousted from her matrimonial house on 05.11.2023 and since then she is living in her Maika. She is always ready to live with the plaintiff-appellant and ready to lead a happy conjugal life with the plaintiff-appellant, therefore, she prayed that the suit filed by the plaintiff for divorce is liable to be dismissed. 9. The learned family court, on the basis of pleadings of the parties and after hearing the respective parties and analyzing the evidence adduced on behalf of both the sides, held that the appellant-husband has not been able to prove the fact of cruelty and desertion against the respondent-wife and accordingly dismissed the suit, against which the present appeal has been filed. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant-husband: 10. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the factual aspect which was available before the learned family court supported by the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 6 11. It has been submitted that the issue of cruelty as also desertion has not been taken into consideration in right perspective. 12. Submission has been made that the learned family court failed to appreciate the fact that the marriage between the parties itself is a void since the consent of the appellant was obtained under threat and coercion and even none of the ceremonies of the marriage as contemplated under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 like saptapadi; exchange of garland; home yajnas etc. were performed and as such the marriage itself is a nullity. 13. Further submission has been made that filing of false case of dowry by the respondent-wife against the appellant-husband and his family member itself is a cruelty but that aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration by learned family court. Even, learned family court has ignored the conversation between the police and the plaintiff-appellant prior to the marriage, recorded and produced in a pen drive and further disbelieved the conversation between DW 1 and PW 2, wherein the DW 1 admitted filing of false dowry complaint before marriage. 14. Further, on the point of desertion submission has been made that for the last 12 years there was no physical relation between the parties, which fact has also not been taken into consideration by learned family court. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 7 15. Further, the learned family court has brushed aside the evidence produced by the appellant and has given no specific finding with respect to the evidences produced by the appellant. 16. Further, the parties are living separately for a long period of time and there is no chance of restoration of conjugal right, but this aspect of the matter has also not been taken into consideration by the learned Family Court while passing the impugned judgment. 17. Submission has been made that the relationship of husband and wife is on the thread of trust which itself has been broken and there is no chance of re-union. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from perversity, as such, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Submission on behalf of respondent-wife: 19. Submission has been made that the appellant has miserably failed to prove the allegation of cruelty and desertion against the respondent-wife. 20. Submission has been made that it is the plaintiff-appellant who committed cruelty and domestic violence upon respondent-wife for want of dowry for which she filed a criminal case U/s-323/379/498(A)/34 of I.P.C. and Section- 4 of D.P. Act against the appellant and his family members. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 8 21. Further, submission has been made that at the time of marriage, the appellant and his family members put pressure upon her parents for wants of dowry and her parents gave various gold and silver jewelries worth Rs.- 6,50,000/- and Rs.-6,00,000/- cash for goods and articles as also spent huge amount at the time of marriage. Her father gave Rs.-1,51,000/- cash at the time of tilak but after engagement the plaintiff-appellant and his family members started demanding Rs.-50 lakh and threatened that if the said amount shall not be given then they will not perform marriage for which her father complained to local police then with the intervention of police the plaintiff-appellant agreed to marry. 22. Submission has been made that after marriage, she went to her matrimonial house and after staying for two days at her matrimonial house, she went to Bangalore with the plaintiff- husband, the appellant herein. It has been stated that she lived with the plaintiff continuously for 11 years at various places. But she was ousted from her matrimonial house on 05.11.2023 and since then she is living in her Maika. 23. Further submission has been made that the respondent-wife is always ready and willing to lead conjugal life with the appellant-husband. Analysis: 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 9 24. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment as also the trial court record. 25. The admitted fact herein is that the suit for divorce has been filed on the ground of cruelty and desertion i.e., by filing an application under Section 13 (1) (i-a), (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and accordingly, evidence have been led and argument has been advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the suit was dismissed and decided against petitioner/appellant-husband. 26. From the pleadings available on record and the arguments advanced on behalf of parties, the issues which require consideration are as to: Whether the judgment and decree of divorce passed on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act and/or on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) requires interference? 27. This Court, in order to appreciate the testimony available on record, has gone through the testimonies of the witnesses, as available in the impugned order. 28. In this case the petitioner-appellant has adduced two witnesses in support of his case. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 10 29. The P.W.-1 is Mukesh Kumar Ray (Plaintiff), in his chief- examination on affidavit, he has reiterated his pleading. He has produced a Pen-drive, which has been marked as Mark- 'X' for identification, which is recording of threatening of police prior to marriage. He has further stated in para-11 that from the first day of marriage, defendant-respondent started quarreling, abusing and insulting him and his family members. In para-12, it is submitted that no physical relation was made in between them. In para-13, it is stated that he made complaint to her family members but they insulted to him. In para-14, he deposed that her family members took away to defendant on 29.09.2012 and they refused for bidai. In para-15, he has stated that her wife is living separately from 29.09.2012 and there is no any contact with her. In para-17, it is stated that after 11 years from 01.01.2024 again they started troubling to him. After living separately from the so long period and torture, statement has been made that it is not possible to live with defendant-wife. So, he filed this suit for divorce. 30. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the marriage was solemnized in Deoghar Mandir. He had not made any objection at that time. He filed this suit for divorce after 12 years of marriage. He had not made any complaint that his wife is not living with him. He went Darjeeling with his mother and father. His wife did not go there. He had not 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 11 remembered that when he had gone to Darjeeling. Except him other three members of his family had also not made any complaint against his wife. His wife has lodged a maintenance case against him. He has no knowledge that his wife has lodged a C.P. Case no.-3335/2023 for demand of dowry. 31. He has stated that it is the false to say that his wife is living with him regularly after marriage. He has not lodged any case for declaration of marriage voidable. He has not lodged any case regarding Bidai of his wife. No Panchayati was taken place in between them and no document was prepared. He has further deposed that it is false to say that on 05.11.2023, he ousted his wife from residence of Govindpur regarding demand of dowry. On showing the photographs to witness filed by the defendant, he told that in the 1st photograph a girl is present with his mother and it is as like his wife. In the 2nd and 3rd photographs a lady present with his mother and father and it is similar to his wife. In the 4th photograph, he was present within local seller and a lady who is Bindu [respondent-wife] and this photograph also of Darjeeling and in 5th photograph Bindu is present with his mother and father. In the 6th photograph Bindu is present with him and his parents. In the 7th photograph, he was present with brother and Bindu. In the 8th photograph, Bindu is present with his mother. In the 9th 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 12 photograph, Bindu is also there. These all photographs are of Darjeeling. 32. The P.W.-2 is Rishikesh Ray, (Brother of plaintiff), in his chief-examination on affidavit, he has reiterated the pleading of plaintiff-appellant. He has stated that he has recorded the conversation with the defendant-wife, in which she has stated that no demand of dowry was made at the time of marriage, the said pen-drive has already been marked as Mark-'X' for identification. 33. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the marriage of Bindu Kumari was solemnized with his brother at Baba Dham temple or not, he has no knowledge about it. The defendant-respondent has lodged any case against his brother and his family members or not, he has no knowledge about it. He or his brother has not made any complaint that defendant-respondent went away from the matrimonial house. His brother has not lodged any case for cancellation of marriage. He is living with his brother at Bangalore. He has no knowledge that his brother went to Darjeeling with his wife-defendant or not. 34. The D.W.-1 is Bindu Kumari (Defendant) in her chief- examination on affidavit, has reiterated her pleading. 35. In her cross-examination, she has stated that she met with plaintiff before marriage with their family members on 25.12.2011 and 05.01.2012. She had written at Giridih that 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 13 the plaintiff-appellant was ready for marriage after intervention of police. She lodged two cases in Giridih. She went Bangalore with his husband after marriage, but she has no documentary proof about it. The address of her husband of Bangalore is 18 Cross Pragati Layout, Dodunkhundi, Marathali, Bangalore. She went there after marriage. She visited to Bangalore in between year 2012 to 2023. After 2023, he constructed a new house and lived there. At present her husband is not living at the aforesaid address, because he has constructed a new house. The occurrence of beating was taken place on 05.11.2023, but no any treatment was done. She has not lodged any case for Bidai. 36. The D. W.-2 is Surendra Singh @ Suresh Kumar Singh (Father of the defendant), who in his chief-examination on affidavit, has reiterated the pleading of defendant. 37. In his cross-examination, he has stated that it is true that after intervention of Jamua police, the marriage of his daughter was solemnized with the plaintiff-appellant. His daughter went to Bangalore, but where she lived, he has no knowledge about it. His daughter was ousted from Govindpur and she was ousted last time on 05.11.2023 from Nokhil, Deoghar. They lodged the case against the plaintiff- appellant and his family members at Giridih. He has further deposed that it is false to say that his daughter has not been 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 14 ousted from Govindpur on 05.11.2023. It is also false to say that his daughter left her matrimonial house in the year- 2012 and after that she did not go to her matrimonial house. 38. The D. W.-3 is Rajendra Pd. Singh (Uncle of the defendant), who in his chief-examination on affidavit, has reiterated the pleading of defendant. 39. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the plaintiff was ready for marriage after intervention of police. He was not present there at that time. He did not go to Dajeeling with plaintiff. He is witness in the case of Giridih. The defendant was ousted from house and he got knowledge about it from phone of defendant. 40. The D. W.-4 is Prabhakar Pd. Rai (Fufa of the defendant), in his chief-examination on affidavit, he has reiterated the pleading of defendant. He has proved the panchayatnama dt. 28.09.2024, which has been marked as Ext.-A. In his cross- examination, he has stated that presence of both the parties is necessary in Panchayat-nama. At the time of Panchayati Mukesh Kumar Ray was not present there. He was not resident of Baranokhil. He has made signature on panchayatnama. The said panchayatnama had been prepared after this suit. The girl told regarding tour of Darjeeling. The defendant also told regarding beating. He has written all the facts in affidavit as heard by the 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 15 defendant. The marriage was solemnized after intervention of police. He is not witness in the case of dowry of Giridih. 41. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, the learned Principal Family Judge after appreciating the evidence, dismissed the suit filed by the appellant-husband for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce u/s 13(1)(i-a), (i- b) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, against which the present appeal has been preferred. 42. It requires to refer herein that since appellate jurisdiction has been invoked herein, therefore, before entering into merit of the case, at this juncture it would be purposeful to discuss the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. 43. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Sub- ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which are described in the explanation to section 7(1). 44. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to the High Court "both on facts and on law". Therefore, section 19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in series of judgments. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 16 45. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First Appeal can examine every question of law and fact which arises in the facts of the case and has powers to affirm, reverse or modify the judgment under question. In "Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi" (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court acting as the First Appellate Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well and the appellate Court therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire evidence and can come to its own conclusion. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being quoted as under: “It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power as the first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of the main matter and the appellate court can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire evidence--oral as well as documentary--and can come to its own conclusion.” 46. Herein, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the evidence of cruelty and desertion as also the demand of dowry has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 47. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel on the issue of perversity, needs to 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 17 refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under: “24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 18 In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.) Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” 48. Herein, submission has been made on behalf of the appellant-husband that the respondent-wife committed mental cruelty against him. 49. So far the allegation of cruelty is concerned, it requires to refer herein the definition of „cruelty’ as has been defined by Hon‟ble Apex in the judgment rendered in Dr. N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326], 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 19 wherein it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to whether the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. 50. The cruelty has also been defined in the case of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [(1988) 1 SCC 105], wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon‟ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition. 51. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.” 52. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty that it is important for the Court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 20 of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.” 53. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty. 54. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”. 55. In Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 21 56. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce. 57. “Cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human conduct and is always dependent on social strata or milieu to which parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that are conditioned by their social status, reference be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288. 58. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 has observed that cruelty is evident where one spouse so treats other and manifests such feelings in other, as to cause reasonable apprehension in mind of other that it would be harmful or 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 22 injurious to reside with other spouse and cruelty may be physical or mental. It has further been observed that staying together under the same roof is not a precondition for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty by his or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under the same roof. 59. In matrimonial relationship cruelty mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between spouses which embitters relationship. Sometimes it may take form of violence, or at times may just be an attitude or approach. Silence in some situations may also amount to cruelty reference be made to the case of Ravi Kumar v. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476. 60. For considering dissolution of marriage at instance of a spouse who alleges mental cruelty, result of such mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to continue with matrimonial relationship reference may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742. 61. Further the word „cruelty‟ is used relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 23 unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778. 62. Further, in the case of Manish Tyagi v. Deepak Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has categorically observed that to constitute „cruelty‟, it is enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and below accepted norm that other spouse could not reasonable be expected to put up with it. Conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful of injurious to continue cohabitation with another spouse. Hence, it is not necessary to establish physical violence. Continued ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference may lead to inference of cruelty. 63. The word “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act has got no static connotation, and therefore, gives a very wide discretion to the Court to apply it liberally and contextually. What is cruelty in one case may not be the 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 24 same for another and has to be applied from person to person while taking note of the attending circumstances. Harm or injury to health, reputation, the working-career or the like, would be important considerations in determining whether the conduct of the defending spouse amounts to cruelty. It has to be shown that the defending spouse has treated him with cruelty to cause reasonable apprehension in his/her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the contesting spouse. 64. Further, it requires to refer herein that the word „desertion‟ has been given in Explanation to Section 13 (1) wherein it has been stated that “the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. 65. 65. It is pertinent to note that the word „desertion‟, as has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 25 marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. 66. Rayden on Divorce ,which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms: “Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.” 67. The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words: “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. 68. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, „the home‟. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 26 marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. 69. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. 70. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a continuing offence. 71. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 27 72. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary intention aforesaid. 73. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of „desertion‟ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. 74. The law consistently has been laid down by this Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 28 75. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions on the issue of cruelty and desertion, has gone through the testimony of witnesses and found from the testimony of the witnesses that the appellant has stated that the marriage itself was solemnized against his will but admittedly no complaint was lodged for this by this appellant. 76. Admittedly, the marriage was solemnized in the year 2012 and the appellant has brought the suit for divorce after 12 years and that too after filing of the case by the wife related demand of dowry and maintenance, which was filed in the year 2023. It is evident that the respondent-wife had filed case of domestic violence and demand of dowry against the appellant and his family members under Sections - 323/379/498(A)/34 of I.P.C. and Section-4 of D.P. Act. 77. So, it appears from the record that it is the appellant-husband who committed cruelty against his wife for which she filed case in the year 2023 and only in order to save his skin from that case, he filed a suit for divorce in the year 2024. 78. Further, from the testimonies of the defendant- respondent it is evident that initially at the time of marriage when there was huge demand of dowry by the appellant and his family member, a complaint was made before the police and only after intervention of the police, the marriage was solemnized. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 29 79. The learned family court, taking note of these facts has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff-husband is unable to prove any instance, which may be construed as cruelty in the strict sense of the term as provided under Section-13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The plaintiff-husband has failed to prove any misconduct on the part of defendant-wife, which could be considered grave and weighty giving reasonable apprehension to him of such a danger which could make it unsafe for him to continue the matrimonial life with the defendant-wife. There may have been ordinary wear and tear in the matrimonial life of the parties, but certainly no cruelty is found to have been committed by the defendant-wife towards the plaintiff- husband. Thus, the plaintiff-husband has not able to prove the fact of cruelty against the defendant-wife. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the view taken by the learned family court cannot be faulted with. 80. So far as the issue of desertion is concerned, the defendant-respondent in unequivocal term has stated that after the marriage continuously for 11 years she resided with the appellant and she has been ousted from the matrimonial house on 05.11.2023 and since then she is living in her Maika. Whereas, the appellant has stated that for the last 12 years there was no physical relation between them and even the marriage has not been consummated. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 30 81. In sum and substance, as per pleading of plaintiff- husband, the appellant herein, on 29.09.2012 the parents of defendant-wife brought respondent-wife in her maika and thereafter she never returns on repeated request and she refused to talk over phone. 82. Whereas the defendant-wife, the respondent herein, has denied the aforesaid pleading of plaintiff and pleaded that on 05.11.2023, she was beaten very badly and ousted her from matrimonial house on 05.11.2023 and during the period of 11 years she lived with plaintiff at Govindpur, Dhanbad, Dugdha, Nokhil, Deoghar and Bangalore. 83. The P.W.-1 (Plaintiff), the appellant herein though in his testimony has stated that respondent-wife went to her maika after bidai on 29.09.2012. But at para-40 of cross- examination, he has stated that he has not lodged any case for bidai of his wife. In para-52, he has identified his wife in photographs and stated that this photograph (Mark-Y to Y/8) is of Darjeeling. 84. Therefore, it appears that though in the deposition he has stated that the defendant-wife went to her maika on 29.09.2012 and after that there is no conversation in between them. But after showing photographs (Mark-Y to Y/8), he has accepted that these photographs are of Darjeeling, in which defendant-wife is present along with him and his family members. It goes to suggest that the 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 31 appellant-husband is concealing the actual date and year knowingly, when he went to Darjeeling with defendant-wife and his family members. However, respondent-wife (D.W.-1) has stated in her evidence that the appellant and his family members started torturing mentally and physically for demand of dowry. She specifically deposed that on 05.11.2023, they beat to her and ousted her from matrimonial house, for which lodged a case. 85. Therefore, the withdrawal from the society of the plaintiff-husband and the abandonment of the plaintiff- appellant by the defendant-wife, the respondent herein is not voluntarily rather in the compelling situation due to her torture and ouster from her matrimonial house, she is living in her maika from 05.11.2023. The criminal case instituted by the defendant-wife against the plaintiff-husband further speaks about the absence of willful abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant as claimed by the plaintiff. 86. For the discussions made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the desertion by the wife of her husband is under compelling circumstances and not the voluntary one. 87. The learned family court taking these facts into consideration has come to the conclusion that the appellant-petitioner is not entitled for a decree of divorce, which cannot be faulted with. 2026:JHHC:20016-DB 32 88. This Court, after discussing the aforesaid factual aspect along with the settled legal position, is adverting to the consideration made by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment and found therefrom that the issue of element of cruelty and desertion by the appellant-husband has been properly considered by the learned Family Judge. 89. Accordingly, issue as framed by this Court is decided against the appellant-husband. 90. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Judge is not coming under the fold of perversity, since, conscious consideration has been made to the evidences available on record. 91. In view thereof, the impugned the judgment and decree, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad, requires no interference. 92. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed. 93. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) 7th July, 2026 A.F.R Alankar/- Uploaded on 9th July, 2026