1 2026:CGHC:1113-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 3 of 2026 Eshwar Gond S/o Santram Gond Aged About 53 Years R/o Semra, Bhaisamunda, Sabriya - Dera, P.S. - Gidhori Tundra, District- Baloda- Bazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary Department of Home, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2. District Magistrate Baloda-Bazar-Bhatapara, District- Baloda- Bazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) 3. Superintendent of Police Baloda-Bazar, District- Baloda-Bazar- Bhatapara (C.G.) ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Hemant Gupta, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 08.01.2026 1. Heard Mr. Hemant Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondents. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.01.08 17:48:48 +0530 2 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers: “I. This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue order/orders, writ and direction/directions and may quashed the order impugned dated 25.11.2025 arising out of order dated 05.01.2026 and 22.09.2025. II. Any other relief/relief’s, which this Hon’ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also please be granted to the petitioner. III. That the Hon’ble Court may also imposed heavy cost upon the respondent for misusing the legal tool for their personal revenge, in the interest of justice.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a citizen of India and is entitled to all fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, including protection against arbitrary or discriminatory action by the State. The respondents, being State authorities, are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. The petitioner is a permanent resident of the address mentioned in the cause title. 4. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the office of respondent No. 3, Superintendent of Police, Baloda-Bazar– Bhatapara, initiated proceedings against the petitioner and issued a memorandum dated 27.06.2025, proposing action under Section 3(5)(b) of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (for short, “Act of 1990”), alleging that the petitioner has criminal antecedents and is 3 involved in petty offences. The memorandum relies on old and stale criminal cases and security proceedings, including Crime No. 202/2013 under Sections 379, 429, and 34 IPC; Crime No. 91/2015 under Sections 294, 186, and 427 IPC; and Crime No. 114/2017 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 294, 323, 506-B, and 325 IPC, all of which were disposed of with fines. It also relies on Crime No. 133/2017 under Section 456 IPC, and Crime Nos. 15/2018 and 81/2019 under Section 34(2) of the Excise Act, in which the petitioner was acquitted. Further reliance is placed on several security-for-good-behaviour proceedings, namely Istegasha Nos. 83/2003, 97/2003, 334/2005, 297/2009, 1138/2009, 782/2011, 37/2012, and 277/2013 under Sections 107 and 116(3) CrPC, all of which lapsed due to efflux of time. Additionally, Crime No. 213/2018 under Sections 107 and 118 CrPC, which is purely preventive in nature, and Case No. 01/2024 under Sections 129 of the BNS and 125 of the BNSS, stated to be pending, were relied upon. It is submitted that none of these cases disclose any continuing or proximate threat to public order so as to justify preventive action under the Act of 1990. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, except for the preventive proceedings noted above, none of the criminal cases resulted in conviction; most ended in acquittal, fines, compounding, or closure due to efflux of time. Reliance on such stale and concluded cases to invoke preventive externment powers is wholly arbitrary and contrary to law. Pursuant thereto, respondent No. 2, the Collector/District Magistrate, issued a notice dated 30.07.2025. Despite 4 this, respondent No. 2 passed an externment order dated 22.09.2025, removing the petitioner from District Baloda-Bazar–Bhatapara and adjoining districts solely on the basis of alleged antecedents, without recording the mandatory satisfaction under Section 5(3) of the Act of 1990 that the petitioner’s presence was prejudicial to public order or State security. 6. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner preferred a statutory appeal under Section 9 of the Act of 1990 before respondent No. 1, the State Government/Home Department, which was dismissed mechanically without due appreciation that the alleged cases pertain to the period 2003–2019 and do not disclose any continuing or imminent threat to public order. Section 5(3) of the Act of 1990 mandates a clear and objective satisfaction that externment is necessary to prevent acts prejudicial to public security or the maintenance of essential services. In the present case, no such finding was recorded, nor was any material presented demonstrating present danger or proximate nexus. It is further submitted that the impugned orders are arbitrary, mala fide, and violative of principles of natural justice. Preventive legislation cannot be invoked to penalize a citizen for past criminal cases that have ended in acquittal or closure, nor can it be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further stated that the externment order seriously infringes the petitioner’s fundamental rights 5 under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner has already suffered more than three months of exclusion, and there is no allegation of any act during this period affecting public order. No finding has been recorded by respondent No. 2 demonstrating any actual or imminent threat posed by the petitioner to the security of the State or the public. The continued operation of the impugned order unjustly stigmatizes the petitioner as an antisocial element. Finally, it is submitted that the mechanical rejection of the petitioner’s appeal violates Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which requires meaningful and expeditious consideration of representations. 8. In view of the above, it is prayed that the impugned orders dated 22.09.2025 and 25.11.2025 be quashed as arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitutional. 9. On the other hand, learned State counsel strongly opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and supported the impugned orders. It is submitted that the petitioner is a habitual offender, consistently involved in criminal and preventive proceedings over a long period. He further submits that the authorities acted not on a solitary incident, but on the cumulative effect of the petitioner’s past conduct, which, according to police assessment, reveals a tendency to disturb public peace and tranquility. It is further contended that the preventive action was initiated strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1990, after due application of mind to the relevant material, and that both the District Magistrate and the appellate authority 6 exercised their statutory jurisdiction lawfully and reasonably. It is thus urged that no case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is made out. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have examined the pleadings, the impugned externment order dated 22.09.2025, the appellate order dated 25.11.2025, and the material available on record with due care and circumspection. 11. The record reveals that the petitioner has been involved in several criminal cases and preventive proceedings over the years, including proceedings under Sections 107 and 116 of the CrPC. Although many of these criminal cases ended in acquittal or fines, the authorities considered the frequency, continuity, and nature of such proceedings in concluding that the petitioner is a habitual offender. Preventive jurisdiction under the Act of 1990 is not invoked to punish an individual for past conduct, but to prevent the likelihood of repetition of acts prejudicial to public order. 12. The externment order reflects that respondent No. 2, the District Magistrate, recorded satisfaction regarding the necessity of preventive action against the petitioner. The Act of 1990 vests wide discretion in the competent authority to pass such orders based on subjective satisfaction formed from the material placed before it. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not sit in appeal over such satisfaction, nor does it re-appreciate the sufficiency of evidence, unless it is shown that the decision-making 7 process is vitiated by arbitrariness, mala fides, non-consideration of relevant material, or violation of statutory or constitutional safeguards. 13. The petitioner’s contention that the cases relied upon are old or resulted in acquittal cannot, by itself, be a decisive factor. Preventive measures operate in a distinct field from punitive criminal law and are based on assessment of future conduct in light of past behavior. The adequacy or sufficiency of the material relied upon is not for this Court to determine, so long as the authority acted within the bounds of law. 14. It is also evident from the record that the petitioner was served with notice, afforded an opportunity of hearing, and permitted to submit a reply. The petitioner further availed the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 9 of the Act of 1990. The appellate authority considered the grounds raised and affirmed the externment order. While the petitioner alleges that the appeal was rejected mechanically, the Court does not find total non-application of mind or denial of opportunity so as to vitiate the appellate order. 15. As regards the challenge based on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, it is well settled that reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order can be imposed by law. Preventive externment, when exercised in accordance with statutory provisions and procedural safeguards, cannot be said to per se violate fundamental rights. In the present case, the authorities have acted within the framework of the Act of 1990. 16. Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, 8 this Court is of the considered view that the impugned orders cannot be said to be wholly arbitrary, illegal, or without jurisdiction so as to warrant interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. However, it is clarified that this Court has not examined the matter as an appellate authority on merits, and all contentions, factual as well as legal, remain open to be urged before the appropriate forum in accordance with law. 17. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan