1 2026:CGHC:7490 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 603 of 2015 Bhagat Ram S/o Mahesh, Aged About 65 Years Caste Satnami, R/o Village Durpa, Tahsil Navagarh, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh........Plainti', Chhattisgarh .. Appellant versus 1 - Heera Lal S/o Ramji, Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Durpa, Tahsil Navagarh, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - Ishwar S/o Ramji, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Durpa, Tahsil Navagarh, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh 3 - Shyam Sunder S/o Ramji, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Durpa, Tahsil Navagarh, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.02.11 17:23:11 +0530 2 4 - Chhote Lal S/o Ramji, Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Durpa, Tahsil Navagarh, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 5 - Sohan Ram S/o Dashrath, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Durpa, Tahsil Navagarh, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 6 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh........Defendants, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant : Shri Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board 11.02.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/plainti' challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 03.08.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge, Janjgir, District: Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 09A/2014 (Bhagatram vs. Heeralal and Others) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2013 passed by the 3 learned Civil Judge, Class- II, Navagarh, District Janjgir- Champa (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 14A/2008 (Bhagatram vs. Heeralal and Others). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The appellant/plainti' instituted a civil suit for declaration of title and possession, permanent injunction, and for declaration that the sale deed dated 24.06.2008, executed by defendant Nos. 1, 2, and 4 in favour of defendant No. 5, as null and void. The civil suit was based on the ground that the plainti' is the owner and in possession of the agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 1694, admeasuring 0.40 acre, situated at Village Durpa, Tahsil Navagarh, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.). The said disputed land was earlier jointly recorded in the revenue records in the names of the plainti' and defendant Nos. 1 to 4. In the year 1994, a family partition took place between the appellant/plainti' and the father of defendant Nos. 1 to 4, namely Ramji. In the said partition, Ramji obtained Khasra No. 06, admeasuring 3.42 acres. After the partition, the appellant/plainti' came into peaceful possession of the disputed land. It is further pleaded that, on the basis of the 4 said family partition, the Additional Tahsildar, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), passed an order and accordingly the revenue records were duly mutated. Thereafter, defendant Nos. 1, 2, and 4, by playing fraud, got their names entered in the revenue records and sold the disputed land to defendant No. 5 by way of a registered sale deed dated 24.06.2008. 3. The defendants ?led their written statement and contended that the suit land, along with other lands situated at Village Durpa, was recorded in the names of the ancestors of the plainti' and defendant Nos. 01 to 04. It was further pleaded that the said land had already been sold by the plainti' and his father, and that no partition ever took place in the year 1994. The documents produced in the mutation proceedings pertain to the period prior to 1994. It was alleged that the plainti', by preparing false and fabricated documents, is attempting to grab the suit land. As per the mutation records, the plainti' and his father were not allotted 3.90 acres of land, but were allotted only 3.40 acres, and even that was wrongly got recorded by including the land belonging to defendant Nos. 01 to 04. The suit land continues to be recorded in the revenue records in the names of the defendants, and the 5 same was lawfully sold by defendant Nos. 01, 02, and 04 to defendant No. 05 by way of a duly registered sale deed dated 04.06.2008. 4. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2013 dismissed the suit of the plainti' holding that burden of proof lay entirely upon the plainti' and that he failed to discharge the same. The trial Court observed that the plainti' claimed title on the basis of an alleged written family partition of the year 1994, but admittedly did not produce the said partition deed on record. Thereagainst, the Civil Appeal preferred by the plainti' has been dismissed vide the impugned judgment and decree by the learned First Appellate Court. Thus, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgments and decrees are illegal, perverse and contrary to the evidence on record as well as settled principles of law. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have failed to consider and record any clear ?nding regarding the possession of the appellant/plainti' over the disputed land, despite speci?c pleadings and evidence led in 6 this regard. Such non-consideration goes to the root of the matter and vitiates the ?ndings. Learned counsel further submits that the learned courts have committed a grave error in not holding the disputed land to be ancestral property, even though the material on record clearly establishes its ancestral nature. The absence of any proper ?nding on this vital issue renders the impugned judgments unsustainable in law. It is also submitted that the learned courts have wrongly upheld the sale deed dated 24.06.2008 executed in favour of defendant No. 5, without appreciating that the transferor had no exclusive right or authority to alienate the ancestral/joint family property, and therefore the said sale deed is illegal, void and not binding on the appellant. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record. 7. From the record, it is evident that the plainti' claimed title over the suit land on the basis of an alleged written family partition of the year 1994. However, admittedly, the said partition deed was never produced on record. In his cross- examination, the plainti' himself conceded that the alleged written partition was not ?led and further admitted that the 7 mutation register did not bear the signatures or thumb impression of Ramji, the father of defendant Nos. 1 to 4. The learned Trial Court also noticed material contradictions in the testimonies of the plainti'’s witnesses regarding the alleged partition. On scrutiny of the mutation records, it was found that only the plainti' and his son had signed the same and not Ramji, which seriously weakened the case of the plainti'. 8. The allegation of fraud and collusion against defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 was also found to be not proved, as no independent evidence was led in support thereof. Further, the plainti' admitted that he had two sisters and that neither they nor the heirs of the deceased sister were given any share nor impleaded as parties, despite their rights under the Hindu Succession Act, rendering the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. In view of these de?ciencies, the learned Trial Court rightly held that the plainti' failed to prove his title and possession over the suit land and dismissed the suit. The learned First Appellate Court, on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, has aArmed the aforesaid ?ndings. The ?ndings recorded by the Trial Court as well as by the First Appellate Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence 8 and are pure ?ndings of fact. No perversity, illegality or material irregularity has been pointed out. In the present second appeal, no substantial question of law arises for consideration. This Court ?nds no ground to interfere with the concurrent ?ndings recorded by both the Courts. 9. Even otherwise the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent ?ndings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such ?ndings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 10. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded ?ndings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/plainti' failed to establish their case by placing cogent and suAcient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the ?ndings so recorded. 11. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and 9 challenge to concurrent ?ndings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. It is well established that when there is a concurrent ?nding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said ?nding. 13. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent ?nding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 14. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law 10 which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and in?rmity at all. 15. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib