1 2026:CGHC:22406-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MA No. 227 of 2025 1. Jagannath Chaturvedi S/o Late Rajulal Aged About 58 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 2. Punam Singh Sahu S/o Ganesh Ram Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 3. Kunjlal S/o Ganesh Ram Sahu Aged About 49 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 4. Premlal S/o Late Samaru Aged About 55 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 5. Mohan Kherde S/o Late Budharu Aged About 63 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 6. Sugriv Vishwakarma S/o Late Sahdev Aged About 76 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 7. Smt. Dulari Bai Banjare W/o Keshav Banjare Aged About 59 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 8. Rohit Kumar Vishwakarma S/o Sugriv Vishwakarma Aged About 36 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 9. Khomlal S/o Late Saradhu Aged About 43 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 10. Mohan Kherde S/o Late Budharu Aged About 63 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI Digitally signed by SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI 2 11.Smt. Budhiya Bai W/o Late Saradhu Aged About 62 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 12. Smt. Lalita Banjare W/o Late Dinesh Kumar Banjare Aged About 45 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 13. Smt. Gangabai Banjare W/o Late Ramulal Banjare Aged About 71 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 14. Smt. Kumari Banjare W/o Late Ramru Aged About 60 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 15. Smt. Meerabai W/o Late Yashwant Aged About 65 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 16. Smt. Asha Sahu W/o Late Hemant Sahu Aged About 43 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 17. Nandkali D/o Mahettar Aged About 50 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 18. Smt. Geeta Banjare W/o Late Punaram Banjare Aged About 53 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 19. Smt. Geeta Joshi W/o Late Khemraj Aged About 52 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) 20. Smt. Ritu Markandey W/o Late Durgesh Markandey Aged About 34 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) ... Petitioners versus 1. Smt. Suman Nadesan Unni (In Person) W/o K. Krishnan Unni Aged About 56 Years R/o Quarter No. 4/a, Street No. 35, Sector- 10, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) (Applicant) 2. Abhijeet Singh Collector, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) (Respondent No. 1) 3 3. Sumit Agrawal Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) (Respondent No. 2) ... Respondents MA No. 223 of 2025 1. Domar Banjare S/o Aamir Banjare Aged About 58 Years R/o Ward No. 50, Borsibhatha, Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1. Smt. Suman Nadesan Unni (In Person) W/o K. Krishnan Unni Aged About 56 Years R/o Quarter No. 4 / A, Street No. 35, Sector-10, Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 2. Abhijeet Singh Collector, Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 3. Sumit Agrawal Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioners : Mr. T.K. Jha, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Parth Kumar Jha, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Respondent No.1 in person. DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu,J & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Singh Rajput, j Order on Board Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J 12.05.2026 1. These two miscellaneous appeals under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 arise out of a common order dated 07.11.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in Contempt Case (C) No.737/2025, therefore, the same are heard together and are being decided by this common order. 4 2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that respondent No.1 herein filed a contempt petition seeking willful non-compliance of the order dated 24.2.2025 passed in WPC No.1035/2025 by which learned writ Court directed the Collector District Durg to take necessary steps if any illegal encroachment over grass land bearing Khasra No.194/1 situated in village Borsi is found. In compliance of aforesaid direction, necessary steps were taken and even after coming to know that there is encroachment on government land, effective steps are not taken to remove such encroachments. Pursuant to notice issued, the contemnor appeared and submitted their response. Considering that no proper compliance of the order passed by the Court has been made by contemnor, vide order dated 07.11.2025 the Superintendent of Police concerned is directed to provide police force to the authorities involved in removing the encroachment. Aggrieved with this order, the appellants, who are dwellers on the land in question, have preferred these two appeals. 3. Learned counsel for appellants in both the appeals would submit that the appellants are legally settled on a part of land bearing Khasra No.194/1, which is given on Patta, by constructing a house thereon. Appellants are regularly paying property tax, water tax and electricity bills for last more than four decades. Pursuant to the order dated 24.2.2025 passed 5 by the High Court, the Tahsildar, Durg vide order dated 28.10.2025 initiated proceeding for removal of alleged encroachment from Khasra No.194/1 and in that proceeding, the Tahsildar after wrongly recording that in the course of proceeding, appellants herein have not produced any documentary evidence establishing that the land in their use is their personal land or leased out to them by the government, directed for removal of possession of appellants as also imposed fine of Rs.2,000/-. Aggrieved therewith appellants have preferred separate appeals before the Sub- Divisional Officer (R) Durg, however, in light of the order impugned dated 7.11.2025, the SDO has refused to hear or admit the appeals. He submits that any person if having grievance that his right is being affected, must have a remedy. Section 44 (1) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 provides for filing of appeal against the order passed in the proceeding under Section 248 of the Code of 1959. Thus, the appellants are not left remediless as the statute provides them a chance of appeal. However, by virtue of order impugned, appellants are being deprived of their substantive as well as procedural remedy guaranteed under the statute and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be interfered with. 6 4. On the other hand, respondent No.1, who appears in person, opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for appellants and submits that the order impugned is an interlocutory order and not a final order of punishment imposed under the Act of 1971, therefore, both the appeals are not maintainable. She further submits that claim of appellants based on alleged patta is false and contrary to the official record. She submits that during pendency of proceedings before the High Court and even at the time when order of removal of encroachment from government land was passed, appellants have not produced any patta alleged issued in their favour. However, as a bold from blue, during pendency of contempt proceeding, the appellants have, for the first time, produced the Pattas. In order to verify the claim of appellants, respondent No.1 sought information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and according to information supplied to her, no such patta was issued in the name of appellants. Thus, it is apparent that Pattas produced by appellants are forged and fabricated documents. In support of her contention, she places reliance on the decision of the Full Bench of this High Court dated 25.1.2017 in MA No.45/2016, parties being Anil Kumar Pandey vs. Pradeep Kumar Shukla. 7 5. Heard learned counsel for the appellants as also respondent No.1, who appears in person. 6. Before we proceed with the matter, it would be fit and proper for us to state the nature of the order passed by the learned Judge in contempt petition, which is under challenge in this appeal. The material portion of the impugned order reads as under : - “From the submission it is reflected that the area of land which has been encroached i.e. 1.76 lakhs sq feet lands whereas the respondents have identified encroachment of about 33,000 Sq feet land which that no proper compliance of the order passed by this Court has been made by the respondents. Let the respondents file affidavit on the next date of hearing. The contemnor shall also place on record what action they have taken to remove the illegal encroachment of the entire land, therefore, It is directed that concerned Superintendent of Police, shall provide Police force to the contemnor without any failure on demand made by the contemnor/Collector, Durg or the Revenue Authority and the machinery who are involved in removing the encroachment. List this case on 25.11.2025 in the fresh matter list. Petitioner in person would submit that the encroachers are creating pressure and threatening her for life. 8 Considering the submission, it is also directed that the petitioner will inform the incident to the concerned Superintendent of Police who will take decision in accordance with the law on the complaint and take suitable action.” 7. From a perusal of the impugned order, as noted herein above, it is evident that the impugned order does not indicate any imposition of punishment contemplated by Section 12 of the Act of 1971, but it can be deduced from reading of the order passed on the contempt petition that contemnor therein directed to file affidavit explaining the action taken to remove the illegal encroachment of the entire land and thereafter the Superintendent of Police concerned was directed to provide police force to the contemnor/authorities involved in removing of encroachment, if demanded. The Superintendent of Police was also directed to take decision in respect of incident happened with petitioner, if reported by her, in accordance with law. 8. Now, let us have a look at the relevant provisions of the Act of 1971, which are material for the purpose of deciding these appeals. 9. Section 2 (a) of the Act of 1971 defines ‘Contempt of Courts’ to mean ‘civil contempt’ or ‘criminal contempt’. 'Civil contempt' is defined in Section 2 (b) which means, willful disobedience 9 to any judgment decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. 10. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for the punishment which shall ordinarily be imposed by the High Court in the case of an established contempt. Section 12 is extracted herein below for ready reference:- “12. Punishment for Contempt of court.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. Explanation.--An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil 10 prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. (4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the contempt of court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.” 11. From perusal of above quoted provision contained in Section 12 of the Act of 1971, it is appearing that the contemnor may 11 be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both. 12. Section 19 of the Act of 1971 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Section 19 of the Act of 1971 reads thus:- "19. Appeals.--(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-- (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:" A bare reading of above quoted provision makes it clear that only in the case of punishment, the affected party has right to file an appeal, if it is by a Single Judge before a Bench of two Judges, and if it is by a Division Bench, before Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. In case of D.N. Taneja vs Bhajan Lal, reported in (1988) 3 SCC 26, the three judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "an appeal will lie under Section 19 (1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in 12 exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, it does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215. The aggrieved party under section 19 (1) can only be the contemnor who has been punished for contempt of court." 14. In case of State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Alibhoy, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 411, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "words 'any order' must be read with 'decision' so as to exclude any interlocutory order of the High Court from scope of appeal. Unless by the order High Court imposes punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, no appeal will lie against it." 15. In J. S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and other, (1996) 6 SCC 291, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows : “"Therefore, an appeal would lie under Section 19 when an order in exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court punishing the contemnor has been passed. In this case, the finding was that the respondent had not willfully disobeyed the order. So, there is no order punishing the respondent for violation of the orders of the High Court, Accordingly, an appeal under Section 19 would not lie." 13 16. The Full Bench of this High Court in case of Anil Kumar Dubey (supra) had the occasion to deal with the issue issue of maintainability of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 and it was observed in the majority judgment thus:- “39. A close analysis of the law laid down by the Apex Court and the High Courts as well as the provisions of Section 19 of the Act, 1971, we are clearly of the view that any order which is not an interlocutory order but by which the High Court proceeds to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, would be appealable. 45…..In our view, an appeal under Section 19 of the Act, 1971 would lie against such an order as it is passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. As held by the Apex Court, it would not be appropriate to make a list of such orders. Each case will have to be decided on its own facts. 47.In view of above discussion, we answer the question referred to this Court by holding that an appeal shall lie under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against an order framing charge in contempt proceedings.” 17. When the impugned order dated 7.11.2025 is tested on the anvil of above rulings of Hon’ble Supreme Court and also Full Bench of this Court, it is clear as day light that by the order 14 impugned, any charge of contempt has not been framed or punishment has not been imposed on the appellants for contempt. The learned Single Judge has merely called the respondents therein to explain by way of an affidavit as to what action have been taken for compliance of the order under contempt and further directed the Superintendent of Police to provide police force to the authorities taking steps for compliance of the order under contempt. Any order or direction on the merits of the dispute, which is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt or deciding an issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, creating cause of action in favour of appellants for filing this appeal, has not been issued by the order impugned. Therefore, this Court has no manner of doubt that the appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Act of 1971 against the impugned order is not at all maintainable in absence of any cause of action available to appellants. 18. From the order sheet dated 28.1.2026 it is appearing that this Bench relying on the interpretation of the provision contained in Section 19 of the Act of 1971 made by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. and others v. Chunilal Nanda and others, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399, had admitted this appeal. 15 19. For the sake of better understanding of the true interpretation of the observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-11 of its decision in case of Midnapore (supra) and relevant for the present case, are reproduced herein below:- “IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits or a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)." 20. A bare reading of above quoted portion of the decision in Midnapore’s case (supra) makes it clear that "any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 16 "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The only exception is where such a direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. However, other orders, could be challenged in an intra Court appeal, if the order was of a single Judge and there was a provision for an intra Court appeal or by Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to the Supreme Court. (in other cases). In substance, the purposive interpretation is that if a High Court decides an issue or makes a direction relating to the merit of the dispute, the aggrieved person is not remediless and can challenge the same not by way of an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, but by means of intra court appeal if there is a provision of such an appeal. Meaning thereby, in absence of any such provision for intra- court appeal, no appeal would lie. 21. The provision of preferring an intra-court appeal of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 (for short ‘the Act of 2006’) reads thus:- “2.Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a Judgment or order of one Judge of the High Court made in exercise of original jurisdiction.- (1) an 17 appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges of the same High Court. Provided no such appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or against any order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India...” 22. On a purposive reading of Section 2 (1) of the Act of 2006, it becomes clear that an appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges of the same High Court. No appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or against any order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus, according to provision of the Act of 2006 of preferring an intra court appeal, if the order is passed exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, then only intra-court appeal lies. If the order is passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, that is to say, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, no intra-court appeal lies. Hence, there is no provision in the Act of 2006 to file an intra court appeal to the Bench of two Judges against any order passed in a proceeding other than under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18 23. In case at hand, the order impugned passed by learned Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Act of 1971 read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India, directing the contemnors to place on record as to what action they have taken to comply with the order under contempt, cannot be construed to an order passed in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, reliance placed on the decision rendered in case of Midnapore (supra) is of no help to the appellants. 24. Ordinarily, it is expected from the counsel, who appears for the appellant before a particular Court, that, instead of obtaining a favourable order, he would provide to the Court correct legal position. We do not know whether the provision of preferring intra-court appeal contained in the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006; decision of the Full Bench of this High Court in Anil Kumar Dubey (supra) were brought to the notice of the Division Bench or not. From the order dated 28.01.2026 it is appearing that the order of the Full Bench in case of Anil Kumar Dubey (supra) is not brought to the notice of the Court. 25. Nonetheless, no one can dispute that an appeal is a statutory remedy created by the Statute. An appeal shall lie to an appellate forum either under a particular statute or under the Rules or under the provisions of the Letters Patent. Where 19 the statute does not confer a right of appeal, mere admission of appeal does not ipso facto render it maintainable or confer a statutory right of appeal where none exists. Question of maintainability of an appeal can also be examined at the final stage as it goes to the root of the case being a legal issue. 26. In case at hand, the provisions of the Act of 2006 which deals with preferring of intra-court appeal does not permit an appeal arising other than the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Most importantly, the order admitting the appeal does not decide any issue but merely entertains an appeal for hearing. Therefore, the order whereunder appeal is admitted for consideration could not be taken as a final order so as to prevent this Court from deciding the maintainability, particularly when the Act of 2006 does not permit such an appeal. 27. For the foregoing discussions and reasons, we do not find any good ground to entertain these two appeals on merits being not maintainable and therefore, both the appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. Sd/- Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Judge roshan/-