2026:HHC:33185 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 678 of 2026 Date of Decision: 07.08.2026 Manish Arora ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr K.S.Gill, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (Oral) The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No.86 of 2025, dated 30.05.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 103(1), 109 and 238 read with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Section 181 of Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act) at Police Station Kala Amb, District Sirmour, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that as per the prosecution, the police have filed a charge sheet against the petitioner and Harshita 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:33185 Aggarwal for the murder of Jitendra Singh. These allegations are false. Jitendra Singh was found injured and was taken to the hospital on 30.05.2025. He succumbed to his injuries on 02.06.2025. The cause of death was ‘Craniocerebral damage due to head injury’. The police have relied upon the confessional statement made by the petitioner in custody. As per the prosecution, the petitioner suspected that Jitendra Singh had done some wrong act with Harshita Aggarwal and committed the murder to teach him a lesson. The prosecution case is based upon circumstantial evidence, which has not been established by the material collected during the investigation. As per the prosecution, the petitioner had administered sleeping pills to Jitendra Singh, but no poison/ethyl alcohol was detected in the viscera. The statement made by the petitioner and the co-accused during the investigation is inadmissible in evidence. The police failed to collect the CCTV footage from key locations. As per the police, a recovery of the car was made at the petitioner's instance, but the recovery was made from a place which was open and accessible to all. The recovery is doubtful. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a 3 2026:HHC:33185 speedy trial is being violated. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that Jitendra Singh was found in an injured condition. His medical examination revealed that he had sustained a grievous injury on his head. His father made a complaint to the police, and the police registered the FIR. The police recovered a broken baseball bat and surgical gloves stained with blood from the spot. A white car was found to be going towards the place of recovery in the CCTV footage at about 04:14 a.m. and returning at about 04:54 a.m. The deceased Jitendra Singh was residing with Manish. The police searched for the petitioner, but could not trace him. The cause of death was found to be Craniocerebral damage due to head injury, which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The police interrogated the petitioner and the co- accused. The petitioner made a disclosure statement which led to the recovery of the vehicle; however, the key could not be recovered. The petitioner also made a disclosure statement that he could show the place where he had deboarded Harshita Aggarwal and the place where he had beaten the deceased. The police have also interrogated the co-accused Harshita Aggarwal and recovered 4 2026:HHC:33185 the clothes, towel and the shoes from the petitioner's room. The petitioner also led the police to the shop from where the beer bottles and pickaxe were purchased and the petrol pump, where the petrol was filled. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court. The result of the analysis mentioned that the DNA of the deceased was found on the blood-stained glove, blood lifted from the spot, blood-stained baseball bat, blood-stained hair, blood- stained leaves and grass, blood-stained shoes of the petitioner and blood-stained scrapings lifted from the driver's seat of the vehicle. The petitioner's DNA and the DNA of the deceased were found in the cigarette butt lifted from the foot mat of the right side of the rear seat of the vehicle. The statement of one witness has been recorded, and the matter was listed on 29th and 30th April, 2026 for recording the statements of witnesses. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely 5 2026:HHC:33185 implicated. The police have relied upon the circumstantial evidence to implicate the petitioner; however, the material is not sufficient to connect the petitioner to the commission of the offence. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/Stated submitted that the blood of the deceased was found on the clothes and the shoes of the petitioner. The petitioner and the deceased were seen together, and the petitioner has not provided any explanation for the circumstances leading to the death of the deceased. The offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous and punishable with death. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6 2026:HHC:33185 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the 7 2026:HHC:33185 criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. 8 2026:HHC:33185 Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: 9 2026:HHC:33185 (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons 10 2026:HHC:33185 and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The status report mentions that the petitioner had led the police to the place from where the vehicle was recovered. The petitioner's blood-stained shoes were found in his room, which 11 2026:HHC:33185 was opened by the key provided by co-accused Harshita Aggarwal. The clothes were also kept in the bucket for washing. The cigarette butt containing the DNA of the petitioner and the deceased was recovered from the vehicle. All these circumstances, prima facie, show the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime. 12. It was submitted that the prosecution has relied upon the statements made by the petitioner and the co-accused during interrogation, which are inadmissible, and there is insufficient material against the petitioner to connect him to the commission of the crime. This submission cannot be accepted. It is true that the status report mentions the result of the interrogation of the petitioner and the co-accused, and any statement made by an accused during the interrogation to the police is inadmissible. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements made by the petitioner and the co-accused to the police during their custody. However, the other circumstances noticed above, prima facie, connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. 13. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission is only stated to be 12 2026:HHC:33185 rejected. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication of the grounds of arrest in all the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed: “58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This judgment was followed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it was observed: “7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as previously there existed no consistent or binding requirements mandating written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth, this means that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make directions issued therein prospective.” 13 2026:HHC:33185 15. It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Sonam Raghuvanshi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1392 that the requirement of providing grounds of arrest is prospective. It was observed: 9. Law is quite settled that serving of the grounds of arrest is mandatory. This has been introduced as a judge-made law vide a judgment of this Court in the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra). That is the precise reason why this Court was pleased to hold that though such a procedure is not contemplated, nonetheless, it is so required in order to give effect to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. For the said reason, the decision was made to apply prospectively. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the respondent was arrested on 9-6-2025 much before the date of pronouncement of Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra). 16. This Court held in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of HP CrMP (M) no. 2329 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025, that the requirement of providing the grounds of arrest is prospective. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of HP SLP (Criminal) no. 797 of 2026. Therefore, the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him. 17. In the present case, a printed proforma was supplied to the accused at the time of his arrest. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Meghalaya v. Sonam Raghuvanshi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1392 that when no plea regarding 14 2026:HHC:33185 grounds of arrest was taken at the earliest, and no prejudice is shown, the accused is not entitled to bail. It was observed: 10. Apart from the fact that the respondent was conspicuously absent and, thus, could not be traced after the occurrence, the law does not restrain the prosecuting agency from re-arresting a person. In other words, non- compliance with the service of grounds of arrest to an accused and consequent enlargement on bail will not act as a fetter to re-arrest the said accused for the purpose of investigation. 11. We find that the respondent is not entitled to bail, both on merits and on the grounds discussed by both the Courts. There is a fundamental difference between non-service of grounds of arrest and non-furnishing of adequate reasons thereunder. While the first category might vitiate the arrest, in the second category, one has to see the prejudice caused to the accused. In the facts of the instant case, it is not as if the respondent was not served with the grounds of arrest. Hence, the case of the respondent falls within the second category discussed above. The respondent has also not taken the said plea at the earliest point of time, having done so only in her 4th Bail Application before the trial court. 12. With respect to the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that there is no waiver of the right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the stage at which a plea touching upon fundamental rights is raised would not matter, we would only clarify that when an accused person files a bail application, the stage might become irrelevant. However, when the accused person warranted a finding on merits on the earlier occasions, it is not open for him/her to go back and raise the plea on the issue pertaining to the grounds of arrest thereafter. 13. As recorded earlier, the respondent has expressed her satisfaction on the reasons behind her arrest before the learned Judicial Magistrate. The relevant documents were, 15 2026:HHC:33185 indeed, served on the respondent. Therefore, we are not inclined to go into the issue as to whether the case involves a voluntary surrender by the respondent or arrest by the appellant, followed by production before the Court. Suffice it to state that both the Courts below have committed an error in enlarging the respondent on bail, on the basis of the judgments rendered by this Court. 18. A reference was made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of India and anr, SLP Criminal 3326 of 2026, decided on 01.04.2026, however, in the said case, it has been nowhere stated that the provisions of supplying the grounds of arrest laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs State of Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) 17132 of 2024, would be retrospective, therefore, no advantage can be derived from the cited judgment. 19. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of trial and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission cannot be accepted. The petitioner was arrested on 04.06.2025 and about one year has elapsed since then. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page 141: 16 2026:HHC:33185 “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 20. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial. 21. No other point was urged. 22. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 23. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) 07th August, 2026. Judge. (Ravinder)