THE STATE OF JHARKHAND, THROUGH ITS CHIEF SECRETARY v. DR. PUSHPLATA
LPA/346/2026 · 2026-07-06
Rajesh Shankar
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 19331 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 19331 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:19772-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 346 of 2026
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Chief Secretary, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
2. Principal Secretary, Department of Health, Family Welfare and Medical Education, Government of Jharkhand, having office at Nepal House, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
3. Secretary, Finance, Government of Jharkhand, having office at Nepal House, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
4. Rajendra Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), through its Director, RIMS, P.O. & P.S. Bariatu, District Ranchi.
5. Director, Rajendra Institute of Medical Sciences, RIMS, P.O. & P.S. Bariatu, District Ranchi. ... Respondents/Appellants
Versus Dr. Pushplata, W/o Dr. Ramesh Prasad, aged about 65 years, resident of First Floor, Saryu Niwas, 36, Purulia Road, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Lower Bazar, District Ranchi. ... Writ Petitioner/Respondent
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CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------- For the Appellants: Mr Gaurang Jajodia, A.C. to G.P.-II
--------- 02/Dated: 06.07.2026
1. Heard Mr Gaurang Jajodia, learned A.C. to G.P.-II appearing for the appellants.
2. This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge order dated 04.05.2026 allowing the respondent’s W.P.(S) No. 2526 of 2026, quashing the order of transferring her from Ranchi to Barhait (Sahibganj) at a stage when she was to retire within six months and further directing the appellants to pay her salary, back-wages etc.
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:19772-DB
3. Mr Jajodia submitted that the respondent had earlier challenged non-regularisation of her services by instituting a petition before this Court. The writ petition was dismissed, and even the Letters Patent Appeal against the same was dismissed. He submitted that the petitioner instituted S.L.P. (C) No. 12235 of 2024 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court suggested to the parties that they explore the possibility of a settlement in the Lok Adalat.
4. Mr Jajodia pointed out that a settlement was reached and transcribed in the settlement paper dated 31.07.2024. The settlement paper did not make any commitment about posting the petitioner at RIMS, which is even otherwise an autonomous institute. He, therefore, submitted that after the settlement and disposal of the SLP based on the settlement, the respondent was posted at Barhait (Sahibganj) and not transferred to the said place. He submitted that this was not at all a case of transfer; the transfer policy guidelines, which were not mandatory even otherwise, did not apply to the respondent's case.
5. Mr Jajodia submitted that since the above essential distinction was noticed or appreciated by the learned Single Judge, the impugned
order warrants interference. 6. We have considered Mr Jajodia’s submission in the context of the material on record and the reasoning in the learned Single Judge’s
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:19772-DB
impugned order. With respect, we are unable to find any error in the view taken in the impugned order warranting interference in this Letters Patent Appeal. The reasons for this conclusion are discussed briefly hereafter. 7. Admittedly, the petitioner’s services were regularised pursuant to a settlement reached at the National Lok Adalat as recorded in the settlement paper dated 31.07.2024. The reference to the Lok Adalat in this case was pursuant to an order made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P.(C) No. 12235 of 2024 instituted by the respondent herein complaining about the non-regularisation of her services. 8. Once the regularisation order was made, there is no reason to hold that her transfer could not be governed by the transfer policy in force from 25.10.1980. Admittedly, the regularisation order was made on 15.12.2025, and the respondent was due to superannuate on 30.06.2026, i.e. hardly six months before the respondent was due to superannuate. 9. The appellants, by making this fine distinction between “posting” and “transfer”, cannot avoid compliance with their own transfer policy resolution of 1980. No doubt, the resolution referred to posting of an employee at or near her home station during the year in which she was due to superannuate “as far as possible”. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:19772-DB
However, that does not mean that such policy could have been breached arbitrarily or without any valid reasons. 10. In this case, we are left with the impression that the respondent was transferred almost 400 km away solely because she dared to pursue her litigation, thereby denying her the benefits of regularisation. Transferring or posting the respondent to Barhait in Sahibganj, almost 400 km away, appears harsh, particularly because the appellants did not place any material on record to justify deviating from their own policy. The question is not whether the policy is mandatory or directory. Even assuming that the policy was directory, it could not have been deviated from on account of arbitrariness or, much worse, mala fides. 11.
Posting the respondent in a remote area almost 400 kms away when she had hardly six months to superannuate, apart from being in breach of the appellant’s own policy, does suggest arbitrariness in the peculiar facts of the present case. The learned Single Judge, accordingly, was justified in interfering to the impugned transfer
order and directing payment of salary to the respondent.
12. In fact, we are quite surprised that a mighty State should force the respondent to litigate for her regularisation after she had served for several years uninterruptedly. After the respondent met with limited success through the intervention of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are even more surprised that the mighty State should
Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:19772-DB
transfer or post the respondent at a remote place 400 kms away when she was due to retire in the next six months.
13. As a model employer, the State is not expected to force a 65-year- old doctor to constantly approach the courts for justice. Admittedly, by 30.06.2026, the respondent had already retired upon attaining the age of superannuation, and the issue now is mostly confined to payments of certain financial benefits, arrears, etc.
14. For all the above reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and consequently dismiss the same. Pending IAs, if any, do not survive and are disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.) July 06, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2 Uploaded on 07.07.2026