(2026: JHHC:19789-DB) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 347 of 2026 Suryadeo Kumar Yadav, aged about 40 yrs, son of Late Somar Yadav, resident of Village & P.O.- Ghanghri, P.S.- Bashistha Nagar (Jori), District- Chatra. ... ... Appellant Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand through its Chief Secretary, Project Bhawan, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District- Ranchi. 2. The Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribag, P.O.& P.S.- Hazaribag, District- Hazaribag. 3. Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, P.O. & P.S.- Koderma, District- Koderma. 4. Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-District Program Co-ordinator, Koderma, P.O. & P.S.- Koderma, District- Koderma. … ... Respondents ------ CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ------ For the Appellant : Mr Rajiv Nandan Prasad, Advocate Mr Sushant Kumar Sinha, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr Rakesh Kumar Shahi, AC to SC(L&C)-I ----- 02 /Dated: 06.07.2026 1. Heard Mr Rajiv Nandan Prasad who appears with Mr Sushant Kumar Sinha for the appellant and Mr Rakesh Kumar Shahi, learned AC to SC(L&C)-I for the respondents. 2. This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge’s order dated 12.02.2026 dismissing the appellant’s W.P.(S) No. 975 of 2026 on the ground of inordinate delay. 3. The appellant’s case is that, on account of his alleged unauthorised absence from 06.05.2015 to 06.07.2015, i.e., two months, he was dismissed from service by order dated 04.07.2016. 4. The appellant has pointed out that in fact, vide Memo dated 19.05.2016, the appellant was allowed to rejoin duties. However, by a further Memo dated 04.07.2016, the appellant’s appointment was cancelled, and he was discharged from service. (2026: JHHC:19789-DB) 2 5. The appellant preferred Appeal No. 72 of 2021 before the Appellate Authority. Though this appeal was preferred almost five years after the date of his discharge, the Appellate Authority did not dismiss the appeal by citing any bar of limitation or on the ground that it was otherwise inordinately delayed. The appeal was decided on merits, but dismissed vide order dated 18.09.2024. 6. During the pendency of this appeal therefore, it could not have been expected of the appellant to file a petition before this Court to challenge his discharge order dated 04.07.2016. The appellant instituted W.P.(S) No. 975 of 2026 on 05.08.2025, i.e., within a year of the dismissal order of the appeal dated 18.09.2024. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that the appellant’s absence was not only for the period between 06.05.2015 and 06.07.2015, i.e., two months. He submitted that the appellant also remained absent from 13.02.2016 to 16.05.2016, as well as during some other periods. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, pointed out that the show cause notice issued to the petitioner refers only to the absence for the period between 06.05.2015 and 06.07.2015, and not to any other periods. The show cause notice issued on 18.09.2015 does refer only to the period between 06.05.2015 and 06.07.2015. In any event, these are not the issues we propose to address in this matter. 9. Having considered the matter, we do not consider that the institution of W.P.(S) No. 975 of 2026, within a year of the date of the appeal dismissal order dated 18.09.2024, was inordinately delayed. This is also not a case in which the doctrine of laches could strictly apply, as it is nowhere pleaded that any parallel rights have accrued in favour of the respondents. Notably, the appellant’s appeal before the Appellate Authority was not dismissed on the grounds of delay or laches. (2026: JHHC:19789-DB) 3 10. The fact that more than nine years had elapsed from the date of the appellant’s discharge is not a factor that could have been considered in this matter because, admittedly, the appellant preferred an appeal to challenge the discharge order. The appeal, though instituted after a considerable period, was never dismissed by the Appellate Authority on the ground of delay, but the dismissal was on merits. 11. Within a year of the date of the appeal dismissal order, W.P.(S) No. 975 of 2026 was filed. The delay, if any, was therefore suitably explained. From the date of the dismissal of the appeal, the petition could not be said to be inordinately delayed, particularly when we consider the appellant's case, who was appointed as a Rojgar Sewak vide Memo dated 04.06.2007. The show cause notice issued to the appellant also alleged an unauthorised absence of only two months, and there is a record that the same was initially condoned vide Memo no. 19.05.2016. 12. After considering all the above facts and circumstances, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 12.02.2026, and remand the same for fresh consideration on the merits after restoring W.P.(S) No. 975 of 2026 to the file of the learned Single Judge. 13. Since we have not considered any of the rival contentions on merits of the matter, we clarify that all contentions of all parties on merits are kept open for the decision of the learned Single Judge consequent upon remand. 14. This appeal is allowed in the above terms without any order for costs. The registry must now place the matter before the learned Single Judge having the roster to deal with these cases. (M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) July 06, 2026 Ranjeet / R.Kr. Uploaded on 08.07.2026