1 2026:CGHC:22513 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 99 of 2025 1 - The Regional Manager Central Bank Of India. Regional Office, Dhanjal Complex, Ambikapur (C.G.), Pin - 497001. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Shri Suren Bhoi S/o Shri Ganesh Bhoi Aged About 60 Years R/o Room No. 01, Bhaiya Than, District Surajpur (C.G.) Pin - 497231 ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner/s : Shri Anand Shukla, Advocate. For Respondent/s : Shri C.V. Ram Shastry, Advocate holding the brief of Shri Ravi Ranjan Sinha, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 13.05.2026 1) By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought following reliefs:- “1. That, the Hon'ble Court may be kind be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 14.02.2025 (ANNEXURE P/1) passed by the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C), Raipur (C.G.) respectively by issuance of writ of mandamus NIRMALA RAO 2 or any other writ/writs, order/orders or direction/directions. 2. That, the Hon'ble Court may be kind be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 14.02.2025 (ANNEXURE P/1) and remand back the matter to the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C), Raipur (C.G.) by directing the said authority to decide the case on its merits. 3. That, the Hon'ble Court may be kind be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 10.03.2023 (ANNEXURE P/2) passed by Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act & RLC (Central), Bilaspur (C.G.) respectively by issuance of writ of mandamus or any other writ/writs, order/orders or direction/directions. 4. Any other relief/relief's which Hon'ble court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.” 2) The facts, in brief, are that the respondent was appointed under the petitioner on 12.8.1991 to the post of Assistant Manager. He was subjected to departmental proceedings and a show-cause notice was issued to him on 15.1.2021. There were serious allegations with regard to forgery in loan sanction and failure in discharge of duties with integrity and honesty, in utter contravention of Regulations 3(1) and 3(3) of the Central Bank of India Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations 1976 (for short, Regulations, 1976), thereby attracting penalties under Regulation 4 of the Regulations, 1976. After a full-fledged departmental enquiry, the respondent was inflicted with the penalty of 3 compulsory retirement with all superannuation benefits vide order dated 11.5.2022. Subsequently, a notice with regard to forfeiture of gratuity was issued by the petitioner on 28.6.2022. The respondent challenged the said order before the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short ‘Act, 1972’) and also sought relief of payment of the gratuity. The petitioner herein filed its reply and thereafter, the Controlling Authority passed an order in favour of the respondent on 10.3.2023 and directed the petitioner herein to release gratuity of Rs.20,00,000/- to the respondent alongwith simple interest @10% per annum from 11.5.2023 till the date of realization. 3) Against the order dated 10.3.2023, the petitioner preferred WP(L) No.151 of 2024, which was disposed of vide order dated 21.8.2024 reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner herein preferred an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Act, 1972 before the Appellate Authority on 21.8.2024 with a delay of 20 months and the said appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 14.2.2025 on account of delay alone. The petitioner has preferred this petition against the said order. 4) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that sufficient cause was assigned by the petitioner in the memo of appeal to condone the delay but the Appellate Authority rejected the same. He would submit that since the penalty was inflicted 4 upon the respondent, he was not entitled to payment of gratuity but the Controlling Authority ignored this fact and directed the petitioner herein to pay gratuity to the tune of Rs.20,00,000/- alongwith interest @ 10% per annum. He would pray to set aside the orders passed by the Controlling Authority as well as the Appellate Authority. 5) On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner. He would submit that according to provisions of Section 7(7) of the Act, 1972, an appeal may be preferred within a period of 60 days which may be extended by a further period of 60 days by the Appellate Authority if sufficient cause is shown to its satisfaction. He would submit that since the appeal was preferred by the petitioner herein after the expiry of 20 months, the same was rightly dismissed by the Appellate Authority. He would submit that this petition deserves to be dismissed. 6) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 7) It is not in dispute that the appeal under Section 7(7) of the Act, 1972 was preferred by the petitioner against the order passed by the Controlling Authority dated 10.3.2023 after a delay of 20 months. The Appellate Authority considered the submissions advanced by the petitioner and thereafter, dismissed the appeal, holding that delay beyond 60 days cannot be condoned. 5 8) The short question which arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the Appellate Authority, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'PG Act") is empowered to condone the delay beyond sixty days in filing the appeal. 9) To appreciate the issue in hand, it would be apposite to refer to Section 7(7) of the PG Act, which reads as follows:- "7. Determination of the amount of gratuity.- (1) xxx xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx xxx (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4), may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days.” 10)The opening portion of Section 7(7) of the PG Act clearly lays down that any person aggrieved by an order of authority passed under Section 7(4) may prefer appeal to the appropriate 6 Government or authority. The Limitation prescribed for filing such appeal is sixty days starting from the date of receipt of order from which the appeal is preferred. The proviso to this Section lays down that the appellate authority, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause for preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, may extend the period for a further period of sixty days. 11)It is thus clear that the limitation for filing an appeal is sixty days and the limitation starts to run from the date of receipt of the order of the appropriate authority. If the appeal is not filed within sixty days, then appellant shall have to satisfy the Appellate Authority that there was sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal. However, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down in the proviso to Section 7(7) of the PG Act that the appellate authority cannot extend the period beyond another sixty days, which means the outer limitation is 60+ 60 = 120 days. If the appeal is filed on 121 days, then the appellate authority cannot condone the delay. 12)It must be remembered that the appeal is creation of statute. Law makers lay down the period of limitation. In case there was no outer limitation provided in the proviso, I could have taken recourse to the Limitation Act and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applicable. However, in the PG Act, which is a special piece of legislation, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down that delay can be condoned only up to sixty days and that no further delay can be condoned. Therefore, the 7 Appellate Authority is powerless to condone the delay when the delay is beyond sixty days. 13)In this behalf I may also make a reference to the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as follows:- "29 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 14) The Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Zila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit Vs. Ram Briksha Singh (Dead) through L.Rs. and others, reported in 2016 (148) FLR 789 wherein after making reference of the Calcutta High Court in the matter of City College Vs. State of West Bengal & others, reported in (1987) 1 LLJ 41 (Cal) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Shri Gurudeo Ayurved Mahavidyalaya vs. Madhav Naraya Mahakode and others, reported in 1994 Lab.I.C. 1542 held that the appellate authority is powerless to condone the delay beyond sixty days. The High Court of Calcutta & the High Court of Bombay have held that in 8 view of special provision under Section 7(7) of the PG Act, the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked by the Appellate Authority under the PG Act for condoning the delay beyond 120 days. 15) Similarly in the matter of Western Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Controlling Authorities & others, reported in 2000(3) MPLJ 63 the Madhya Pradesh High Court also held that the Appellate Authority cannot condone the delay or extend the period of limitation beyond the period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the PG Act. 16) The Andhra Pradesh High Court took a similar view in the matter of Warangal District Co-Operative Society Ltd. Vs. Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Ac, 1972, reported in (2002) III LLJ 616 and held that it is settled principle of interpretation of statutes that if there are two mandates, the general must give a way to the special and, therefore, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot apply in such cases and condonation of delay thereof shall be governed by the provisions of Section 7(7) of the PG Act. 17)Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-referred cases, no case is made out for interference. 9 18)Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Nimmi