2026:HHC:35440 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 505 of 2026 Reserved on: 14.08.2026 Date of Decision: 21.08.2026 Dinesh Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Janmajai Chauhan, Advocate. For the respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 08.06.2026 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur, District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 13.06.2025 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, District Sirmaur (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:35440 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Ajay Kumar (PW1) was posted in Haripurdhar Police Post on general duty. He and Ashok Kumar (PW4) were patrolling in the market on 22.12.2019. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-79-0768 was parked in the middle of the road, which was obstructing the traffic. No person was found sitting in the vehicle. The informant was trying to find out about the owner of the vehicle when the accused came, caught hold of the informant and slapped him. The matter was reported to the police, and an FIR (Ext. P1/PW12) was registered at the police station. HC Mukesh Kumar (PW13) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.P1/PW13) and took the photographs (Ext.P2/PW13 to Ext. P4/PW13). Dr Vikas Chauhan (PW10) examined the informant and issued the MLC (Ext.P2/PW10). The informant produced his jacket (Ext.P1) worn by him at the time of the incident. This jacket was put in a cloth parcel and was sealed with seal “E”. The parcel was seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). Seal impression (Ext.PW1/C) was obtained on a separate piece of cloth. 3 2026:HHC:35440 Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 332 and 353 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Informant Ajay Kumar (PW1) narrated the incident. Shyam Singh (PW2), Balbir Singh (PW3), Krishan Rana (PW5), Anil Kumar (PW6) and Satpal (PW7) did not support the prosecution case. HC Ashok Kumar (PW4) was an eyewitness. HASI Lal Singh (PW8) proved the entries in the daily diary. HC Ashish Chauhan (PW9) proved the appointment and posting order of the informant. Dr Vikas Chauhan (PW10) medically examined the informant. Inspector Jeet Ram (PW11) prepared the challan. MHC Dev Dutt (PW12) proved the FIR. HC Mukesh Kumar (PW13) investigated the matter. 4 2026:HHC:35440 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that he was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by the testimony of HC Ashok Kumar (PW4). The medical evidence and torn uniform produced by the victim also corroborated his version. The mere fact that independent witnesses had turned hostile was not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. No reason was assigned as to why the police officials would depose falsely against the accused. The informant was discharging his official duty, and the accused had caused hurt to him in the discharge of the official duty. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: Sections Sentence Section 353 of Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for four months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 days. Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of 5 2026:HHC:35440 payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 days. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur at Nahan (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court that the statements of the informant and Ashok Kumar (PW4) corroborated each other. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. The accused had not assigned any reason as to why the police officials would depose falsely against him. The statements of the informant and Ashok Kumar were corroborated by the recovery of a torn jacket and the medical evidence. The statements of independent witnesses were not sufficient to cast a doubt on the prosecution version. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate, which did not require any interference from the Appellate Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision 6 2026:HHC:35440 asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution version, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. The informant’s statement was contradicted on material aspects. The photographs showed that there was a sizable heap of snow on the roadside. The victim stated that he was not aware whether there was some snow on the road or not, which made his version highly doubtful. No challan was issued for obstructing the traffic, which falsified the prosecution version. The Medical Officer admitted that injuries could have been caused by way of a fall. The jacket was seized after two days, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Learned Trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Janmajai Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/state. 10. Mr Janmajai Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There are various contradictions in the 7 2026:HHC:35440 statements of official witnesses, which made the prosecution’s version doubtful. Independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution case, and learned Courts below erred in holding the accused guilty. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not extended to the accused, and such benefit should have been extended. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that this Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision. The learned Courts below have concurrently found that testimonies of police officials were credible and there was no reason to disbelieve those testimonies. This is a pure finding of fact and should not be disturbed while exercising revisional jurisdiction. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person who assaults the public official while in discharge of his official duties. Thus, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8 2026:HHC:35440 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: - “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. 9 2026:HHC:35440 (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re- examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 10 2026:HHC:35440 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: 11 2026:HHC:35440 i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the 12 2026:HHC:35440 present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant Ajay Kumar (PW1) stated that he and Ashok Kumar (PW4) were on patrolling duty on 22.12.2019. They found a car bearing registration No. HP-79-0768 parked in the middle of the road, which was creating a traffic jam. He asked the accused to remove the vehicle, but the accused caught hold of him by his uniform and slapped him. The accused also tore his uniform. Many people gathered on the spot. He stated in his cross- examination that the car was parked on Sangrah Road. The accused resided near Bhangani Mata Temple, where he had a shop and a house. The house of the accused was 1.5 km away. He admitted that the snow was visible in the photograph. He also admitted that there are chances of skidding of the vehicle on the snow. Two cars could have easily crossed at the same time. He admitted that no traffic infringement report was issued. 13 2026:HHC:35440 16. His testimony is duly corroborated by the statement of Ashok Kumar (PW4) who stated that he and Ajay were on patrolling duty on 22.12.2019. He was controlling the traffic towards Nahan, and Ajay was controlling the traffic towards the bus stand. He heard some noise and went to the spot. He saw that a car bearing registration No. HP-79-0768 was parked in the middle of the road, which was creating a traffic jam. The accused had caught hold of the uniform of Ajay and was beating him. Balwant Singh and another person came to the spot and rescued the informant. The button of the uniform of Ajay was broken. He stated in his cross- examination that there was a snowfall due to which the vehicles usually skidded. He admitted that the house and the shop of the accused were located near Bhangani Mata. He denied that the accused was called to the police post by Constable Ajay. 17. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses to show that they were making false statements. Nothing was suggested to them that they had any motive to depose falsely against the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) SCC Online SC 69 that the Appellate Court should not interfere with the findings 14 2026:HHC:35440 regarding the credibility of the witnesses recorded by the learned Trial Court unless there is some illegality in it. It was observed: - “83. The trial court, after recording the testimony of the PW-10, and on consideration of the same, found her evidence trustworthy and credible. We see no reason to question the assessment of the credibility of the witness by the Trial Court, which had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness and all other witnesses. Nothing has been brought to our notice of any serious illegality or breach of fundamental law to warrant taking a different view of the evidence of PW-10. In this regard, we may keep in mind the valuable observations made by this Court in Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497, in the following words: “28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not be forgotten that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in the appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law or unreasonable. 29. ………………………………….. 30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [(1947-48) 75 IA 252: AIR 1949 PC 32] the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on the point, stated [Quoting from Watt v. Thomas, [1947] 1 All ER 582, pp. 583 H-584 A.]: (IA p. 255) 15 2026:HHC:35440 “…but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the Judge of the first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing how their evidence is given.” 18. Nothing was shown against the police officials to discard their testimonies, and it is not possible to interfere with the finding regarding their credibility. 19. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. However, the contradictions are not sufficient to acquit the accused, as the contradictions are bound to come with time. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - 16 2026:HHC:35440 “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. 17 2026:HHC:35440 V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross- 18 2026:HHC:35440 examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court, in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) 19 2026:HHC:35440 “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable; contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credibility to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the 20 2026:HHC:35440 material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]]. 32. These are variations that would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded 21 2026:HHC:35440 with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that 22 2026:HHC:35440 impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 21. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: - “17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this Court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: "42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When 23 2026:HHC:35440 the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Achchar Singh vs. State of H.P., AIR 2021 SC 3426, that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded due to exaggeration alone. It was observed: “24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. Cambridge Dictionary defines "exaggeration" as "the fact of making something larger, more important, better or worse than it is". Merriam-Webster defines the term "exaggerate" as to "enlarge beyond bounds or the truth". The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as "enlarged or altered beyond normal proportions". These expressions unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an 'exaggerated statement' lies in a fact, to which fictitious additions are made to make it more penetrative. Every exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of 'truth'. No exaggerated statement is possible without an element of truth. On the other hand, the Advanced Law Lexicon defines "false" as "erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct, or true". Oxford Concise Dictionary states that "false" is "wrong; not correct or true". Similar is the explanation in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differential between an 'exaggerated 24 2026:HHC:35440 version' and a 'false version'. An exaggerated statement contains both truth and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of truth in it (being the 'opposite' of 'true'). It is well said that to make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such distinction, is duty-bound to disseminate 'truth' from 'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff in case of exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the chaff are so inextricably intertwined that, in their separation, no real evidence survives that the whole evidence can be discarded. [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643, 18.] 25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major portion of the evidence is found deficient, if the residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, a conviction can be based on it. This Court, in Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112, held that: "24. ...So far as this contention is concerned, it must be kept in view that while appreciating the evidence of witnesses in a criminal trial, especially in a case of eyewitnesses, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus cannot apply, and the court has to make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is of course true that when a witness is said to have exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of trial and has tried to involve many more accused and if that part of the evidence is not found acceptable the remaining part of the evidence has to be scrutinised with care and the court must try to see whether the acceptable part of the evidence gets corroborated from other evidence on record so that the acceptable part can be safely relied upon..." 26. There is no gainsaying that homicidal deaths cannot be left to judicium dei. The Courts, in their quest to reach the truth, ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its best 25 2026:HHC:35440 efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of the doubt is extended. 27. An eyewitness is always preferred to others. The statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the difference between exaggeration and falsity. We find that the truth can be effortlessly extracted from their statements. The trial Court fell in grave error and overlooked the credible and consistent evidence while proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated statements made by the eyewitnesses belie their version.” 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and others Versus State of Rajasthan, 2022 Cri. L.J. 374, that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded because he had made a wrong statement regarding some aspect. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood, his entire statement is to be discarded does not apply to India. It was observed: - “48. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood, the evidence in its entirety has to be eschewed may not have a strict application to the criminal jurisprudence in our country. The principle governing sifting the chaff from the grain has to be applied. However, when the evidence is inseparable and such an attempt would either be impossible or would make the evidence unacceptable, the natural consequence would be one of avoidance. The said principle has not assumed the status of law but continues only as a rule of caution. One has to see the nature of the discrepancy in a given case. When the discrepancies are very material, shaking the very credibility of the witness, leading to a conclusion in the mind of the court that it is neither possible to separate it nor to rely upon it, it is for the said court to 26 2026:HHC:35440 either accept or reject." 24. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies. The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively affect the prosecution's case and whether they pertain to the core of the case rather than the details. 25. Learned Courts below have consistently held that the contradictions do not affect the testimonies of the witnesses and have accepted the statements of the witnesses. This Court does not exercise the appellate jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence. Thus, the submission that the testimonies of the witnesses are to be discarded because of some contradiction cannot be accepted. 26. It was submitted that Constable Ajay had been transferred and could not have discharged the duties. This submission will not help the accused. The testimonies of police officials were not challenged in the cross-examination that Constable Ajay was discharging his official duties. It was suggested to H.C. Ashok that Constable Ajay had called the accused to the police post, clearly showing that Constable Ajay was posted at the police post. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu 27 2026:HHC:35440 Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 383: - “38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross- examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. 39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner. **** 42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.” 27. Thus, the submission that Constable Ajay was not shown to be a public official at the time of the incident cannot be accepted. 28. It was submitted that independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution version and this would make the 28 2026:HHC:35440 prosecution case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 958 that witnesses turning hostile is not a new phenomenon, but the accused can be acquitted if there is other evidence on record. It was observed: 18. When a witness, produced on behalf of the prosecution, deposes against the prosecution version and goes against his/her own previously recorded statements, the prosecution can request the Court to declare such a witness as hostile and seek permission from the Court to cross-examine its own witness. This is the procedure followed in a Trial, as we all know. In the present case, there are as many as fifty-one prosecution witnesses, and it is also a fact that many of them have turned hostile by turning against their earlier statements made before the police under section 161 CrPC, and even before the Magistrate under section 164 CrPC, in some cases. This phenomenon is not new; in fact, it is sadly a common occurrence in our criminal Courts today, much to the despair and frustration of the prosecution. This case, therefore, is no exception. Despite this, however, there are witnesses in the present case, especially PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-15 and PW-49, whose evidence, in the form of their testimonies before the Court, is more than sufficient to convict the present appellants. 29. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be discarded merely because the independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution version. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 5 SCC 646: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 680: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 207, that the testimonies of the 29 2026:HHC:35440 police officials cannot be ignored because they are police officials. It was observed at page 656: “21. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that recovery has not been proved by any independent witness is of no substance for the reason that, in the absence of an independent witness to support the recovery, it cannot be ignored unless proved to the contrary. There is no such legal proposition that the evidence of police officials, unless supported by an independent witness, is unworthy of acceptance or that the evidence of police officials can be outrightly disregarded.” 30. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to the police force. It was observed: “11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole testimony of the police official, which, if otherwise reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. There is also no rule of law that lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer, even if such evidence is otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever the evidence of a police officer, after scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of conviction, and the absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution’s case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force.” 30 2026:HHC:35440 31. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State, AIR 2003 S.C. 3011, wherein it was held: “The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness, and there is no principle of law that, without corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of police personnel as of other persons, and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no principle of general application can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied) 32. This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed: 22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. In other words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of such a police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, then basing the conviction thereupon cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground. This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh [1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC 229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 595: AIR 2013 SCW 3102] that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large shows its disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer unreliable and untrustworthy, 31 2026:HHC:35440 the court may disbelieve him, but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the police department should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that the quality of the evidence outweighs the quantity of evidence. 23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil, 2001 (1) SCC 652, in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 674, this court held that: — “23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be rejected solely on the ground that independent witnesses have not been examined when, on the perusal of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the case put forth by the prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence of the official witnesses is trustworthy and credible, there is no reason not to rest the conviction on the basis of their evidence.” 24. We must note that in the former it was observed: — “21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature… If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police, the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.” 25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out 32 2026:HHC:35440 memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of independent witnesses. 26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official witnesses cannot be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined. The correctness or authenticity is only to be doubted on “any good reason”, which, quite apparently, is missing from the present case. No reason is forthcoming on behalf of the Appellant to challenge the veracity of the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, which the courts below have found absolutely to be inspiring confidence. Therefore, basing the conviction on the basis of testimony of the police witnesses as undertaken by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court vide the impugned judgment, cannot be faulted with.” 33. In the present case, the testimonies of official witnesses were duly corroborated by the recovery of the torn jacket. The Medical Officer had also found injuries on the right arm near the elbow, an abrasion on the right arm near the elbow, bruise on the left side of the chest, which corroborates the informant's version that the accused had given beatings to him. The Medical Officer admitted in his cross-examination that the injuries could have been caused by way of a fall. However, that is an alternative hypothesis and will not make the prosecution version suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical 33 2026:HHC:35440 evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: “22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 34. It was submitted that there is a delay in the recovery of the uniform which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The delay in recovery of the uniform would be a case of defective investigation, which would not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. It was held in Karnel Singh vs. State, 1995 (5) SCC 518 that the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted due to the defective investigation because the investigating officer is not under the control of the complainant, 34 2026:HHC:35440 and the complainant cannot be penalised for the negligence of the investigating officer. It was held: “4. We have very carefully scrutinised the evidence, having regard to the fact that (PW 6) the Investigation Officer had not taken the care expected of him. He did not record the statements of the two witnesses, nor did he refer to the attachment of the 'Chaddi' in his oral evidence. That was a very vital piece of evidence to which little or no attention was paid. If the seizure of that article was properly proved, the article with semen stains would have lent strong corroboration to the evidence of the prosecutrix. There is no doubt that the investigation was casual and defective. But despite these deficiencies, both the Courts below have recorded a conviction. The question is: are they right? 5. Notwithstanding our unhappiness regarding the nature of the investigation, we have to consider whether the evidence on record, even on strict scrutiny, establishes the guilt. In cases of defective investigation, the Court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence, but it would not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on account of the defect; to do so would be tantamount to playing into the hands of the Investigating Officer if the investigation is designedly defective. Any Investigating Officer, in fairness to the prosecutrix as well as the accused, would have recorded the statements of the two witnesses and would have drawn up a proper seizure memo regarding the 'Chaddi'. That is the reason why we have said that the investigation was slipshod and defective. 6. We must admit that the defective investigation gave us some anxious moments, and we were at first blush inclined to think that the accused was prejudiced. But on closer scrutiny, we have reason to think that the loopholes in the investigation were left to help the accused at the cost of the poor prosecutrix, a labourer. To acquit solely on that ground would be adding insult to injury.” 35 2026:HHC:35440 35. This position was reiterated in Sachin Kumar Singhraha v. State of M.P. (2019) 8 SCC 371: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 363, and it was held: “At this juncture, we would like to recall that it is well- settled that criminal justice should not become a casualty because of the minor mistakes committed by the Investigating Officer. We may hasten to add here that if the Investigating Officer suppresses the real incident by creating certain records to make a new case altogether, the Court would definitely strongly come against such action of the Investigating Officer. There cannot be any dispute that the benefit of doubt arising out of major flaws in the investigation would create suspicion in the mind of the Court, and consequently, such an inefficient investigation would accrue to the benefit of the accused. As observed by this Court in the case of State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, (2000) (1) SCC 247, a criminal trial cannot be equated with a mock scene from a stunt film. Such a trial is conducted to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused arraigned, and in arriving at a conclusion about the truth, the courts are required to adopt a rational approach and judge the evidence by its intrinsic worth and the animus of the witnesses. The courts are not obliged to make efforts either to give latitude to the prosecution or loosely construe the law in favour of the accused. The traditional dogmatic hypertechnical approach has to be replaced by a rational, realistic and genuine approach for administering justice in a criminal trial.” 36. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Srichand K. Khetwani v. State of Maharashtra, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 32: (1967) 1 SCR 595: AIR 1967 SC 450: 1967 Cri LJ 414: (1967) 2 SCJ 36 2026:HHC:35440 178 that no adverse inference can be drawn for failure to collect the evidence. It was observed: 8. Further, an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence. When no such evidence has been obtained, it cannot be said what that evidence could have been and therefore, no question of presuming that that evidence would have been against the prosecution, under Section 114, illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, can arise. 37. This position was reiterated in Chand Khan v. State of U.P., (1995) 5 SCC 448: 1995 SCC (Cri) 915, wherein it was observed: “In the FIR, which was lodged within two hours of the incident, the substratum of the entire prosecution case finds place, including a statement that during the incident, Sm. Naeema Parveen had, in defending herself, given a blow to one of the accused with a vegetable-cutting knife. In view of the above statement recorded in the FIR, the Investigation Officer (PW 16) ought to have taken steps to seize the knife even if PW 5 had not produced it for, one of the essential requisites of a proper investigation is the collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence and that necessarily includes, in a case of assault, seizure of the weapon of offence, but then failure to collect evidence and failure to produce evidence collected during investigation at the trial carry two different connotations and consequences. While the former may entitle the court to hold the investigation to be perfunctory or tainted, affecting the entire trial, in the case of the latter, the court may legitimately draw a presumption in accordance with Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act. As the case presented before us comes under the first category of failures, we have to find out whether we will be justified in discarding the prosecution case solely for the remissness of the Investigating Officer in seizing the knife. The consistent 37 2026:HHC:35440 and reliable evidence of the eyewitnesses, coupled with the nature of injuries sustained by some of them and Chand Khan, and the fact that in the FIR it has clearly been stated that one of the miscreants had been assaulted by a vegetable cutting knife, do not persuade us to answer the question in the affirmative.” 38. Therefore, the prosecution’s version cannot be discarded because of delay in recovery of the uniform. 39. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Siyasaran v. State of M.P., 1994 SCC OnLine SC 4: 1995 Cri LJ 2126 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person for using force on a government servant. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and there is no error in not extending the benefit of the Act to the accused. 40. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for 4 months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 353 of IPC and simple imprisonment for 6 months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 332 of IPC. The accused had assaulted the police officials in broad daylight in the middle of the market, which 38 2026:HHC:35440 can harm law and order; hence, a deterrent view was required to be taken to prevent other persons from assaulting the public officials while discharging their duties. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is lenient, and no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court. 41. No other point was urged. 42. Thus, there is no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. Hence, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed. All the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st August, 2026 (Nikita)