1 2026:CGHC:1233 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 509 of 2013 1 - Bodhiram S/o Late Teejuram Aged About 39 Years R/o Bhaktudera, P.S. Baradwar, Tah. Sakti, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., Chhattisgarh 2 - Prahlad S/o Ramcharan Aged About 38 Years R/o Bhaktudera, P.S. Baradwar, Tah. Sakti, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1 - Shantilal S/o Dasharam Aged About 39 Years R/o Pendra Road, Civil And Revenue Distt. Bilaspur C.G., Chhattisgarh 2 - Vikas S/o Ramprasad Aged About 26 Years R/o Pendra Road, Civil And Revenue Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Nirmal S/o Ramprasad Aged About 23 Years R/o Pendra Road, Civil And Revenue Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Smt. Anupdevi W/o Ramprasad Aged About 49 Years R/o Pendra Road, Civil And Revenue Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 5 - State Of Chhattisgarh W/o Thru- Collector, Janjgir-Champa, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2026.01.15 17:03:09 +0530 2 For Appellants : Ms. Meena Shastri, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Ritesh Giri, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 08.01.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants/plaintiffs challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 24/09/2013 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa, C.G. in Civil Appeal No.80- A/2010 (Bodhiram & Ors Vs. Shantilal & Ors) arising out of the judgment dated 25/10/2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa, C.G. in Civil Suit No.51A/2009 (Bodhiram & Ors Vs. Shantilal & Ors). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs preferred the Civil Suit pleading inter alia that one Panchram was kotwar of the village Bhaktudera with it's dependent village Ranigoan of district Janjgir-Champa (C.G). Being kotwar, Panchram came in possession of the suit land. Panchram had three sons namely Dasharam, Ramcharan and Teejram. Here in the case, respondent no. 1 is son and respondent no. 4 is daughter of late Dasharam respondent no. 2 & 3 are sons of respondent no. 4. The appellant no. 1 is son of Late Teejram and the appellant no. 2 is son of late Ramcharan. Parties of the case are Hindus and governing by Mitakshra 3 shakha of Hindu law. Panchram became title holder of the suit land after coming into force of the provision of section 158 of Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. After death of "Panchram", Dasharam became karta of the Hindu joint family and Kotwar of the village in place of Late Panchram. Panchram died in the year 1979. During life time of Dasharam, 2/3 (1/3 + 1/3) part of the suit land were cultivated by the appellants and remaining 1/3 part was possessed by Dasharam as per their family arrangement After death of Dasharam, his son respondent no. 1 became karta of the family and kotwar of the village. Thereafter, he mutated all the revenue records pertaining to the suit land in his name leaving only 0.75 acre for the appellant no. 1, 0.75 acre for the appellant no. 2 and dispossessed the appellants from the remaining part of the suit land. 3. In the said Civil Suit, the defendant Nos.1 to 3 submitted the written statement and denied the plaint averments. They stated that the plaintiffs have not impleaded all the legal heirs of Dasharam, who are necessary parties to the present case. The suit land was never recorded in the name of Dasharam in the revenue records of Village Bhaktdera at any point of time. The father of Respondent No. 1, namely Dasharam, and thereafter Respondent No. 1 himself, were appointed as Kotwar by the appointing authority on the basis of their eligibility and not with the consent of the plaintiffs. The suit land has never been partitioned, nor can Kotwari land be made subject to partition. 4 Respondent No. 1 is the sole owner of the suit land. The plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit land. Therefore, their allegation of cultivating the suit land and of attempts to dispossess them is false. Out of greed, the plaintiffs had earlier filed an application before the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Sakti, which was dismissed. 4. The learned trial Court after framing the issues and considering the evidence adduced by the parties, as also material available on record, dismissed the suit filed of the plaintiffs. 5. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs filed the Civil Appeal before the learned First appellate Court who by order impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellants/defendants. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record. 7. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 8. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate 5 Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/defendants failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 9. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 11. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 12. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law 6 cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 13. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/ Amardeep