1 2026:CGHC:23358 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 1720 of 2023 Order Reserved on: 16.3.2026 Order Delivered on: 15.5.2026 • Saheb S/o Shri Ram Nagina Aged About 53 Years Working On The Post Of Armeture Winder Category 5, Employee No.22930291, At Central Work Shop South Eastern Coal Fields Limited, Korba District Korba, Chhattisgarh, R/o Chopda Colony Qr.No.721, Bishrampur, Police Station Bishrampur, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. Union Of India Through The Managing Director, (Personnel) And Administration, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Basant Vihar, Seepat Road, Bilaspur, Police Station Sarkanda, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 2. The General Manager Central Work Shop, S E C L Korba, Post Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh. RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 3. The Deputy General Manager Excavation Central Work Shop, S E C L Korba, Post Korba Colliery, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh. 4. The Regional Finance Manager Central Workshop (Central Store) S E C L Korba, Post Office Korba Colliery, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh. 5. The Depot Officer (Store) Central Workshop (Central Store) S E C L Korba, Post Office Korba Colliery, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh. 6. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Home, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vivek Chopda, Advocate. For Respondent(s) No. 2 to 5 : Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate. For Respondent/ State : Ms. Vartika Shrivastava, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Order 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1. That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue writ in the nature of mandamus to quash the order dated 11-12/01/2023 issued by respondent No. 1. 3 10.1A. That this Hon'ble court may be please to issue A writ and/or and order or direction in the nature of appropriate writ do issue quashing the order dated 27.10.2018 whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from the service in the interest of justice. 10.2. That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent No.1 to reinstate the petitioner in employment and give consequential benefits from the date of suspension. 10.3. Any other relief, which may be deemed, fit by this Hon'ble Court just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be provided in favour of the petitioner.” 2. Brief facts of the case, is that, the petitioner is challenging the impugned order dated 11/01/2023 passed by respondent No.1, whereby he has been removed from service on the allegation that he had secured employment by submitting forged documents pertaining to land bearing Khasra No. 583/3, Rakba 0.405, situated at Village Kunda of Bishrampur Colliery, which land had been acquired by SECL, and that his appointment was allegedly obtained on the basis of such false documents. It is submitted that the primary allegation against the petitioner is that he misrepresented himself as the grandson of Pawan, son of Gharbharan, caste Goud, and thereby secured employment in the respondent organization, further alleging, on the basis of an 4 anonymous complaint, that the petitioner actually belongs to the Yadav caste as recorded in his service book as Ahir/Yadav and, being a non-tribal, could not claim lineage from Gharbharan. Accordingly, he was charged under Clause 26.01 and 26.9 of the Standing Orders, and charges were framed against him on 27/05/2011. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charges, which was rejected, and he was subjected to a departmental inquiry, ultimately resulting in his dismissal from service vide order dated 27/10/2018, however, the appellate authority, while passing the impugned order, failed to examine the fundamental issue regarding the authenticity and credibility of the complaint and the complainant, as consistently emphasized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Hon’ble Court. It is further submitted that the verification of caste and related status falls within the exclusive domain of the competent statutory authority, and a departmental inquiry is neither the proper forum nor vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, nevertheless, in the present case, no such inquiry was conducted by the competent authority, and instead, the petitioner was proceeded against departmentally. It is also pertinent that a criminal case registered against the petitioner on the same set of allegations under Sections 465, 468, 471, and 420 of the IPC resulted in his acquittal by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surajpur, vide judgment dated 18/01/2019. Thereby rendering the impugned action unsustainable in law. That after rendering more than a decade of service, an anonymous 5 complaint was made before the SECL Headquarters alleging procurement of employment through forged documents, pursuant to which the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 27/05/2011, and a committee was constituted on 22/06/2011. Thereafter, following departmental proceedings, he was held guilty and removed from service on 27/10/2018. It is further submitted that the petitioner, along with similarly situated persons, had earlier approached this Hon’ble Court in WP(S) No. 4728/2011, wherein the Court directed the authorities to refer the matter to the appropriate committee, and subsequent writ appeals bearing No. 721/2018 were also preferred, with orders dated 13/04/2018 and 16/01/2020. The petitioner also initiated further proceedings forming part of the second round of litigation. It is further stated that despite the petitioner’s acquittal in the criminal proceedings and the settled legal position, the appellate authority, relying upon findings in Revenue Case No. 76-10(B)-121/10-11 (State vs. Saheb), erroneously upheld the allegation that the petitioner had obtained employment on the basis of forged documents. That during service, a charge memo was issued, and an FIR was also registered, however, upon conclusion of the criminal trial, the petitioner was honorably acquitted, yet the appellate authority rejected his appeal and passed the impugned order dated 11/01/2023. Hence, the present writ petition is being filed before this Hon’ble High Court seeking appropriate reliefs and directions, as the impugned order is arbitrary, illegal and 6 unsustainable in the eyes of law, leaving the petitioner with no efficacious alternative remedy except to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was duly appointed on 07.03.1996 to the post of Armature Winder (Category-I, later Category-V) in South Eastern Coalfields Limited as a land oustee consequent upon the acquisition of land bearing Khasra No. 583/3, admeasuring 0.405 hectares, situated at Village Kumda, on the strength of a valid consent letter and sworn affidavits executed by the original titleholder, Pawan S/o Gharbharan, who, having no other heirs, had formally acknowledged the petitioner as his maternal grandson (“नाती”). It is further submitted that after rendering more than a decade of unblemished service, an anonymous complaint alleging fraud and misrepresentation of caste and relationship was made, which was duly enquired into by the competent authority, namely the Upper Collector/District Magistrate in the year 2007, and upon a detailed fact-finding enquiry, the complaint was categorically found to be baseless and accordingly closed. Notwithstanding this conclusive determination, the respondent authorities arbitrarily initiated disciplinary action by placing the petitioner under suspension on 27.05.2011, issuing a charge sheet, and simultaneously lodging an FIR culminating in Criminal Case No. 204/2012. During the pendency of departmental proceedings, this Hon’ble Court in W.P. 7 (S) No. 4728/2011 permitted continuation of the enquiry but expressly confined its scope to verification of the relationship alone, prohibiting any enquiry into caste status; however, in disregard of the same and despite the pendency of the criminal trial on identical allegations, the respondents hastily concluded the departmental enquiry and terminated the petitioner’s services vide order dated 27.10.2018. It is emphatically contended that the petitioner was thereafter honourably acquitted on merits by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surajpur, vide judgment dated 18.01.2019, which has attained finality, yet the Appellate Authority, while deciding the appeal pursuant to directions of this Hon’ble Court in W.P.(S) No. 9105/2022, mechanically rejected the same by order dated 11-12.01.2023 without considering the binding effect of the acquittal, the earlier clean chit of the Collector, and the complete absence of cogent evidence establishing forgery or misrepresentation. It is thus urged that the impugned action is arbitrary, perverse, and unsustainable in law, whereas the respondents seek to justify the termination by invoking the principle of preponderance of probabilities in departmental proceedings, alleging inconsistencies in the petitioner’s claim of relationship and purported misrepresentation under the Certified Standing Orders, which, it is submitted, are wholly misconceived and untenable in the facts and circumstances of the case. He has placed reliance upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat 8 Gold Mines Ltd, (1999) 3 SCC 679, G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat, (2026) 5 SCC 446, LIC vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491, Roop Singh Negi, vs. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, Kuldeep Singh vs. Commr. of Police, (1992) 2 SCC 10, Punit Rai vs. Dinesh Chaudhary, (2003) 8 SCC 204, Union of India vs. Dudh Nath Prasad, (2000) 2 SCC 20 and A.P. Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595. 4. Learned counsel for respondents No. 2 to 5 submits that the present writ petition is wholly untenable, being devoid of any legal or factual substance, and is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. The impugned order of termination dated 27.10.2018, as affirmed by the appellate order dated 11.01.2023, has been passed strictly in accordance with law pursuant to a comprehensive, fair and procedurally impeccable departmental enquiry. The gravamen of the charges against the petitioner pertains to grave misconduct involving fraud and impersonation, inasmuch as he secured public employment by falsely projecting himself as the grandson and nominee of a land oustee belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, thereby illegitimately usurping a benefit intended exclusively for genuine beneficiaries. The Enquiry Officer, after conducting as many as 26 sittings and examining extensive documentary evidence including revenue records, affidavits, agreements, and genealogical records, conclusively established that the petitioner had fabricated his identity, the finding that the alleged grandfather was younger than the 9 petitioner itself exposes the fraudulent foundation of his claim. It is further submitted that the principles of natural justice were scrupulously adhered to—the petitioner was served with a detailed charge-sheet, allowed representation through a defense assistant, granted full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and the proceedings were adjourned on multiple occasions to accommodate him, thereby negating any allegation of bias or procedural irregularity. The reliance placed by the petitioner on his acquittal in the criminal case is wholly misplaced and legally unsustainable, as it is a settled principle that departmental proceedings and criminal trials operate in distinct spheres, with different standards of proof, an acquittal does not ipso facto absolve an employee from disciplinary liability. It is further submitted that this Hon’ble Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, does not sit in appeal over departmental findings and cannot re-appreciate evidence or interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the same is perverse or shockingly disproportionate, which is clearly not the case herein. The act of securing employment by fraud strikes at the very root of public service and constitutes a serious breach of trust warranting the penalty of dismissal. In view of the settled legal position, the unimpeachable findings of the departmental enquiry, and the gravity of misconduct established, it is humbly prayed that the present petition be dismissed with exemplary costs. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble 10 Supreme Court in the matter of State Bank of India and others vs. P. Zadenga, (2023) 10 SCC 675. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. From the bare perusal of the records appended with the petition, it appears that the allegations against the petitioner are that he obtained employment as a land oustee on account of acquisition of land bearing Khasra No. 583/3 admeasuring 0.405 hectares situated at Village Kumda, on the basis of a claim that the original title holder, namely Pawan S/o Gharbharan, had adopted the petitioner as his maternal grandson, and on the basis of such alleged acknowledgment and acceptance the petitioner was granted employment; it further appears from the records that the petitioner belongs to a different caste and was also not originally a resident of the State of Chhattisgarh; according to the respondents, the petitioner secured employment by way of impersonation and by producing forged and fabricated documents, pursuant to which a criminal case came to be registered against him for offences punishable under Sections 465, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code; it is further revealed that although the petitioner was subsequently acquitted in the criminal proceedings arising out of the said FIR, departmental proceedings had independently been initiated against him by the SECL on the basis of the enquiry conducted into the allegations relating to fraudulent procurement of 11 employment, and upon conclusion of the departmental enquiry the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be duly proved; it further appears that during the course of the departmental enquiry all prescribed procedures were duly followed, proper opportunity of hearing and defence was afforded to the petitioner, and thereafter the petitioner was terminated from service vide order dated 27.10.2018; against the said order of termination the petitioner preferred an appeal under the relevant statutory provisions and service rules, however, the said appeal also came to be dismissed by the competent appellate authority; the principal ground raised by the petitioner is that once he had been acquitted by the Criminal Court on the same set of allegations, he could not thereafter be punished in departmental proceedings, however, the said issue is no longer res integra in view of the settled legal position consistently laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court that criminal proceedings and departmental enquiries operate in entirely different fields and are governed by different standards of proof, and therefore mere acquittal in a criminal case does not ipso facto preclude the employer from proceeding departmentally against a delinquent employee or imposing punishment if the charges stand proved in departmental proceedings on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. 7. From the perusal of the record, it further appears that the land in dispute originally belonged to one Pawan S/o Gharbharan, 12 belonging to Gond caste, and upon acquisition of his land he was granted employment by the SECL; it also appears that the said Pawan had rendered service in the SECL for approximately three to four years and thereafter left the service on account of illness; during the course of enquiry, the statement of the said Pawan was recorded, wherein he categorically denied having any acquaintance or relationship with the present petitioner and specifically denied having executed any consent letter or declaration in favour of the petitioner; he further categorically denied that the petitioner was his grandson in any manner whatsoever; apart from the aforesaid statement, statements of villagers of the concerned locality were also recorded, wherein they consistently stated that the petitioner was not the grandson of Pawan and that the actual grandson of Pawan was an altogether different person; it further appears that during the enquiry conducted by the Sub-Divisional Officer, the petitioner in his cross-examination dated 17.04.2012 stated that the grandson of Pawan had expired about five years earlier, however, from the proceedings of Revenue Case No. 76-10(B)-121/10-11 before the concerned SDO, a report was submitted clearly indicating that late Pawan was alive at the relevant point of time, thereby creating serious contradictions in the stand taken by the petitioner and further substantiating the allegations that the petitioner had attempted to secure employment by falsely projecting himself as the adopted grandson of Pawan. 13 8. 13 8. Since the departmental enquiry conducted against the petitioner does not suffer from any inherent illegality, procedural irregularity, or violation of principles of natural justice, and further considering that the present writ petition is not in the nature of a statutory appeal against the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings, this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot re-appreciate the evidence or sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority unless it is demonstrated that the enquiry was conducted in a manner contrary to law or in violation of prescribed procedure; however, from the material available on record, there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner was denied reasonable opportunity of hearing or fair opportunity to defend himself during the course of the departmental proceedings; on the contrary, it appears that due and adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner at every stage of the enquiry, and despite such opportunity the petitioner failed to establish that he was in fact the grandson of late Pawan or that late Pawan had ever executed any valid consent or declaration in his favour on the basis of which employment came to be granted to him in the SECL; therefore, in absence of any perversity or procedural infirmity in the departmental proceedings, no interference is called for by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 9. The Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have given anxious and detailed consideration to every aspect of the 14 matter, and only after conducting a full-fledged departmental enquiry in accordance with the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice has the petitioner been removed from service, which action cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary, or unreasonable in any manner whatsoever; it further appears from the record that every procedural safeguard contemplated under the applicable service rules was duly complied with, inasmuch as the petitioner was served with a show cause notice, charge- sheet/charge memo, and all relevant materials pertaining to the allegations levelled against him, and he was also afforded adequate and effective opportunity of hearing and defence before the competent authority; thereafter, upon due appreciation and consideration of the entire material available on record, including the evidence adduced during the departmental proceedings, the authorities arrived at the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner stood proved and accordingly imposed the penalty of removal from service, which decision does not suffer from any procedural infirmity, perversity, or arbitrariness warranting interference by this Court. 10. It is a well-settled and trite principle of law that any appointment obtained by practising fraud, misrepresentation, impersonation, or by production of forged documents is void ab initio, thereby striking at and crumbling the very foundation of the employer- employee relationship from its inception; such an appointment confers no enforceable right upon the employee and can lawfully 15 be annulled by the employer upon discovery of the fraud; it is equally well established that criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings operate in distinct and independent spheres and are governed by different principles, objects, and standards of proof; while in a criminal trial the prosecution is required to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt, in departmental or domestic enquiries the standard of proof is that of preponderance of probabilities, and therefore mere acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically absolve a delinquent employee from departmental liability nor does it bar the employer from imposing appropriate punishment if the misconduct stands proved in the departmental proceedings. 11. In the matter of State Bank of India and Others v. P. Zadenga, (2023) 10 SCC 675, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that acquittal in a criminal case does not foreclose or bar disciplinary action against a delinquent employee; the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that the nature, scope, object, and standard of proof applicable in criminal proceedings are entirely different from those governing departmental disciplinary proceedings, and therefore even if a delinquent employee is acquitted by the Criminal Court, the same by itself cannot be construed to mean that the employer is precluded from continuing or concluding departmental proceedings or from imposing an appropriate punishment, including removal from 16 service, if the misconduct stands proved in the departmental enquiry on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. 12. 12. Further, in the matter of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the scope of judicial review in matters arising out of departmental enquiries is extremely limited, and the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own findings for those recorded by the disciplinary authority; interference is warranted only in cases where it is demonstrated that the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings are perverse, arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or have resulted in gross miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice, and unless such exceptional circumstances are shown to exist, the conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority cannot be termed illegal or unsustainable in law. 13. The Court, while exercising the power of judicial review, does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded in departmental proceedings and cannot reappreciate or reassess the evidence as if conducting a fresh enquiry; interference is permissible only in exceptional circumstances where the findings are based on no evidence whatsoever, are manifestly perverse, arbitrary, or irrational, or where the conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority are such that no reasonable person acting 17 judicially could have reached on the basis of the material available on record. 14. Accordingly, when the matter is examined in the light of the aforesaid settled principles of law, it becomes abundantly clear that during the course of the departmental enquiry the petitioner was afforded full and adequate opportunity of hearing, and the entire proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with law and the prescribed procedure; the material available on record clearly establishes that the petitioner had secured employment by practising fraud and misrepresentation and by producing documents which were fraudulently prepared and relied upon for the purpose of obtaining service in the SECL; upon due consideration of the evidence and material brought on record during the enquiry, the disciplinary authority rightly arrived at the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner stood proved and consequently imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, which order thereafter came to be affirmed by the appellate authority after independent consideration of the matter; in the considered opinion of this Court, both the disciplinary as well as the appellate orders are well-reasoned, legally sustainable, and based upon proper appreciation of the material available on record, and therefore the same do not warrant any interference in exercise of the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18 15. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings recorded hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is devoid of merit and does not warrant any interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 16.3.2026 15.5.2026 15.5.2026 Raghu Jat