Dr. Pradeep Kumar Shukla v. Guru Ghasidas Central University and Ors
WPS/9810/2025 · 2026-05-10
Shri Parth Prateem Sahu
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 19273 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 19273 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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2026:CGHC:22130
AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on 18.02.2026
Order Delivered on 11.05.2026
Order Uploaded on 12.05.2026
WPS No. 9810 of 2025 Dr. Pradeep Kumar Shukla S/o Shri Shri Nath Shukla Aged About 38 Years Associate Professor (terminated), Department Of Bio-Technology, Guru Ghasidas University, PS And PO Koni, Civil And Revenue Distt Bilaspur, Permanent Address Vill. Para Brahmanan, PO Kuchera, Distt Faizabad, Up- 224158, Uttar Pradesh
... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Guru Ghasidas University Through Its Registrar, PS And PO Koni, Civil And Revenue Distt Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 495009 2 - The Vice Chancellor And Chairman Of The Executive Council Of Guru Ghasi Das University, Ps And Po Koni, Civil And Revenue Distt Bilaspur, Cg, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Dr. M.S.K.Khokhar Ex Registrar (Acting) Presently Working As The Pro Vice Chancellor And Executive Council Member Of The University, Guru Digitally signed by PRAVEEN KUMAR SINHA Date: 2026.05.12 10:21:38 +0530
2 / 16 Ghasidas University, Po And Ps Koni, Civil And Revenue Distt Bilaspur, Cg, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Shri K.L.Tiwari Working As A Professor (On Extension), Department Of Bio Technology, Guru Ghasidas University, Po And Ps Koni, Civil And Revenue Distt Bilaspur, Cg , District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Shri B.N.Tiwari Head Department Of Bio Technology, Guru Ghasidas University, Po And Ps Koni, Civil And Revenue Distt Bilaspur, Cg, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 6 - Dr. Seema Rai Working As An Associate Professor In Department Of Zoology, Guru Ghasidas Central University And A Member Of The Executive Council Of Guru Ghasidas Central University, Po And Ps Koni, Civil And Revenue Distt Bilaspur, Cg, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 7 - Dr. Shailendra Kumar (deleted) 8 - The Ministry Of Human Resources Development, Government Of India, Through Its Secretary, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi, District : New Delhi, Delhi 9 - The Visitor Guru Ghasidas Central University, Secretariat Of The Visitor, President House Secretariat, Raiseena Hills, New Delhi, 110001, District : New Delhi, Delhi 10 - State Of C.G. Through Sho, Koni Thana, Po Koni, Civil And Revenue Distt Bilaspur, Cg, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Avinash K. Mishra Advocate For Resp. No.1, 3 to 6 : Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ashutosh Shrivastava, Advocate For Resp. No.8 & 9 : Mr. Bhupendra Pandey, Advocate For Resp. No.10/State : Mr. Rishabh Bisen, Panel Lawyer S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge CAV Order
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1.
By this writ petitioner, petitioner has questioned the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 26.08.2013 (Annexure P-1) whereby the petitioner who was on probation, his services were terminated and was discharged from service. 2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner was appointed on the post of Associate Professor (Bio-technology) vide
order dated 15.02.2012 and has joined the appointed post on
05.03.2012. Service of petitioner is governed with provision of Central Universities Act, 2009 (in short “Act of 2009”) and Statue No.22 (1). Petitioner while discharging his duties has been given important responsibility as he was recommended as Research Supervisor in Biotechnology vide order dated 29.08.2012. It is contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that while petitioner was discharging his duties with utmost sincerity and hard work he was served with notice for clarifying the reason for not displaying model answers. Petitioner was initially appointed on probation and thereafter decision was taken to extend the period of probation of petitioner for one year vide resolution of the Executive Council meeting held on 19.04.2013. In the resolution as mentioned above probation period of six Teachers were extended mentioning that they hae not followed the instructions. However, it is the petitioner only who has been terminated from service before completion of extended probation period. He also pointed out that order of termination of petitioner and discharge from service during probation period is not a termination simpliciter but it is punitive in nature as the reasons for terminating services of petitioner (Probationer) was assessing his misconduct which is apparent from show cause notice issued to petitioner during his period of service one
4 / 16 of which is dated 08.05.2013 issued by Head fo Department of Bio- Technology to explain the reason of preponement of Pre- Ph.D. course work class, not being present in the meeting held at 10:05 a.m. on 08.05.2013 and leaving campus without seeking the permission from examination unit. Another show cause notice was issued on 24.05.2013 to explain the reason for sending SMS to the mobile phone of the then Vice Chancellor. Registrar (Acg.) issued another show cause notice to petitioner dated 29.05.2013 for explaining the reason for not attending the Vice Chancellor while he was standing on the road in front of Forestry Department. Petitioner had submitted reply to show cause notices. Petitioner thereafter availed summer leave from 02.06.2013 to 23.06.2013. However due to his illness on account of mental harassment by the officials of the University, petitioner took medical treatment of anxiety related symptoms. Petitioner thereafter had joined duties on 05.08.2013 along with medical fitness certificate and suddenly petitioner was served with termination order dated 26.08.2013 by the Registrar (Acg.) mentioning unsatisfactory performance during probation period. 3.
He contended that once probation period was extended for one year, performance of petitioner could have been assessed only upon completion of the period of probation and therefore termination of service of petitioner on the basis of assessment and evaluation of the performance of petitioner during that period, is highly arbitrary and illegal. He contended that the petitioner who is working as Associate Professor (Academic Staff) can be terminated only after following due process of law and following procedure as prescribed in Statute No.25
5 / 16 made under Act of 2009 which provides for a departmental enquiry to be conducted before issuing order of termination . No opportunity of hearing was afforded to petitioner. Behind the back of petitioner, misconduct of petitioner was discussed and pursuant to decision taken therein, impugned order has been passed. He contended that with respect to other similarly placed Professors namely Dr. Monika Bhadauria, Dr. Satendra Kumar Nirala, Dr. Sujeet Kumar and Dr. Ashwini Kumar Dixit, they were provided opportunity of hearing and Enquiry Committee was constituted to enquire into the matter pertaining to negligence of duty and indiscipline. He also contended that according to Clause -3 of Ordinance (governing conditions of service of appointed Teachers of the University) as per provision of Section 28 (1) of Act of 2009 and Statute No.22 (1) it is the Executive Council which is having to assess the suitability of petitioner only after 24 months from the date of his joining service in University. Since the petitioner had joined the duties on 05.03.2012 for a period of two years on probation and further period of one year has been extended, therefore, the Executive Council could not have assessed suitability of petitioner prior to 05.12.2015. In support of his contentions, he places reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Marathwada University Vs. Sheshrao Balwantrao Chavan (1989 AIR SC 1582), Chandra Kishore Jha Vs.
Mahavir Prasad (1999 AIR SC 3558), Dhananjay Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka (2001 AIR SCW 1512), V.P. Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab (2000) 3 SCC 239 , Union of India Vs. Shardindu (2007) 6 SCC 276, Registrar General High Court of Gujarat Vs. Jayshree Chamanlal Buddhbhatti (2013 AIR SCW 6482,) Union of India Vs. Mahendra Singh (2022 SC
6 / 16 OnLine 909), Abhay Jai Vs. High Court of judicature for Rajasthan & Anr. (2022 Live Law -SC-284) and decision of this Court in cases of Santosh Kumar Ratnakar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. {2011 Vol.4 MPHT (Chh) 42}. 4.
Learned counsel for respondents No. 1, 3 to 6 would vehemently oppose the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that selection and appointment of teaching staff in the respondent University is made in accordance with provision of Statue No.18 appended to Act of 2009. According to provision of Statue No.18 it is the Executive Council to consider the recommendation of selection committee for appointment of teaching staff and accordingly the Executive Council considered the recommendation of selection committee for appointment on the post of Associate Professor in its meeting held on 14.02.2012. Appointment of petitioner was on probation for two years and it was extended for another year. In the appointment order itself it is clearly mentioned that service of appointees may be terminated if his service were found to be unsatisfactory during the probation period and the decision of respondent University shall be final. From the contents of order Annexure P-1 (order impugned), it is apparent that termination of petitioner is on account of unsatisfactory performance . It is contented that no improvement was made by petitioner in performance of his duties and he was not even regular in attending his duties and therefore in terms of condition No.7 of the appointment order service of petitioner has been terminated in compliance of resolution of Executive Council dated 24.08.2013. Petitioner has accepted order of
7 / 16 employment/appointment in University subject to terms and conditions stipulated in the order of appointment. Petitioner is having efficacious alternate remedy to challenge the impugned order under Section 33 (2) as well as right to appeal under Section 35 of the Act of 2009. It is also contended that termination of petitioner is on the ground that his services was found unsatisfactory. Mere issuing of notice to petitioner for his acts and omissions prior to passing of order of termination would not amount the order of termination to be on account of misconduct or stigmatic. In support of his contentions, he places reliance upon the decision in case of Rajesh Kohli Vs. High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors. reported in (2010) 12 SCC 783, Rajesh Kumar Shrivastava Vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. reported in (2011) 4 SCC 447, Pramjit Singh Vs. Director, Public Instructions (Schools) and Ors. reported in (2010) 14 SCC 416 and State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. Palak Modi and Anr.
reported in 2013 (3) 607. Reliance is also placed on decision of High Court of Chhattisgarh in WPS No.832 of 2013 (Bhumi Nath Tripathi Vs. Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya & Ors.). 5.
Learned counsel for respondents No. 8 & 9 also supported the case of University. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the records of the writ petition. 7. So far as objection raised by counsel for respondent-University in their reply with regard to availability of efficacious alternate remedy available under the law is concerned, petitioner even after taking note of facts and event as brought in record about the application submitted by
8 / 16 petitioner for re-consideration of candidature of petitioner by Executive Council and availability of alternate remedy of appeal etc. under provision of Act of 2009, pressed upon this writ petition on merits. In above facts of case and also considering that writ petition was initially filed on 28.08.2013 which was converted from WPC to WPS pursuant to application filed by petitioner seeking amendment in writ petition for changing the nomenclature of writ petition from WPC to WPS and deleting some of the relief clause by its application dated 06.11.2024 which came to be allowed vide order dated 08.08.2025 I find it appropriate to consider this writ petition on merits. 8. In the facts of case the question arises for consideration is, as to whether petitioner is entitled for a enquiry before terminating and discharge from service when petitioner was on probation and not a confirmed employee. Further whether the petitioner can be terminated during the continuation of probation period mentioning that service of petitioner was unsatisfactory. 9. Before proceeding further dealing with facts of case I find it appropriate to take into consideration the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M. Venugopal Vs. Divisional Manager LIC of India, Machilipatnam, A.P. and Anr. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 323 while dealing with the case of Development Officer working with LIC as probationer, suffered order of termination on account of not achieving target, has observed that service of probationer can be terminated after making overall assessment of
9 / 16 his/her performance and no notice is required to be given before terminating their services and observed thus :
“15. Even under general law, the service of a probationer can be terminated after making an overall assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is required to be given before termination of such service.
This aspect has been examined by this Court in the case of The Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore v. Dr Pandurang Godwalka where it has been pointed out that if the performance of the employee concerned during the period of probation is not found to be satisfactory on overall assessment, then it is open to the competent authority to terminate his service. 11. In case of Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr Vs. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni reported in (1997) 8 SCC 461 while again dealing with case of Development Officer has observed thus:
“6. The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause.”……. x x x x x x x x x
12. The requirement to hold a regular departmental enquiry before dispensing with the services of a
10 / 16 probationer cannot be invoked in the case of a probationer especially when his services are terminated by an innocuous order which does not cast any stigma on him. But it cannot be laid down as a general rule that in no case can an enquiry be held. If the termination is punitive in nature and is brought about on the ground of misconduct, Article 311(2) would be attracted and in that situation it would be incumbent upon the employer, in the case of government service, to hold a regular departmental enquiry. In any other case also, specially those relating to statutory corporations or government instrumentalities, a termination which is punitive in nature cannot be brought about unless an opportunity of hearing is given to the person whose services, even during the period of probation, or extended period, are sought to be terminated.
(See: Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India)in which it was held that appointment to a permanent post on probation means that the servant is taken on trial. Such an appointment comes to an end if during or at the end of the probation, the person so appointed is found to be unsuitable and his services are terminated by notice. An appointment on probation or on an officiating basis is of a transitory character with an implied condition that such an appointment is terminable at any time. See also: Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab.)
12. In case of The Manager, Government Branch Press and Another Vs. D.B. Belliappa reported in (1979) 1 SCC 477, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that principle that can be deduced from above analysis is that if services of temporary govt. servant are terminated in accordance with conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory, or for a like reason which marks him off in a class apart from other
11 / 16 temporary servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of applicability of Article 16. 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rajasthan High Court Vs. Ved Priya and Anr. reported in (2021) 13 SCC 151 discussed about fundamental difference between termination of a probationer and that of a confirmed employee and observed thus:
“18. Furthermore, there is a subtle, yet fundamental, difference between termination of a probationer and that of a confirmed employee. Although it is undisputed that the State cannot act arbitrarily in either case, yet there has to be a difference in judicial approach between the two. Whereas in the case of a confirmed employee the scope of judicial interference would be more expansive given the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution or the Service Rules but such may not be true in the case of probationers who are denuded of such protection(s) while working on trial basis. 19.
Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved by the competent authority if found unsuitable. Its only in a very limited category of cases that such probationers can seek protection under the principles of natural justice, say when they are ‘removed’ in a manner which prejudices their future prospects in alternate fields or casts aspersions on their character or violates their constitutional rights. In such cases of ‘stigmatic’ removal only that a reasonable opportunity of hearing is sine qua non. Way back in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India , a Constitution Bench opined that:
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"28.... In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with."
14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Jaswant Singh reported in (2023) 9 SCC 150 while considering appeal filed by State of Punjab defending order of discharge of a Constable (Probationer) has held that from perusal of said rule it is apparent that in case of probationary constable is found unlikely to prove an efficient officer, he may be discharged by Senior Superintendent of Police at any time within three years from the date of enrollment.
The SSP relying upon the recommendation of the supervising officer (SP, Training Centre) formed an opinion that probationary constable is found unlikely to prove a efficient police officer owing to his demeanour as reported and discussed herein- above and concluded that in considered view of Supreme Court all the three courts misconstrued Rule 12.21 of PPR and decreed the suit filed by respondent-plaintiff. It also held that looking to the contents of the
order of discharge, in the considered opinion, there is no foundation of misconduct alleged in the order and it is an order of simpliciter discharge of a probationer constable.
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15. In case of State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Sukhwinder Singh reported in (2005) 5 SCC 569, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that High Court has gone completely wrong in drawing the inference that the
order of discharge dated 16.03.1990 was, in fact, based upon misconduct and was, therefore, punitive in nature, which should have been preceded by a regular departmental inquiry. It further held that there cannot be any doubt that respondent was on probation having been appointed about eight months back and concluded that High Court was clearly in error in holding that respondent’s absence from duties was foundation of order which necessitated an enquiry as envisaged under rules. 16. In case of Ajit Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1983) 2 SCC 217, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that period of probation gives time and opportunity to employer to watch the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period fo probation. Mere holding of a preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520 reiterated principles in the matter of termination of probationer and has observed :
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“29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when a probationers appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationers appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job.”
18. Now I will consider the facts of case in which order Annexure P-1 is passed.
It is not in dispute that petitioner was appointed on the post of Associate Professor vide order dated 15.02.2012 on the conditions as enumerated therein. Condition No.7 of the order clearly stipulates that appointment of petitioner is on probation for two years which may, if needed be extended to another year. The services of appointee may be terminated if found unsatisfactory during the probation period. Decision of the University in this regard shall be final. Petitioner had accepted the condition of service as mentioned in appointment order and joined his post. There is clear stipulation in the appointment order that services of petitioner can be terminated if found unsatisfactory during period of probation. Order Annexure P-1 is passed during
15 / 16 probation period recording that service of petitioner was found unsatisfactory. Language used in order only mentions about the extension of period of one year and further that Executive Council in its meeting dated 24.08.2013 has taken decision to terminate his services and discharge him under Cause -7 of the order of appointment . Contents or order do not mention any word so as to infer that order terminating and discharging the petitioner from service is in any manner punitive or stigmatic. 19. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that decision is taken only after issuance of show cause notice from which it can be inferred that decision for terminating services is taken considering misconduct of petitioner and therefore departmental enquiry is necessitated, is also not acceptable in the facts of case and law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court as discussed above. 20. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ved Priya (supra), has further held that from contents of order of termination neither any specific misconduct has been attributed to Respondent 1 nor any allegation made. Order is based on overall assessment of performance of Respondent 1 during the period of probation, which was not found satisfactory .
Such an inference which can be a valid foundation to dispense with services of a probationer does not warrant holding of an enquiry in terms of Article 311 of Constitution. 21. From the aforementioned facts, it is clear that submission made by
learned counsel for petitioner that termination of petitioner from service being probationer is based on consideration of misconduct and
16 / 16 therefore services of petitioner could not have been terminated without departmental enquiry, is not sustainable and accordingly said argument raised is repelled.
22. Decisions relied upon by earned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable on facts of the case. Said judgments do not advance the case of the petitioner.
23. For the foregoing discussions and law enunciated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decisions as referred to above, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the order of termination of petitioner (probationer) of services on the ground that his services during probation was unsatisfactory, and termination being simpliciter. Writ petition being sans merit is liable to be and is accordingly dismissed. Sd/ -Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Praveen