2026:HHC:35431 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 119 of 2008 Reserved on: 18.8.2026 Date of Decision: 21.8.2026 Mandir Thakur Dwara Dulehar ...Appellant Versus Ram Lubhaya (since deceased) through LRs ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr Harshit Sharma, Advocate. For Respondents No.1(a) to 1(c) : Mr Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr Atharv Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 26.12.2007, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Una, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment and decree dated 7.11.1997, passed by learned Sub Judge, First Class, Court No. 2, Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court), 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:35431 were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking a declaration that the plaintiff is the owner-in-possession of the suit land, mentioned in the head note of the plaint and a consequential relief for permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining the defendant from interfering in the suit land. It was asserted that the suit land is owned and possessed by the plaintiff. The entries in the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants as tenant-at- will are wrong, illegal, null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff’s rights. The defendants and their predecessor were never inducted as tenants. The Mutation No. 4036 in favour of Mulkhu, the defendant's predecessor, as owner of the suit land is wrong. The defendant is threatening to interfere with the plaintiff's possession based on the mutation. Hence, the suit was filed for seeking the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of locus standi, 3 2026:HHC:35431 maintainability and jurisdiction, the suit being barred by limitation and the plaintiff being estopped by his act and conduct to file the present suit. The contents of the plaint were denied on merits. It was asserted that the defendant was in possession of the suit land from the time of his ancestors. The defendant became the owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The suit land was part of Khasra No. 1820, which was bifurcated into Khasra No. 1820/1 and 1820/2. Khasra No. 1820 was owned by Ganga Ram and Bansi Dass. However, the predecessor of the defendant remained in possession of Khasra No. 1820 without the payment of any rent. The previous owners had made a grant in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. Alternatively, the defendant had become the owner by way of adverse possession. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 05.10.1993: - (i) Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land? OPP. (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction prayed for? OPP. 4 2026:HHC:35431 (iii) Whether the defendants are estopped by their act and conduct and on account of legal estoppel and res judicata to seek adjudication regarding Khasra No.1820/2 as alleged? OPP (iv) Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD. (v) Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD. (vi) Whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred as alleged? OPD. (vii) Whether the suit is time-barred? OPD. (viii) Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct to file the present suit? OPD. (ix) Whether the previous owners gave Khasra No.1820 to the predecessor of the defendants as a grant as alleged? OPD. (x) If issue No.9 is proved, whether the defendants are in possession of the suit land as tenants and have become owners with the enforcement of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act as alleged? OPD. (xi) Whether issue Nos.9 and 10 are not proved, whether the defendants are coming in possession continuously, uninterruptedly and have become owners of the same as alleged? OPD. (xii) Relief. 5. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the plaintiff examined Mahant Haridas (PW1), Dharam Chand (PW2) and Sat Pal (PW3). The defendants examined Usha (DW1) and Sarwan Chand (DW2). 5 2026:HHC:35431 6. Learned Trial Court held that the predecessor-in- interest of the plaintiff was inducted as a tenant. He was continuously recorded in possession of the suit land right from the year 1920-21. The proprietary rights were conferred upon him on 29.4.1979 vide mutation (Ex. D12). The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate the conferment of the proprietary rights was barred. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered Issue No.6 in the affirmative, Issue No.9 partly in the affirmative, the rest of the issues in the negative and dismissed the suit. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Una, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant was recorded to be in possession as a non-occupancy tenant. Proprietary rights were conferred upon him in the year 1979. There was no infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by learned Courts below, the plaintiff filed the present appeal 6 2026:HHC:35431 which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law vide order dated 20.03.2008: - (i) Whether the Trial Court, while deciding Issue No.6, recorded the erroneous findings that the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant is not maintainable in the Civil Court? Have not both the Courts below exceeded their jurisdiction and acted in an erroneous and perverse manner in recording findings on all the issues? (ii) Whether both the Courts below have committed grave error of law and jurisdiction in holding that the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant is barred under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure? (iii) Whether both the Courts below have misused and misconstrued entries in the revenue record and ignored the ratio of the judgment of this Hon’ble Court passed in RSA No. 478 of 1989 to come to the conclusion that there exists a relationship of landowner and tenant between the parties and defendants-respondents have become owners of the suit land by operation of law? Are not the findings of the Lower Appellate Court that there is automatic conferment of proprietary rights over defendants-respondents erroneous, illegal, arbitrary and perverse? (iv) Whether the Trial Court has gravely fallen in grave procedural error in clubbing the various issues together and disposing of the same collectively by not following the ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court interpreting the provisions of Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure? (v) Whether both the Courts below have acted in a highly erroneous and perverse manner in failing to 7 2026:HHC:35431 appreciate that the property belonging to idol, which is perpetual minor could not have been under tenancy of defendants-respondents, especially Mahant had no authority to induct any tenant over the property of idol and also there was no proper pleadings, proved of creation of alleged tenancy and payment of rent, especially when the revenue entries were showing a contrary position? (vi) Whether both the Courts below have gravely erred in law in refusing to decree the suit of the plaintiff for injunction or for possession by moulding the relief when both the Courts below came to the conclusion that the possession of respondent over the suit land is not adverse to the true owner? 9. I have heard Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Harshit Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No. 1(a) to 1(c). 10. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, for the appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court had recorded a specific finding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred; hence, no finding could have been recorded on merits. The learned Appellate Court had not given any findings on the question of jurisdiction and recorded the findings on merits, which is impermissible. Therefore, he prayed that the 8 2026:HHC:35431 present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decree passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, submitted that learned Courts below had rightly held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. The suit was rightly dismissed by the learned Courts below. The predecessor-in- interest of the defendants was proved to be a tenant, and the revenue entries continuously showed him to be the tenant. There is no infirmity in the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial Question of Law No.1: 13. It is undisputed that a mutation of conferment of proprietary rights has been attested in favour of the predecessor of the defendant. The plaintiff specifically asserted in para-1 of the plaint that Mutation No. 4036, making Mulkhu the owner of the suit land, is wrong and illegal. The mutation (Ex. D-12) shows that the mutation of conferment of proprietary rights was attested on 29.4.1979 in favour of Mulkhu. The plaintiff has not 9 2026:HHC:35431 challenged the mutation. The plaintiff never asserted that the order was not passed by the competent authority or that the fundamental principle of law was not followed. It was laid down in Chuniya Devi versus Jindu Ram 1991 (1) Shimla Law Cases 213 that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into the conferment of the proprietary rights is barred except when there is a violation of the natural law, the statutory authorities have not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure or have not complied with the provisions of the Act. This judgment was explained by this Court in Shankar Versus Rukmani 2003 (1) Shim. L.C. 300, and it was held that where an order has been passed by the Land Reforms Officer, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into the validity of the order is barred. It was observed: - “4. So far the ratio in judgment in Chuhniya v. Jindu Ram's case (supra) is concerned, the reference before the Full Bench was whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction in respect of the order of conferment of proprietary rights under Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter called 'the Act') which has been answered in the negative except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by the Act have not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of the judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with. 10 2026:HHC:35431 5. The acquisition of proprietary rights by tenants other than non-occupancy tenants is dealt with in Chapter X of the Act. This Chapter consists of Sections 104 to 117. Section 112 of the Act provides for a bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court for calling into question the validity of any proceedings or orders taken or made under this Chapter. By providing an appeal and revision against the order passed by the Land Reforms Officer under this Chapter, a further bar of jurisdiction has been provided under Section 115 to call in question any order made by the Collector, Commissioner or Financial Commissioner by declaring them final. It is also observed by the Full Bench in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram's case (supra) that from the Scheme of Chapter X, it is clear that there are bound to be occasions when the dispute about the relationship of landlord and tenant would arise in the proceedings which need to be adjudicated upon by the authorities as provided therein, before conferment of proprietary rights upon a tenant or before the resumption of land by the landowner. 6. Referring to sub-section (4) of Section 104 and Rule 29, the Full Bench has concluded in para 39 that: "...........It is implicit in sub-section (4) of Section 104 that the Legislature envisaged that a dispute may arise whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner is a tenant or not when proceedings were in progress under Chapter X and provided that it shall be decided by the authorities contemplated under this Chapter who shall require the landowner to establish that a person cultivating his land is not a tenant." 7. It was in this context that the Full Bench further held in paragraph 40 : "Any inquiry by a Civil Court on the question was barred by the legislature by specifically providing in Sections 112 and 115, both occurring in Chapter X, that the validity of any order made under the 11 2026:HHC:35431 Chapter shall not be called in question in any court and that the order shall be final except as expressly provided in the Chapter. The legislature knew its mind fully well. Where it wanted a dispute to be determined by the Civil Court, it provided so in Chapter X itself. One has only to look at Sections 107 and 109 (2). Not only did the Legislature rule out any determination by a Civil Court, by necessary implication, of other matters, it expressly said so in Sections 112 and 115." 8. While discussing the rationale for the exclusion of the Civil Court, the learned Judges have held in paragraph 44 that: "The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in the matter of determination of the question whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner is his tenant or not for purposes of Chapter X, is both reasonable and understandable. Permitting such a question to be determined by the civil court also would have introduced an element of unpredictability, spread over a long period while the matter was under adjudication before the Civil Court at the trial or an appellate stage, which could have made the effective implementation of measures of land reform aimed at by the Act, uncertain. The legislature could legitimately think of ruling out such a situation. It has done so by excluding the jurisdiction of the civil court expressly in that matter." 9. After analysing the judgment in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram's case (supra), we have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under the Act if the dispute pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant arises during the proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights upon the tenant and resumption of land by the landowner and the order in respect thereof has been passed by the authorities under the Act except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities 12 2026:HHC:35431 envisaged by that Act had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of a judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with. But if the dispute of landlord and tenant arises independently of the proceedings under the Act, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction.” 14. This aspect was also clarified by a Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court in Tajdin & Ors. Vs. Milkho Devi & Ors. Latest HLJ 2005 H.P. 825, wherein it was held: - “13. This judgment appears to have settled all the matters about which there was some conflict with regard to the interpretation of the judgment of the Full Bench in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram's case (supra). One factor which has to be kept in mind and should not be lost sight of white considering the import of the judgment of the Full Bench is that the question before the Full Bench was whether the civil court had jurisdiction in respect of an order conferring proprietary rights under Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 which had not been assailed under the provisions of the said Act. The Full Bench in para 39 again made it clear that a dispute may arise where the person cultivating the land of a landowner is a tenant or not when proceedings were in progress under Chapter X. The Full Bench was dealing with the impact of the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Sections 12 and 115 of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, both of which occur in Chapter X, and it is in this context that the observations made in para 40 have to be read. Again, in para 44 (quoted above), the Full Bench has clearly held that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matter of determining the question whether a person cultivating the land of the landowner is a tenant or not for the purposes of Chapter X is both reasonable and understandable. It is thus clear that the question before 13 2026:HHC:35431 the Full Bench and its answer and the various observations were confined to disputes pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant arising out of and during the course of proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights on the tenant and Chapter X of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The observations made in Chapter 45 have to be read in this context only. 14. This has been amply clarified by the Division Bench in Shankar case (supra) wherein after analyzing the entire law and the judgment in Chuhniya Devi's case (supra) the Division Bench held that if a dispute pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant arises during the proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights upon the tenant and the resumption of land by the landowner and the order in respect thereof has been passed by the authorities under the Act the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction except in a case where it is found that the competent authority has acted either in violation of the Rules of Natural Justice or contrary to the provisions of law laid down in the Act or the Rules. If the dispute regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant has no connection with the proceedings under Chapter X of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to hear and decide this dispute. 15. I am not only bound but am in respectful agreement with the observations of the Division Bench in Shankar's case quoted hereinbefore. The bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 112 of the Tenancy and Land Reforms Act will only apply when the validity of proceedings or orders made under Chapter X is called in question in any Civil Court. Similarly, under Section 115 of the said Act, the order in appeal or revision passed by the Collector, Commission or Financial Commissioner can also not be challenged before the Civil Court unless the same is in violation of the principles of Natural Justice or is contrary to the provisions of the Rules or the Act. The foundation for this must be laid in the plaint. It is the averments made in the plaint which will show whether 14 2026:HHC:35431 the Civil Court has or does not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” 15. A similar view was taken in S. Vanathan Muthuraja v. Ramalingam, (1997) 6 SCC 143 wherein it was observed at page 146: “3…….It is settled law that when jurisdiction is conferred on a tribunal, the courts examine whether the essential principles of jurisdiction have been followed and decided by the tribunals, leaving the decision on merits to the tribunal. It is also an equally settled legal position that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunal, the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such a provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Where there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary that the statute creates a special right or liability and provides a remedy for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the tribunal so constituted and the question whether remedies are normally associated with the action in civil courts or prescribed by the statutes or not requires examination. Therefore, each case requires examination of whether the statute 15 2026:HHC:35431 provides right and remedy and whether the scheme of the Act is that the procedure provided will be conclusive and thereby excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect thereof. After the advent of independence, the land reforms were one of the policies of the Government, abolishing the feudal system of land tenures and conferment of the ryotwari patta on the tiller of the soil. Thereby, the land reform laws extinguish pre-existing rights and create new rights under the Act. The Act provides for the jurisdiction of the tribunals in matters relating thereto and hierarchy of appeals/revisions is provided thereunder, giving finality to the orders passed thereunder. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognisance of the suits of civil nature covered under the land reform laws stands excluded, giving not only finality to the decisions of the tribunal but also ensuring disposal of the matters by the tribunal and making the ryotwari patta granted to the tiller of the soil conclusive. Under the normal course of civil procedure, the jurisdiction for the trial of the civil suits, in relation to the matters covered under the Acts, being time-consuming and tardy, and there being the lack of financial resources or otherwise incapacity to defend or want of knowledge of the parties as to their rights, energy-sapping civil suits with hierarchy of appeals are intended to be avoided. Obviously, therefore, the civil suits by necessary implication stand excluded unless the fundamental principles of procedure are followed by the tribunals constituted under the land reform laws. In this case, the Act concerned extinguishes the pre-existing right, creates new rights under the Act and requires tribunals to enquire into the rival claims and a form of appeal has been provided against the order of the primary authority. Thereby the right and remedy made conclusive under the Act are given finality by the orders passed under the Act. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil court stands excluded.” 16 2026:HHC:35431 16. In the present case, the plaintiff could have only got the relief after getting rid of the mutation. However, he had not challenged the mutation, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. 17. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Athmanathswami Devasthanam Vs. K. Gopalaswami Ayyangar AIR 1965 S.C. 338, that once the Court concludes that it had no jurisdiction, it should not give any findings on the merits. It was observed: - “13. The last point urged is that when the civil court had no jurisdiction over the suit, the High Court could not have dealt with the cross-objection filed by the appellant with respect to the adjustment of a certain amount paid by the respondent. This contention is correct. When the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, it cannot decide any question on the merits. It can simply decide on the question of jurisdiction and, con- cluding that it had no jurisdiction over the matter, had to return the plaint.” 18. Therefore, there is force in the submission of Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant/plaintiff, that learned Trial Court and learned Appellate Court erred in recording the findings on merits. 19. It was submitted that the proper course for the Court was to return the plaint or reject the plaint. This submission 17 2026:HHC:35431 cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Coop. Housing Society Ltd., (1990) 2 SCC 288: 1990 SCC OnLine SC 154, that the jurisdiction has to be determined on the basis of averments made in the plaint and not on the averments made in the written statement. If the plaintiff goes to the Court, asserting that the defendant is a trespasser, the Court will have the jurisdiction. If, however, the defendant succeeds in proving that he is a tenant, the Court would dismiss the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove the jurisdictional fact. It was observed at page 306: - “24. But the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is originated must be determined on the averments in the plaint or claim application and not on the defence taken by the adversary party. For example, if the plaintiff goes to court alleging that the defendant is a trespasser, the ordinary court will have jurisdiction and its jurisdiction will not be taken away merely because the defendant pleads tenancy. If, however, the defendant succeeds in proving that he is a tenant in respect of premises, possession whereof is sought, the court trying the case would dismiss the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove the jurisdictional fact that the defendant was a trespasser……” 20. In the present case, the plaintiff came to the Court with the averment that the defendant had no right to interfere with the suit land. The defendant pleaded that he had become the owner by way of conferment of proprietary rights, which 18 2026:HHC:35431 claim is found to be correct. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to prove the jurisdictional fact and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 21. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly recorded that the suit of the plaintiff was barred before the Civil Court, and there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. Substantial Question of Law No.2 to 6: 22. Since the Civil Court does not have the jurisdiction, therefore, no finding can be given regarding these substantial questions of law, as per the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Athmanathswami Devasthanam (supra). Hence, these substantial questions of law have become redundant. Final Order: 23. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. 24. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. 25. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st August, 2026 (Chander)