2026:JHHC:19875-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI LPA No. 332 of 2026 Pawan Kumar Mandal, son of Late Jitan Mandal, resident of Village- Tarajora, P.O. and P.S.-Sonaraithari, District-Deoghar …. Appellant Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Ranchi 2. The Divisional Commissioner, Santhal Parganas Division, Dumka. 3. The Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar 4. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar 5. The Circle Officer, Sarwan, Deoghar 6. Sarlu Mandal, son of Late Hari Mandal, resident of Village- Tarajora, P.O. and P.S.- Sonaraithari, District- Deoghar 7. 16 Anna Raiyat of Village- Tarajora, P.O. and P.S.-Sonaraithari, District- Deoghar …. Respondents ----- CORAM HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Appellant: Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, Sr. Advocate Mr. Om Prakash, Advocate For the State: Mr. Jayant Franklin Toppo, GA-V ----- 02/06.07.2026 Heard Mr Rajeeva Sharma, learned Sr. counsel, who appears along with Mr Om Prakash, Advocate, for the appellant, and Mr Jayant Franklin Toppo, learned G.A.-V, for the State. 2. This appeal challenges the order dated 16.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge, disposing of W.P.(C) No. 4771 of 2022 instituted by respondent No. 6 herein. 3. Respondent No. 6 instituted W.P.(C) No. 4771 of 2022 to challenge the Divisional Commissioner’s order dated 17.01.2022, which inter alia held that Village Tarajora within Block Sarawan [ said village ], was a ‘Pradhani’ village and, consequently, the rule appointing a ‘Pradhan’ on a hereditary basis would apply. 4. The learned Single Judge reversed the Divisional Commissioner’s order dated 17.01.2022 and held that the said village was a ‘Khas’ village; therefore, under Section 5 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy 2026:JHHC:19875-DB (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1949 Act’], the rule of election to the post of ‘Pradhan/Headman’ would apply, rather than the hereditary principle referred to under Section 6 of the Act. 5. Mr Rajeeva Sharma submits that a Full Bench of this Court in Alamuni Hansda v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar 228 relying on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Sheapujan Bhagat v. Thakur Hembrom, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 529, held that if a candidate in the line of succession under the hereditary principle is unavailable, an election must be held. He further submits that this implies that where a candidate in the line of succession under the hereditary principle is available, the village must be regarded as a ‘Pradhani’ village and the hereditary principle must be followed. 6. Mr Rajeeva Sharma points out that the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 4771/2022 and the respondent No. 6 herein are, in fact, the appellant’s brother. He submits that about 50 to 60 years ago, the grandfather of the appellant and respondent No. 6 was the ‘Pradhan’ of the said village. He submits that there is no question of a ‘Pradhani’ village reverting to a ‘Khas’ village, particularly when candidates in the line of succession on a hereditary basis are available. He submits that this is what has been laid down by the Full Bench in Alamuni Hansda’s case and by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sheapujan Bhagat’s case referred to above. 7. On the foregoing grounds, Mr. Rajeeva Sharma submits that the learned Single Judge’s impugned order warrants interference in this appeal. 8. Mr. Jayant Franklin Toppo, learned GA-V, defends the impugned order of the learned Single Judge on the basis of the reasoning set out therein. He submits that Mr. Rajeeva Sharma’s interpretation of the decisions of the Hon’ble Full Bench and the Hon’ble Supreme Court is incorrect. He further submits that, in the present case, although the grandfather of the appellant and respondent No. 6 may have been the 2026:JHHC:19875-DB ‘Pradhan’ of the said village almost 50 to 60 years ago, it is admitted that neither the father of the appellant nor that of respondent No. 6 served as the ‘Pradhan’ thereafter. Consequently, he submits that the said village was a ‘Khas’ village at the time the appellant insisted that it be treated as a ‘Pradhani’ village. He also submits that the definition of a ‘Khas’ village under Section 4(ix) of the 1949 Act does not support the construction or interpretation now suggested on behalf of the appellant. 9. For all the reasons stated above, he submits that the appeal may be dismissed. 10. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 11. In a matter of this nature, it was incumbent upon the appellant to furnish the correct dates to all the authorities to support the claim that the village in question was a ‘Pradhani’ village, and not a ‘Khas’ village, at the time the appellant demanded that it be treated as a ‘Pradhani’ village and that he be permitted to succeed as the ‘Pradhan’ or ‘Village Headman’ of the said village. This the Appellant has not done. Still, based on the disclosures and certain admitted facts, this appeal does not deserve success. 12. Even by the appellant’s own admission, his grandfather was the ‘Pradhan/Headman’ of the said village nearly 50 to 60 years ago. The admission is that the grandfather died about 50-60 years ago while a Pradhan of the said village. Admittedly, upon his demise, it is not even the case of the appellant that his father, or any other legal heir of his grandfather, succeeded to the office of ‘Pradhan’ or ‘Headman’ under the hereditary principle. Crucially, the report of the Circle Officer, Sarawan, also confirms that following the demise of the appellant’s grandfather 50 to 60 years ago, the village has consistently remained a ‘Khas’ village. 13. Thus, for at least 50 to 60 years, the said village was never treated as a ‘Pradhani’ village. Indeed, it could not have been so regarded because, 2026:JHHC:19875-DB at the time of the demise of the appellant’s grandfather, no candidate in the line of succession under the hereditary principle was available. After a lapse of 50 to 60 years, and that too without providing any precise dates or particulars of what transpired during this interregnum, the appellant insists that the said village should be regarded as a ‘Pradhani’ village rather than a ‘Khas’ village. 14. Section 4(ix) of the 1949 Act defines a ‘Khas Village’ to mean “a village in which there is no mulraiyat nor for the time being any village headman irrespective of whether there was or was not previously a mulraiyat or village headman in the village.” 15. In the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has correctly held that the latter part of this definition clarifies that to ascertain whether a village is a ‘Khas’ or a ‘Pradhani’ village, it must be seen whether there is currently a headman in the village who has been appointed under the hereditary principle. In the absence of such a headman, the village becomes ‘Khas’, even if at some point in the past there was a headman appointed under the hereditary principle. 16. The learned Single Judge has also recorded that the parties do not dispute that the last ‘Pradhan’ was appointed several decades ago, and that at the time of the present appointment, there was no ‘Pradhan’ or ‘Headman’ occupying the office under the hereditary principle. 17. Having regard to the definition of the term “Khas Village” referred to above, no case is made out to fault the learned Single Judge’s interpretation. The expressions “for the time being” and “irrespective of whether there was or was not previously a mulraiyat or village headman in the village.” in Section 4(ix) of the 1949 Act cannot be ignored. 18. Moreover, the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Alamuni Hansda (Supra), has observed as under:- 2026:JHHC:19875-DB “37. In the event a successor is not found, then in such an event the pradhani village reverts back to a khas village. In the judgments rendered in the case of Thakur Hembrom (Supra), Baisakhi Harijan (Supra) and Babu Lal Mandal (supra), the High Court of Patna and this Court have held that only after a claim to be appointed on the basis of hereditary rights is refused or rejected, the process for election of a village headman under Section 5 and the applicable rules will be vitiated. However, the said decisions seek to endorse the view that two applications, one on the basis of hereditary right and the other one on the basis of election can be made simultaneously. Such a view is untenable in law as a village cannot be a khas and a pradhani at the same point of time and there is no question of entertaining two such applications simultaneously. The judgment of Thakur Hembrom was questioned before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and vide judgment dated 7th November 1996 rendered in the case of Sheapujan Bhagat v. Thakur Hembrom, (1997) 1 SCC 529, the same was reversed…..” 19. Therefore, the principle of reversion of a village from 'Pradhani' to 'Khas' is recognised in Alamuni Hansda (supra) and Sheapujan Bhagat (supra) is not premised merely upon the duration of vacancy, but upon the position obtaining 'for the time being' under Section 4(ix) of the 1949 Act. Apart from the principle that a Court’s decision is not to be construed like a Statute, the expressions 'successor is not found' in Alamuni Hansda (supra) and 'candidate in line of succession is unavailable' in Sheapujan 2026:JHHC:19875-DB Bhagat (supra) are both to be understood in the context of the statutory definition which looks to the actual state of affairs at the relevant time, namely, whether there exists a village headman appointed under the hereditary principle. 20. Where, as here, no such headman has existed for a substantial period, and the administrative record consistently reflects 'Khas' status, the village cannot be regarded as 'Pradhani' merely because a putative heir in the line of succession now comes forward to claim hereditary rights. The statutory scheme does not permit a village to simultaneously occupy both statuses, nor does it require authorities to treat a long-standing 'Khas' village as 'Pradhani' based on a belated assertion of hereditary claim. 21. The above paragraph was emphasised by Mr Rajeeva Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant. This paragraph, in clear terms, states that if a successor is not found, the ‘Pradhani’ village reverts to a ‘Khas’ village. This conclusion of the Full Bench was after considering several earlier precedents, including those emanating from the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheapujan Bhagat (Supra). Therefore, the contention that reversion of a village from a ‘Pradhani’ village to a ‘Khas’ village is inconceivable cannot be accepted. Accepting such a contention would run counter to the ratio of the Hon’ble Full Bench’s decision in Alamuni Hansda (Supra). 22. In Sheapujan Bhagat (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that if the candidate in the line of succession under the hereditary principle is unavailable, an election must be held. This was clearly in the context of the definition clause, which refers to the position for the time being, i.e., at the time when a claim is made for appointment as a ‘Pradhan’ or ‘Headman’ under the hereditary principle. 23. In Sheapujan Bhagat (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a situation in which the village headman, Hari Hembrom, had 2026:JHHC:19875-DB resigned in 1950 and thereafter no headman was appointed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “in the meanwhile, the village has become a Khas village within the meaning of Section 4(ix) of the Act.” As a result, when an application was made by the raiyats of the village, the Assistant Commissioner directed the conduct of an election, in which the Appellant was declared successful. The appellate Authority, however, set aside the Assistant Commissioner’s decision, and remanded the matter. The Commissioner, by exercising revisional powers, accepted the Petitioner’s contention that the village was a Khas village. 24. The Commissioner’s decision was challenged before the High Court, which held that the appointment of a headman should be made as far as possible under the hereditary principle, and that, in case the candidate in the line of succession is unavailable, an election must be held. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was called upon to consider the correctness of the High Court's decision. 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus in paragraph 2: “2. The only question for consideration is whether the respondent should be appointed as a headman under Section 5 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act 14 of 1949) (for short ‘the Act’) by virtue of hereditary right or by election? It is seen that the village headman, by name Hari Hembrom, had resigned in 1950 as a headman and, thereafter, no appointment of the headman was made. In the meanwhile, the village has become khas village within the meaning of Section 4(ix) of the Act. Resultantly, when an application was made by the raiyats of the village, the Assistant Commissioner had directed to conduct the election in which the appellant was declared 2026:JHHC:19875-DB the successful candidate. When the respondent challenged the election before the authority, a remand order was passed. The appellant filed a revision before the Commissioner. The Commissioner accepting the contentions of the appellant set aside the order of appointment. When writ petition was filed against that order, the High Court by the impugned order had held that appointment should be made as far as possible under the hereditary principle. In case the candidate in the line of succession on hereditary principle is unavailable, then the election requires to be done. The question, therefore, is whether the view taken by the High Court is correct in law? Section 4(ix) defines “khas village”, as a village in which there is no mulraiyat (headman) nor for the time being any village headman irrespective of whether there was not previously a mulraiyat or village headman in the village. Section 5 provides that on an application of a raiyat or of landlord of any khas village and with the consent of at least two- thirds of the jamabandi raiyats of the village ascertained in the manner prescribed, the Deputy Commissioner may declare that a headman shall be appointed for the village and shall then proceed to make the appointment in the prescribed manner.” 26. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 3, held as follows: “3. The question then is whether a person from a different village can contest the election for headman? It is seen that a reading of the provisions does not indicate 2026:JHHC:19875-DB that a stranger to the village is intended to be elected as a headman. In this case, the appellant is right that the principle of hereditary succession does not arise since the previous incumbent, Hari Hembrom had voluntarily resigned and, therefore, the question of hereditary succession does not arise. It would arise only when the incumbent dies and his successor is available; in such a situation, under the scheme of the Act, the headmanship is required to be given to his son. In this case, since Hari Hembrom had already resigned voluntarily, the question of hereditary succession does not arise. Admittedly, the appellant is not from the same village. Therefore, he cannot claim the right of appointment. The Commissioner, therefore, is directed to hold a regular election in accordance with the prescribed procedure and read with Section 5 of the Act.” 27. Thus, contrary to Mr Rajeeva Sharma’s contention, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not held that a Pradhani village can, under no circumstances, be reverted to a Khas village, or that, after such conversion, if, after several years (at least 50-60 years in the present case), a putative heir turns up, the status of the village reverts to Pradhani and the headman must be appointed under the hereditary principle and not by election. With respect, Mr Sharma’s submission was premised on reading a truncated line from Hansda’s Case, out of context and without adverting to the complete facts and the law laid down in Sheapujan Bhagat (Supra). 28. The decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Full Bench, far from assisting the appellant’s case, run counter to their claim in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Here, when the appellant claimed 2026:JHHC:19875-DB the position of ‘Pradhan’ or ‘Headman’ on a hereditary basis, there was no ‘Headman’ or ‘Pradhan’ appointed in that capacity immediately before his demise. The facts show that the appellant’s grandfather, assuming he was appointed under the hereditary principle, died about 50 to 60 years ago. After that, the appellant has not placed any material to suggest that the post of ‘Pradhan’ or ‘Headman’ was filled in line of succession on the hereditary principle. The material suggests otherwise. 29. For the reasons stated above, we find no error whatsoever in the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. Consequently, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs. 30. Pending interlocutory application, if any, will not survive and is disposed of. (M. S. SONAK, C.J.) (RAJESH SHANKAR, J.) 06.07.2026 A.F.R. Satish/R.Kumar/ Uploaded on 08.07.2026