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2026 DAILYLAW 19181 (BOM)

M/S ASHIRWAD UDYOG (HUF) THR. KARTA SATYANARAYAN RAMCHANDRAJI LOYA v. M/S N.S. AGRO, THR. SHRI SHANKAR RAMJILAL AGARWAL AND ANOTHER

WP/5315/2025 · 2026-10-14

body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

wp 5315-2025.odt 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. WRIT PETITION NO. 5315 OF 2025 PETITIONER : 1. M/s Ashirwad Udyog (HUF) Through Karta Shri Satyanarayan Ramchandraji Loya, Aged about 72 years, Occ. Business, R/o 91, East Wardhaman Nagar, Nagpur District Nagpur. ..VERSUS.. RESPONDENTS : 1. M/s N.S. Agro, Through Shri Shankar Ramjilal Agarwal, Aged about 55 years, Occ. Business, Plot No.4, Kh. No.63/8, Behind Pal Petrol Pump, Khapsi Khurd, Nagpur. 2. Shankar Ramjilal Agarwal, Aged about 55 years, Occ. Business Resp. Nos. 1 & 2, R/o B/7, Row House, Vedbhumi, Wathoda, Nagpur 440035 And also at Singhal Sales Corporation, Kalamna Market Road, Opposite Mahakal Sabhagriha, Nagpur-440035. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. A.C. Dharmadhikari, Advocate for petitioner(s). Mr. M.R. Joharapurkar, Advocate for respondents. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2026:BHC-NAG:13827 wp 5315-2025.odt 2 CORAM : NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J. DATE OF RESERVING THE JUDGMENT : 07.10.2026. DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE JUDGMENT : 14.10.2026. JUDGMENT 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for both the parties. 2. The present petition is filed for setting aside order below Exhibit 24 dated 12.06.2025, passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Nagpur in R.C.S. No.298 of 2021. By way of the impugned order, the Trial Court has rejected the application filed by the petitioner herein under the provisions of Order XV-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C) for directing the defendant, i.e., the respondent herein to deposit the arrears of rent. 3. Facts, as can be seen from the petition, are as under: That on 07.12.2021, the petitioner filed a suit against the present respondents for possession, arrears, ejectment, and mesne profits. In response to the suit summons, the respondents filed written statement and counter-claim. Thereafter, on 21.06.2024, an application below Exhibit 24 was filed by the petitioner seeking deposit of arrears of rent. The respondents filed wp 5315-2025.odt 3 its reply and stated that the premises was vacated on 31.12.2019 itself, and therefore, there is no question of depositing the rent as prayed for. The said application is rejected vide order dated 12.06.2025. The said order is impugned in the present petition. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Counsel for the respondent. 5. The learned Counsel for petitioner submits that the Lower Court has erred in law to reject the application since relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted. He points me out the provisions of Order XV-A of the C.P.C. to state that the said provision contemplates deposit of arrears of rent or license fee in a suit between a licensor/lessor against a licensee or lessee. It also further contemplates that the lessee/tenant should continue to deposit the rent and failure to do so would result in striking of defence of the tenant. He further submits that the Lower Court has failed to apply its mind on the said admitted fact and has therefore not taken into consideration the leave and license agreement. 6. He further submits that as far as defence of the tenant regarding he vacating the suit premises on 31.12.2019 is concerned, no material was placed on record to substantiate the said plea. In a nutshell, it is his submission that the impugned wp 5315-2025.odt 4 order is unsustainable in law. 7. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondents counters the said submissions. By pointing me out the affidavit-in- reply filed in the present petition, learned Counsel for the respondent submits that as stated in the written statement, the suit premises already stands vacated and is occupied by one Singhal Sales Corporation, who has also instituted a Regular Civil Suit No. 168/2023, before the Trial Court. He therefore submits that the Trial Court, in the impugned order, has rightly held that since the possession of the suit premises already stands handed over to the plaintiff, there is no question of payment of rent or deposit of arrears. 8. By way of additional reply, the learned Counsel for respondents points me out that the petitioners herein had filed an application for attachment before judgment under the provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5, in which categorical statement was made that on 15.07.2022, plaintiffs had taken possession of the suit property. He also points me out the order passed on the said application on 02.11.2023, wherein the present respondents had specifically stated that the goods do not belong to them. It is, therefore, his submission that the order is perfectly legal and valid. wp 5315-2025.odt 5 9. Rival contentions fall for my consideration. 10. Order XV-A of C.P.C. (Bombay Amendment) speaks about striking off defence in a suit by lessor. Rule 1 of the said Order XV-A contemplates that in any suit by a lessor against a lessee or his eviction, with or without the arrears of rent, the defendant-lessee shall deposit such amount as the Court may direct on account of arrears and thereafter continue to deposit the said in succeeding month. It further contemplates that in the event of any default in making the deposits as aforesaid, the defence would be struck off. Sub-rule (2) and (3) of the said Order XV-A carves out a modality before passing of any order under Sub-rule (1). 11. A meaningful reading of the said Order XV-A would reveal that the inquiry as contemplated under the said order is summary in nature. The said order and the provisions thereof would obviously come into play when the possession of the suit premises is either admitted by the lessee or it can be shown that he is in possession on the basis of some document or material on record. 12. If the documents produced by the respondents are tested on the touchstone of this provision, it can hardly be said that the defendant tenant has admitted that he continues to be in wp 5315-2025.odt 6 possession of the suit premises. There is a specific averment in the written statement that the possession was handed over on 31.12.2019 itself. True it is that there is no possession receipt stating the said fact, but only because a receipt is not there it cannot be a pointer to the fact that the possession was not in fact handed over. If the possession of the defendant would have been continued, as stated by the plaintiff, he would not have stated in the application for attachment before judgment that the goods lying on the said premises were not of his own. 13. Furthermore, admittedly, another person, M/s. Singhal Corporation (who has been inducted as a tenant according to the defendant), has filed a suit against the present petitioner/original plaintiff is also a pointer to the fact that the present respondent has vacated the suit premises. 14. It is thus clear that various disputed questions regarding as to whether the defendant respondent herein continues to be in possession or has vacated the premises would arise. The same questions would obviously require a full-fledged trial where the contrary versions of each of the respective parties would be tested on the touchstone of examination and cross-examination. 15. Even though learned Counsel for petitioner points me out that the array of the defendant which states that the third wp 5315-2025.odt 7 person, i.e., Singhal Sales Corporation, Kalamna Market Road, is shown as an address of the present respondents, I am hardly impressed by the said submission. As can be seen from the plaint filed by the said Singhal Sales Corporation, the proprietor named is Nitin Narayan Agrawal, while the proprietor of the present respondent, i.e., the original defendant, is Shankar Ramjilal Agrawal. Thus, there are prima facie two different persons. The question whether the defendants are carrying on business under a different trade name would also require elaborate evidence. 16. Thus, no fault can be found with the impugned order, looking at the scope of inquiry under Order XV-A as delineated by me supra. The petition, therefore, lacks merits and is liable to be rejected. Hence, it is rejected. 17. Rule discharged. (NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.) Jayashree.. Signed by: Mrs. Jayashree Pethe Designation: PA To Honourable Judge Date: 14/10/2026 18:53:13