2026:HHC:33246 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 4152 of 2013 Reserved on: 31.7.2026 Date of Decision: 10.8.2026. Jodh Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Naresh Kaul, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 06.08.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 23.02.2012 and order of sentence dated 28.02.2012 were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:33246 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant Amin Chand (PW1) and his brother-in-law Kishan Chand (since deceased) were boarding a bus on 25.02.2006 at about 09.20 AM. The informant had boarded the bus, and Kishan Chand was about to board it when a truck bearing registration No. HP-38-7657 hit the bus from the rear. Kishan Chand fell and was crushed under the front tyre of the truck. The driver identified himself as Jodh Singh. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. The matter was reported to the police. An entry (Ex. PW10/A) was recorded in the Police Station. SI Nek Ram (PW11) was sent to the spot for verification. He visited the spot and recorded the informant's statement (Ex.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW10/B) was registered. SI Nek Ram investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW11/A) and took the photographs (Ex.PH1 to Ex.PH9). He seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-38-7657 vide 3 2026:HHC:33246 memo (ExPW8/A). He conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the report (Ex.PW11/C). He filed an application (Ex.PW11/B) for the postmortem examination of the deceased. Dr P.K. Ahluwalia (PW6) conducted the postmortem examination and found that the cause of death was multiple injuries which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued the report (Ex.PW6/A). HHC Inderjeet (PW5) mechanically examined the truck and did not find any defect in it. He issued the report (Ex.PA). The accused produced the documents of the vehicle which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 and 304A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. Amin Chand (PW1) is the informant and eyewitness. Baldev Singh (PW2), Ashwani Kumar (PW3), and Chaman Lal (PW4) are 4 2026:HHC:33246 the eyewitnesses. Gopal Singh (PW5) is the owner of the truck. Dr P.K. Ahluwalia (PW6) conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased. Rajinder Soga (PW7) took the photographs. Rajesh Kumar (PW8) did not support the prosecution case. Jaram Singh (PW9) is the witness to the recovery. HC Bir Singh (PW10) signed the FIR. Nek Ram (PW11) investigated the matter. HHC Inderjeet Singh (PW12) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He examined Sushil Kumar (DW1) and Sanjay Kumar (DW2) in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the bus was parked. The passengers were getting down and boarding the bus. The accused was driving the truck, and his truck had hit the stationary bus, which led to the death of Kishan Chand. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Conviction Sentence Section 279 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of 5 2026:HHC:33246 ₹1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days. Section 304-A of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹3,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the truck had hit the stationary bus. Kishan Chand fell, and he was crushed under the tyres of the truck. The suggestion given to the witness that the truck was loaded and could not stop even after the application of the brake showed that the accused should have been more careful while driving the truck. There was no mechanical defect in the truck that could have led to the accident. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 6 2026:HHC:33246 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other. The prosecution did not examine the persons travelling in the bus or boarding it; hence, an adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution. The statements of the defence witnesses made the prosecution version doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 10. Mr Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the identity of the accused was not established. The owner of the truck stated that he had not employed the accused as a driver, which made the prosecution case doubtful that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. There is a discrepancy in the site plans placed on record which made the prosecution case highly doubtful. The 7 2026:HHC:33246 statements of witnesses contradicted each other in material particulars. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State submitted that the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle. The truck being driven by him had hit a stationary bus, causing the death of Kishan Chand. The Identity of the accused was never disputed in the cross- examination of the witnesses and cannot be challenged during the present revision. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent 8 2026:HHC:33246 defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in a criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 9 2026:HHC:33246 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforesaid. Even the framing of 10 2026:HHC:33246 the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the 11 2026:HHC:33246 aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material; the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not 12 2026:HHC:33246 interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 13 2026:HHC:33246 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The informant, Amin Chand (PW1) stated that he had boarded the bus and Kishan Chand, his brother-in-law, was about to board the bus, when a truck hit the bus. Kishan Chand fell, and the front tyre of the truck crushed him. He died on the spot. The accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. He admitted in his cross-examination that the place of incident had a steep gradient and a sharp curve. He admitted that the bus was parked on the curve. He could not say whether a loaded vehicle would stop immediately after the application of the brake or not. The sons of Mahinder and Joginder were also boarding the bus. He denied that the accident had not occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the truck. 20. Baldev Singh (PW2) stated that he got down from the bus. Two passengers had boarded the bus, and a third was about to board the bus when a truck bearing registration No. HP38- 7657 hit the bus. The passenger who was boarding the bus fell 14 2026:HHC:33246 and was crushed. The accused was driving the truck, and the accident occurred because of his negligence. He also admitted in his cross-examination that the place of the accident had a sharp curve. 2-3 passengers had boarded the bus at the place of the accident, and the deceased was the last person to board the bus. He denied that the truck was being driven at a normal speed or that there was any negligence of the driver of the truck. 21. Ashwani Kumar (PW3) stated that he was driving the bus bearing registration No. HP-54-7502. He stopped the bus at Patholi. Passengers were getting down the bus, and some passengers were boarding the bus. A truck hit the bus; the person who was boarding the bus fell and was crushed under the tyre of the truck. The accused was driving the truck. He admitted in his cross-examination that there was a steep gradient at the place of the accident. The truck was not completely loaded. He had a valid driving licence for driving the bus, but he had not brought it to the Court. He admitted that the loaded vehicle would not stop immediately after the application of the brake. He denied that the accident had not occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the truck. 15 2026:HHC:33246 22. Chaman Lal (PW4) stated that one passenger got down from the bus and two passengers were boarding the bus. One passenger was about to board the bus when a truck hit the bus. The passenger fell and was crushed under the tyres of the truck. He stated in his cross-examination that the place of the accident had a steep gradient and a sharp curve. He was issuing tickets to the passengers and came to know of the accident after some time. The bus had moved 1-2 ft. after the accident. He denied that the passenger was crushed under the tyres of the bus. 23. The statements of these witnesses are consistent that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. This part of the statements was not challenged in the cross- examination. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that when the testimonies of the witnesses are not challenged in the cross-examination, it is impermissible to challenge them during the arguments. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh, 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross- examination, the same cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State 16 2026:HHC:33246 of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4, and it was held at page 34: “58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is required to be cross-examined to bring forth inconsistencies and discrepancies, and to prove the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18:50 hrs; therefore, it was required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be arrested around 19:00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ex. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2- 9-2014 at 14:30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time, i.e. 17, 10 hrs, mentioned in Column 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station, Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9-2014. Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, the argument that the accused was arrested on 1- 9-2014 at 18:50 hrs is not tenable. 59. The House of Lords, in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell held that it is essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the 17 2026:HHC:33246 truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under: “Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue, but it seems to me that cross- examination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross-examination, and afterwards, to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling.” 60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under: 18 2026:HHC:33246 “My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to.” 61. This Court, in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850, quoted from Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) to hold that in the absence of cross- examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under: (State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp. 566- 67, para 13) “13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned: (1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or 19 2026:HHC:33246 (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.” 62. This Court, in a judgment reported in Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288: (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268, laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 294-95, paras 15-16) “15. Moreover, there was no effective cross- examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed. PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to the factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross- examination is a matter of substance, not of procedure. One is required to put one's own version in the cross-examination of the opponent. The effect of non-cross-examination is that the statement of the witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross- examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandal v.Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906. This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put, the Court would presume that the witness account has been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440. 16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag 60, it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings not challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by another party must be accepted as fully established. The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. 20 2026:HHC:33246 Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359 has laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in the cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross- examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court, Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83 has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged, and the witness is not cross-examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Karnidan Sardav.Sailaja Kanta Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683 has laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of administration of justice allows of cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.” 24. Gopal Singh (PW5) is the owner of the vehicle. He stated in his examination in chief that he had employed the accused as a driver and the accused was carrying the fuel wood from Fatehpur to Nagabadi. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not employed the accused as a driver and he could not say who was driving that truck. It is apparent from the 21 2026:HHC:33246 statement of this witness that he has made a contradictory statement. He stated initially that he had employed the accused as a driver, but stated subsequently that he had not employed the accused as a driver. Both these versions cannot stand together, and he is not a credible witness. Hence, the submission that his testimony could discard the prosecution case cannot be accepted. 25. The accused had examined Sushil Kumar (DW1) and Sanjay Kumar (DW2). Sushil Kumar (DW1) admitted in his cross-examination that the accident had not taken place in his presence. He was told about the accident by the persons present on the spot. Similarly, Sanjay Kumar stated that he had reached the spot at about 10.15 p.m., after he was informed of the accident, and the accident had not taken place in his presence. Therefore, both these witnesses have not witnessed the accident, and their testimonies regarding the manner of the accident are hearsay and cannot be relied upon. Thus, no advantage can be derived from these testimonies. 26. The statements of the prosecution witnesses show that the bus was parked and the truck had hit the stationary bus. It was suggested to the witnesses that it is difficult to stop a 22 2026:HHC:33246 loaded truck. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the accused should have been careful while driving the truck and should have ensured that the truck was brought to a halt after the application of the brake. 27. The photographs of the spot show that the bus was parked on the extreme left side of the road. The truck had hit the conductor's side of the bus. A wide road is shown towards the right side of the bus. The accused had no justification to take the truck towards the left side of the bus, and even if he wanted to cross the bus, he was supposed to cross it towards the right side of the bus as per the Rules of the Road Regulation, 1989. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligent in driving the truck. 28. The inquest report (Ex. PW11/C) has a site plan in which Hanuman temple is shown towards the other side of the road where the accident had occurred. The site plan (Ex. PW11/A), on the other hand, shows the temple towards the same side of the road where the accident had occurred. The photographs also show the temple towards the same side where the accident had occurred. It was submitted that there was a discrepancy in the two site plans which made the prosecution 23 2026:HHC:33246 case highly suspect. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The discrepancy in the site plan is the result of defective investigation, and the prosecution case cannot be discarded because of some defective investigation. It was held in Karnel Singh vs. State, 1995 (5) SCC 518 that the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted due to the defective investigation because the investigating officer is not under the control of the complainant, and the complainant cannot be penalised for the negligence of the investigating officer. It was held: “4. We have very carefully scrutinised the evidence, having regard to the fact that (PW 6) the Investigation Officer had not taken the care expected of him. He did not record the statements of the two witnesses, nor did he refer to the attachment of the 'Chaddi' in his oral evidence. That was a very vital piece of evidence to which little or no attention was paid. If the seizure of that article was properly proved, the article with semen stains would have lent strong corroboration to the evidence of the prosecutrix. There is no doubt that the investigation was casual and defective. But despite these deficiencies, both the Courts below have recorded a conviction. The question is: are they right? 5. Notwithstanding our unhappiness regarding the nature of the investigation, we have to consider whether the evidence on record, even on strict scrutiny, establishes the guilt. In cases of defective investigation, the Court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence, but it would not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on account of the defect; to do so would be tantamount to playing into the hands of the Investigating Officer if the 24 2026:HHC:33246 investigation is designedly defective. Any Investigating Officer, in fairness to the prosecutrix as well as the accused, would have recorded the statements of the two witnesses and would have drawn up a proper seizure memo regarding the 'Chaddi'. That is the reason why we have said that the investigation was slipshod and defective. 6. We must admit that the defective investigation gave us some anxious moments, and we were at first blush inclined to think that the accused was prejudiced. But on closer scrutiny, we have reason to think that the loopholes in the investigation were left to help the accused at the cost of the poor prosecutrix, a labourer. To acquit solely on that ground would be adding insult to injury.” 29. This position was reiterated in Sachin Kumar Singhraha v. State of M.P. (2019) 8 SCC 371: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 363, and it was held: “At this juncture, we would like to recall that it is well- settled that criminal justice should not become a casualty because of the minor mistakes committed by the Investigating Officer. We may hasten to add here that if the Investigation Officer suppresses the real incident by creating certain records to make a new case altogether, the Court would definitely strongly come against such action of the Investigation Officer. There cannot be any dispute that the benefit of doubt arising out of major flaws in the investigation would create suspicion in the mind of the Court, and consequently, such an inefficient investigation would accrue to the benefit of the accused. As observed by this Court in the case of State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, (2000) (1) SCC 247, a criminal trial cannot be equated with a mock scene from a stunt film. Such a trial is conducted to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused arraigned, and in 25 2026:HHC:33246 arriving at a conclusion about the truth, the courts are required to adopt a rational approach and judge the evidence by its intrinsic worth and the animus of the witnesses. The courts are not obliged to make efforts either to give latitude to the prosecution or loosely construe the law in favour of the accused. The traditional dogmatic hypertechnical approach has to be replaced by a rational, realistic and genuine approach for administering justice in a criminal trial.” 30. In the present case, the eyewitnesses consistently stated that the truck had hit the stationary bus. Therefore, a defective site plan will not take away the effect of these testimonies and the submission that the prosecution case is to be discarded because of defective investigation cannot be accepted. 31. It was submitted that the prosecution has not examined other persons boarding the bus or travelling in it, and an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. This submission cannot be accepted. The Court has to see the effect of the statements recorded before the Court, and if the testimony of the witnesses is found to be credible, the prosecution case cannot be discarded because of the non-examination of the witnesses. This position was recognised in Pohlu v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 196: 2005 26 2026:HHC:33246 SCC (Cri) 1496: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 1393, wherein it was observed: - “10. It was then submitted that some of the material witnesses were not examined, and in this connection, it was argued that two of the eyewitnesses named in the FIR, namely, Chander and Sita Ram, were not examined by the prosecution. Dharamvir, son of Sukhdei, was also not examined by the prosecution, though he was a material witness, being an injured eyewitness, having witnessed the assault that took place in the house of Sukhdei, PW 2. It is true that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses if it prefers to rely upon the evidence of the eyewitnesses examined by it, which it considers sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution. However, the intrinsic worth of the testimony of the witnesses examined by the prosecution has to be assessed by the court. If their evidence appears to be truthful, reliable and acceptable, the mere fact that some other witnesses have not been examined will not adversely affect the case of the prosecution. We have, therefore, to examine the evidence of the two eyewitnesses, namely, PW 1 and PW 2, and to find whether their evidence is true, on the basis of which the conviction of the appellants can be sustained.” 32. Therefore, the prosecution case cannot be discarded because of the non-examination of the passengers or other persons boarding the bus. 33. It was submitted that the mechanical examination of the bus was not conducted, which is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission cannot be accepted. The bus was parked and was not moving. Therefore, the mechanical defect in it, if 27 2026:HHC:33246 any, would not have contributed to the accident and the mechanical examination of the bus would not have assisted in determining the negligence. 34. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence and held that the truck being driven by the accused had hit the stationary bus due to which Kishan Chand fell and was crushed under the tyres of the truck. 35. Dr P.K. Ahluwalia (PW6) conducted the post-mortem examination of Kishan Chand and found that he had died because of the multiple injuries sustained by him which could have been caused in an accident. He was not cross-examined at all, which means that his testimony has been accepted as correct. Thus, it was duly proved that Kishan Chand had died because of the negligence of the accused, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC. 36. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused and learned Courts below erred in denying the benefit of the probation to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh 28 2026:HHC:33246 Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have pro- liferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the In- dian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal fre- quency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to re- main in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sen- tence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat 29 2026:HHC:33246 the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attract- ing the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He can- not and should not take a chance thinking that rash driv- ing need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 37. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the 30 2026:HHC:33246 view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 38. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 39. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and a deterrent view was to be taken. The sentence of one year cannot be said to be excessive because one precious life was lost in the present case. Hence, no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court. 40. No other point was urged. 31 2026:HHC:33246 41. Thus, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are fully sustainable. Hence, the present revision fails and is dismissed. 42. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 43. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th August, 2026 (Chander)