1 2026:CGHC:22504 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 9031 of 2023 Judgment Reserved On :02.04.2026. Judgment Delivered On : 13.05.2026. Rajesh Kumar Batariya S/o Johan Lal Batariya Aged About 36 Years R/o Nagar Panchayat Kuawra, P.S. Dharsiwa, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Home Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Director General Of Police Police Head Quarter, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Inspector General Of Police Bastar Range, Bastar, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 4 - Superintendent Of Police Dantewada, District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Shri C. Jayant K. Rao, Advocate. For State/Res(s) : Shri Dilman Rati Minj, Dy AG. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Order 1. This Writ Petition has been filed against the order dated 03.07.2023 (Annexure P/1) whereby Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh has rejected the mercy appeal of the petitioner. 2. The petitioner by way of this Writ Petition has prayed for the following reliefs:- 10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the order dated 03.07.2023 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent No. 2 and reinstates the petitioner with all consequential benefits. AVINASH SHARMA Digitally signed by AVINASH SHARMA Date: 2026.05.18 18:29:48 +0530 2 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief as it may deems fit and appropriate. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed in police services as a Constable in the year 2007 vide order dated 22.05.2007. During the relevant point of time i.e. from 16.02.2014, petitioner remained absent from his duties, as such, he was given a notice dated 11.03.2014 by the Superintendent of Police, Dantewada, District South Baster Dantewada to the effect that the act of petitioner being absent from duty without necessary permission amounts to indiscipline and therefore, petitioner was directed to appear within 3 days of the date of receipt of the said notice, failing which, disciplinary action will be taken against the petitioner. Similarly, the S.P. South Baster Dantewada again issued several notices to the petitioner for his appearance and for joining his service on 15.04.2014, 07.05.2014, 05.06.2014, 07.07.2014 and 05.09.2014. Despite of those notices, the petitioner did not appear before the authorities and not joined the services and continuously remained absent from the service without necessary permission. Thereafter, the SP South Baster Dantewada C.G. issued letter of charges upon the petitioner on 27.03.2017 charging the petitioner of unauthorized absence from duty since 16.02.2014 and that inspite of several notices the petitioner did not appear in the duty and that conduct amounts to indiscipline and misconduct which is in violation of Rule 3 (1) sub rule 1, 2 , 3 of Chhattisgarh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1965 and also violative of para 64 (2) (4) of Police Regulations. Accordingly, departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner and information of the same was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 21.07.2017 informing the petitioner to cause his appearance otherwise ex-parte departmental enquiry will be initiated against him. Since the 3 petitioner did not participate in the departmental enquiry, the same was conducted ex-parte and after recording statement of 5 witnesses, it was found proved that the petitioner was absent for a period of about 1508 days i.e. from 16.02.2014 to 04.04.2018. The enquiry reported was submitted before the Superintendent of Police, Dantewada on 15.02.2018 and vide order dated 04.04.2018, the petitioner was removed from service on account of unauthorized absence from duty from 16.02.2014 to 04.04.2018 (four years, one month and 19 days) treating the said period to be ‘No work No pay’. Against the removal from service order dated 04.04.2018, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Inspector General of Police, Baster Range who after going through the material before him, affirmed the order dated 04.04.2018 and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 11.02.2022. Thereafter, against the order dated 11.02.2022, the petitioner preferred a mercy appeal before the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh who also affirmed the order of subordinate authorities and rejected the mercy appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 03.07.2023. It is this order against which, this petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the punishment imposed on the petitioner is too harsh as the petitioner was facing financial as well as mental problems during the relevant point of time. The petitioner was faced with the domestice problems. He submits that ex-parte proceedings has been initiated against the petitioner and no proper opportunity of hearing has been provided to the petitioner. As such, the order impugned is liable to be set aside. 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that the present petition is liable to be dismissed as ample opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner right from issuance of first notice dated 11.03.2014 till issuance of 4 warning notice for conducting ex parte departmental proceedings but the petitioner did not paid heed to the same and chose not to participate in the proceedings and now he cannot come before this Court for his own negligence. The mercy appeal of the petitioner has rightly been rejected which is not required to be interfered with. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition with great circumspection. 7. From the perusal of record, it appears that the petitioner was a police constable who was unauthorizedly absent from his duty for a long period i.e. from 16.02.2014 to 04.04.2018 (Four years one month and 19 days). At the first instance, the petitioner was given a notice dated 11.03.2014 by the Superintendent of Police, Dantewada, District South Baster Dantewada to the effect that the act of petitioner being absent from duty without necessary permission amounts to indiscipline and therefore, he was directed to appear within 3 days of the date of receipt of the said notice, failing which, disciplinary action will be taken against the petitioner. Thereafter, again on 15.04.2014, the SP, South Baster Dantewada issued a verbatim notice to the petitioner as the petitioner was issued on 11.03.2014 which was received by the father of the petitioner but the petitioner did not pay any heed to the said notice. Thereafter, the S.P. South Baster Dantewada again issued several notices to the petitioner for his appearance and for joining his service on 07.05.2014, 05.06.2014, 07.07.2014 and 05.09.2014 and those notices were received by father of the petitioner or any other member. Despite of those notices, the petitioner did not appear before the authorities and not joined the services and continuously remained absent from the service without necessary permission. Thereafter, the 5 SP South Baster Dantewada C.G. issued letter of charges upon the petitioner on 27.03.2017 charging the petitioner of unauthorized absence from duty since 16.02.2014 and that inspite of several notices the petitioner did not appear in the duty which amounts to indiscipline and misconduct which is in violation of Rule 3 (1) sub rule 1, 2 , 3 of Chhattisgarh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1965 and also violative of para 64 (2) (4) of Police Regulations. The charges as framed on the petitioner reads as under:- "दिनांक 16.02.2014 को ्ቚातः गणना से दिना दिकसी सूचना के कतव्य से अनाधिकृ त रूप से गैरहाजि!र रहना तथा कतव्य पर उपቝኌ%थत होने के संं में ार-ार नोदि(स दिये !ाने पर %वयं ्ቚा्቎ करने के ा भी आप अपने कतव्य पर उपቝኌ%थत नहीं हुए व दिना दिकसी सूचना के लम्े समय तक अनाधिकृ त रूप से कतव्य से अनुपቝኌ%थत होकर घोर अनुशासनहीनता, अशोभनीय आचरण एवं काचार ्ቚቦኌशत करते हुए म०्ቚ० छ०म० जिसदिवल सेवा आचरण दिनयम-1965 के दिनयम 3(1) के उपदिनयम 1, 2, 3 का %प्ቖ उ्ቤंघन करना तथा पुलिलस रेग्युलेशन के पैरा-64 (2) (4) में उ्ቤेलि;त सेवा की सामान्य शत> का %प्ቖ उ्ቤंघन करना।" 8. The letter of charges were sent to the petitioner informing him to present his reply whatsoever to the letter of charges and whether the petitioner wishes to appear before the authorities. But the petitioner despite receiving the said notice, did not file any reply to the same. Therefore, vide order dated 30.06.2017, the Superintendent of Police, South Baster Dantewada appointed a Departmental Enquiry Officer who also issued a letter dated 11.07.2017 to the petitioner for the consent of the petitioner regarding appointment of the said departmental enquiry Officer in the petitioner’s case. The said letter dated 11.07.2017 was received by the petitioner but the petitioner did not answer the same. Thereafter on 6 22.09.2017, the departmental enquiry Officer again issued a last warning to the petitioner to respond in the matter. But since the petitioner did not do so, the departmental enquiry Officer vide letter dated 29.09.2017 informed to the petitioner that petitioner’s no response has been interpreted as a consent to the ex parte departmental enquiry. 9. Since the petitioner as stated above was given sufficient opportunities to appear and present his side which he on his own chose not to present, as such, the contention raised by counsel for the petitioner that petitioner was not afforded opportunity of hearing lacks substance. The plea that the enquiry was conducted ex parte in violation of principles of natural justice is devoid of merit. The principles of natural justice require that an opportunity be afforded; they do not compel the authority to ensure participation of a delinquent employee who deliberately abstains from the proceedings. The petitioner, having consciously avoided participation despite adequate notice, cannot now assail the enquiry on the ground of lack of opportunity. 10. Father of the petitioner also filed a representation dated 24.02.2022 (Annexure P/4) before DGP Chhattisgarh to take the petitioner back in service and post him in Raipur. From perusal of the said representation, it appears that due to domestic affairs, the petitioner remained absent from his duties. Further, it appears that father of the petitioner has impliedly accepted that the petitioner was having knowledge about the notices sent by the Department for appearance of the petitioner and the petitioner himself chose not to respond the same. However, personal or domestic difficulties, without any formal intimation or sanctioned leave, cannot justify continuous unauthorized absence extending over four years. 7 11. Morever, it is to be borne in mind that the petitioner was serving in a disciplined force. Discipline and punctuality are foundational requirements of police service. Unauthorized absence for a period of 1508 days is a grave misconduct. In such circumstances, the punishment of removal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate or shockingly harsh so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. In the matter of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao {AIR 1963 SC 1723}, the Hon’ble Apex Court authoritatively held that in proceedings under Article 226, the High Court is concerned not with the correctness of the decision but with the decision-making process. It was categorically observed that the High Court cannot review the evidence and arrive at an independent finding on the facts. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence is not a matter for judicial review. The departmental authorities are the sole judges of facts, and so long as there is some evidence which reasonably supports the conclusion, the findings cannot be interfered with. It was also clarified that the standard of proof applicable in criminal trials proof beyond reasonable doubt, is not attracted in departmental proceedings, where preponderance of probabilities is the governing standard. 13. The principle governing the scope of interference has been further reiterated in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that in proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, the High Court shall not reappreciate evidence, examine adequacy or reliability of evidence, or substitute its own view for that of the disciplinary authority, unless the findings are perverse or the enquiry is vitiated on account of violation of statutory rules or principles of natural justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- 8 “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. 9 (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] , many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter 10 which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [(1975) 2 SCC 557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349 : AIR 1975 SC 2151] , the principles have been further discussed at paras 21-24, which read as follows : (SCC pp. 561-63) “21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] . First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of 11 enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548] said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548] this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on 31-5-1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 12 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477] .) 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and 13 then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do.” 16. These principles have been succinctly summed up by the living legend and centenarian V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 298] . To quote the unparalleled and inimitable expressions : (SCC p. 493, para 4) “4. … in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor textbooks, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.” 17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up to the latest in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything. xxx xxx 14 20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford Dictionary is “moral uprightness; honesty”. It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence, etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values. 14. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Sree Rama Rao (supra), this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own view for that of the disciplinary authority so long as the enquiry is conducted in accordance with law and the findings are supported by evidence. Similarly, in P. Gunasekaran (supra), it has been categorically held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, shall not act as a court of appeal in disciplinary matters and shall not interfere with findings of fact unless they are perverse or based on no evidence. The present case does not fall within any of the exceptional contingencies enumerated therein. 15. Reference may further be had to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 wherein it has been held as under:- 23. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar case [Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 609] has, while 15 dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant, expressed the aforestated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is wilful. On an apposite understanding of the judgment Krushnakant B. Parmar case [Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 609] we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorised absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is wilful even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent. 24. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other authorities relating to unauthorised absence and the view expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] the Court, dealing with unauthorised absence, has stated thus: (SCC p. 473, para 11) “11. Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorised absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorised absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorised absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorised absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 16 25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows: (P.L. Singla case [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] , SCC pp. 473-74, para 14) “14. Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorised absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence.” 26. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat [(2009) 11 SCC 678 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 668] , the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. Eventually, the employee was visited with order of dismissal and the High Court had given the stamp of approval to the same. Commenting on the conduct of the appellant the Court stated that he was not justified in remaining unauthorisedly absent from official duty for more than six months because in the interest of discipline of any institution or organisation such an approach and attitude of the employee cannot be countenanced. 27. Thus, the unauthorised absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in P.L. Singla [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] . 16. After keeping in mind the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases as also upon analysis of the factual situation of the case, in the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioner is not entitled to any 17 leniency. The record clearly establishes that repeated notices were issued to him at every relevant stage. The initial notices directing him to resume duty were served, followed by the memorandum of charges and subsequent communications from the Departmental Enquiry Officer. The notices were admittedly received either by the petitioner himself or by his father at his residential address. Despite such service, the petitioner chose neither to report back to duty nor to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. 17. The disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and thereafter the Director General of Police, while considering the mercy appeal, have independently examined the matter and affirmed the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry. No procedural irregularity, perversity, or violation of statutory provisions has been demonstrated before this Court. 18. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order dated 03.07.2023 rejecting the mercy appeal of the petitioner. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Avinash The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 02.04.2026 13.05.2026 ------ 18.05.2026