1 2026:CGHC:1117-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1112 of 2025 Ram Say Karsh @ Ram Sagar S/o Nilchand Karsh @ Nilkanth Aged About 60 Years R/o Shiv Mandir Parsabhatha, Ward No.-32, P.S. - Balconagar, District - Korba (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station - Balco Nagar, District - Korba (C.G.) ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Shalvik Tiwari, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge Judgment on board Per Ramesh Sinha, C hief Justice 08.01.2026 1. Heard Mr. Shalvik Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent. ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.01.08 17:48:08 +0530 2 2. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) questioning the impugned judgment dated 12.02.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Korba, District Korba (C.G.) in Special Case (POCSO) No.60/2021, whereby the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant with a direction to run all the sentences concurrently in the following manner :- CONVICTION SENTENCE Under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Alternative Punishment awareded under the POCSO Act Under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Rigorous imprisonment for 25 years with fine amount of Rs.3,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 03 months. Under Section 506 Part- II of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous imprisonment for 03 years with fine amount of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month. Under Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous imprisonment for 05 years with fine amount of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 02 months. 3. Notice was duly issued to the mother of the victim (PW-1); however, despite service of notice, no one has entered appearance on her behalf, nor has any representation been made to contest or oppose the present appeal. 3 4. The prosecution case, in substance, is that the accused, Ramsai Karsh alias Ram Sagar, committed a heinous sexual offence against a minor victim, aged below 16 years, thereby attracting stringent penal provisions under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as well as the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’). 5. As per the prosecution, on 19.02.2021 at about 2:00 p.m., the accused, who was a neighbour of the victim, unlawfully entered the house of the victim situated at Parsabhatha, Balco, within the jurisdiction of Police Station Balconagar, District Korba. At the relevant time, the victim was alone in the house. The accused closed the door from inside and forcibly caught hold of the victim. Despite her resistance and cries for help, the accused gagged her mouth and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. The victim was a minor below 16 years of age on the date of the incident, and thus the act constituted rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault. 6. The prosecution further alleges that when the victim threatened to disclose the incident to her parents, the accused intimidated her with dire consequences. He threatened to kill her parents and also threatened to sexually assault her younger sisters, thereby causing grave fear and terror in the mind of the minor victim. Due to fear, social stigma, and shame, the victim did not immediately disclose the incident to anyone. 4 7. Subsequently, after some time, the victim started experiencing pain in her stomach and chest and noticed that her menstrual cycle had stopped. Upon being informed of these symptoms, the victim’s mother took her for medical examination, where a pregnancy test revealed that the victim was pregnant. Thereafter, the victim disclosed the incident to her parents, following which, on 18.05.2021, the victim along with her mother approached Police Station Balconagar and lodged a written complaint narrating the entire incident. 8. Based on the written report (Ex.P/1), a crime was registered against the accused, and the matter was taken up for investigation. During investigation, the victim was medically examined, and sonography confirmed her pregnancy vide Ex.P/8. The medical examination of the accused was also conducted, and he was found capable of performing sexual intercourse vide Ex.P/10. The spot map of the incident was prepared vide Ex.P/7. The statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. vide Ex.P/13 wherein she supported the prosecution version. Relevant documentary evidence, including school records/eviction register relating to the age of the victim, was collected to establish her minority vide Ex.P/6. 9. The victim approached the High Court seeking permission for medical termination of pregnancy, and pursuant to the orders passed by the High Court, further medical procedures were carried 5 out. DNA profiling of the fetus was also conducted as part of the investigation vide Ex.18. Upon completion of the investigation, the accused was arrested on 19.05.2021 and remanded to judicial custody vide Ex.P/15. 10. After collecting all material evidence and completing the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court for trial against the accused under Sections 450, 376(3), and 506 (Part II) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 11. On the basis of the material contained in the charge-sheet, the trial Court found that a prima facie case was made out against the accused for the offences under Sections 376(3), 506 Part-II and 450 of the IPC, along with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 12. Accordingly, charges under the aforesaid provisions were framed, read over and explained to the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 13. The statement of the accused was thereafter recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him, abjured his guilt, and asserted that he had been falsely implicated in the case and had not committed any offence. 14. So as to prove the complicity of the accused/appellant in the crime in question, prosecution has examined as many as eight 6 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-8 and exhibited 18 documents in support of its case as Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/18. In support of the defence, appellant/accused has not examined any witness, but exhibited three documents as Ex.D/1 to Ex.D/3. 15. The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and documentary evidences available on record, by the impugned judgment dated 12.02.2025 convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by him calling in question the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 16. Mr. Shalvik Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently contends that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is wholly illegal, perverse, and unsustainable in the eyes of law, as the same has been recorded without proper appreciation of the evidence available on record and in complete disregard of the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. It is submitted that the learned trial Court failed to consider the material and glaring discrepancies in the prosecution story, as well as serious contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, including the evidence of the Investigating Officer. Independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution case and the conviction has been founded merely on self-serving statements which themselves do not inspire 7 confidence, without there being any cogent, reliable, and trustworthy evidence to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 17. Mr. Tiwari further submits that the prosecution failed to prove the age of the victim in accordance with law. The mother of the victim admittedly did not know the exact date of birth of the victim, and significantly, the author of the school admission register was not examined to prove the alleged age of the victim. Hence, the very foundation for invoking the provisions of the POCSO Act is vitiated. It is further argued that there is a serious identity mismatch, as the complaint was lodged against one “Ram Sagar Karsh”, whereas the police prosecuted “Ramsai Karsh”, rendering the prosecution case doubtful and illegal. 18. It is contended by Mr. Tiwari that no forensic linkage has been established between the appellant and the alleged offence, as the embryo/fetus in the womb of the victim was not subjected to DNA or forensic examination to conclusively prove that the pregnancy was the result of sexual intercourse with the appellant. The victim’s version regarding the commission of rape in broad daylight is inherently improbable, as she has failed to explain why no resistance, alarm, or attempt to call other family members or neighbours was made. Such omissions, according to learned counsel, strike at the root of the prosecution case and render it unreliable. 8 19. Mr. Tiwari emphasizes that the entire prosecution story is devoid of any credible foundation and is based on conjectures, assumptions, and presumptions. The learned trial Court has failed to analyze the contradictions, omissions, and improvements in the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC vis-à- vis their depositions before the Court, which do not inspire confidence. Mandatory procedural requirements under law have not been complied with, and the essential ingredients of the alleged offences have not been made out; yet, the appellant has been erroneously convicted. 20. It is further argued by Mr. Tiwari that no motive whatsoever has been attributed or proved against the appellant, and none of the independent witnesses have supported the prosecution version or established the presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence. The prosecution has miserably failed to discharge its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction, therefore, rests solely on suspicion and sympathy rather than legal proof, which is impermissible under criminal law. It is a settled principle that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, and any doubt must invariably enure to the benefit of the accused. 21. Mr. Tiwari also submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated with mala fide intention, and the conduct of interested witnesses casts a serious shadow of doubt on the veracity of their 9 testimony. From the entire evidence on record, no prudent person can arrive at the conclusion that the appellant committed the alleged offence. The impugned judgment, according to learned counsel, reflects complete non-application of mind and amounts to misuse of the process of law. 22. Under these circumstances, Mr. Tiwari prays that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence be set-aside and acquit the appellant of all the charges. 23. On the other hand, Mr. Shailendra Shrama, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent, submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is legal, proper, and based on a correct appreciation of the evidence available on record, and therefore calls for no interference by this Court in appellate jurisdiction. It is contended that the prosecution has successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent, consistent, and trustworthy oral as well as documentary evidence, duly supported by medical and scientific material. 24. Mr. Sharma argues that the testimony of the victim is natural, trustworthy, and inspires confidence, and it is well settled law that the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault, if found reliable, is sufficient to base a conviction and does not require corroboration. Minor discrepancies or variations, as pointed out by the defence, are bound to occur due to passage of time and 10 trauma suffered by the victim and do not go to the root of the prosecution case. The trial Court has rightly relied upon the consistent version of the prosecutrix, which stands corroborated by her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. and the medical evidence showing pregnancy. 25. It is submitted by Mr. Sharma that the delay in lodging the FIR has been sufficiently and satisfactorily explained by the prosecution, as the victim was a minor and was threatened by the accused with dire consequences, due to which she remained silent out of fear and social stigma. Such delay, in cases of sexual offences involving minors, is neither unnatural nor fatal to the prosecution case. The learned State counsel submits that the evidence on record clearly establishes that the victim was below 16 years of age at the time of the incident, and therefore consent, if any, is legally irrelevant and immaterial. 26. With regard to the alleged non-examination of independent witnesses, Mr. Sharma submits that sexual offences are generally committed in secrecy and privacy, and hence absence of independent eye-witnesses does not dent the prosecution case. The evidence of the Investigating Officer has been duly appreciated by the learned trial Court, and no material contradiction or omission has been brought on record which could discredit the prosecution case. The alleged discrepancy in the name of the accused is merely a clerical variation and does not 11 create any doubt about the identity of the accused, who was throughout known to the victim and apprehended accordingly. 27. Mr. Sharma further submits that the medical and scientific evidence, including the sonography report confirming pregnancy and the medical examination of the accused showing him to be capable of sexual intercourse, lends strong corroboration to the version of the prosecutrix. Non-conduct of DNA examination of the fetus, by itself, is not fatal to the prosecution case, particularly when the direct and reliable testimony of the victim is available on record. 28. It is also contended by Mr. Sharma that the learned trial Court has meticulously analyzed the evidence, applied the settled principles of criminal law, and recorded a well-reasoned judgment of conviction. The findings recorded are neither perverse nor based on assumptions or presumptions, but are supported by material evidence on record. The defence has failed to establish any material illegality, irregularity, or perversity warranting interference by this Court. Lastly, Mr. Sharma prays that the appeal being devoid of merit be dismissed, and the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court be affirmed. 29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length, carefully considered their rival submissions advanced before us, and meticulously examined the entire material available on record. We have also perused the oral and documentary evidence 12 in detail, including the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, with utmost circumspection, keeping in view the settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in criminal appeal. 30. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the testimony of the victim/prosecutrix deserves acceptance and whether the prosecution has established the case of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 31. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments and has held that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if found reliable can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature deserves acceptance. 32. The first question for consideration before this Court would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date of incident, the victims were minor? 33. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 13 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 34. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows: “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. 14 (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) 15 or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 16 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied 17 upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 35. Regarding the age of the victim, the victim herself (PW-2) has categorically stated in her examination-in-chief that at the time of giving evidence on 16.11.2021 she was about 15–16 years of age and that on the date of occurrence, i.e. 19.02.2021, she was 15 years old. She has further stated that her date of birth is 14.04.2005. The mother of the victim (PW-1) has also deposed that the victim was about 15 years old at the relevant time, though she stated that she does not remember the exact date of birth. Thus, the oral evidence of the victim and her mother consistently establishes that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. 36. The defence conducted a detailed cross-examination of both the victim (PW-2) and her mother (PW-1). However, no specific or material challenge was put to either witness regarding the correctness of the victim’s age or date of birth. The mother of the victim (PW-1), though unable to recall the exact date of birth, 18 stated in her cross-examination that the victim is her elder daughter, that she herself got married at the age of about 20–22 years, and that the victim was born about two years after her marriage. Even though the witness could not state the present age of the victim, her testimony, read as a whole, does not in any manner discredit the prosecution case regarding the minority of the victim. 37. The Investigating Officer, Neelam Kerketta (PW-7), has deposed that during the course of investigation, an application (Ex.P/3) was submitted to the Headmaster of the concerned primary school on 22.06.2021 seeking the admission records of the victim. Pursuant thereto, on 14.07.2021, the Headmaster produced the admission register, and the verified copy of the relevant entry was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/4. The Investigating Officer has specifically denied in cross-examination that the document was fabricated, thereby affirming the genuineness of the seizure and the document. 38. The Headmaster of the primary school (PW-3) has corroborated the prosecution case by stating that on receipt of the police requisition (Ex.P/3), he produced the admission register of the school on 14.07.2021, which has been exhibited as Ex.P/5. As per the admission register bearing admission number 7301, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 07.04.2005, and it is further recorded that the victim was admitted in Class-I on 14.07.2011. 19 The admission register is a document maintained in the ordinary course of official duty. 39. Although in cross-examination the Headmaster (PW-3) admitted that he was not posted in the school at the time of the victim’s admission and that the school record does not disclose the basis on which the date of birth was recorded, it is noteworthy that no suggestion was made to the victim’s mother (PW-1), who was the most competent person to speak about the age of the victim, that the age recorded in the school register was either deliberately enhanced or reduced at the time of admission. Mere absence of knowledge of the exact basis of entry by the Headmaster does not demolish the evidentiary value of a contemporaneous official record. 40. The Dakhil-Kharij/admission register (Ex.P/5 / Ex.P/5C), being a record maintained by a public servant in discharge of official duty, is admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and carries a presumption of correctness. The said document finds support from the oral testimony of the victim herself as well as her mother. The defence has neither produced any documentary evidence nor elicited any material contradiction in cross- examination to discredit or rebut the said document. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekh Ram, (2006) 5 SCC 736 and other decisions clearly 20 recognizes such school records as reliable evidence for determination of age. 41. In the totality of the facts and evidence on record, there is no reason to disbelieve the prosecution version regarding the age and date of birth of the victim. The consistent oral evidence of the victim (PW-2), the supporting testimony of her mother (PW-1), and the documentary evidence in the form of the school admission/Dakhil-Kharij register conclusively establish that the victim’s date of birth is 14.04.2005 / 07.04.2005 as recorded in the school record. Upon calculation, on the date of the incident, i.e., 19.02.2021, the victim was 15 years, 10 months and a few days old, which is admittedly below 16 years of age. Accordingly, this Court affirms the finding recorded by the learned trial Court with regard to the age of the victim. 42. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Sections 376(3), 506 Part-II and 450 of the IPC ? 43. PW-1 – the mother of the victim, is the informant in the present case. She has deposed that when the victim complained of bodily pain and stoppage of menstruation, she took her to the hospital, where the doctor confirmed that the victim was pregnant. On being questioned, the victim disclosed that the pregnancy was caused due to sexual assault committed by the accused, Ramsai Karsh, also known as Ramsagar Karsh, who is their neighbour. 21 She further stated that she went to the house of the accused to question him, where his family members misbehaved with her and asked her to lodge a report first. Thereafter, she took her daughter to Police Station Balco and submitted a written complaint (Ex.P/1), which bears her signature. Though in cross-examination she stated that the written complaint was written at the police station and read over to her, she consistently supported the contents thereof and denied suggestions of false implication, demand of money, or previous enmity. Her evidence clearly establishes disclosure of the incident, lodging of FIR, identity of accused, and absence of motive for false implication. 44. PW-2 – Victim is the most material witness. She has categorically stated that on 19.02.2021, the accused entered her house when she was inside her room, closed the door, gagged her mouth, touched her private parts, and committed rape upon her. She has further deposed that when she threatened to tell her mother, the accused intimidated her by threatening to kill her parents and to sexually assault her sisters. Due to fear and shame, she did not disclose the incident immediately. PW-2 explained the delay in reporting by stating that only after her pregnancy was detected by the doctor did she disclose the incident. She consistently identified the accused as the perpetrator and denied all defence suggestions regarding false implication, meeting boys, or monetary disputes. Though some contradictions and omissions were elicited regarding minute details such as time, resistance, or 22 sequence of events, they are natural in a testimony of a minor victim of sexual assault and do not affect the core of the prosecution case. Her testimony remains consistent, natural, and trustworthy on the factum of rape, threat, and identity of the accused. As held in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384, minor discrepancies cannot discredit the prosecutrix. 45. PW-4 – Dr. Amulya Kaushila, the medical officer, medically examined the victim on 19.05.2021. He found her secondary sexual characteristics fully developed, hymen ruptured, and advised sonography and urine test, which confirmed pregnancy. He collected vaginal slides and handed them over to the police. Though no opinion on recent intercourse could be given, his evidence corroborates sexual activity and pregnancy, fully supporting the prosecution case. 46. PW-5 – Constable Narendra Raj Singh took the accused for medical examination. He proved the procedure followed during the examination and supported the seizure of samples. His testimony establishes proper chain of custody. 47. PW-6 – Lady Constable Bindeshwari Sahu escorted the victim to the hospital for medical examination and took custody of sealed packets handed over by the doctor. Her evidence supports the prosecution on fair investigation and medical corroboration. 48. PW-7 – ASI Neelam Kerketta (Investigating Officer) proved registration of FIR, seizure of documents, recording of statements, 23 medical examination of victim and accused, and compliance with High Court orders for medical termination of pregnancy and DNA examination. She admitted that DNA profiling could not yield a conclusive opinion due to absence of fetal profile; however, she clarified that this was a limitation of forensic examination, not falsehood in the prosecution case. She also clarified that Ramsagar and Ramsai Karsh are the same person, known by different names in the locality. No evidence was produced by the defence to show mistaken identity. As held in Dana Yadav @ Dahu v. State of Bihar (2002) 7 SCC 295, dock identification by the victim is substantive evidence. 49. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2012) 8 SCC 21, held as under: “22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the 24 prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core 25 version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 50. In the matter of Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India and others, (2018) 17 SCC 291, in paras 14 and 20, it is observed as under: “14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with authority that the Pocso Act is a gender legislation. This Act has been divided into various chapters and parts therein. Chapter II of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of the said Chapter contains two sections, namely, Section 3 and Section 4. Section 3 defines the offence of “Penetrative Sexual Assault” whereas Section 4 lays down the punishment for the said offence. Likewise, Part B of the said Chapter titled “Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor” contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and Section 6. The various subsections of Section 5 copiously deal with various situations, circumstances and categories of persons where the offence of penetrative sexual assault would take the character of the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section 5(k), in particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability of a child stipulates that where an offender commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking advantage of the child's mental or physical disability, it shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.” 26 *** “20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge Bench in M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 “1. … “child is the father of man”. To enable fathering of a valiant and vibrant man, the child must be groomed well in the formative years of his life. He must receive education, acquire knowledge of man and materials and blossom in such an atmosphere that on reaching age, he is found to be a man with a mission, a man who matters so far as the society is concerned.” 51. The Supreme Court in the matter of Nawabuddin v. State of Uttarakhand (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.144 OF 2022), decided on 08.02.2022 has held as under:- “10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid objects and to achieve what has been provided under Article 15 and 39 of the Constitution to protect children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, the POCSO Act, 2012 has been enacted. Any act of sexual assault or sexual harassment to the children should be viewed very seriously and all such offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment on the children have to be dealt with in a stringent manner and no leniency should be shown to a person who has committed the offence under the POCSO Act. By awarding a suitable punishment commensurate with the act of sexual assault, sexual harassment, a message must be conveyed to the society at large that, if anybody commits any offence under the POCSO Act of sexual assault, sexual harassment or use of 27 children for pornographic purposes they shall be punished suitably and no leniency shall be shown to them. Cases of sexual assault or sexual harassment on the children are instances of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of such debased sexual pleasure. Children are precious human resources of our country; they are the country’s future. The hope of tomorrow rests on them. But unfortunately, in our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position. There are different modes of her exploitation, including sexual assault and/or sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation of children in such a manner is a crime against humanity and the society. Therefore, the children and more particularly the girl child deserve full protection and need greater care and protection whether in the urban or rural areas. As observed and held by this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745, children need special care and protection and, in such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. In the case of Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703, it is observed by this Court that a minor who is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected even more than a major victim because a major victim being an adult may still be able to withstand the social ostracization and mental harassment meted out by society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so. Most crimes against minor victims are not 28 even reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a close friend. Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Therefore, no leniency can be shown to an accused who has committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 and particularly when the same is proved by adequate evidence before a court of law.” 52. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on allowing the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. In State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekar, (2004) 8 SCC 153, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows: “21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or 29 circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration, as understood in the context of an accomplice, would suffice.” 53. On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705, observed as follows: “17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.” 54. The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP v. Sonu Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under : “12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language, leaves no 30 discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.” 55. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the victim. She is found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the victim can be sustained. 31 56. The law is settled that in sexual assault cases, especially under the POCSO Act, the testimony of the victim is of paramount importance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rai Sandeep @ Deenu (supra) emphasized the concept of the ‘sterling witness,’ whose testimony should be accepted at face value if consistent, credible, and naturally in consonance with the facts. PW-2 satisfies this standard. Similarly, the observations in Alakh Alok Srivastava (supra) and Nawabuddin (supra) underscore the need to view child sexual abuse offences with utmost seriousness and without any leniency, particularly when the victim is a minor and the accused exploits trust or proximity to commit the offence. 57. In the present case, the victim was below 16 years of age at the time of the offence. Therefore, consent, even if allegedly given, is wholly irrelevant. The offence squarely falls under Section 376(3) IPC (rape of a minor), in conjunction with Section 6 POCSO Act (aggravated penetrative sexual assault) and also involves house trespass under Section 450 IPC and criminal intimidation under Section 506 Part-II IPC. As per Section 29 of the POCSO Act, once the prosecution has discharged the initial burden of proof, the accused is presumed to be guilty, and the onus shifts on him to rebut the presumption. The appellant has failed to discharge this onus in any manner. 58. The procedural and evidentiary aspects have also been rigorously examined. The delay in lodging the FIR, the circumstances of 32 disclosure, and the conduct of the appellant threatening the victim to silence her, all are consistent with established judicial observations that victims, especially minors, often delay reporting sexual assault due to fear, trauma, and social stigma. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sonu Kushwaha (supra) has reiterated that the POCSO Act mandates stringent punishment for offences committed against children and no leniency is permissible, particularly in cases involving prepubescent or minor victims. 59. In light of the above, this Court is of the firm opinion that the trial Court was fully justified in convicting the appellant under the above-mentioned provisions. The conviction and sentencing accord with the gravity and heinous nature of the crime. The trial Court rightly observed that the offence involved sexual assault on a minor, aggravated penetrative sexual assault, house trespass, and criminal intimidation, all committed in a calculated and premeditated manner by a person known to the victim and her family. The cumulative effect of these actions has had, and will continue to have, profound psychological and emotional impact on the victim. 60. In regard to sentencing, it is noted that Section 376(3) IPC prescribes life imprisonment, and Section 6 POCSO Act prescribes punishment commensurate with the gravity of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Considering the absence of prior criminal antecedents of the appellant and his advanced 33 age, the trial Court has followed statutory mandates in imposing punishment, while accounting for the seriousness of the offence and the need to send a clear message to society about protection of children from sexual offences. 61. In view of the totality of evidence, statutory mandates, and guiding precedents, this Court finds no infirmity, illegality, or misappreciation of facts or law in the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court. The victim’s testimony, corroborated by her mother, medical evidence, and investigative records, forms a complete and convincing chain of evidence that leaves no reasonable doubt about the appellant’s guilt. Minor inconsistencies in non-material aspects do not detract from the compelling core evidence establishing rape, aggravated sexual assault, house trespass, and criminal intimidation. 62. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant is wholly devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentences imposed by the trial Court under Sections 376(3), 506 Part-II, 450 IPC, and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, are affirmed in their entirety. 63. The appellant/convict is stated to be in jail. He shall serve out the sentence awarded by the trial Court by means of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.02.2025. 64. Registry is directed to forward a certified copy of this judgment to the Superintendent of the Jail concerned, where the appellant is 34 presently undergoing sentence. The Superintendent shall ensure that the copy of the judgment is duly served upon the appellant and that the appellant is informed of his right to challenge this judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by preferring an appropriate appeal, with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, as may be permissible under law. 65. Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and action, if any. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu