1 2026:HHC:35190 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 58 of 2015 Reserved on: 12.8.2026 Date of Decision: 20.8.2026. Kale Ram ...Petitioner Versus State of HP ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Vijay Chaudhary, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition is directed against the judgment dated 16.01.2015, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, Camp at Bilaspur (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 13.05.2014 and order of sentence dated 21.05.2014, passed by 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:35190 learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, HP (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with Rules 11 and 20 of the HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978. It was asserted that ASI Ram Nath (PW9), HC Keshav Chand, Constable Daulat Ram (PW7), and Constable Surinder Kumar (PW3) were present on National Highway-21, near Petrol Pump, Swarghat, on 22.01.2006 at about 12.50 P.M. They stopped a truck bearing registration No. HR-55A-6925. The driver identified himself as Kale Ram. The police asked for the documents of the articles being transported in the truck. However, the accused got frightened. The police became suspicious and called Roop Lal (PW5) and Garja Ram (PW2) on the spot. The police checked the truck in their presence and found the bags of potatoes loaded in the truck. These were 3 2026:HHC:35190 removed, and the bags containing walnut bark were found beneath them. These were counted and were found to be 41 in number. Each contained 28-29 kg of walnut bark. Hence, 11 quintals of walnut bark were recovered. 09 bags were marked as K/9, 10 bags were marked as 00/07, and 22 bags were marked as Kachchua Chaap. 1-2 pieces of walnut bark were taken out of each bag. These were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘S’. Seal impression (Ex.PW9/D) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to witness Garja Ram after their use. The bags were marked as Serial No.1/06 to 41/06. The bags and sample were seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). Rukka (Ex.PW9/A) was prepared and sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW9/B) was registered. Garja Ram issued a certificate (Ex.PW9/C). Ram Nath investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW9/E). The accused pointed out the place where the walnut bark was loaded in the truck. The site plan (Ex. PW9/F) and spot memo (Ex.PW1/B) were prepared. Certificate regarding the walnut bark (Ex.PW9/H) was obtained. The evaluation report (Ex.PW5/A) was issued by Roop Lal (PW5). The challan book (Ex.PW4/B) and copy of bill (Ex.PW4/A) were taken in possession. Photographs 4 2026:HHC:35190 (Ex.PA to Ex.PK), whose negatives are Ex.PL to Ex.PU were taken. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act and Section 379 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Prem Lal (PW1) and Garja Ram (PW2) are the forest officials who had witnessed the recovery. Surender Kumar (PW3) is the owner of the truck. Pradeep Chand (PW4) proved that bags of potatoes were loaded in the truck at Manali. Roop Lal (PW5) issued the valuation certificate. Jawan Singh (PW6) proved that the truck containing the potato bags had left the Union. Daulat Ram (PW7) and Surinder Kumar (PW8) are the official witnesses to recovery. Ram Nath (PW9) effected the recovery and investigated the matter. 5 2026:HHC:35190 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent and a false case was made against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. Their testimonies show that the accused was transporting walnut bark. Bark is included in the definition of forest produce under Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act. The accused was required to obtain a permit for transporting the walnut bark. However, no such permit was produced by him. Therefore, he had violated Rule 11 of HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, which is punishable under Rule 20 of HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978. However, the prosecution had failed to prove that the walnut bark was the stolen property. Hence, learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC, but convicted him of the commission of an offence punishable under Rule 20 read with Rule 11 of HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 and sentenced him to undergo simple 6 2026:HHC:35190 imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹5,000/- and in case of default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other on material particulars. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making a false statement. The recovery was effected by chance, and the independent witness could not have been associated in the present case. The accused was arrested on the spot, and there was no dispute regarding his identity. The bark of the walnut tree is a forest produce as defined in Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act. The accused had failed to produce any permit regarding the transportation of the walnut bark. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence. No interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:35190 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. There were material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses which made the prosecution case doubtful. The forest officials claimed that the incident had occurred at 05.00 p.m., whereas the police officials maintained that the incident had occurred at 12.50 P.M., which made the prosecution case highly suspect. The identity of the accused was also not established because the name of the driver was mentioned as Surender Kumar in the challan book. The walnut bark was not sent to the laboratory to establish its identity. The witnesses also contradicted each other regarding the manner of taking the sample. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Vijay Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 8 2026:HHC:35190 10. Mr Vijay Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The learned Trial Court had charged the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 41/42 of the Indian Forest Act, but the accused was convicted for the violation of Rule 11 punishable under Rule 20 of HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978. No specific charge under Rule 20 was framed, and the accused was materially prejudiced in his defence. The statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other, and there is no evidence that the bark was a prohibited species. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: - (i) State of H.P. Vs. Nagnu Ram and others 2011 SCC OnLine HP 3215; (ii) Rajinder Kumar and others Vs. State of H.P. 2026: HHC:33; and (iii) Fateh Singh and others Vs. State of HP 2016: HHC:9917 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the learned Courts 9 2026:HHC:35190 below had rightly noticed the provision of Section 2(4) of the Forest Act to conclude that the bark was a forest produce, and it was covered under the provision of HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978. This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate upon the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding 10 2026:HHC:35190 before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of 11 2026:HHC:35190 the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High 12 2026:HHC:35190 Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: 13 2026:HHC:35190 “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the judgment. 15. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 41 and 42 14 2026:HHC:35190 of the Indian Forest Act, but convicted him for the commission of an offence punishable under Rule 20 for violation of Rule 11 of HP Forest Transit (Land Route) Rules, 1978. It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. Vs. Nagnu Ram and others, 2011 SCC OnLine HP 3215, that when the notice of accusation put to the accused did not contain any reference to the violation of the rules framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, this is a material infirmity which would vitiate the conviction of the accused. It was observed: 12. In the notice of accusation put to respondents in the present case, no reference to violation of rules framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act has been stated. In Shiv Narain Bhasin v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1985 SLC 274, it has been held that Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act is merely an enabling section empowering the State Government to prescribe by rules penalties of imprisonment or fine or both for contravention of rules framed under Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act. The Court has further held that it was necessary for the trial Magistrate to state the precise rules framed under Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act for the violation of which the accused was required to be punished and therefore, notice of accusation was held to be defective. 13. The Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 have been framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the Act. Rule 11 provides for a pass for transportation of forest produce. Rule 20 provides imprisonment or fine or both for contravention of the rules. The proviso to Rule 20 provides a penalty double in 15 2026:HHC:35190 case of an offence committed after sunset or before sunrise or after resistance to the lawful authority or where the offender has been previously convicted of a like offence. Therefore, reference to Rule 20 in the accusation is necessary where there is an allegation of violation of rules. In the present case there is absence of reference of rules, more particularly, rule 20 framed under Sections 41, 42 of the Indian Forest Act by the State Government in the notice of accusation which was put to respondents, who were not given an opportunity to project their defence to the accusation of violation of rules framed under Sections 41, 42 of the Indian Forest Act which has caused prejudice to respondents. In these circumstances, after due appreciation of material on record, the finding of benefit of doubt given by the learned Magistrate to the respondents cannot be said to be wrong. 16. This position was reiterated in Fateh Singh v. State of H.P., 2016 SCC OnLine HP 4052 wherein it was observed: 13. Similarly, there is also merit in the contention of Mr G.R. Palsra, Advocate, that the notice of accusation put to the accused was defective as no reference to the violation of Rules framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the IF. Act has been stated in the notice of accusation so put to the respondents. A perusal of the judgment passed by the learned trial Court demonstrates that the accused have been convicted under Rule 20 of Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978, framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the IF Act. A perusal of the notice of accusation put to the accused demonstrates that there was no reference to violation of any Rule framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the IF Act put to the present petitioners. This Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nagnu Ram, Criminal Appeal No. 293 of 2004 while relying upon the judgment passed in Shiv Narain Bhasin v. State of Himachal Pradeswh 1985 SLC 274 has held that Section 42 of IF Act is merely an enabling 16 2026:HHC:35190 Section empowering the State Government to prescribe, by Rules, penalties of imprisonment or fine or both for contravention of Rules framed under Section 41 of the IF Act and it was necessary for the trial Magistrate to state the precise Rules framed under Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act for the violation of which the accused was required to be punished and therefore, notice of accusation was held to be defective. This Court further held that where there was an allegation of violation of Rules, reference of the Rule was necessary and absence of reference of Rules, more particularly, Rule 20 framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the IF. Act by the State Government in the notice of accusation, which was put to the accused, who were not given an opportunity to present their defence to the accusation of violation of Rules framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, caused prejudice to the accused/respondents. Accordingly, in my view, as there was no reference to Rule 20 framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the IF Act by the State Government in the notice of accusation which was put to the accused, the same was defective as per law laid down by this Court. 17. These judgments are binding on this Court. Therefore, in view of these binding precedents, the accused could not have been convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Rule 20 of HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Route) Rules, 1978 without framing a specific charge. 18. Ram Nath (PW9) stated that the police intercepted a truck bearing registration No. HR-55A-6925 and found walnut bark loaded beneath the bags of potato. He obtained a certificate (Ex.PW9/C) to this effect, which mentions that the bags 17 2026:HHC:35190 contained walnut bark. Garja Ram (PW2) has nowhere stated that he had issued any certificate regarding the recovered substance being walnut bark. He stated in his cross-examination that the sample was not tested in any laboratory to determine the nature of the sample. He could not tell which timber the sample belonged to. He volunteered to say that the sample was walnut bark. Similarly, Prem Lal (PW1) stated in his examination-in-chief that the police had recovered walnut bark. Significantly, Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 do not mention walnut bark in Annexure-D. Walnut bark is mentioned in Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 2013, in Schedule-II at Serial No.43 as Juglans Regia, with Local/Trade name (Akhrot/Khod) and prohibited plant part bark. No witness stated that the police had recovered the bark of the species Juglans Regia. This was essential because the prosecution relied upon the statements of the forest officials as experts. Therefore, they were required to prove that the article recovered had a botanical name mentioned in the schedule. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Jai Lal, (1999) 7 SCC 280: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1184: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 885 that an expert is a person who has made 18 2026:HHC:35190 a special study of the subject and he has to furnish the material to the Court to enable the judge to form an independent opinion. The report should state the facts and the opinion. “17. Section 45 of the Evidence Act which makes the opinion of experts admissible lays down that when the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to the identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to the identity of handwriting, or finger impressions are relevant facts. Therefore, to bring the evidence of a witness as that of an expert, it has to be shown that he has made a special study of the subject or acquired a special experience therein or in other words, that he is skilled and has adequate knowledge of the subject. 18. An expert is not a witness of fact. His evidence is really of an advisory character. The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusions to enable the Judge to form his independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the case. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, becomes a factor and often an important factor for consideration along with the other evidence of the case. The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the data and material furnished, which form the basis of his conclusions. 19. The report submitted by an expert does not go into evidence automatically. He is to be examined as a witness in court and has to face cross-examination. This Court in the case of Hazi Mohammad Ekramul Haq v. State of W.B. [AIR 1959 SC 488: 1959 Supp (1) SCR 922] concurred with the finding of the High Court in not placing any reliance 19 2026:HHC:35190 upon the evidence of an expert witness on the ground that his evidence was merely an opinion unsupported by any reasons.” 19. This position was reiterated in Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Regency Hospital Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 709: (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 840: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1625, wherein it was observed at page 715: 18. The importance of the provision has been explained in State of H.P. v. Jai Lal [(1999) 7 SCC 280: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1184]. It is held, that, Section 45 of the Evidence Act which makes the opinion of experts admissible lays down, that, when the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, of science, or art, or as to the identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to the identity of handwriting, or finger impressions are relevant facts. Therefore, in order to bring the evidence of a witness as that of an expert, it has to be shown that he has made a special study of the subject or acquired a special experience therein or in other words, that he is skilled and has adequate knowledge of the subject. 19. It is not the province of the expert to act as Judge or Jury. It is stated in Titli v. Alfred Robert Jones [AIR 1934 All 273] that the real function of the expert is to put before the court all the materials, together with reasons which induce him to come to the conclusion, so that the court, although not an expert, may form its own judgment by its own observation of those materials. 20. An expert is not a witness of fact, and his evidence is really of an advisory character. The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusions to enable the Judge to form his independent 20 2026:HHC:35190 judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the case. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, becomes a factor and often an important factor for consideration along with other evidence of the case. The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the data and material furnished, which form the basis of his conclusions. (See Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr Sukumar Mukherjee [(2009) 9 SCC 221: (2009) 10 Scale 675], SCC p. 249, para 34.) 21. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu [(2000) 6 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088: AIR 2000 SC 1691], it has been laid down that without examining the expert as a witness in court, no reliance can be placed on an opinion alone. In this regard, it has been observed in State (Delhi Admn.) v. Pali Ram [(1979) 2 SCC 158: 1979 SCC (Cri) 389: AIR 1979 SC 14] that “no expert would claim today that he could be sure that his opinion was correct, expert depends to a great extent upon the materials put before him and the nature of question put to him”. 22. In the article “Relevancy of Expert's Opinion, it has been opined that the value of expert opinion rests on the facts on which it is based and the expert's competency for forming a reliable opinion. The evidentiary value of the opinion of an expert depends on the facts upon which it is based and also the validity of the process by which the conclusion is reached. Thus, the idea that is proposed in its crux means that the importance of an opinion is decided on the basis of the credibility of the expert and the relevant facts supporting the opinion, so that its accuracy can be cross-checked. Therefore, the emphasis has been on the data on the basis of which an opinion is formed. The same is clear from the following inference: “Mere assertion without mentioning the data or basis is not evidence, even if it comes from an expert. Where the experts give no real data in support of their opinion, the evidence, even though admissible, may be 21 2026:HHC:35190 excluded from consideration as affording no assistance in arriving at the correct value.” 20. Hence, it was essential for forest officials to state the botanical name. The legislature has used the word Juglans Regia consciously because there are roughly 20 species of Juglans in the genus Juglans. The Plant List includes 110 scientific plant names of species rank for the genus Juglans.2 Therefore, in the absence of the botanical name of Juglans Regia, the prosecution version that the accused was transporting walnut bark, which required a pass under Rule 11, has not been established. 21. Learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act defines the forest produce as bark, and the walnut bark would be included in Rule 11 of the HP Forest Transit (Land Route) Rules. However, they ignored that the (Annexure-D) framed under Rule 11 specifically mentioned the species which required a pass and the fee payable thereon. Therefore, it was not possible to include the general definition provided under Section 2(4) of the HP Forest Act. 22. Surinder Kumar (PW8) stated that the police stopped the vehicle and demanded the papers from the accused, and he 2 Sharma M, Sharma M, Sharma M. A comprehensive review on ethnobotanical, medicinal and nutritional potential of walnut (Juglans regia L.). Proc.Indian Natl. Sci. Acad. 2022;88(4):601–16. doi: 10.1007/s43538-022-00119-9. Epub 2022 Sep 22. PMCID: PMC9510174. 22 2026:HHC:35190 got frightened. The police became suspicious that some forest produce was being transported. Hence, the forest officials were called to the spot. Prem Lal (PW1) and Garja Ram (PW2) reached the spot, and the vehicle was checked in their presence. ASI Ram Nath (PW9) and Daulat Ram (PW7) checked the truck and found the bags of walnut bark concealed beneath the potato bags. B.O. Check Post was called to the spot, and thereafter walnut bark was weighed. Garja Ram (PW2) stated that he was called by the police to the spot and he found that officials of the Forest Department, Deputy Ranger and police officials were checking the vehicle. They recovered the walnut bark. He stated in his cross-examination that he had received a message from the Range Office and he went to Forest Colony. He admitted that the Range Officer was not called to the spot. He admitted that he had visited Forest Colony and had not gone near the Petrol Pump. Similarly, Prem Lal (PW1) stated that he was called by the In- charge of the Police Post. He went to the spot and found that a truck carrying walnut bark and potato was stopped. He stated in his cross-examination that the investigation was carried out in the Police Station. 23 2026:HHC:35190 23. Therefore, the witnesses have given different versions regarding the place where the investigation was carried out. The police official stated that the investigation was carried out and the walnut bark was checked on the spot, whereas the forest officials stated that the walnut bark was checked in the Police Post or the Forest Colony. 24. Daulat Ram (PW7) stated that a truck bearing registration No. HR-55A-6925 reached the spot at 12.50 PM. Surinder Kumar (PW8) also made a similar statement. Prem Lal (PW1) stated in his cross-examination that the incident occurred at about 05.00 p.m. Garja Ram (PW2) also stated in his cross-examination that the truck was intercepted at about 05.30 p.m. Therefore, the police and forest officials have given different times of the incident. It is true that people do not remember the time by looking at the watch. However, a person can easily distinguish whether the incident had occurred in the middle of the day or the evening. Therefore, the discrepancy is not regarding the time, but the period when the incident had occurred, and the same makes the prosecution case doubtful. 24 2026:HHC:35190 25. Daulat Ram (PW7) stated that 1-2 pieces were taken out of each bag and they were retained as a sample. Surinder Kumar (PW8) also made a similar statement. Ram Nath (PW9) stated that 2-4 pieces were taken out of each bag and the sample was prepared. Prem Lal (PW1) stated that police took out the sample from one bag. Therefore, the police and the forest officials have made different statements regarding the manner of taking the sample. 26. Prem Lal (PW1) stated in his cross-examination that the potato bags were removed from the vehicle by labourers and he could not mention their names and addresses. Garja Ram (PW2) stated that police officials were removing the bags of apples. Daulat Ram (PW7) stated that five police officials had unloaded and loaded the bags in the truck. Surinder Kumar (PW8) stated that 4-5 police officials had unloaded the truck. Ram Nath (PW9) stated in his cross-examination that the truck was unloaded by requisitioning the labourers. Therefore, the statements of the witnesses are also discrepant regarding the manner of unloading the vehicle. 25 2026:HHC:35190 27. These discrepancies are significant and are connected to the recovery and the steps taken during the recovery. Any discrepancy in the statements would make the testimonies of prosecution witnesses doubtful. 28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 756 that the evidence of the prosecution must be tested for its inherent consistency: consistency with the account of other witnesses and consistency with undisputed facts. It was observed: “21. …. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful, independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 26 2026:HHC:35190 29. It was held in David Piper vs Mark Hales 2013 EWHC B1 (QB) that the Court has to see whether the statement of the witness is consistent or not. It was observed: - 34. The guidance about how courts approach this is given in the extra-judicial writing of the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, approved by the courts, and is apposite. In "The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues", published in "The Business of Judging", Oxford 2000, reprinted from Current Legal Problems, vol 38, 1985, p 1-27, he wrote: ". . . Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue substantially affecting the outcome of an action, often knowing that a decision this way or that will have momentous consequences on the parties' lives or fortunes, how can and should the judge set about his task of resolving it? How is he to resolve which witness is honest and which dishonest, which reliable and which unreliable? The normal first step in resolving issues of primary fact is, I feel sure, to add to what is common ground between the parties (which the pleadings in the action should have identified but often do not) such facts as are shown to be incontrovertible. In many cases, letters or minutes written well before there was any breath of dispute between the parties may throw a very clear light on their knowledge and intentions at a particular time. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks, debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To attach importance to matters such as these, which are independent of human recollection, is so obvious and standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable, that no prolonged discussion is called for. It is nonetheless worth bearing in mind, when vexatious conflicts of oral testimony arise, that these fall to be judged 27 2026:HHC:35190 against the background not only of what the parties agree to have happened but also of what plainly did happen, even though the parties do not agree. The most compendious statement known to me of the judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403at p 431. In this, he touches on so many of the matters which I wish to mention that I may perhaps be forgiven for citing the relevant passage in full: ''Credibility' involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour', which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias, wishful thinking or by too much discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional and who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes, the memory becomes fainter, and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present 28 2026:HHC:35190 recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point, it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process, contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part." Every judge is familiar with cases in which the conflict between the accounts of different witnesses is so gross as to be inexplicable save on the basis that one or some of the witnesses are deliberately giving evidence which they know to be untrue . . .. more often dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. The main tests needed to determine whether a witness is lying or not are, I think, the following, although their relative importance will vary widely from case to case: (1) the consistency of the witness's evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred; (2) the internal consistency of the witness's evidence; (3) consistency with what the witness has said or deposed on other occasions; 29 2026:HHC:35190 (4) the credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation; (5) the demeanour of the witness. The first three of these tests may, in general, be regarded as giving a useful pointer to where the truth lies. If a witness's evidence conflicts with what is clearly shown to have occurred or is internally self-contradictory, or conflicts with what the witness has previously said, it may usually be regarded as suspect. It may only be unreliable and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility. The fourth test is perhaps more arguable. . . ." 35. The following guidance of Lord Goff in Grace Shipping v. Sharp & Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Law Rep. 207 at 215- 6 is also helpful. "And it is not to be forgotten that, in the present case, the Judge was faced with the task of assessing the evidence of witnesses about telephone conversations which had taken place over five years before. In such a case, memories may very well be unreliable, and it is of crucial importance for the Judge to have regard to the contemporary documents and the overall probabilities. In this connection, their Lordships wish to endorse a passage from a judgment of one of their number in Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas S.A. (The Ocean Frost), [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, when he said at p. 57: - "Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not, 30 2026:HHC:35190 and where there is a conflict of evidence, such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses' motives, and the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a Judge in ascertaining the truth." [emphases added]. That observation is, in their Lordships' opinion, equally apposite in a case where the evidence of the witnesses is likely to be unreliable, and it is to be remembered that in commercial cases, such as the present, there is usually a substantial body of contemporary documentary evidence." In that context, he was impressed by a witness described in the following terms. "Although, like the other main witnesses, his evidence was a mixture of reconstruction and original recollection, he took considerable trouble to distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent which I found convincing and reliable." That is so important and so infrequently done." 36. This approach to fact-finding was amplified recently by Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal in Wetton (as Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v. Ahmed and others [2011] EWCA Civ 610, in paragraphs 11, 12, & 14: 11. By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what impressed the judge most in his task of fact-finding was the absence, rather than the presence, of contemporary documentation or other independent oral evidence to confirm the oral evidence of the respondents to the proceedings. 12. There are many situations in which the court is asked to assess the credibility of witnesses from their oral evidence, that is to say, to weigh up their evidence to see whether it is reliable. Witness choice is an essential part of the function of a trial judge, and he or she has to decide whose evidence 31 2026:HHC:35190 and how much evidence to accept. This task is not to be carried out merely by reference to the impression that a witness made by giving evidence in the witness box. It is not solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or other factors that might generally be called the 'demeanour' of a witness. The judge should consider what other independent evidence would be available to support the witness. Such evidence would generally be documentary, but it could be other oral evidence; for example, if the issue was whether a defendant was an employee, the judge would naturally consider whether there were any PAYE records or evidence, such as evidence in texts or e-mails, in which the defendant sought or was given instructions as to how he should carry out work. This may be particularly important in cases where the witness is from a culture or way of life with which the judge may not be familiar. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge. 14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present, but the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct, and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its non-production, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence, and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence. 37. Contemporaneity, consistency, probability and motive are key criteria and more important than demeanour, which can be distorted through the prism of prejudice: how witnesses present 32 2026:HHC:35190 themselves in a cramped witness box surrounded for the first time with multiple files can be distorted, particularly elderly ones being asked to remember minute details of what happened and what was said, and unrecorded, nearly 4 years later as here. Lengthy witness statements prepared by the parties' lawyers long after the events also distort the accurate picture, even though they are meant to assist the court.” 30. In the present case, the statements of prosecution witnesses were not consistent and learned Courts below erred in relying upon those testimonies. 31. Therefore, the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt, which is extended to him, and he is acquitted of the commission of the offence punishable under Rule 20 of HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 after giving him the benefit of doubt. The fine, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner/accused after the expiry of the period of limitation, in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 32. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik 33 2026:HHC:35190 Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 33. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. 34. The revision stands disposed of with the above terms, so also the pending application(s), if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th August, 2026 (Chander)