1 2026:CGHC:22156-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 423 of 2026 Hemendra Singh Thakur S/o. Pratap Singh Aged About 57 Years Presently Working At Assistant Grade-Ii, Municipal Corporation Raigarh, District- Raigarh (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Urban Administration, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Director Department of Urban Administration, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Municipal Corporation Raigarh Through The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Raigarh Chhattisgarh, District- Raigarh (C.G.) 4 - Municipal Corporation Ambikapur Through The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Ambikapur Chhattisgarh District- Surguja (Ambikapur) (C.G.) 5 - Mayank Singh Aged About 42 Years, R/o. C.P. Singh Working As Assistant Grade-Ii, At Municipal Corporation Raigarh, District- Raigarh (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate (through Video Conferencing) assisted by Mr. Ashutosh Singh, Advocate For Respondents No.1 & 2/State : Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.05.13 10:20:04 +0530 2 For Respondent No.3 : Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Amit Bhardwaj, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Keshav Prasad Gupta, Advocate For Respondent No.5 : Mr. Prateek Sharma, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 12.05.2026 1 Heard Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Senior Counsel (through Video Conferencing) assisted by Mr. Ashutosh Singh, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents No.1 & 2, Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3, Mr. Amit Bhardwaj, learned counsel holding brief of Mr. Keshav Prasad Gupta, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 and Mr. Prateek Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5 on I.A. No.01, which is an application for condonation of delay of 31 days in preferring the appeal. 2 For the grounds assigned in the application (I.A. No.01), the same is allowed. Delay of 31 days in filing the writ appeal is hereby condoned. 3 By way of the present writ appeal, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the order dated 22.01.2026 passed by the learned 3 Single Judge in WPS No.254/2019 and for remanding the matter to the learned Single Bench for adjudication afresh on merits in accordance with law. 4 The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 22.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.254/2019 (Hemendra Singh Thakur v. State of Chhattisgarh and others) whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge has been dismissed. 5 Brief facts of the case before the learned Single Judge, in nutshell, are that the appellant/writ petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Peon in the Municipal Corporation, Raigarh and was subsequently promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-III sometime in the year 2012. Respondent No.5 was initially appointed as Assistant Grade-III in the Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur and thereafter his services were transferred to the Municipal Corporation, Raigarh vide order dated 03.12.1999. The services of respondent No.5 were regularized vide order dated 17.12.2002 with effect from 01.07.2001. Thereafter, respondent No.5 was promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-II vide order dated 05.03.2015, which came to be challenged by the appellant/writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge. 6 It was the case of the appellant/writ petitioner that earlier she had preferred WPS No.4555 of 2018, which was disposed of vide 4 order dated 12.07.2018 directing respondent No.3 to decide her pending representation. Pursuant thereto, the representation submitted by the appellant/writ petitioner was rejected vide order dated 13.08.2018, which was also assailed in the writ petition. 7 The appellant/writ petitioner contended before the learned Single Judge that while considering the case of respondent No.5 for promotion to the post of Assistant Grade-II, no seniority list was ever published by respondent No.3. It was further pleaded that despite submitting an application under the Right to Information Act seeking copy of the seniority list, no such document was supplied by the Municipal Corporation, Raigarh. It was also contended that the name of respondent No.5 continued to reflect in the seniority list of Assistant Grade-III maintained by the Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur and, therefore, the promotion granted to respondent No.5 to the post of Assistant Grade-II was illegal and contrary to the applicable rules governing seniority and promotion. 8 Feeling aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the respondent authorities, the appellant/writ petitioner preferred WPS No.254/2019, which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 22.01.2026. 9 After dismissal of the writ petition vide order dated 22.01.2026, the appellant/writ petitioner requested her erstwhile counsel to file a review petition against the said order. However, the said counsel 5 was of the opinion that the matter was not fit for review and, accordingly, declined to prefer the same. The said counsel also voluntarily issued a No Objection Certificate (NOC) in favour of the appellant/writ petitioner. Thereafter, the appellant/writ petitioner, through the present counsel and his associates, preferred Review Petition No.77/2026 assailing the order dated 22.01.2026. However, the said review petition came to be dismissed for want of prosecution vide order dated 13.03.2026. 10 Immediately thereafter, the appellant/writ petitioner filed MCC No.301/2026 on 16.03.2026 seeking restoration of Review Petition No.77/2026, however, the said MCC was also dismissed vide order dated 30.03.2026. It has been contended that both the Review Petition No.77/2026 as well as MCC No.301/2026 were filed within the prescribed period of limitation and, therefore, the delay, if any, in filing the present writ appeal has occurred solely on account of pendency of the aforesaid proceedings. It is submitted that immediately after dismissal of MCC No.301/2026 on 30.03.2026, the present writ appeal has been preferred. 11 It is further the case of the appellant/writ petitioner that the impugned order dated 22.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge is unsustainable in law as well as on facts, inasmuch as the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the controversy involved in the matter pertains to jurisdiction, eligibility and statutory compliance in the matter of promotion of respondent 6 No.5. According to the appellant/writ petitioner, the writ petition has been dismissed on technical grounds without adjudicating the substantial illegality alleged in the promotion granted to respondent No.5, which has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. Hence, the present writ appeal has been filed seeking interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 12 Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition solely on the ground of delay and laches without appreciating that the cause of action, in fact, arose only in the year 2018 upon enforcement of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2018, whereby the eligibility criteria for promotion was reduced from seven years to five years, thereby conferring enforceable eligibility and corresponding service rights upon the appellant. It is contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the appellant had been diligently pursuing his remedies and had immediately approached this Court by filing WPS No.4555/2018 upon obtaining information under the Right to Information Act disclosing serious discrepancies in the gradation list and the process adopted for granting promotion to respondent No.5. According to learned Senior Counsel, there was neither any deliberate inaction nor any unexplained delay attributable to the appellant. 7 13 It is further submitted that the impugned promotion order dated 05.03.2015 was issued when the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2007 were in force, which specifically mandated a minimum of seven years’ experience on the post of Assistant Grade-III for eligibility to promotion. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that Rule 10 of the Rules of 2007, as also the corresponding provisions under the Rules of 2018, require that promotion be made strictly in accordance with seniority reflected in a duly prepared gradation/seniority list published by the competent appointing authority. However, in the present case, no gradation list for the relevant year i.e. 2014-2015 was ever prepared or published by Municipal Corporation, Raigarh, which fact stands substantiated from the RTI reply dated 14.05.2018. Therefore, according to him, the promotion granted to respondent No.5 in absence of a valid gradation list is wholly arbitrary, contrary to statutory provisions and unsustainable in law. 14 Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider the jurisdictional defect in the promotion granted to respondent No.5. It is argued that respondent No.5 was originally appointed in Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur and his appointing authority continued to be Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur. In absence of any lawful absorption order and proper fixation of seniority in Municipal Corporation, Raigarh, the authorities at Raigarh had no 8 jurisdiction to consider and grant promotion to respondent No.5. It is further contended that the name of respondent No.5 simultaneously appeared in the gradation list of Assistant Grade- III maintained by Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur for the period 2014-2018 while at the same time he was shown to have been promoted as Assistant Grade-II in Municipal Corporation, Raigarh, which clearly demonstrates serious procedural impropriety and illegality in the matter of promotion. 15 It is also submitted that respondent No.4-Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur, in paragraph 5 of its reply filed in WPS No.254/2019 (Annexure A/6), has itself admitted that the No Objection Certificate in favour of respondent No.5 was issued only on 06.07.2019, whereas the impugned promotion order had already been issued on 05.03.2015. According to learned Senior Counsel, the aforesaid admission clearly demonstrates that on the date when promotion was granted, respondent No.5 had neither been lawfully absorbed nor relieved from Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur, and therefore, the promotion order suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. 16 Learned Senior Counsel next submits that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the illegal promotion granted to respondent No.5 has continuing civil consequences adversely affecting the service rights, promotional avenues and seniority position of the appellant and, therefore, the matter gives rise to a 9 recurring and continuing cause of action. It is argued that the impugned judgment suffers from non-consideration of material pleadings, statutory provisions and jurisdictional issues and has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by declining adjudication on merits merely on technical grounds. 17 Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Kr. Bhuyan v. Debajit Das, (2019) 12 SCC 275, learned Senior Counsel submits that where an action is tainted by arbitrariness, favouritism or fraud, the same cannot be protected on the ground of delay and laches. Referring to paragraphs 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the said judgment, it is contended that fraud vitiates every action and an illegal promotion obtained contrary to statutory rules cannot be sustained merely because the challenge was raised subsequently, particularly when satisfactory explanation regarding delay has been furnished. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge be set aside and the matter be considered on merits by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 18 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent Nos.1 and 2 supported the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and submitted that the writ petition suffered from gross delay and laches and, therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to entertain the same. It 10 is submitted that the promotion order in favour of respondent No.5 was issued on 05.03.2015, whereas the writ petition came to be filed only in the year 2019 without any satisfactory explanation for such belated challenge. It is further submitted that even after dismissal of the writ petition, the appellant/writ petitioner had preferred Review Petition No.77/2026 as well as MCC No.301/2026 and both the proceedings stood dismissed, therefore, no interference is called for in the present writ appeal. 19 Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 also supported the impugned order and submitted that the learned Single Judge has passed the order after due consideration of the pleadings and material available on record. It is contended that the appellant/writ petitioner cannot be permitted to reopen a stale claim after lapse of several years. It is further submitted that the review petition as well as the MCC preferred by the appellant/writ petitioner having already been dismissed, the present writ appeal deserves to be dismissed. 20 Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 submits that the promotion granted to respondent No.5 was made in accordance with the applicable rules and after due consideration by the competent authority. It is submitted that there was no illegality or jurisdictional defect in the promotion process as alleged by the appellant/writ petitioner. Learned counsel further submits that the appellant/writ petitioner is seeking to challenge a settled service 11 position after considerable delay and, therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. It is also submitted that subsequent dismissal of Review Petition No.77/2026 and MCC No.301/2026 further fortifies the correctness of the impugned order. 21 Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5, while adopting the submissions advanced on behalf of the other respondents, submits that respondent No.5 has been validly promoted and has been continuously discharging duties on the promotional post for several years. It is contended that the appellant/writ petitioner has failed to establish any legal right warranting interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. It is further submitted that after dismissal of the writ petition, the review petition and the restoration MCC preferred by the appellant/writ petitioner were also dismissed and, therefore, the present writ appeal is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 22 We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and carefully considered their rival submissions. We have also perused the entire record of the case, including the impugned order dated 22.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.254/2019, the order dated 13.03.2026 passed in Review Petition No.77/2026 and the order dated 30.03.2026 passed in MCC No.301/2026. The submissions advanced by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner as well as 12 those advanced by learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent Nos.1 and 2 and respondent Nos.3 to 5 have received our anxious and thoughtful consideration. 23 After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the parties therein as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge has passed the impugned order in following terms:- “7. ……..The petitioner never challenged the order of transfer or order of absorption, or regularization of respondent No.5 before any forum. Even in the present petition, those orders have not been challenged and only order of promotion dated 5.3.2015 has been challenged after a lapse of four years. Therefore, the contention made by counsel for the petitioner appears to be misconceived. The circular referred by counsel for the petitioner dated 11.5.2005 and Annexure-P/7 dated 9.6.1999 deals with transfer of employees of Municipalities and Nagar Panchayats and are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently argued that the petition filed by the petitioner suffers from delay and laches. 8. In the matter of Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa and others reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in para 21 as under:- “21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this 13 Court: (A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648: “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted vuqlwph & pkj 9. ¼ fu;e 11 nsf[k;s ½d even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 14 (emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25: "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of 15 acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive 16 assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to- case basis.” (emphasis supplied) (C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301: "36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four 17 years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. x x x 38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 18 (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action.The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v.Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213) “12. 470-71, paras 1213) “12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911,p. 395 as follows: ‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part;and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress,but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the 19 claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’ 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial 20 management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?” 39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will 21 not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” 10. The fallout of the above-discussed facts and law can be summarized as under: “(I) The petitioner never challenged the order of transfer or the order of confirmation of respondent No.5 and therefore, those orders have attained finality. (II) The petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-III sometimes in the year 2012 whereas, respondent No.5 was 22 appointed to the post of Assistant Grade-III in the year 1999. Respondent No.5 was transferred from Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur to Raigarh as Assistant Grade-III. (III) Respondent No.5 was promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-II vide order dated 5.3.2015 and on the said date, the petitioner was not eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Grade-II as he did not have completed seven years of service on the post of Assistant Grade-III.” 11. The petitioner challenged the order of promotion dated 5.3.2015 by filing the writ petition in the year 2019 without explaining the delay part properly. The petitioner has pleaded in para 7 of the writ petition that it is declared that there is no delay in filing the writ petition. 12. Taking into consideration the above- discussed facts, I do not find any good ground to interfere into the matter. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.” 24 From perusal of the record, it is apparent that the principal challenge raised by the appellant/writ petitioner pertains to the promotion order dated 05.03.2015 issued in favour of respondent No.5. However, admittedly, the said order came to be assailed by filing the writ petition only in the year 2019 after lapse of nearly four years. The learned Single Judge, after taking into 23 consideration the pleadings on record, the nature of challenge involved and the settled principles governing delay and laches in service jurisprudence, has declined to entertain the writ petition. We find that the learned Single Judge has assigned cogent and sustainable reasons while arriving at the conclusion that the writ petition suffered from unexplained delay and acquiescence. 25 It is not in dispute that the appellant/writ petitioner never challenged the order of transfer of respondent No.5 from Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur to Municipal Corporation, Raigarh nor the order of regularization/absorption passed in his favour. Those orders, therefore, attained finality long back. The challenge raised subsequently only to the promotion order dated 05.03.2015, without assailing the foundational orders, has rightly been held by the learned Single Judge to be misconceived. It is also evident from the record that respondent No.5 had been working on the promotional post for several years and the service position had already attained finality. 26 We also find substance in the observation recorded by the learned Single Judge that the dispute raised by the appellant/writ petitioner relates to seniority and promotion affecting third party rights and settled service positions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decisions relied upon by the learned Single Judge, particularly in Tarsem Singh (supra), N. Murugesan (supra) and M.J. James (supra), has consistently held that stale claims 24 relating to promotion and seniority ought not to be entertained after considerable delay, especially where interference would unsettle rights accrued in favour of others. The principles of delay, laches and acquiescence squarely apply to the facts of the present case. 27 The contention of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner that the cause of action arose only after enforcement of the Rules of 2018 also does not persuade this Court. The challenge in the present case is essentially directed against the promotion order dated 05.03.2015 and the alleged irregularities existing at the time of grant of such promotion. The subsequent amendment in the Rules of 2018 cannot revive a stale cause of action nor confer a fresh right to reopen settled service matters after several years. 28 We further find that even after dismissal of the writ petition on 22.01.2026, the appellant/writ petitioner preferred Review Petition No.77/2026, which came to be dismissed for want of prosecution vide order dated 13.03.2026. Thereafter, MCC No.301/2026 seeking restoration of the review petition was also dismissed vide order dated 30.03.2026. Though delay in filing the present writ appeal has already been condoned by this Court considering the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, nevertheless, dismissal of the review petition and the restoration MCC also demonstrates that the appellant/writ petitioner could not successfully pursue the 25 remedies availed against the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 29 So far as the reliance placed by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant on the judgment rendered in Ajit Kr. Bhuyan (supra) is concerned, the same is distinguishable on facts. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found clear elements of favouritism, manipulation and fraud established on record. In the present case, except bald allegations, no material of such nature has been brought on record so as to demonstrate fraud or deliberate manipulation warranting interference despite delay and laches. Mere allegation of illegality, in absence of cogent material, cannot be a ground to unsettle a long-standing promotion and settled service position. 30 Upon overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the pleadings raised by the parties, the material available on record and the findings returned by the learned Single Judge, we are of the considered opinion that no case for interference is made out in the present intra-Court appeal. The learned Single Judge has rightly taken into consideration the fact that the challenge to the promotion order dated 05.03.2015 was raised after considerable lapse of time and that the appellant/writ petitioner had failed to satisfactorily explain such delay. The service rights of respondent No.5 had already crystallized and any interference at this belated stage would unsettle the settled 26 service position and adversely affect accrued rights. The learned Single Judge has also rightly observed that stale claims relating to seniority and promotion cannot ordinarily be entertained in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 31 We further find that the appellant/writ petitioner had already availed remedy by filing Review Petition No.77/2026 against the order dated 22.01.2026, which came to be dismissed for want of prosecution on 13.03.2026, and thereafter MCC No.301/2026 seeking restoration of the review petition was also dismissed on 30.03.2026. Even otherwise, from the material placed on record, no such patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error is made out so as to warrant interference with the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 22.01.2026 passed in WPS No.254/2019 does not suffer from any infirmity requiring interference by this Court. 32 Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merits is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 33 There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu