[2026:RJ-JP:3666] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.9574/2022 1. Harshita Garg Daughter Of Shri Nirmal Kumar Garg, Aged About 27 Years, Resident Of Makaan No. D-93, Ladli Path, Chomu House, C-Scheme, Police Station Vidhyakpuri, Jaipur (Raj). 2. Rajat Morya Son Of Shri Mangilal, Aged About 31 Years, Resident Of 817, UB Aura Tower Apartment, Shahkar Marg, Jyoti Nagar, Infront Of Imli Phatak, Jaipur (Raj). ----Petitioners Versus 1. Babloo @ Pawan Son Of Late Shri Balram @ Bal Bahadur, Resident Of Gram Pulga, Post Office Barshaini, Police Station Barshaini, Tehsil Bhuntar, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh. 2. Central Bureau Of Investigation, Through Special P.P. 3. State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor. ----Respondents Connected With S.B. Criminal Bail Cancellation Application No.139/2023 Harshita Garg Daughter Of Shri Nirmal Kumar Garg, Aged About 27 Years, Resident Of Makaan No.D 93, Ladli Path, Chomu House, C-Scheme, Police Station Vidhayakpuri, Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor 2. Babloo @ Pawan Son Of Late Shri Balram @ Bal Bahadur, Resident Of Gram Pulga, Post Office Barshaini, Police Station Barshaini, Tehsil Bhuntar, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manish Gupta, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shyam Singh Yadav, Adv. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAVEER BHATNAGAR Order [2026:RJ-JP:3666] (2 of 6) [CRLMP-9574/2022] 1. Date of conclusion of arguments 22/01 /2026 2. Date on which the judgment was reserved 22/01 /2026 3. Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced Full Judgment 4. Date of pronouncement 28 /01/2026 1. The petitioners- Harshita Garg and Rajat Morya have preferred the instant petition under Sections 482 and bail cancellation application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., challenging the order dated 17.03.2021 passed by the Special Court (N.D.P.S. Cases), Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur in FIR No.350/2016 registered at Police Station Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur for the offences under Sections 8/20 of the N.D.P.S. Act which was later on transferred to CBI, New Delhi with Case No. RC3(S)/2019/CBI/SC/III/New Delhi, by which the application for grant of pardon filed by Respondent No.2 was allowed and bail was granted to Respondent No.2 Babloo @ Pawan. 2. 2. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that vide impugned order dated 17.03.2021, the accused respondent- Babloo @ Pawan was granted pardon against provision of Section 306 of Cr.P.C. It is contended that the said order suffers from patent illegality as the same was passed violating the essential term of Section 306 of Cr.P.C. It is further claimed that as per Section 306(4) of Cr.P.C., enlarging the accused-respondent -Babloo @ Pawan on bail is per se illegal as Section 306(4) provides explicitly that after the grant of pardon, the accused shall be detained till the conclusion of the trial. It is also contended that the trial Court has no right to enlarge the petitioner on bail in terms of Section 439 of Cr.P.C., as the provision of Section 439 of Cr.P.C. is not applicable, and only under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. [2026:RJ-JP:3666] (3 of 6) [CRLMP-9574/2022] could the respondent have applied for bail. In support of his argument, learned counsel relies on the judgment of Noor Taki Alias Mammu vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 Raj 52, passed by this Court and Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes vs. The State of Maharashtra & Others, 1968 AIR 594, passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 3. Contrarily, it is argued by learned counsel for the C.B.I. that the case was transferred to the C.B.I. and thereafter, as per the provision of Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the application was filed, and the same was allowed by the trial Court. It is contended that there is no violation of any provision enshrined under Section 306 of Cr.P.C., as the same is not applicable in the present case, and the entire proceeding is governed by Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act. It is further contended that it is not necessary to apply before the trial Court/ or Magistrate for pardoning an offender under Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act, as the Central Government or the State Government itself are competent to grant a pardon to the offender. Similarly, there is no provision under Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act corresponding to Section 306(4) of Cr.P.C.; therefore, there is no embargo on the trial Court from granting bail to the accused until the conclusion of the trial. As a result, the trial Court is competent to grant bail to the accused-respondent under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., and the impugned order suffers from no patent illegality and was passed after due application of law. 4. Heard and perused the material available on record. [2026:RJ-JP:3666] (4 of 6) [CRLMP-9574/2022] 5. The Apex Court in the case of Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi, (2001) 8 SCC 289, while dealing with Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act and Sections 306 & 307 of the Cr.P.C., held as under:- "28. Under Section 64(1) of the Act, the Central Government or the State Government may tender immunity from prosecution for any offence under the Act or under the Penal Code or under any Central or State Act with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person appearing to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. The limitations on the exercise of the power are twofold. First, the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, must form an opinion that it is necessary or expedient to grant immunity to such a person. The reasons for such an opinion are required to be recorded in writing. The second limitation on the exercise of the power under Section 64(1) is that it can be granted only conditionally — the condition being that the person granted the immunity must make a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances relating to the contravention. The immunity is limited only to the offence in respect of which a tender of evidence is made [Section 64(2)]. If the condition subject to which the immunity is granted is not fulfilled by the person to whom the immunity has been tendered, after recording a finding to that effect by the Central Government or the State Government, the immunity shall be taken to have been withdrawn and such person may be tried for the offence in respect of which the tender of immunity was made or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter. The underlying rationale of Section 64 is that the Government/NCB which is vitally interested in getting hold of the culprits, must be allowed to assess the strength of the evidence available to it and if necessary, bolster its case with evidence of an accomplice. Therefore, the section serves the same purpose as the grant of pardon to approvers under Section 307 CrPC. "39. Assuming there is a conflict between the powers of the court under Section 307 CrPC and the power of the Central Government under Section 64 of the Act, then it must be held that Section 64 would prevail both on the ground that the Act being a special Act overrides CrPC [2026:RJ-JP:3666] (5 of 6) [CRLMP-9574/2022] which is a general Act and also because the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one." (Emphasis Supplied) 6. Thus, it is obvious that the provisions of section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act & Section 306 Cr.P.C are entirely distinguishable and the safeguards provided under section 306 of the Cr.P.C. are not applicable for pardoning immunity under section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act. Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act and Sections 306 of the Cr.P.C., both provide mechanisms for tendering pardon to an accomplice to obtain evidence. Still, they differ significantly in their authority, application, and scope. Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act grants the Central or State Government the power to grant immunity to an accomplice before or during a trial. Conversely, Sections 306 & 307 Cr.P.C. are judicial powers exercised by Magistrates at the stage of pre-trial or by the Courts of Session at the stage of post- committal. 7. In the instant case, though there was no need for the prosecution to apply for pardoning the accomplice under the provisions 306 & 307 of the Cr.P.C, as the powers are exclusively vested with the Government, however, even it is assumed that Section 306 of Cr.P.C are applicable then also the procedural safeguards such as the statement of the accomplice before the magistrate under section 164 of the Cr.P.C has been taken care. As far as the contention that the respondent has wrongly been enlarged on bail on transgression of the provision of section 306(4), is also misconceived as the provision reads as under:- "(4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) - [2026:RJ-JP:3666] (6 of 6) [CRLMP-9574/2022] (a) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any; (b) shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial." 8. There is no provision in Section 64 of the N.D.P.S. Act pari materia with the provision prescribed under Section 306(4) of Cr.P.C., which imposes an embargo of detention on a person granted pardon until the culmination of the trial. Therefore, the contention that the respondent has been wrongly granted bail vide the impugned order is incorrect. 9. Upshot to the above discussion, the instant petition and bail cancellation application is accordingly, dismissed. (PRAVEER BHATNAGAR),J Ashwani Kr Srivastava /-39-40