2026:HHC:33142 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 40 of 2014 Reserved on: 30.7.2026 Date of Decision: 07.8.2026. Jawahar Mohammad ...Petitioner Versus State of HP ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Ms. Divyani Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Ms Srishti Negi, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 17.12.2013, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Solan, Camp at Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 27.12.2011 and order of sentence dated 29.12.2011, passed by the learned Judicial 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:33142 Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Pawan Kumar (PW1) and Satish Kumar (PW2) were going to Nalagarh on 01.08.2005 in a motorcycle bearing registration No. HB-12B-0139, which was being driven by Satish Kumar. A three-wheeler bearing registration No. HP-12A-5667 came from Nalagarh at a high speed and hit the motorcycle near Chiknipul on the wrong side of the road. The motorcycle riders and the driver of the three-wheeler, Jawahar Mohammad, sustained injuries. They were taken to the hospital. An intimation (Ex.PW5/A) was given to the police. SI/Additional SHO Asha Ram (PW8) went to the hospital for verification. He recorded the statement of Pawan Kumar (Ex.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW6/B) was registered. Dr 3 2026:HHC:33142 Sunita Sood (PW7) examined the injured Satish Kumar and found that he had sustained simple and grievous injuries. She issued the MLC (Ex.PW7/B). She also examined Pawan Kumar and Jawahar Mohammed and found that they had sustained simple injuries. She issued the MLCs (Ex.PW7/C and Ex.PW7/D). Asha Ram went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW8/A). He seized the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-12B-0139 vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). He also seized the three- wheeler bearing registration No. HP-12A-5667 vide memo (Ex.PW3/A). Jawahar Muhammad produced the documents of the vehicle which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). Satish Kumar produced the documents of the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-12B-0139, which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/D). Rajinder Singh (PW4) mechanically examined the vehicles and found that there was no defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ex.PW4/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of 4 2026:HHC:33142 accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its case. Pawan Kumar (PW1) and Satish Kumar (PW2) sustained injuries in the accident. Ram Pal (PW3) witnessed the recovery. Rajinder Singh (PW4) mechanically examined the vehicle. HC Mansu Ram (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. HC Rajinder (PW6) signed the FIR. Dr Sunita Sood (PW7) examined the injured. Inspector Asha Ram (PW8) investigated the matter. Dr Lalit Agrawal (PW9) treated the patient and issued the case summary. Joginder Singh (PW10) took the photographs. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC admitted that he was driving a three-wheeler bearing registration number HP-12A-5667 on 01.08.2005 at about 05.00 p.m. He admitted that he had sustained injuries. He claimed that the truck was moving ahead. The motorcycle and the three-wheeler hit the rear side of the truck. The motorcycle 5 2026:HHC:33142 had not hit the three-wheeler. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the motorcyclists corroborated each other. The accused admitted that he was driving the three-wheeler at the time of the accident. The plea taken by the accused that a truck was moving ahead and the motorcycle and three-wheeler had hit the truck was not proved on record. A witness’s testimony cannot be discarded because he had turned hostile. The mechanic did not find any defect in the vehicle that could have led to the accident. The accident had occurred on the right side of the road, and the accused was negligent in taking the three-wheeler towards the right side of the road. The accused was unable to control the three wheeler showed that he was driving the three-wheeler at a high speed. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Conviction Sentence Section 279 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 2026:HHC:33142 ten days. Section 337 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for ten days. Section 338 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, District Solan, Camp at Nalagarh (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of the motorcycle riders corroborated each other. The mechanical expert did not find any defect in the vehicles that could have led to the accident. The accident had occurred towards the right side of the road, and the accused was negligent in taking the three-wheeler towards the right side of 7 2026:HHC:33142 the road. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence which did not require any interference in appeal. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other, which made the prosecution case highly suspect. The defence version that the vehicles were moved after the accident was highly probable, and reliance could not have been placed upon the photographs and the site plan. As per the statement of the witnesses, the photographs were taken during the night, whereas the photographs were taken in broad daylight. The learned Trial Court had not granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Ms Divyani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms Srishti Negi, learned counsel for the 8 2026:HHC:33142 petitioner/accused and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Ms Divyani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, for the petitioner/accused submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. Learned Trial Court held without any evidence that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed. The mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to implicate the accused. The statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects, which makes the prosecution case highly suspect. When two versions are appearing on record, the version in favour of the accused should be preferred. Therefore, she prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. She relied upon the following judgments in support of her submission: - (i) Sansar Chand Vs. State of HP 2016: HHC:9991; (ii) State of HP Vs. Krishan Lal 2024: HHC:8595; (iii) Deep Raj Vs. State of HP 2025: HHC:19449; and (iv) Sanju Vs. State of HP 2024: HHC:10295 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the 9 2026:HHC:33142 testimonies of motorcycle riders corroborated each other on material aspects. The site plan and the photographs show that the three-wheeler was being driven towards the right side of the road and the accused violated the Rules of the Road Regulation, which was the proximate cause of the accident. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of facts while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in a criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 10 2026:HHC:33142 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded 11 2026:HHC:33142 error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforesaid. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651, that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: 12 2026:HHC:33142 “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material; the 13 2026:HHC:33142 order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it 14 2026:HHC:33142 is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sansar Chand (supra). 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court 19. Pawan Kumar (PW1) stated that he was riding the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-12B-0139, which was being driven by Satish Kumar. A three-wheeler bearing registration No. HP 12A-5667 came at a high speed towards the wrong side of the road and hit the motorcycle. He and Satish Kumar sustained injuries. The accused was driving the three- wheeler at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross- examination that he had become unconscious after the accident. The accused had also sustained injuries, and he was also taken to the hospital. He denied that the three-wheeler and the motorcycle had hit a tanker. 20. Satish Kumar (PW2) stated that he and Pawan Kumar were going towards Nalagarh on 01.08.2005. A three-wheeler came towards the wrong side of the road and hit the motorcycle 15 2026:HHC:33142 near Chiknipul. He, Pawan and the driver of the three-wheeler sustained injuries in the accident. He stated in his cross- examination that he did not have a driving license. He denied that he did not know how to drive the motorcycle. He also became unconscious and could not say who had brought him to the hospital. He denied that the accident occurred because of his negligence. 21. Both the witnesses corroborated the statements of each other. There is nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were deposing falsely. Both the witnesses stated that the motorcycle was moving towards the left side whereas the three-wheeler bearing registration No. HP-12A-5667 was moving towards the right side of the road. 22. Dr Sunita Sood proved that Satish Kumar and Pawan had sustained injuries in the accident. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to doubt his testimony. It was observed: 16 2026:HHC:33142 “22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal trial. 23. In Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26) “26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: 26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. 26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. 26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. 26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. 26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishment in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. 17 2026:HHC:33142 26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with the passage of time should be discarded.” (emphasis supplied) 23. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed: “33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: “(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.” 18 2026:HHC:33142 34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra:(2023) 13 SCC 365). 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh, 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is something inherently improbable in his testimony. It was observed: “The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a 19 2026:HHC:33142 grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them.” 25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed: - “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence, more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and, in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross-examination and what impression is created by his evidence, taken in the context of the case, and not by entering into the realm of 20 2026:HHC:33142 conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent with one another so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting the three respondents, namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram.” (emphasis supplied) 26. The injuries on the bodies of the motorcyclists prove their presence on the spot, and their testimonies are entitled to great weight and learned Courts below had rightly accepted those testimonies. 27. The statements of the injured are duly corroborated by the site plan (Ex.PW8/A) in which the motorcycle is seen moving towards its left side, and the three-wheeler is shown towards its extreme right side. The width of the road is shown to be 13 ft. mettled. Point No. 6 of the site plan mentions that a 6 ft. unmettled and 10 ft. mettled road was available towards the left side of the three-wheeler. The contents of the site plan are duly corroborated by the photographs (Ex. P1 to P4) in which the 21 2026:HHC:33142 three-wheeler is shown towards the extreme right side of the road, whereas the motorcycle is towards the left side. 28. Joginder Pal (PW10) took the photographs. He stated that he had taken the photographs on 01.08.2005 at about 11.12 A.M. He remained on the spot for about 10 minutes. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness makes the prosecution case highly suspect because he had taken the photographs on the date of the accident at about 11.20 a.m., whereas the accident had occurred on 01.08.2005 at about 05.00 p.m. This submission will not help the defence. The date 01.08.2005, mentioned by the photographer, is clearly an error because it was rightly pointed out in the memorandum of revision that the photographs were taken in the daytime and since the accident had taken place during the evening, the photographs could not have been taken on the same day, but would have been taken on the next day. 29. Ram Pal (PW3) stated that there was no three- wheeler on the spot. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied that a three-wheeler was parked on the spot. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Asha Ram 22 2026:HHC:33142 (PW8) stated that he had recorded the statement of Ram Pal (Ex.PW8/C) and Pawan Kumar as per their version. This part of his statement was not challenged in the cross-examination. Ram Pal (PW8) had stated before the police that the three- wheeler was seized in his presence. Therefore, he has made two inconsistent versions — one before the police and the other before the Court — neither of which can stand together. Hence, his credit has been impeached under Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross- examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not 23 2026:HHC:33142 been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 30. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed: “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed: "It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony. 31. Thus, the testimony of this witness cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. 32. It was submitted that the site plan (Ex.PW1/A) does not show the motorcycle and three-wheeler on the unmetalled portion of the road, whereas they are shown on the unmetalled portion of the road in the photographs. Hence, the photographs 24 2026:HHC:33142 and the site plan contradict each other. This submission cannot be accepted. The site plan (Ex.PW8/A) shows a three-wheeler towards the extreme left side of the road. Note No.6 mentions that a three-wheeler had left the metalled portion of the road completely, clearly showing that the accident had occurred on the unmetalled portion of the road. The photograph also shows the front tyre of the three-wheeler on the edge of the road. Hence, the photographs do not contradict the site plan and cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. 33. Therefore, the learned Courts below have rightly accepted the testimonies of the motorcyclists and held that the accident had occurred towards the extreme right side of the three-wheeler and extreme left side of the motorcycle. 34. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. 25 2026:HHC:33142 State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 35. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road. 36. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was 26 2026:HHC:33142 an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 37. In Shakila Khader v. Nausheer Cama, (1975) 4 SCC 122: 1975 SCC (Cri) 379: 1975 SCC OnLine SC 103, the car went to the right side of the road, hit the parapet and turned turtle. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the driver was negligent. It was observed at page 126: “6. The facts in the case speak eloquently about what should have happened. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving that led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed but also the width of the road, the density of the traffic, and the attempt, as in this case, to overtake the other vehicles, resulting in going to the wrong side of the road and being responsible for the accident. Even if the accident took place in the twinkling of an eye, it is not difficult for the eyewitness to notice a car overtaking other vehicles and going to the wrong side of the road and hitting a vehicle travelling on that side of the road. The criterion adopted by the learned Judge for assessing the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and rejecting them is thoroughly unjustifiable. There may be cases where it is 27 2026:HHC:33142 difficult to be clear or specific in giving details as to the cause of the accident, but this is not one such case. The reference by the learned Judge about the slight damage to the electric post and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the car could not have been going at a high speed is not correct, as we shall show later. His further observation that the fact that the car travelled another 45 feet and hit against the parapet wall and turned turtle showed that the car must have been travelling at an extremely high speed but there is a little blue paint on the pole and a faint gray stain on the parapet wall is self-contradictory unless we are to infer that the learned Judge implied that the one or the other is not true. He does not so hold. There can be no doubt about the car having hit the electric post and the parapet wall. That and the fact of its overturning would establish the rash and negligent driving. A car driven normally and travelling behind a bus does not go to the opposite side of the road, hit an electric post and parapet wall, and turn turtle. The car apparently stopped only because it turned turtle. It did not hit the electric post or the parapet wall full tilt; if it did, it would have stopped at one of those points. We should remember that the collision with the scooter and pushing it back would have considerably reduced the speed of the car. Even so, it travelled farther. The slight damage to the electric post and the parapet wall is because the car hit them sideways. Nobody has suggested that they were brought into existence for this case. The car would probably not have stopped but for turning turtle, and it should have been travelling quite fast before it could overturn, as the learned Judge himself realises. There is only one conclusion possible on the facts of this case, and that is that the accused came over to the wrong side of the road and was responsible for the accident, and that is clearly a rash and negligent act in the condition of the road and the condition of the traffic.” 28 2026:HHC:33142 38. It is undisputed that the accused was driving the three-wheeler at the time of the accident. He admitted this fact in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Thus, it was proved that the accused had breached the Rules of Road Regulations, which was the proximate cause of the accident, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. 39. Satish Kumar admitted that he did not have a driving licence at the time of the accident. It was submitted that Satish Kumar was negligent in driving the motorcycle without a driving licence and learned Courts below erred in holding the accused to be negligent. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down in State Government v. Bhawanesh Kumar, 1957 SCC OnLine MP 102, that the absence of a driving licence does not constitute rashness or negligence. It was observed: “15. We are equally clear that from the mere fact that the accused-respondent did not possess a driving licence, it cannot be positively inferred that he was guilty of rashness or negligence in driving a heavy vehicle like a truck. There is evidence of Jabbar (D. W. 1), which shows that the accused is in charge of the Sarodha Head Workshop, and he has been testing and driving motor vehicles for 1½ years. According to him, he is an 29 2026:HHC:33142 experienced motor driver, and consequently, there is nothing to show that in undertaking to drive a heavy motor vehicle like a truck, he was undertaking a risk for which there was no justification whatsoever. Whether he drives a vehicle with a licence or without a licence, the law expects him to be neither rash nor negligent in the performance of his task, and we will judge his conduct in the matter as if he were the most qualified driver who brings to his task the ordinary reasonable competency of persons driving heavy motor vehicles.” 40. This position was reiterated in Suleman Rehiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 337: (1968) 2 SCR 515: AIR 1968 SC 829, wherein it was observed: 12…. There is no presumption in law that a person who possesses only a learner's licence or possesses no licence at all does not know how to drive. For various reasons, not excluding sheer indifference, he might not have taken a regular licence. The prosecution’s evidence that Appellant 1 had driven the jeep to various places on the day previous to the occurrence is proof of the fact that he knew how to drive. There was no basis for the conclusion that it was a sheer stroke of good fortune that he did not meet with any accident on that day. xxxxx 14….In the present case, we do not know what the proximate cause of the accident was. We cannot rule out the possibility of the accident having been caused by the fault of the deceased. The question of whether Appellant 1 was proficient in driving a Jeep or not resolves the issue. His proficiency in driving might furnish a defence, which a learner could not have, but the absence of proficiency did not make him guilty. The only question was whether, in point of fact, he was not competent to drive and his incompetence was the cause of the death of the person concerned. 30 2026:HHC:33142 41. Therefore, the accused cannot take advantage of the fact that Satish Kumar did not have any valid driving licence with him to drive the motorcycle. 42. Learned Trial Court held that the accused was driving the three-wheeler at a high speed. Ms Divyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the accused. had rightly relied upon the judgments of this Court in Krishan Lal (supra), Deep Lal (supra) and Sanju (supra) to submit that mere use of high speed is not sufficient to conclude negligence. However, this finding will not make any difference, because the proximate cause of the accident was the driving of the three-wheeler towards the right side of the road and not the high speed. Thus, the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court regarding the high speed of the three-wheeler will not vitiate its judgment. 43. The accused has taken a defence that a truck was going ahead of the motorcycle and the three-wheeler. The motorcycle and the three-wheeler had hit the truck. This defence was not established on record. Pawan Kumar (PW1) and Satish Kumar (PW2) specifically denied that a truck was going ahead of them and the motorcycle and three-wheeler had hit the 31 2026:HHC:33142 truck, and denied suggestion does not amount to any proof. Reliance was placed on the photographs (Ex.P1 and Ex.P2) to submit that the dent on the three-wheeler is at a higher level than the height of the motorcycle and the accident could not have been caused by the motorcycle. This submission cannot be accepted. The motorcycle is lying on the ground, and its height would have been less. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the motorcycle could not have caused the dent to the three-wheeler. However, the handle of the motorcycle is touching the dent, which supports the conclusion that the motorcycle had hit the tanker. No prosecution witnesses admitted that a truck was moving ahead, and the motorcycle and tempo had hit it. No evidence was produced to establish this fact. Therefore, the submission that the accident could not have been caused by the motorcycle because of the height of the dent cannot be accepted. 44. Dr Sunita Sood examined the injured and found that Satish Kumar had suffered simple and grievous injuries. Pawan Kumar and the accused Jawahar Mohammad had sustained simple injuries. She admitted in her cross-examination that injuries could be caused if the occupants of both the vehicles are hit by another heavy vehicle. It was submitted that the cross- 32 2026:HHC:33142 examination of the Medical Officer corroborates the defence version that the motorcycle and three-wheeler had hit the truck. This submission cannot be accepted. The statement made by the Medical Officer is an alternative hypothesis and insufficient to hold that the three-wheeler and the motorcycle had hit the truck. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: “22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 33 2026:HHC:33142 45. Thus, the prosecution's case cannot be discarded because of the alternate hypothesis accepted by the Medical Officer. 46. The statement of Dr Sunita Sood regarding the injuries sustained by Satish Kumar and Pawan Kumar was not challenged in the cross-examination and is to be accepted as correct. Thus, it was duly proved on record that Satish Kumar had sustained grievous injury and Pawan had sustained simple injury in the accident which was caused because of the negligence of the accused. 47. It was submitted that learned Trial Court erred in not granting the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is 34 2026:HHC:33142 galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an 35 2026:HHC:33142 accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 48. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 49. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the 36 2026:HHC:33142 drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 50. Therefore, the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused. 51. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for three months each for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for three months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of IPC, and rigorous imprisonment of six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 338 of IPC. Considering the manner of the accident and the nature of the injuries, the sentence cannot be said to be excessive, requiring an interference from this Court. 52. No other point was urged. 37 2026:HHC:33142 53. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed. 54. A copy of this judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be transmitted forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 7th August, 2026 (Chander)