Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2026:HHC:34716 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 76 of 2015 Reserved on: 11.08.2026 Date of Decision: 18.08.2026 Ishwar Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1No For the Petitioner : Mr Ankit Dhiman, Advocate. For the respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 09.01.2015 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Shimla, H.P., Camp at Rohru (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 31.05.2007 and order of sentence dated 01.06.2007 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jubbal, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:34716
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant (name being withheld to protect her identity) had gone to graze her cattle on
12.05.2006. The accused came and started beating her. She picked up a darat to save herself, but the accused snatched the darat from her. She shouted for help, but nobody came to the spot. Gobiya also came to the spot. He abused the informant. The informant ran away from the spot. She filed a written application (Ext.PW1/A). The police registered an FIR (Ext.PW5/B). HC Dalip Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW6/A). Dr Dinesh Kumar (PW4) medically examined the informant and found that she had sustained multiple injuries. He advised an X-ray, but no fracture was detected. Hence, the nature of injury was stated to be simple, which could have been caused within 24 hours by kicks and fist blows. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW4/A). ASI Hari Singh (PW5) further investigated the matter. The informant produced her shirt, which was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal “H”.
Seal impression
3 2026:HHC:34716 (Ext.PW5/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the parcel was seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 506 and 354 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 6 witnesses to prove its case. Informant (PW1) narrated the incident. Gita Ram (PW2) witnessed the recovery. The informant's husband (PW3) was told about the incident. Dr Dinesh Kumar (PW4) medically examined the informant ASI Hari Singh (PW5), and HC Dalip Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He stated that the witnesses are interested and they deposed against him because of enmity. He
4 2026:HHC:34716 claimed that he was innocent and he was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was satisfactory. It was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the testimony of the victim’s husband. Enmity is a double- edged weapon, and it can furnish a motive for the commission of the crime. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 354 and 506 of the IPC and sentenced him as under: Sections Sentences 323 of Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 354 of Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹10,000/- and, in default of payment of the fine,
to
undergo
simple imprisonment for 15 days.
506 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 5 2026:HHC:34716
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II Shimla Camp at Rohru (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the informant’s testimony was satisfactory and was duly corroborated by the medical evidence. The enmity cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with it. Hence, the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The informant had changed her version from time to time. The accused had lodged an FIR against the accused regarding the beatings given by the informant to the accused. The informant had named Gobiya as the person who had visited the spot and abused her. However, Gobiya was not arrayed as an accused. She had also abandoned this version in the Court. The plea of the accused that the informant had taken her cattle to the field
6 2026:HHC:34716 of the accused and had assaulted him was highly probable, and learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and
order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The informant had not stated anything about outraging her modesty in the complaint made by her to the police. The plea taken by the accused, that the complainant had taken her cattle to the field of the accused and had inflicted injuries to the accused, was highly probable. Learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the informant had specifically stated in the complaint made to the police that the
7 2026:HHC:34716 accused had tried to outrage her modesty. Therefore, the submission that the informant had not stated anything about outraging her modesty is not correct. The learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused had inflicted injuries to the informant and outraged her modesty and criminally intimidated her. This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: -
“7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate upon the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder:
8 2026:HHC:34716
“438.
Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section
439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory
order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its
9 2026:HHC:34716 conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record.
7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re- examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct
judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following:
“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated
10 2026:HHC:34716 with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii.
The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned
order, observed as under:
“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As
11 2026:HHC:34716 held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.”
7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant had made a written complaint (Ext.PW1/A) to the police stating that the accused started beating her. He was trying to dishonour her (csbTtrh djus dh dksf'k'k dj jgk Fkk), and she had picked up a darat to save her honour. Thus, it is
12 2026:HHC:34716 apparent that the informant had not mentioned in her complaint that the accused had outraged her modesty. However, considering that the informant is a rustic villager, the statement made by her in the complaint that the accused was trying to dishonour her can be construed as outraging her modesty. 16. The informant stated that she was grazing her cattle on 12.05.2006, when the accused caught hold of her breasts. She took out a darat, then corrected to say that the accused took out the darat and threw it away. She started crying. However, there was no person. The accused attempted to rape her. The accused was intoxicated. 17. The statement made by the informant in the Court is not as per the prosecution version. The informant stated in the Court that the accused had tried to rape her. However, this fact was missing from the initial complaint made by her to the police. This was an important fact which could not have been missed by the informant. Further, she had stated in the complaint that she picked up the darat to save her honour. However, she stated in the Court that the accused had snatched the darat from her bundle of grass and threw it away. 13 2026:HHC:34716
18. She stated in her cross-examination that she was not aware that the accused had filed a complaint against him on 13.05.2006 regarding beatings given to him. She denied that the matter was listed before the Court on 10.01.2007. HC Dalip Singh (PW6) admitted in his cross-examination that an FIR was registered against the informant on 13.05.2006 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC.
The informant's husband admitted in his cross-examination that the accused had filed a complaint against the informant and the matter was pending before the Court. This admission shows that the informant’s husband was also aware of the pendency of the case against her. However, the informant had concealed these facts from the Court. 19. The informant's husband (PW3) was not present on the spot, and the incident was narrated to him by the informant on
13.05.2006. The incident had occurred on 12.05.2006. Therefore, there was a considerable time lapse between the narration of the incident to him and the incident. Hence, the statement made by the informant to her husband does not fall within the purview of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act as part of the same transaction
14 2026:HHC:34716 and cannot be admitted in evidence, therefore, the testimony of this witness cannot be used to corroborate the informant's version. 20. Dr. Dinesh Kumar (PW4) examined the informant on
13.05.2006. He found a small contusion over L3 and L4 vertebrae, swelling of the left thumb. No other injuries were found by him, even though the informant was complaining of pain. He admitted in his cross-examination that the injuries could be caused by way of self-infliction, but volunteered to say that it is difficult because the injuries were on L4 and L5. He admitted that the injury could be caused by way of a fall. The informant claimed that the accused had given beatings to her after pushing her. However, only the injuries on the L3 and L4 and swelling on the left thumb were found. Therefore, the medical evidence does not corroborate the informant's version. 21. The informant produced one torn shirt before the police. However, the informant had nowhere stated in her complaint (Ext.PW1/A) that her shirt was torn in the incident. Therefore, the production of the torn shirt will not corroborate the informant's version. 15 2026:HHC:34716
22.
There is no other corroboration to the informant's testimony. Even the matter was reported to the police on 13.05.2006 by means of a written application. Thus, the FIR was also not lodged promptly. 23. Therefore, the informant's testimony was not corroborated by any evidence. Rather, the informant is shown to be an unreliable witness who is prone to exaggeration and who was arrayed as an accused before the Court at the instance of the complaint made by the accused. Thus, she has an interest in saving herself by shifting the blame to the accused. Learned Courts below held that the informant's testimony was corroborated by the medical evidence, which is not correct as noticed above and by the testimony of her husband, which is inadmissible as noticed above. Therefore, learned Courts below erred in seeking corroboration from the inadmissible evidence, which vitiated their judgments. Hence, the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. 24. In view of the above, the revision filed by the accused is allowed, and the judgment of conviction dated 31.05.2007 and
order of sentence dated 01.06.2007 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jubbal, District Shimla, H.P. as affirmed by
16 2026:HHC:34716 the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Shimla, H.P., Camp at Rohru vide judgment dated 09.01.2015 are ordered to be set aside, and the petitioner/accused is acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 354, and 506 of the IPC. The fine, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner after the expiry of the period of limitation, in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 25. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judg- ment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 27. A perusal of the record shows that learned Additional Sessions-II, Shimla camp at Rohru had passed an order on 12.12.2014 noticing that alterations were made in the informant’s statement, after issuing an unattested copy by one Lalit Chauhan. A
17 2026:HHC:34716 request was made to the disciplinary authority to hold an inquiry into the matter. This Court sought clarification from the learned District and Sessions Judge, Shimla regarding the result of the enquiry so conducted. However, the learned District and Sessions Judge sent a letter on 29.05.2026 stating that no record of reference regarding tampering in the informant’s statement in the aforesaid case was found/available in the office and no enquiry was conducted against any of the officials qua tampering of the record in the aforementioned matter. This reflects a sorry state of affairs because an order was passed by the competent court of law to take action regarding the tampering in the judicial record, which is a very serious matter. However, no action was taken by the disciplinary authority.
Therefore, a copy of the order passed by learned Additional Session-II, Shimla, camp at Rohru on 12.12.2014, be forwarded to learned District and Sessions Judge, Shimla, (disciplinary authority) to take action as per the law. The result of the action so taken by the disciplinary authority will be communicated to this Court within six months, and the matter will be listed only for this purpose after six months. 28. The present revision stands disposed of and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 18 2026:HHC:34716
29. The record of the learned Courts below be returned. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th August, 2026 (Nikita)