1 2026:CGHC:22457 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Reserved for orders on : 25.04.2026 Order passed on : 13.05.2026 MCRC No. 2321 of 2026 1 - Anwar Dhebar S/o Lt. Haji Zikar Dhebar Aged About 52 Years R/o Dhebar House, Pension Bada Raipur, (Cg) (Currently Under Judicial Custody At Central Jail, Raipur (Cg) ... Applicant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Investigating Officer, Economic Offence Wing/ Anti-Corruption Bureau Chhattisgarh, Head Quarter At Telibandha, In Front Of Jai Jawan Petrol Pump, Raipur, Chhattisgarh 492001 ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title is taken from Case Information System) For Applicant : Mr. Mayank Jain, Mr. Harshwardhan Parganiha and Ms. Manubha Shankar, Advocates For State : Mr. Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 (Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge) C.A.V. Order 1. The applicant has preferred the present first application for grant of bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, consequent upon his arrest in connection with Crime No. 44 of 2024 dated 05.10.2024, registered by the Economic Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau, Chhattisgarh, for offences punishable under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7(b) and 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. At the time of institution of the present application, the charge-sheet had not been filed; however, during the pendency of these proceedings, a charge-sheet came to be submitted on 29.06.2024 before the competent Court. Upon such filing, additional offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, have also been incorporated. The applicant was taken into custody on 23.02.2026. 2. The present application emanates from and assails the order passed by the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Raipur, whereby the prayer of the applicant seeking regular bail has been declined. Case of Prosecution : 3 3. The prosecution case, as it unfolds from the material collected during investigation, is rooted in allegations of a well-organized and systematic corruption racket operating within the functioning of the Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation Limited (CSMCL), wherein the present applicant is alleged to have played a central and influential role. It is the prosecution’s specific case that the applicant, by virtue of his political stature and influence, exercised undue control over the administrative and financial processes of CSMCL and misused such influence to orchestrate the clearance of bills of certain manpower supply agencies in exchange for illegal gratification. 4. According to the prosecution, the modus operandi of the alleged conspiracy involved the imposition of a fixed percentage of commission on the bills submitted by manpower agencies engaged with CSMCL. It is alleged that the applicant, acting in concert with co-accused persons, particularly Naveen Pratap Singh Tomar, who was functioning as Deputy General Manager and in-charge Managing Director of CSMCL, ensured that no bills were cleared unless the concerned agencies paid the demanded commission. The prosecution asserts that Siddharth Singhania and Naveen Pratap Singh Tomar acted as key intermediaries in this arrangement, facilitating the collection, consolidation, and subsequent transfer of illegal proceeds to the applicant. The entire process is alleged to have been carried out in a clandestine yet structured manner, thereby constituting a criminal conspiracy. 4 5. It is further alleged that the applicant not only received such commission amounts but also actively influenced the escalation of the rate of commission beyond what was previously prevalent. The prosecution contends that, apart from the standard commission allegedly being extracted, an additional portion of the service charges payable to the manpower agencies was also siphoned off under the guise of commission at the behest of the applicant. This, according to the prosecution, demonstrates a deliberate and calculated abuse of power aimed at deriving pecuniary advantage through illegal means. 6. A significant development in the prosecution case arises from the intervention of the Enforcement Directorate (ED), which, during the course of its investigation under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, unearthed substantial evidence pointing towards corrupt practices within CSMCL. A formal communication dated 05.12.2023 (F. No. ECIR/RPZO/05/2023/678) was addressed by the Deputy Director of the Enforcement Directorate, Raipur, to the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh, under Section 66(2) of the PMLA, sharing details of predicate offences disclosed during the money laundering investigation and requesting registration of an FIR and initiation of action by the Anti-Corruption Bureau. 7. The prosecution heavily relies upon the events dated 29.11.2023, when a search operation conducted by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 17 of the PMLA led to the interception 5 of a cash transaction amounting to Rs. 28.80 lakhs near the office premises of CSMCL. It is alleged that two individuals, namely Abhishek Kumar Singh and Tejram Nirmalkar, employees of M/s Eagle Hunter Solutions Limited, a manpower supplying agency, were apprehended while attempting to hand over the said cash to Devansh Devangan and Jitendra Kumar Nirmalkar. A detailed panchnama was drawn at the spot, and the cash along with mobile phones was seized. 8. During interrogation, the said individuals purportedly disclosed that the amount constituted illegal gratification demanded for facilitating the clearance of pending bills of their company. It was revealed that Abhishek Kumar Singh had been instructed by a senior employee, Neeraj Kumar, to deliver the cash to representatives of Naveen Pratap Singh Tomar. Further statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA indicated that the bribe receivers were acting under the directions of one Lokeshwar Prasad Sinha, proprietor of M/s Fortune Buildcon, who in turn had been instructed by Tomar to arrange for the collection of cash. 9. The prosecution case further elaborates that M/s Eagle Hunter Solutions Limited had submitted bills amounting to approximately Rs. 3.43 crores to CSMCL, and in order to secure clearance of the same, they were compelled to pay a bribe calculated at approximately 8% of the bill value, i.e., Rs. 29.40 lakhs. It is alleged that this demand was accompanied by explicit threats that 6 the bills would not be processed unless the payment was made. In furtherance of this demand, the amount was withdrawn from the company’s bank account on 29.11.2023, out of which Rs. 60,000 was retained by the operations manager and the remaining Rs. 28.80 lakhs was handed over for delivery to the designated recipients. 10. The prosecution also places reliance on electronic evidence in the form of call detail records, chat transcripts, and other digital communications retrieved from the seized mobile devices, which allegedly corroborate the existence of a coordinated network engaged in the collection and distribution of illegal gratification. Statements of various witnesses and accused persons, recorded in the presence of independent witnesses, are stated to further substantiate the allegations of extortion and abuse of official position. On the basis of the material collected by the Enforcement Directorate, it is the prosecution’s case that Naveen Pratap Singh Tomar, being a public servant, abused his official position to obtain undue pecuniary advantage, thereby attracting provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The ED also indicated the possible involvement of higher-level functionaries within CSMCL, suggesting that the corruption was not isolated but systemic in nature. Consequently, acting upon the information shared by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 66(2) of the PMLA, the State Economic Offences Investigation Bureau/Anti- Corruption Bureau, Raipur, initiated further investigation into the 7 predicate offences. The present applicant is alleged to be a principal beneficiary and key conspirator in the said illegal scheme, having received or being intended to receive the illicit proceeds generated through coercive extraction of commission from manpower contractors. 11. In sum, the prosecution seeks to establish that the applicant, in active connivance with co-accused public servants and private intermediaries, engineered a corrupt mechanism whereby official processes were subverted for personal gain, thereby causing not only financial loss to the State exchequer but also undermining the integrity of public administration. Submission of Learned Counsel for the applicant : 12. Learned counsel for the Applicant, assailing the legality of the prosecution and the continued incarceration of the Applicant, has advanced elaborate and multifaceted submissions. It is contended that the very institution of the present FIR (commonly referred to as the “Manpower FIR”) constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law. It is submitted that the allegations, transactions, and factual substratum forming the basis of the present FIR are substantially identical to those already investigated in FIR No. 04 of 2024 (the “Liquor FIR”), wherein multiple charge-sheets have been filed. The initiation of a second FIR on the same set of facts is argued to be impermissible in law and violative of the 8 constitutional protection against double jeopardy enshrined under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed upon authoritative pronouncements including T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 and Amitbhai Shah v. CBI, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 348, wherein it has been unequivocally held that a second FIR on the same cause of action is unsustainable. 13. Developing the said submission further, learned counsel argues that the present FIR is not only based on the same material, accused persons, and transactions, but is in fact a mere offshoot or consequence of the earlier Liquor FIR. The alleged commission from manpower agencies is intrinsically linked to, and arises out of, the broader allegations of illegal financial operations within the Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation Limited (CSMCL), which are already under investigation in the Liquor FIR. The doctrine of sameness of transaction, as elucidated in C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 567, is invoked to contend that no separate investigation or prosecution can be sustained where the offences arise out of the same transaction. 14. It is next contended that the arrest of the Applicant, effected after an inordinate delay of more than one year and four months from the registration of the FIR, is manifestly mala fide and actuated by extraneous considerations. The timing of the arrest is particularly assailed, inasmuch as the Applicant was taken into custody at a 9 juncture when he had already been granted bail in another case and was on the verge of securing relief in the pending proceedings relating to the Liquor FIR. It is submitted that such conduct on the part of the investigating agency demonstrates a deliberate design to prolong the Applicant’s incarceration. In this regard, learned counsel has vehemently argued that the present case exemplifies a classic instance of “evergreening of custody,” whereby successive arrests are orchestrated in different cases to ensure that the Applicant remains continuously incarcerated, notwithstanding the grant of bail in individual matters. 15. A detailed chronology of events has been placed on record to demonstrate that each time the Applicant approached the threshold of release, a fresh arrest was effected by another agency or in another case. Such a practice, it is urged, has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arvind Kejriwal v. CBI, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2550 and more recently in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, passed in Crl. App. 815/2026 vide order dated 10.02.2026 wherein the Apex Court cautioned against the misuse of arrest powers to defeat the grant of bail. Challenging the legality of the arrest, it is further submitted that the grounds of arrest are wholly mechanical, vague, and devoid of any substantive justification. No search has been conducted at the premises of the Applicant, nor has any incriminating material been recovered from him. It is argued that the statutory requirements under Section 35(b) of the 10 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which mandate the existence of necessity for arrest, such as preventing further offences, ensuring proper investigation, or preventing tampering with evidence, are conspicuously absent in the present case. Reliance is placed upon the celebrated judgment in the matter of Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., reported in (1994) 4 SCC 260 as well as Mohd. Zubair v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2023) 16 SCC 764 and Siddharth v. State of U.P., reported in (2022) 1 SCC 676, to contend that arrest cannot be made in a routine or mechanical manner. 16. On merits, it is submitted that no prima facie case is made out against the Applicant. The Applicant is neither named in the FIR nor in the ECIR registered by the Enforcement Directorate. There is no evidence of any money trail linking the Applicant to the alleged proceeds of crime. Furthermore, the Applicant is not a public servant, and therefore, the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 7 and 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act are not satisfied. Similarly, the offences relating to forgery under Sections 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC are argued to be wholly inapplicable in the absence of any specific allegations or material. With regard to the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC, it is submitted that there is a complete absence of any cogent material demonstrating a meeting of minds or prior agreement between the Applicant and the co-accused. Reliance is placed upon Ram Sharan Chaturvedi v. State of M.P., reported in (2022) 16 SCC 11 166 to emphasize that mere suspicion or association cannot substitute the legal requirement of proof of conspiracy. 17. The prosecution case, it is further argued, rests primarily on the statements of co-accused persons, which, in law, do not constitute substantive evidence. In the absence of independent corroboration, such statements cannot form the basis of continued incarceration, as held in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 28 and Prem Prakash v. ED., reported in (2024) 9 SCC 787. Learned counsel has also drawn attention to the contemporaneous official records, which reveal that the bills of the concerned manpower agencies had already been sanctioned prior to the date of the alleged recovery of cash on 29.11.2023. This factual aspect, it is submitted, fundamentally undermines the prosecution’s theory that illegal gratification was demanded or paid for the clearance of such bills. It is further submitted that even the role attributed to co-accused Naveen Pratap Singh Tomar is misconceived, inasmuch as official records demonstrate that he held no independent decision-making authority and his functions were purely ministerial in nature. Moreover, during confrontation, both the Applicant and the said co-accused have categorically denied any acquaintance with each other. 18. On the aspect of bail, learned counsel submits that the Applicant satisfies the well-established “triple test,” namely: (i) absence of flight risk, (ii) no likelihood of tampering with evidence, and (iii) no 12 possibility of influencing witnesses. The Applicant is a permanent resident with deep roots in society, has cooperated with the investigation throughout, and has not misused the liberty granted to him during previous paroles. It is emphasized that the entire evidence in the case is documentary in nature and already in the custody of the investigating agency, thereby obviating any requirement for further custodial interrogation. The denial of bail, in such circumstances, would amount to punitive detention, contrary to the settled principle that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception,” as reiterated in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 40 and Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, reported in (1980) 2 SCC 565. 19. In conclusion, it is submitted that the continued incarceration of the Applicant is wholly unjustified, disproportionate, and violative of his fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Applicant undertakes to abide by any conditions that may be imposed by this Court and to cooperate fully with the investigation and trial. n light of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to enlarge the Applicant on regular bail in connection with FIR No. 44 of 2024. Submissions of Learned State Counsel : 20. Learned State counsel, vehemently opposing the prayer for grant of bail, submits that the present application is wholly 13 misconceived, devoid of merits and deserves to be rejected outright, having regard to the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the applicant and the stage of investigation. At the outset, it is submitted that the present bail application has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking grant of bail in connection with Crime No. 44/2024 registered by the EOW/ACB, Chhattisgarh, for serious offences punishable under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 7(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and subsequently, upon filing of charge-sheet, additional offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and Section 12 of the PC Act have also been incorporated. 21. It is contended that the nature of accusations, the magnitude of the scam and the manner in which the offence has been committed clearly disentitle the applicant from seeking the discretionary relief of bail. Learned State counsel submits that the present case pertains to a large-scale, well-organized and deeply entrenched corruption racket involving illegal extraction of huge amounts of money from manpower supply agencies engaged with the Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation Limited (CSMCL). It is submitted that the applicant is not a peripheral or incidental accused, but rather a key conspirator and principal beneficiary of the entire illegal scheme. The investigation has revealed that the applicant, in active connivance with co-accused persons including senior officers of CSMCL and private intermediaries, orchestrated 14 a systematic mechanism of extortion whereby manpower agencies were compelled to pay hefty commissions for clearance of their legitimate dues. 22. It is further submitted that the modus operandi adopted by the accused persons was structured, continuous and operated at a large scale. Initially, a fixed percentage of commission was levied on bills submitted by manpower agencies, which was subsequently increased substantially, even up to one-third or more of the bill amount, under the directions of the present applicant. The investigation has also revealed that the applicant had instructed further enhancement of such illegal recoveries in view of impending elections, thereby clearly demonstrating his controlling influence and dominant role in the conspiracy. Learned State counsel places strong reliance on the material collected during investigation, including statements of various witnesses, co-accused persons and independent officers, which unequivocally establish that the illegal collection of commission was being carried out under the direct supervision and instructions of the present applicant. Statements of key witnesses such as officials of manpower agencies and employees of CSMCL clearly indicate that the illegal gratification was collected at the behest of the applicant and ultimately routed to him through a chain of intermediaries. 23. It is further submitted that the trap proceedings conducted on 29.11.2023, wherein an amount of Rs. 28.80 lakhs was seized 15 while being exchanged between co-accused persons, is a crucial incriminating circumstance which corroborates the existence of the illegal network. The apprehension of multiple accused persons at the spot, coupled with recovery of cash and electronic evidence, clearly establishes that the offence is not based on conjectures, but is supported by concrete material. Subsequent arrests of co-accused persons, including those directly involved in the handling and transfer of tainted money, further strengthen the prosecution case and establish the operational chain of the conspiracy. 24. Learned State counsel further submits that the statements recorded during investigation, including those of co-accused and independent witnesses, when read in conjunction with documentary and electronic evidence, clearly demonstrate that the applicant was not merely a passive beneficiary but an active architect of the entire scheme. The contention of the applicant that there is no material against him is therefore wholly misconceived and contrary to the record. Refuting the argument of the applicant regarding alleged duplication of FIRs, it is submitted that the present case is based on a distinct cause of action, involving separate transactions, different sets of evidence and independent acts of corruption relating specifically to manpower agencies. It is contended that merely because certain broader allegations may overlap with another case does not render the present FIR illegal, 16 particularly when the investigation has revealed independent instances of criminal conduct constituting separate offences. 25. Learned State counsel also strongly opposes the contention regarding delay in arrest, submitting that the arrest of the applicant was effected only after collection of substantial incriminating material and upon emergence of his active role in the conspiracy. It is contended that in complex economic offences involving multiple layers of transactions and actors, investigation necessarily requires time to unravel the financial trail and identify the actual beneficiaries. Therefore, the timing of the arrest cannot be termed as mala fide or arbitrary. It is further submitted that the present case involves serious economic offences affecting public exchequer and governance. The illegal extraction and siphoning of funds, which were ultimately derived from public resources, amounts to a grave economic offence having far-reaching consequences on the financial health of the State. It is well settled that economic offences constitute a class apart and are required to be viewed with greater seriousness in matters of bail, as they involve deep-rooted conspiracies and systemic corruption. 26. Learned State counsel submits that the applicant is a highly influential person with deep-rooted connections, substantial financial resources and a wide network of associates. In such circumstances, there exists a strong and reasonable apprehension that, if released on bail, he may influence or intimidate witnesses, tamper with evidence, obstruct further 17 investigation and interfere with the process of law. It is further submitted that investigation in respect of tracing proceeds of crime, identification of benami assets and involvement of other persons is still ongoing, and any premature release of the applicant would seriously prejudice such investigation. 27. It is also contended that the applicant has criminal antecedents and is involved in other serious cases of similar nature, which clearly indicates his propensity to engage in such offences. The magnitude of the scam, the amount involved and the organized manner in which the offence has been committed clearly demonstrate that the applicant does not deserve any leniency from this Court. Learned State counsel further submits that the argument of the applicant regarding absence of direct recovery or documentary evidence is misplaced, as in cases of conspiracy and economic offences, the chain of circumstantial evidence, statements of witnesses and financial trail are sufficient to establish prima facie involvement. At the stage of bail, a detailed appreciation of evidence is neither warranted nor permissible. 28. It is lastly submitted that the principles governing grant of bail in serious economic offences clearly militate against the release of the applicant. The gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the applicant, the stage of investigation, the likelihood of interference with evidence and the larger public interest are all factors which weigh heavily against grant of bail. In view of the aforesaid 18 submissions, learned State counsel prays that the present bail application be rejected. 29. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the case diary, charge-sheet material and the documents placed on record. 30. The present application has been preferred under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking regular bail in connection with Crime No. 44/2024 registered by the Economic Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau, Chhattisgarh, for offences punishable under Section 120-B IPC and Sections 7(b) and 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, wherein subsequently, after filing of charge-sheet, offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act have also been incorporated. 31. At the outset, this Court is conscious of the settled principles governing consideration of bail under Section 483 BNSS. While adjudicating a prayer for bail, the Court is not expected to undertake a meticulous examination of evidence as would be done during trial; nevertheless, the Court is required to assess whether a prima facie case exists, the nature and gravity of accusation, the role attributed to the accused, the possibility of tampering with evidence, likelihood of influencing witnesses and the larger societal impact of the alleged offence. 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 528 has 19 authoritatively held that while considering bail, the Court must take into account the nature of accusation, severity of punishment, character of evidence, possibility of securing presence of the accused and reasonable apprehension of witnesses being influenced. The Apex Court observed that grant of bail is a matter involving judicial discretion to be exercised cautiously and not mechanically. It was held thus : “11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are: 20 (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.” 33. The allegations in the present case disclose a deep-rooted and systematic corruption network allegedly operating within the functioning of the Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation Limited (CSMCL). The material collected during investigation, prima facie, indicates that manpower supply agencies were allegedly compelled to pay illegal commission for clearance of their legitimate dues and bills. 34. The prosecution case further reveals that the present applicant was not a peripheral participant but is alleged to be one of the principal beneficiaries and controlling figures in the entire conspiracy. Statements recorded during investigation, electronic communications, seizure proceedings and financial linkages are stated to indicate that the illegal collections were being made in a structured and organized manner through intermediaries and co- accused persons. 21 35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that economic offences stand on a different footing and are required to be viewed with greater seriousness. In Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 439, the Apex Court in paragraphs 34 and 35 observed that economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in matters of bail, having regard to their serious impact on the economy and public confidence in governance. The Court held that economic offences involving deep-rooted conspiracies and huge loss of public funds are grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole. Relevant paragraphs are quoted below for ready reference : “34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country. 35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment 22 which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.” 36. Similarly, in Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 466, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that economic offences involving public money require a strict approach and grant of bail in such matters cannot be treated as a matter of routine. paragraphs 23 to 25 are quoted hereunder : “23. Unfortunately, in the last few years, the country has been seeing an alarming rise in white-collar crimes, which has affected the fibre of the country's economic structure. Incontrovertibly, economic offences have serious repercussions on the development of the country as a whole. In State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal [(1987) 2 SCC 364 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 364] this Court, while considering a request of the prosecution for adducing additional evidence, inter alia, observed as under: (SCC p. 371, para 5) 23 “5. … The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white-collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest.” 24. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of 24 securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 25. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously and considered as a grave offence affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.” 37. In the present case, the allegations pertain not merely to an isolated act of bribery but to an organized mechanism of 25 extraction of illegal gratification from manpower agencies dealing with a State Corporation. Prima facie, the material collected during investigation suggests systemic abuse of official machinery for pecuniary gain. Such allegations, if ultimately established, strike at the very foundation of public administration and institutional integrity. 38. The contention of learned counsel for the applicant that the present FIR is hit by the principle against multiple FIRs and constitutes a second FIR on the same cause of action does not persuade this Court at this stage. The prosecution has specifically contended that the present case concerns distinct transactions relating to manpower agencies, separate acts of illegal gratification and independent evidence emerging during investigation. Whether the present FIR is ultimately sustainable in law or whether it is hit by the doctrine of sameness is a matter requiring detailed examination during appropriate proceedings and cannot be conclusively adjudicated in a bail application. At the present stage, this Court is only required to examine whether the material collected during investigation discloses prima facie involvement of the applicant. Even otherwise, the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant in T.T. Antony (Supra) and Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (Supra) do not advance the case of the applicant in the peculiar facts of the present matter. 26 39. Prima facie, the present case appears to involve a separate chain of transactions relating specifically to manpower agencies and illegal commission extraction therefrom. So far as the argument regarding delayed arrest and alleged “evergreening of custody” is concerned, the same also does not merit acceptance at this stage. The investigation in the present case pertains to complex economic offences involving multiple accused persons, financial transactions, digital evidence and alleged proceeds of crime. In such matters, the investigating agency is required to collect documentary and electronic evidence before effecting arrest. Merely because arrest has been effected after collection of substantial material cannot ipso facto render the arrest mala fide. 40. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant in Joginder Kumar (Supra), Siddharth (Supra) and Mohd. Zubair (Supra) arose in entirely different factual backgrounds and cannot be applied mechanically to the present case involving allegations of large-scale corruption and economic offences. 41. This Court also finds that the prosecution has placed reliance not merely upon statements of co-accused persons but also on seizure proceedings, electronic communications, call detail records, statements of manpower agency officials, recovery of substantial cash amount and the chain of circumstances emerging from the investigation. At this stage, the Court is not expected to meticulously examine the evidentiary admissibility or probative value of each piece of material. 27 42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State represented by CBI v. Anil Sharma held in paragraph 6 that in matters involving corruption and conspiracy, custodial and investigative requirements stand on a different footing and the Court should not lightly interfere where serious allegations supported by material exist. “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible police officers would conduct themselves in a 28 responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offenders.” 43. The argument that the applicant is not a public servant and therefore offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act are not attracted is also not sufficient to persuade this Court for grant of bail. The charge-sheet reflects incorporation of Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which pertains to abetment of offences under the Act. Prima facie allegations suggest active participation and facilitation of illegal gratification through a chain of intermediaries. 44. At this stage, it cannot be said that no offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act is made out against the applicant. The contention regarding absence of direct recovery from the applicant also cannot be treated as determinative in cases involving criminal conspiracy and economic offences. The law relating to conspiracy is well settled that direct evidence of agreement is seldom available and conspiracy is generally established through surrounding circumstances and conduct of parties. 45. Prima facie, the prosecution material indicates that the applicant allegedly exercised considerable influence over the functioning of CSMCL and the illegal collections were being routed through intermediaries acting at his behest. Statements recorded during 29 investigation, coupled with electronic material and recovery proceedings, at this stage, cannot be brushed aside as wholly unreliable. Whether such material ultimately results in conviction is a matter for trial. However, at the stage of bail, existence of a strong prima facie case is sufficient to decline discretionary relief. 46. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 118, particularly paragraphs 12 to 16, held that while considering bail, the Court must record a prima facie satisfaction regarding involvement of the accused and must also consider the seriousness of allegations and impact on society. The Court further held that where relevant considerations indicate possibility of interference with investigation or administration of justice, grant of bail would be improper. “12. The determination of whether a case is fit for the grant of bail involves the balancing of numerous factors, among which the nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment and a prima facie view of the involvement of the accused are important. No straitjacket formula exists for courts to assess an application for the grant or rejection of bail. At the stage of assessing whether a case is fit for the grant of bail, the court is not required to enter into a detailed analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond 30 reasonable doubt the commission of the crime by the accused. That is a matter for trial. However, the Court is required to examine whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence and on a balance of the considerations involved, the continued custody of the accused subserves the purpose of the criminal justice system. Where bail has been granted by a lower court, an appellate court must be slow to interfere and ought to be guided by the principles set out for the exercise of the power to set aside bail. 13. The principles that guide this Court in assessing the correctness of an order [Ashish Chatterjee v. State of W.B., CRM No. 272 of 2010, order dated 11-1-2010 (Cal)] passed by the High Court granting bail were succinctly laid down by this Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]. In that case, the accused was facing trial for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code. Several bail applications filed by the accused were dismissed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. The High Court in turn allowed the bail 31 application filed by the accused. Setting aside the order [Ashish Chatterjee v. State of W.B., CRM No. 272 of 2010, order dated 11-1-2010 (Cal)] of the High Court, D.K. Jain, J., speaking for a two-Judge Bench of this Court, held : (SCC pp. 499-500, paras 9-10) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order [Ashish Chatterjee v. State of W.B., CRM No. 272 of 2010, order dated 11-1-2010 (Cal)] passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; 32 (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. * * * 10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to these relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it to be illegal.” 14. The provision for an accused to be released on bail touches upon the liberty of an individual. It is for this reason that this Court does not ordinarily interfere with an order of the 33 High Court granting bail. However, where the discretion of the High Court to grant bail has been exercised without the due application of mind or in contravention of the directions of this Court, such an order granting bail is liable to be set aside. The Court is required to factor, amongst other things, a prima facie view that the accused had committed the offence, the nature and gravity of the offence and the likelihood of the accused obstructing the proceedings of the trial in any manner or evading the course of justice. The provision for being released on bail draws an appropriate balance between public interest in the administration of justice and the protection of individual liberty pending adjudication of the case. However, the grant of bail is to be secured within the bounds of the law and in compliance with the conditions laid down by this Court. It is for this reason that a court must balance numerous factors that guide the exercise of the discretionary power to grant bail on a case-by-case basis. Inherent in this determination is whether, on an analysis of the record, it appears that there is a prima facie or reasonable cause to believe that the accused had committed the crime. It is not relevant at this stage for the court to 34 examine in detail the evidence on record to come to a conclusive finding. 15. The decision of this Court in Prasanta [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496] has been consistently followed by this Court in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh [Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446] , Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P. [Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P., (2013) 16 SCC 797] , Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508] , Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka [Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406] and State of Orissa v. Mahimananda Mishra [State of Orissa v. Mahimananda Mishra, (2018) 10 SCC 516] . 16. 16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is 35 perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. In Neeru Yadav v. State ofU.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , the accused was granted bail by the High Court [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] . In an appeal against the order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] of the High Court, a two-Judge Bench of this Court surveyed the precedent on the principles that guide the grant of bail. Dipak Misra, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) held : (Neeru Yadav case [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , SCC p. 513, para 12) “12. … It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an 36 order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration while dealing with the application for bail have not been taken note of, or bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the Court does not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It, on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the Court.” 47. This Court also cannot ignore the apprehension expressed by the prosecution that the applicant is an influential person possessing substantial political and financial clout. The investigation is stated to be continuing with regard to tracing proceeds of crime, identification of benami assets and involvement of other persons. In such circumstances, the possibility of influencing witnesses or obstructing further investigation cannot be ruled out. The submission of learned counsel for the applicant that the entire 37 evidence is documentary in nature and therefore there exists no possibility of tampering also does not inspire confidence. 48. Economic offences involving conspiracy frequently depend upon witness testimonies, electronic records, financial transactions and interconnected circumstances. Investigation regarding money trail and identification of beneficiaries is still stated to be underway. Premature release of an accused alleged to be a central conspirator may adversely affect the course of investigation. 49. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the applicant upon Sanjay Chandra v. CBI and Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab is distinguishable in the facts of the present case. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception”; however, the said principle is not absolute and is subject to the facts and gravity of each case. 50. The cumulative effect of the material collected during investigation, the nature and gravity of allegations, the prima facie role attributed to the applicant, the magnitude of the alleged corruption network, the continuing nature of investigation, the evidence collected so far, the day-to-day unfolding of the involvement of other accused persons in the case, the criminal antecedents of the applicant and the possibility of influencing witnesses or obstructing the investigative process persuade this Court to hold that no case for grant of bail is made out at this stage. 38 51. It is clarified however that the observations made hereinabove are purely prima facie in nature and confined only to adjudication of the present bail application. The trial Court shall proceed independently and uninfluenced by any observations contained in this order. 52. Accordingly, the bail application is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Shayna JUDGE