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2026:CGHC:22432 The date when the
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AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 832 of 2008 Manoj Kumar Rajwade, S/o Shri Harvansh Rajwade, aged about 26 years, Occupation – Agriculture, R/o Village – Turna, P.S.- Darima, District Sarguja (CG)
... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh through S.H.O., P.S. Darima, District Sarguja (CG)
... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Rishikant Mahobia, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Kanhaiya Ram Yadav, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey CAV Judgment The appellant in this appeal calls in question the legality and validity of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
2 4.9.2008 passed by Special Judge under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Surguja at Ambikapur in Special ST No.129/2006 whereby the appellant stands convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 376(1) of Indian Penal Code. RI for seven years, pay a fine of Rs.200/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for one month. Under Section 366 of Indian Penal Code. RI for five years, pay a fine of Rs.200/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for one month. Under Section 365 of Indian Penal Code. RI for two years, pay a fine of Rs.200/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for one month. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 25.4.2006 the accused/appellant through other co-accused called the prosecutrix, a member of scheduled caste community, to the house of Jaimati where the appellant allured her of getting a job and then took her to the residence of an MLA at Ambikapur where the appellant committed rape upon her and confined her there. The appellant got her signature on some documents there and later he said that these documents are regarding their court marriage. After receiving information about the prosecutrix being confined in the house of MLA, her family members
3 reached there and brought her back. On 6.6.2006 the prosecutrix went to the house of her sister and on 9.6.2006 the accused/appellant along with 4-5 persons in a jeep reached the house of her sister and started dragging her by hand.
On report being lodged to the above effect, offence under Sections 365, 342, 120B, 366, 465, 352, 506B of IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (in short “the SC/ST Act”) was registered against the accused persons. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons u/s 365, 342, 120B, 366, 465, 452, 506, 376 of IPC and 3(1)(xii) of the SC/ST Act. 03. Learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act, 366, 376(1), 120B, 365 & 465 of IPC against the accused/appellant whereas co-accused Lalit Kumar and Ku. Jaimati were charged under Sections 366 & 120B of IPC and co-accused Alam Das was charged under Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act and Sections 366 & 120B of IPC. They abjured the charges and prayed for trial. 04. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution examined 11 witnesses in all. Statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 05. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court
4 while acquitting the co-accused persons of all the charges, convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as mentioned above. Hence this appeal. 06.
Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. From the statement of the prosecutrix it is clear that she went with the appellant of her own free will and after the incident, she did not inform anybody about the act of the appellant. There are material omission and contradiction in her statement which is suggestive of false implication of the appellant. Looking to her overall conduct, her statement and the letters written to the appellant, she seems to be a consenting party. He would submit that as per evidence of PW-4, PW-5, PW-6, PW-7 and PW-8 it is seen that the appellant performed court marriage with the prosecutrix. He further submitted that the learned trial Court failed to consider the evidence of MP Gupta, ASI (PW-11) who wrote the FIR (Ex.P/1) and recorded statement u/s 161 of CrPC of the prosecutrix. This witness categorically stated that the prosecutrix did not state about rape either in the FIR or in her police statement. The medical evidence also does not support the prosecution case. As per statement of PW-2 Dr. Lata Goyal, the prosecutrix was habitual to intercourse and no sign of recent intercourse was found on her body. Thus, in view of the above, it is crystal clear that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against
5 the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore, the impugned
judgment in respect of the appellant is liable to be set aside. Reliance is placed on the judgment dated 4.12.2023 of this Court in CRA No.798/2023 in the matter of Yaqub Khan Vs. State of CG; judgment dated 22.7.2024 in CRA No.595/2024 in the case of Thanda Ram Sidar Vs. State of CG and the judgment dated 14.1.2026 in CRA No.1540/2016 in the case of Rakesh Khunte Vs. State of CG and other connected appeal. 07. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposing the contention of the appellant would submit that in view of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant by the impugned judgment which calls for no interference by this Court. The present appeal being without any substance is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 08. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 09. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that the learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act, 366, 376(1), 120B, 365 & 465 of IPC against the accused/appellant whereas co-accused Lalit Kumar and Ku. Jaimati were charged under Sections 366 & 120B of IPC and co-accused Alam Das was charged under Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act and Sections 366 & 120B of IPC. After
6 appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, learned trial Court while acquitting the co-accused of all the charges and the accused/appellant of the charges under SC/ST Act and Sections 120B & 465 of IPC, convicted and sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment. 10. As per prosecution case, the prosecutrix was aged about 18 years at the time of incident. The prosecutrix (PW-1) states that on the date of incident i.e. 25.4.2006 the accused/appellant took her to the house of MLA on the pretext of getting her job and there he committed rape upon her. Though next morning she tried to escape from there but the accused/appellant had locked her in a room. However, in the evening her sister and brother reached there and they took her out from the room. She narrated the whole incident to her sister. She states that on 27.4.2006 her maternal grand-father came to the residence of MLA and then she alongwith her maternal grand-father returned to her house at Turna.
On 4.6.2006 she went to the house of her brother-in-law (Jeeja) at Village-Amlidih where the accused/appellant came on 9.6.2006 and told her sister and brother-in- law that he has performed court marriage with the prosecutrix and so would take her back. 11. As per written complaint Ex.P/1, the prosecutrix alleged that the accused/appellant prepared forged documents but the learned trial Court acquitted him of the charge u/s 467 of IPC. 7
12. The prosecutrix admitted some suggestion of the defence that the accused/appellant is known to her since childhood as they are residents of the same village. She states that the love letters of Ex.D/1 to D/7 were written by her. She then volunteers that the accused/appellant got these letters written by her at the residence of MLA on 26.4.2006. She denies the suggestion that all these letters were written by her to the appellant on different dates. She states that this fact was disclosed to the police while giving statement Ex.D/8 and if the same is not recorded there, she cannot tell the reason. She admits that she voluntarily went with the appellant on his motorcycle to the residence of MLA. She states that on 27.4.2006 she returned to her house with her maternal grand-father from the house of MLA and thereafter did not go to police station to lodge report. She denies execution of an affidavit regarding marriage with the appellant. She admits that while going to Raipur and returning, she did not disclose to anyone that she is forcibly taken away by the appellant. She admits that her maternal grand-father was police inspector and has retired now. However, she denies the suggestion that on the influence of her maternal grand-father, the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case. She states that in her police statement Ex.D/8 she disclosed that the appellant committed rape on her 2-3 times and if the same is not recorded there, she cannot tell the reason. 13. PW-2 Dr.
Smt. Lata Goyal examined the prosecutrix on
28.7.2006. She did not notice any internal or external injury on the
8 body of the prosecutrix. In her opinion, the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse and no definite opinion regarding rape could be given. Her report is Ex.P/3. 14. It is clear from the written report Ex.P/1 and the FIR (Ex.P/12) that the incident took place on 25.4.2006, the written report was made on 19.6.2006 and FIR lodged on 27.7.2006 with explanation for delay as yksd yTtk ds Mj ls ,oa ifjokj dks tkudkjh ugha nsus ls. 15. PW-4 sister of the prosecutrix states that on 24.4.2006 Jaymati was at her house and Lalit Kumar (brother of Jaymati) came to take Jaymati back. While leaving, Jaymati told that she is also taking the prosecutrix to her house but she objected to it. However, Lalit and Jaymati insisted and assured that they would drop the prosecutrix at 5 o’clock. However, she was not brought back by 5 o’clock and next day at 3 o’clock she received a phone call that the prosecutrix is at the residence of MLA at Ambikapur. Thereafter she along with her brother went to the residence of MLA where the prosecutrix disclosed that the appellant bought her there on motorcycle on the pretext of getting her job and confined her in a room and also committed rape on her. In cross-examination she admits the suggestion that the appellant is well known to the prosecutrix. She admits that Jaymati did not take the prosecutrix with her forcibly but she went with Jaymati voluntarily and while leaving, the prosecutrix told that she would come back by 5 o’clock. In para 14 she states that she has no knowledge
9 about love affair between the appellant and the prosecutrix and also has no knowledge whether due to this relationship, the prosecutrix wrote several letters to the appellant.
She states that she has no knowledge whether the prosecutrix went with the appellant to Raipur and returned after two days. 16. Admittedly, it is not the case of the prosecution that at the time of incident the prosecutrix was minor. It is also an admitted position in this case that the incident allegedly took place on 25.4.2006 whereas the written report (Ex.P/1) was made on 19.6.2006 and the FIR (Ex.P/12) lodged on 27.7.2006 with explanation for delay as yksd yTtk ds Mj ls ,oa ifjokj dks tkudkjh ugha nsus ls. The prosecutrix also admitted writing love letters Ex.D/1 to D/7 to the appellant. However, she volunteered that the appellant forcibly got these letters written by her at the residence of MLA. It is also observed that there are many omission and contradictions in the statements of the prosecutrix recorded by the police and before the trial Court. She admitted that while staying in the house of MLA she did not disclose anyone about the act of the appellant and also while going to Raipur and returning she did not tell anyone that she is taken away by the appellant forcibly. 17. True it is that ordinarily the evidence of the prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if her evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. It is equally true
10 that while rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim, a false allegation of rape causes equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication.
Indisputably, in a case of sexual assault, the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter. 18. From close scrutiny of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, in particular of the prosecutrix coupled with her conduct during the alleged incident and subsequent thereto, this Court is of the opinion that prosecution has failed to prove the charges leveled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of the prosecutrix is not of a sterling quality which could make basis for conviction of the accused. Her evidence suffers from the vice of omission, contradiction and exaggeration. She appears to be a consenting party to the act of the appellant. Being so, learned trial Court was not justified in holding the appellant guilty of the offence under Sections 376(1), 366 and 365 of IPC and he deserves to be acquitted of these charges. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of learned trial Court holding the appellant guilty under Sections
11 376(1), 366 and 365 of IPC is hereby set aside and he is acquitted of these charges. 20. The appellant is reported to be on bail. However, keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of BNSS, 2023 he is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, he shall on receipt of notice thereon appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. A copy of this judgment be also forwarded to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and necessary action.
Sd/ (Rajani Dubey) Judge Khan MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Digitally signed by MOHD AKHTAR KHAN Date: 2026.05.13 15:47:28 +0530